THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014856
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975

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V,
The President's Daily Brief
July 23, 1975
5
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified on on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
July 23, 1975
-? Table of. Contents.
Egypt: President Sadat's speech yesterday had the
effect of keeping tensions high in the Middle
East
(Page I)
Turkey: Opposition criticism of the government's
decision to postpone action against the US
bases has been neither as severe nor as
sustained as feared. (Page 3)
Notes: Angola; Portugal; Italy; Canada-USSR
(Page 4 and 5)
At Annex a discussion of CSCE: A Balance Sheet
and Future. Impact.
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EGYPT
President Sadat maintained
the tens'bons surrounding Middle East nego-
tiations with his announcement last night
that he has not yet decided whether to
approve the extension of the UN forces'
mandate in the Sinai, which expires to-
morrow.
Sadat acknowledged that the Security Council's
appeal on Monday for a favorable Egyptian decision
indicates a concern about "the gravity of the Mid-
dle East situation," but he said that in making
its decision, Egypt will take into account the
council's responsibility not only for easing ten-
sions but also for "implementing" past resolutions
on Israeli withdrawal.
Sadat implied that Egypt still expects the UN
to adopt a resolution clarifying that the UN force
will not be used to perpetuate the status quo.
Foreign Minister Fahmi told Ambassador Eilts yes-
terday that Egypt still wants an "acceptable" res-
olution that states the urgency of movement toward
a settlement.
Egypt's ambassador to the UN told Ambassador
Moynihan yesterday that he expects Sadat to reply
to the Security Council's appeal sometime today.
If Sadat's response is positive, the Egyptian
diplomat says an extension resolution could be
hased on the most recent UN resolution providing
for UN forces in the Sinai, but it must also in-
clude a reference to the Security Council's ap-
peal, Egypt's response, and a paraphrase of the
Secretary General's recent report on the purposes
of the UN force. The US embassy in Cairo has in-
terpreted Sadat's failure to make a decision now
on the UN mandate as an indication that he is
leaving the door open for an extension.
(continued)
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Sadat did not mention the status of current
negotiations at any point in his two-hour speech.
The political congress he was addressing ends to-
morrow, and he may speak again at its closing
session.
The Israelis interpreted favorably Sadat's
avoidance of the subject of negotiations. Quoting
"senior observers" in Israel, Jerusalem's interna-
tional news service reported their initial impres-
sion that Sadat is still interested in negotia-
tions for an interim agreement and wants to keep
the UN forces in Sinai.
Israeli Defense Minister Peres told the Knes-
set yesterday that he was "taking seriously" the
movement of Jordanian troops from the Syrian border
to the Jordan River opposite Israeli forces.
while the Jordanian deployment
was "admittedly" of a "defensive nature," it could
quickly change into an offensive posture. Peres
did not suggest that Jordan had moved additional
forces toward the Israel front over the past few
days; rather he seemed to have had in mind move-
ments that occurred over a month ago.
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TURKEY
Opposition criticism of the Dem-
irel government's decision to postpone
action against the US bases has been
neither as severe nor as sustained as
the government had feared.
One leader of the opposition Republican People's
Party has told a US embassy official that the party
was exercising restraint because of the realization
that there is little sentiment in Turkey for loosen-
ing ties with the US. Our embassy believes that
Republican leaders do not want to open themselves
to the charge that they forced the government to
retaliate against US installations.
The Turkish government, despite this rather
mild reaction, probably still believes that domes-
tic political pressures require a new defense
cooperation agreement with the US. According to
the latest assessment from our embassy, the content
of the new agreement will depend on the outcome
of the Congressional debate on the arms embargo.
Our embassy in Ankara believes the Turks will prob-
ably announce some form of provisional status for
US installations as early as the end of this month,
pending renegotiation of the defense agreement.
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ANGOLA
NGO
Brazz
Kinshasa
Cabind
AIRE
Luluabourg
Luanda
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Malanje
Nova Redondo
Lobito
Benguel
N a
Li boa
havuma
-Cassin?a
k,.Ondangua
SOOTH-WEST AFRICA
(Intern tional Territory)
558238 7-75
MILES
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NOTES
An effort by troops of Angola's National Front
'to drive on Luanda has stalled near Caxito, 40 miles
northeast of the capital, an area dominated by the
rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
The Portuguese military in Luanda
protect it against an
offensive by the Front.
help defend the city for the Popular Movement if
the National Front marches on the city. Recent
substantial Soviet arms deliveries to the Popular
Movement and harsher press treatment of the rival
National Front indicate that Moscow is more firmly
casting its lot with the Movement.
Two Portuguese Socialist Party officials' re-
jection of a request that they join the cabinet ap-
parently reflects their party's continued commit-
ment to a joint strategy with Revolutionary Council
moderates of preventing Prime Minister Vasco Gon-
calves from forming a new government.
The two Socialist leaders
to accept cabinet posts
declined
The Prime Minister's
position was further eroded by the refusal of three
other non-communist members of the former cabinet
to take posts proffered by Goncalves, and by the
desertion of his key leftist economic advisers.
Anti-communist mobs, meanwhile, defied the Revolu-
tionary Council and continued to attack Communist
Party headquarters and officials in northern and
central Portugal.
(continued)
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Amintore Fanfani yesterday resigned as Leader
of Italy's Christian Democratic Party after losing
a vote of confidence at its national council meet-
ing.
? If he is replaced with another individual,
rather than the "collegial leadership" desired by
Prime Minister Moro, the new leader will almost
certainly be a moderate who has reached an agree-
ment with the party left. By ousting Fanfani, the
Christian Democrats have met one of the conditions
the Socialists have set for their joining a new
center-left coalition government. The Socialists
also want the Christian Democrats to shift their
policies to the left and begin formally to consult
the Communists on the content of the government's
program.
The two Soviet cosmonauts aboard Salyut-4 are
planning to leave their space station on Saturday
for the return trip to Earth after 63 days in space.
This mission sets a new Soviet record for
manned space flights, but it falls short of the
84-day record set by the crew of Skylab-4 in 1974.
Canada plans to close its ports on the east
coast to the Soviet fishing fleet after July 28,
according to the Canadian ambassador in Moscow.
The Canadians intend to take this step because
of "consistent and flagrant" violations of existing
fishing agreements and the failure of the Soviets
to respond to 15 official approaches made by Canada.
The Trudeau government has been under heavy pres-
sure from its fishing industry and political leaders
in the maritime provinces to halt overfishing by
foreign fishing fleets--especially Soviet and Japa-
nese--in Canada's North Atlantic waters. The So-
viets appear to be the principal violators.
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CSCE: A BALANCE SHEET AND FUTURE IMPACT
The summit of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe is
the culmination of negotiations that
were frustrating as well as educational
for all participants. For the Soviets
the route to the summit was longer and
bumpier than they anticipated. Never-
theless, they can, with some justifica-
tion, view the successful conclusion of
the conference as a triumph for their
diplomacy. Moscow will gain more credit
than anyone else for having persuaded
the heads of 35 states to come to Helsin-
ki in the name of European security.
For Brezhnev, in particular, it will be
a welcome accomplishment only six months
before the next, and probably his last,
party congress.
Soviet gains derive, in a sense,
from the process of CSCE rather than from
any specific wording of the document to
be signed. In return for Western endorse-
ment of the principle that post - World
War II borders are inviolable, the Warsaw
Pact states in principle accepted some
constraints on their future behavior.
The burden of implementing the agreements
covering expanded human contacts, increased
cooperation, and a reduction of politi-
cal and military tensions will fall pri-
marily on the communist states--but the
pertinent articles give them considerable
leeway on interpretation.
Constant exposure to the negotia-
ting tactics of the Soviets was a useful
reminder to the Europeans of the limits
of detente diplomacy. The maintenance
of solidarity throughout the negotiations
was a major Western achievement.
The Inviolable Borders Question
The reason for Moscow's 20-year quest for in-
violable frontiers in Eastern Europe rests in So-
viet insecurity--a concern greater than would seem
appropriate given the military balance in Europe,
but nonetheless real. If the Soviet achievements
at CSCE seem to be in the areas of atmosphere, psy-
chology, and perception, they are no less meaningful
to Moscow.
(continued)
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The Soviets made a number of concessions in
the wording of the CSCE agreement, but it may be
that none was as significant as the unwritten obli-
gation they assumed. The kinds of gains the Soviets
have made at CSCE are exploitable only if the atmos-
phere remains undisturbed in Europe and Soviet be-
havior remains within the limits of acceptability.
While no one would argue that CSCE will prevent the
Soviets from taking any action that they considered
vital to their interests, the CSCE atmosphere could
have an effect on how Moscow weighs the pros and
cons of any significant destabilizing action. There
will almost certainly be differences within the So-
viet leadership and between the USSR and the West
over what is permissible, and the burden will be on
the West to keep the margins as narrow as possible.
The Soviets also made some significant conces-
sions to get CSCE. Before the conference began,
Moscow had to:
--work out a satisfactory agreement on Berlin;
--accept US and Canadian participation;
--agree to enter the force reduction talks
(MBFR).
In the conference itself, they were compelled
to accept the idea that a CSCE agreement would in-
clude more than a statement of amorphous principles;
indeed, it would cover tangible areas of consider-
able sensitivity to a closed society. There is
good ground for skepticism about the practical con-
sequences of the Soviet concessions of freer move-
ment of people and ideas and the military-related
"confidence-building measures." Nonetheless, the
Soviets have, for the first time, accepted the prin-
ciple that such matters are legitimate concerns of
the European community and a legitimate part of
"European security."
Movement of. People. and Ideas
CSCE was made possible when the participants
agreed to trade recognition of the inviolability of
frontiers for improvements in the "freer movement
of people and ideas." In a sense, this represented
an exchange of present realities for future possi-
bilities. The West calculated that, while it was
indicating acceptance of Europe's division, it might
at the same time set in motion processes that could
eventually attentuate that division.
(continued)
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The Soviets did everything possible, short of
scuttling the conference, to minimize their obliga-
tions on freer movement of people and ideas. In
long months of tough bargaining, the West gradually
retreated from its far-reaching objectives. Most
of the surviving provisions are couched in terms of
intent rather than obligation. The operative verbs
are usually "intend," "hope," "encourage," "facili-
tate," "study." The Soviets consistently, and suc-
cessfully, opposed inclusion of the verb "will."
Furthermore, many of the articles contain other
escape hatches for the Soviets. The provision on
improved working conditions for journalists, for
example, contains a clause barring expulsion of
journalists engaged in professional activity, but
it adds the proviso that their activity must be
"legitimate." In the USSR, the Soviets will deter-
mine what is legitimate.
The texts are divided into two broad categories:
"human contacts" and "information." The Soviets,
in assessing the risks involved in these items, prob-
ably employed a different division, distinguishing
between provisions affecting Soviet citizens directly
and those concerning the activity of foreigners in
the Soviet Union. In the first category are state-
ments dealing with family reunification, marriage
between nationals of different states, travel, radio
broadcasting, and other activities related to the
dissemination of information. The second category
consists primarily of improved working conditions
for journalists, although items such as travel and
tourism also fall into this category.
The Soviets negotiated hard to neutralize the
impact of both texts, but if past experience is a
guide they will be more concerned about provisions
affecting Soviet citizens. The article facilitating
marriage between nationals of different states is
not likely to be particularly troublesome because
the number of cases will probably remain small. The
provisions dealing with family reunification and
"contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family
ties" may be more difficult because of increased
emigration in recent years. The Soviets are not,
however, obligated actually to increase the flow of
emigrants. Furthermore, these provisions, as well
as clauses having to do with travel, tourism, con-
tacts among professional and religious groups, and
similar subjects, are well covered in Soviet law,
and there is little doubt that Moscow will apply its
law to whatever degree is necessary to maintain con-
trol.
(continued)
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On radio broadcasting, the CSCE text does lit-
tle more than apply pressure on the Soviets to re-
frain from reinstituting the jamming of Western
broadcasts. Moscow stopped most jamming just as the
second stage of CSCE was beginning, obviously in an
effort to eliminate the topic as a source of conten-
tion.
Such provisions are not likely to affect the
Soviet political order, nor are they likely to touch
the lives or the imagination of the USSR's people.
They will, however, raise certain problems. Any
tough Soviet statements or actions against individ-
uals whose plight gets attention in the West will
be viewed as a violation of the spirit, if not the
letter, of CSCE. There is a good chance that So-
viet dissidents will seize on CSCE provisions to
argue their cases, and resorting to legalisms or the
various escape clauses in the CSCE document will
not get the Soviets off the hook. Western publicity
will be the main weapon in the arsenal of Soviet
citizens seeking greater personal freedom. In short,
the Soviets are more vulnerable to the cause cele-
bre than they were before CSCE.
Future Impact on the East
With CSCE out of the way, at least until 1977,
the Soviets will now turn to other multilateral
forums to keep the process of detente moving for-
ward. They are already talking about the necessity
for complementing political detente with "military
detente," and their public focus no doubt will now
shift to Vienna and the MBFR negotiations.
Moscow, however, will feel itself under no
special pressure to make concessions to the West in
Vienna as a result of CSCE. The once tight linkage
between the two negotiations has disappeared, and
the West will lose the option of trying to use So-
viet intent in CSCE as a lever for progress in MBFR.
The Soviets may do more to promote regional
agreements in Europe. Some manifestations of this
have already been seen in the revival of Soviet in-
terest in the long-dormant proposal for a nuclear-
free zone in Scandinavia and the first tentative
probes toward becoming involved in Nordic economic
cooperation. It is conceivable that the Soviets
may eventually undertake similar initiatives in the
Mediterranean. On a broader front, they may revive
their proposal for a world disarmament conference.
A major thrust of Soviet activity in the post-CSCE
era will be outside the sphere of official confer-
ences and multilateral initiatives. In particular,
the Soviets will push for advancement of their idea
for pan-European trade unionism.
(continued)
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The Soviets have some work to do within the
communist movement in Europe as a result of CSCE.
They have been heavily engaged in organizing a meet-
ing of the European Communist parties. One purpose
of this meeting is to strengthen Moscow's voice on
the ideological front in anticipation of post-CSCE
pressures. In addition, the Soviets would like to
have a more influential voice in determining the
priorities, tactics, and policies of the various
West European Communist parties. The growth in the
influence and the potential governing role of these
parties give Moscow more reason than before to do
what it can to make sure that their activities con-
tribute to, rather than complicate, Soviet policies.
Future Impact on the West
Almost three years of hard negotiations have
tempered Western expectations for CSCE. West Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, the
Belgians will value CSCE for what it did not do.
Their primary goal, for domestic political reasons,
has been to block any external interference in their
political affairs and assure that CSCE could not
be used to hinder progress toward West European
unity.
In West Germany, the coalition government may
come under attack from the Christian Democrats and
some West Berlin politicians for not securing
stronger language perserving Bonn's right to achieve
national reunification through peaceful means, but
it should be able to ride out such protests.
The ?conference poses a dilemma for other West-
ern states such as the UK, France, and Italy. De-
tente has become an important part of their foreign
policies, and they cannot afford to dismiss the con-
ference as inconsequential. On the other hand, too
much emphasis on the positive results of CSCE could
encourage overblown expectations for detente, weaken
West European resolve, and increase pressures for
reductions in defense expenditures. Detente eupho-
ria could conceivably increase pressures on the
West for concessions in the force reduction talks.
Concern in some Western quarters about such
euphoria, however, appears exaggerated at this stage.
The prolonged bargaining at CSCE has probably rein-
forced the predilection in the West to assume very
little, be patient and, above all, maintain soli-
darity.
(continued)
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In summary, the agreements that will be signed
in Helsinki touch on virtually all areas of critical
interest to Europe. But they will not in themselves
have a decisive impact on European events, and the
future course of detente in Europe will be much more
affected by:
--the maintenance of West European solidarity
and, in particular, the unity of the EC Nine;
--continued West European cooperation with the
US;
--the possible emergence of new leadership in
Moscow;
--the growth of economic interdependence be-
tween East and West;
--the progress of force reduction and strate-
gic arms negotiations;
--the reaction to increased communist influ-
ence in Europe, particularly in Portugal and
Italy;
--increased competition for influence in the
Mediterranean; and
--development of a growing community of inter-
est among the poorer states of southern Europe
that could increasingly turn the attention of
richer north European leaders inward.
These problems illustrate how difficult it may
be to sITICN'e beyond the stage of cold-war confronta-
tion into the new era of negotiated detente presaged
by the CSCE. The CSCE agreements will not assure
this outcome, but at least they provide a touch-
stone measuring the commitment of both East and
West to further this process.
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