JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00909256
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 215
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2022
• Case Number: F-2021-00762
• Publication Date: June 4, 1946

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations
DeClassifled and Approved for Release
by the Centrai.Intelligence Agency
Date: /
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�
JAPANZSE LNTELLIGENCE ORUN/ZATIONS /N CH/NA
Introductions
tee purpose of this investigation *mu; been as foliose: �
a. To oiliest in greater detail. further information concerning the
highly wimples Japanese Intelligence System, particularly am-
corning:
Organisational Structure -
Prominent Personalities
Methods of Operation
To correlate this information into a somprehenaive report on
Japanese Intelligence in Chi= for future study and reference.
4
To understand the war time votes in order to be on guard for
peace time organising along similar /inset by the. same people,
who mor use the war time methods of operation.
;seam et Intelliromes
The basis of statements in this report stem from information set out
in reports of investigation during the period from September /945
through March /946 as compiled by investigators of SSIVAD in canton,
Tientsin, Peiping, Teingtaos and Shanghai. The findings are presented
as briefly as possible to give the report adherence, while in the ap-
pendix following each section of the report my be found the detailed
explanations, charts, etc.
It must be remembered that at the time of the investigation, certain
unavoLiabls difficulties inherent to the situation in China precluded
mush of the evidence from Japanese sources. Ons predominant binder-
ease which existed, and still exists, is the inevitable liaison which
must be conducted with the Chinese authorities in order to interview
Japanese military personnel, which in several instances has fruitless
attempts to obtain desired interviews. This has been particular/7
true in ~ad..
Also the gener4 destruction of evidence by the Jnpanese following
the surrender has completely eliminated sthe posing/4' of substanti-
ating investigations with documuintaa proof, hence a line must be
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drain between inforMation Ilan/shed by Japanese officers *43 were asked �
� to submit reports, ami the informations furnished by agents and con
tents; in most asses neither are authentic* and in some cases deliber-
ate/If' fa/se 'statement8 were made by responsible Japanese in order to
� prevent detection of the true facto. Agent reports are generally accu-
� rate and true within the limits of error of � human memory�
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CHINA SEAS FLEET efooseelos
2. THE SHANGHAI JAPANESE NAVAL BABE COND 000 OOOO
3. THE SHANGHAI SPEOIAL NAVAL LANDING PARTY O
44 THE JAPANESE NAVAL OFFICE IN SHANGHAI, CHINA
A.
B.
The Navigation Section
The Investigative Section
The Press Section 4040010011404,
Duties loilio'soilpernivoi000loibloosoo
Organization and Personnel
1) Chief of the Japanese Navel Office in
Shanghai
2) The General Affairs Section
3)
6) The Information and Liaison Section
A. Duties and Officers
2.) Information Room .......... OOOOOOO �
2) Liaison Room ................ OOOOO
a) Listening Post ....... OOO � O *00
3) The Enemy Properties Control Room .
IMOIle HOValle � � � O OOO � 0���
=LANs OF THE JAPANESE NAVY
1 Maim ��
porno. ......... voes�
**s. ..... 4-m 11 eos0����..��
21 Sakura Kik".. ip ;1 41411,
tut � � * � � .
Kentai Yoko
4 Shingishi Kikan ����� .. .. .
5 Kodama Kikan
6 zwato..Ziken.........." A.s.t.st �
7) Agmol 41�41140.0.4,4). . .. 00400-000
8) Others '41.64i;;401,�44p.ieedleiipoo
000000 OOOOOOO 00
.11�00444414100,0000
00 ***** 00 *** I.
00400 ****** 04000
pmc
9
10
16
16
16
16
17
17
18
19
20
20
21
22
26
46
47
48
52
53
53
53
54
54
55
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T= JAPANESE NAVY AND SOVIETS 55
APPENDIX 4,414p4ornowomeoettio *
A. Chart Showing Omnization of !lama
B. List of Employees of Manwa ........ OOOOOOOOO
-Z. Chart Showing Organization of KodaxaaKikan
'D. Biographical Data 00641100410,0410000000000 ***** 00
E. Eugene Hogans vooloftiregotrip4co
57a
58
59
67
68
80
*This was prepared at a later date and therefore is attached
to the last section.
- 2 -
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The Zapanese China� Seas Vilest, under the direction of
the Navel General Staff, Tokyo, with Headquarters at Shanghai,
was responsible for the ;aptness Navy's mission in China,
edtioh was to combat enemy assault troops, safe-guard sea com-
munications, patrol channels of Yangtze and tOb.angpoo Rivers
and blockade China Coast. At Shanghai, these duties discharged
� by Naval Base Comma, Special Naval Landing Party mid Naval
Office assisted by numerous Service Special Units. Naval Base
� Command was responsible for the defense of Shanghai mid its
vicinity, Special Naval Lending Party, entered Shanghai in 1937
and. oocupied the Zapanese section of the city for the purpose
of protecting ;aptness nationals and their interests. The
Landing Party aided in policing these sections of Shanghai
occupied by the Navy, although primary Jurisdiction rested in
other organizations.
The Naval Office in bitanghai attention to iiaison,
collec-
ting of infomation both for the China .Seas fleet tad the Naval
General, Staff, Tokyo, in which matters it omminicated direct-
ly with the General Staff. Navel Office attended to neeptiations
and settlements of affairs relative to Naval operations, defense,
protection of communications, purchasing of military necessities
and transportation. It maintained contact with other Naval and
Official organizations. Navigation section, Naval Office
obtained economic intelligence from smugglers, Investigation
section handled research Press section eulogized the entire
japanese Navy. The Information and Liaison section conducted
investigation and kept contact with all foreign nationals,
maintained a listening post and controlled enemy prgarty.
The Japanese Navy was helped in its intelligence mork
numerous Kikens and Yokes. *loh organized to collect material
and information in Chilut. Towards the &wrists, the zepanese Na-
vy adopted a policy or oonclUation and appeasement and received
maw favors from them in exchange for conveniences, during the
-war.
- 3 4.
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The .Imperial Japanese Navy at Shanghai.; China was under. �
the control and direction tsf'the Japanese China Seas Fleet
wb.idi had its origin in and was responsible to the Japanese
Ministry of Navy and the Naval General Staff at Tokyo, Japan.
The Japanese China Seas. Fleet had its Headquarters at
Shanghai, China and was composed of a Courrander-in-Chief and
numerous staff officers. The mission of the China Seas Fleet
was performed by noky sul-branches stationed in Shanghai as
well as the rest of China.
The mission of thi China Seas ?leaf was
To combat enemy assault troops gord safe-guard
sea oammunioatiOns.
Safe-guarding channels or the Yangtze and
Whangpoo Rivers.
Blockade and patrol of the coast of China.
The following units or the China Seas Fleet were located
at Shangb.al, China v
Shanghai Naval Base Comma
Commander: Rear-Admiral TOKUJI kola
2 The _Shanghai _Naval Special._landing Tarty _
Commander: Rear-Admiral. Minoru KATSUITO
The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai
Commander: Rear-Admiral KEriri MINATO
The majority of the duties of the Javanese Navy at
Shanghai were discharged by the Shanghai Naval Base
Commaikd, The Shanehai Special Naval Landing Party,
The dapanase Naval Office in Shangb.ai. These offi..
ass will be discussed later in this report.
The iapanese Naval Air Faroe in Central China
Commander: Captain UNOSUEE MOSZAKI
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The Second Meteorological Corps
� Commander: Kenji 111MR1
The Shanghai Naval Navigation Office
Commander: Captain TUMIXO MUMMA.
The Shanghai Naval Transportation Office
which had a branch office in Taingtan
Com:ander: Captain Tasusato TANABE
The Shanghai Naval Transportation Office controlled.
all Ettipping firms affiliated with the Japanese
_Navy.
The First Naval Ordnance Office
which had branch offices in Hankow, Taingteo
Nanking and Peiping �
Commander: Paymaster Vicse-Admiral BOW= 0mAT3UZAWA
The first Naval Ordnance Office at Shanghai stocked
and supplied war goods to the entire offices of the
Japanese China Seas Fleet, and other organisations
designated by directive.
The First Naval Office of Accounts and Supplies
which had branch offices in Hankow, Tsingtas
Nanking and Peiping
Commander: Paymaster Vice-Admiral BUMP=�011LT8IITAWA
The First Japanese Naval Office of Accounts and
Supplies was responsible for the supervision of
accounts of the entire offices of the Japanese
China Seas Fleet said the purchaaing and selling
of military epode.
10. The Shanghai Naval Clothing and Provisions Depot
which had a branch office in Taingten
Command:Or: Paymaster Vice-Admiral HUMP= ,0MILTS0,241.A.
The Shanghai Nave]. Clothing end ProVisions Depot had
the responsibility of stocking and investigation of
clothing and provisions of the Japanese China Seas
Fleet and other Naval Offices.
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los '.,011
110 4db '
�
The First Naval Ortliallei Office, the First
� Japanese Navel Office of Accounts and Supplies,
� and the Shanghai Nava/ Clothing and Provisions
Depot, in discharging their duties as a supply
� branch of the organization, had contact with and
direction of all flags dealing with and furnish-
ing supplies to. the Naval Offices, It was to these
Offices that the firms of NUTWA and KODDIA. IaKAN
on occasions, were used as espionage agen-
cies, were responsible.
The. First Naval Construction Office .
*lick had a branch officio in Tsingten
Commumder: captain zczlivai Itl'ZITA
'
The First Navel Construction Office was responsi-
ble for the Construction of defense posts and
general construction work of the Japanese China
Seas Fleet, with the exception of the Second China
Seas
�
3 2 � dil7,1:igaat First�D had r nall: eNrolainbapvaleerretNent:. ithBagitairtahniThs�,efi="moilleNnod1Pir.213"ztecleftngeun al Constructioninitruz"�Nrga'thlialltativ.lunrN��AehavinIaaC�nstrlatO14filfici
The First Naval Enginearing Office was responsible
for the production and repair of warships, aims
- and -manna- 00111allirtiCatital sets for the Japanese
China Seas riaeit or other Naval Offices included
in directives* The First Naval Engineering Office
directed and supervised the 'fork of the Kiangnan
� Dockyard at Sb.angnai, China and other turnsemployed by the Japanese Navy in this type of work*
)* The First Natal Hospital
Commanders Surgeon Rear-Mtairal. MINTARO KANAZANA
�
24.
The Court-Marshal Japanese China Seas Fleet�
The First Naval Prison �
0031111.111140rt� PrC11,08t Captain ALI'l NINA
5. The First Naval Mail Orris*
Commander: Commissioner VITIRO HXGOHAI
:
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SECRET
The following units of the China Seas Fleet were not
located at Shanghai, China, and had no �Moss there :
1. The Japanese Naval. Office in Peking, Nanking,
Hankow, Amoy, Canton and Hong Kong.
2. The Tsingtao Naval Base Command
Headquarters: Tsingtao
Commander: Vice-Admiral SHIGE.TI KANEKO
The Tsingtao Naval Base Command had the following mission:
a. To combat enemy assault troops
b. To safe-guard sea communications
b. To blockade and patrol the coast of China
North of 330 North latitude.
The Yangtze River Naval Base Command
Headquarters: Hankow
Commander: Vice-Admiral TORAD SAWADA
The Yangtze River Naval Base Command was charged
with the responsibilitzir
a To combat enemy assault troops
b To safe-guard the channels of the Yangtze
- River between Hankow and Kiangyin
The Second China Seas Fleet
nadquarters; Hong Kong
Commander: Vice-Admiral RITITARO 711.71TA
Chief of Staff: �Rear-Admiral rm.. -am cncoliA.
'Me Second China Seas Fleet had offices at Hong Kong
under the command of Rear-Admiral YUZURI1 OKUMA and
the Amoy branoh under tti a command of Vice-Admiral
SEIICHI HARM. Its duties were :
a. To combat enemy assault troops
b. To safe-guard sea communications
c. Blockade and patrol of the China coastal waters
West of 1000 East and North-East of the line
conneoting Gape point (Leishow Peninsula) and
the point 200 North of 1/2v East.
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Hainan Garrison
Headquarters: Sana, Hainan Island
� Commander: Vice-Admiral KELM� GOGA
Chief of Starr: xear-Admiral KINZI SMTDA
The Hainan Garrison had the following responsibi-
lity:
a. To combat enemy assault troops
b. Blockade and patrol of the China coast
,west of the line connecting Gopa point
and the point 200 North of 112" East.
The forlowing is the staff of the Japanese China Seas
Fleet 'located at Shemg4 ail. China:
Vice-Admiral RYOZO FIDIUDA
Commander-in-Ohiet or the China Seas Fleet
(Kay 1945 - August /945)
Vice:-Admiral NAOMASA S4MN7C1
Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet
(Decenber 1944 - August 1945) -
Rear-Admiral KANTI 00diwA
Assistant Chief of Staff, China Seas Fleet
(February 1945 - August 1945)
Captain YAMIZANI TANABE
Chief of supplies, engineering,
Comma der-in-Chief of Naval Transportation
Section of China Seas Fleet.
The following were staff officers assigned to the China
Seas Fleet at Shanghai, China :
Captain ILISANOHI OGAGIRO
Captain TAKEO KA20
� Captain TOSHIO KONDO
� Captain T.AKEStiI SHINLIZMT.ANT
Commander ariailACHIRO TANIOKA
Commander TADASHI SHIMURA
Commander TAKESHI WOI
'aro M W AA. ....
- a-
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� Commander GENIGHIRO KIONISHI
Commander 111:4a1IHEIO AKAGI
Commander KAZUTO3iI ASADA
Lt.Comdr. ISAMU ma.-./. AMA
In addition to the above officers, the Chief of Staff -
of the Japanese China Seas Fleet often called for advice upon
Commending officers of the various units under his command and
bestowed upon them the title of staff officers of the China
Seas Fleet, in addition to their title as Commander of the
various units to which they were assisted.
THE SHANGHAI jAPANESE NAVAL BASE CO.V/AND
The responsibility for the defense of Shanghai and its
vicinity was, so lb.r as the Japanese Navy was concerned in the
Japanese Naval Base Command under the direction of Rear'-Admi-
ral TOKUJI Milt and the Manghai Naval Special Landing Party,
und.er the command of Rear-kimiral 'MINORU MATSUNO.
The duties of the Shanghai Japanese Naval Base Command �
were entirely military. The following diart shows the offi-
oers' strength and duties of the Naval Base Command:
�
THE SHANGHAI JAPANESE NAM BASE COMAND
Headquarters of the
Shanghai Japanese Naval
Base Command
(Commander: Rears,Admirel
Tokuji Mori)*
Officers 71
� Sailors 810
Morot boats: 49
Converted mine-
layers : 7*
Ferry boats: 5
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1. Direction of the
entire foroe.'
2. Waters under command:
Ohl.na coast, South of
33 N. and East of
1200Z.
3. Safeguarding of sea
communications
1. Control of port
affairs in Shanghai,
Safeguarding of waters
under command, and
protection of naviga-
tion routes.
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� Tugs
Dredgers :
Mud-carriers
Carat boats:
Lighters :
Pontoons :
Japanese Garrison at 1.
Shichiaahan or Raffle
Island of Pake Liehtao 2.
group.
(Conimander: Captain
TAKECHIYO TERANI&T.7)
Captain TMANISHI was
concurrently commander
of River Gun-boat ATAKA.
Ships under direct
dommtnd:
13. 2. Waters under command:
5 Shanghai port areas
8 and Yangtze River
below ICiangyin.
Officers t 64
Sailors :1,088
River Gun-boat: �
ATAKA
Motor boats: 4
"Suicide* �
Torpedo
boats
/. Officers : .133
Sailors :2,379
2. Motor boats: 18
"Suicide"
torpedo bts: 98
Gun-boat: KAIS=
Old-type destroyers: 2
River Gun-boats 4
Transports 1
Converted sub-chaser 1
1 Defense of Raffle
Island and. 3afeguardi
of waters under comm
2. Waters under command:
Central China coast,
South of 330N. and
North of Ta-ohu Shan
1. Defense of Cho*shan
Archipelago and Safe
guarding of waters
under command.
2. Waters under command
Central China coast,
South of Ta-Chu Shan
and East of 1200 E.
The Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party, entered
Shanghai in /937 at the time of the China Inciddnt. Upon its
entrance, the Special Naval Landing Party took over the Northern
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section of Shanghai, that is, that portion of the city north of
Soochow Creek known as Hongkew in which Japanese nationals were
living. The Special Naval Landing Party also took over the
' Pootung section of Shanghai which is across the 1Nhangpoo River
immediately opportte the International Settlement and likewise
was inhabited to a large extent by the Japanese nationals. The
purpose expressed by the Japanese in taking these sections of
Shanghai was to protect the lives and interests of the Japanese
people living there.
Immediately upon the outbreak of the Pacific war, the
Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party moved into that
part of the International Settlenent lying between Soochow Creek
on the North, Avenue Edouard VII on the South, Whangpoo River on
the East and the Shanghai Race Course, on West.
After the outbreak of the Pacific, war the Japanese Shanghai
Special Naval Landing Party occupied a very secondary position to
that of the Army. However, they did retain jurisdiction of these
portions of Shanghai *Joh had been occupied by the Navy.
The duties Of the japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing
Party were to defend, Shanghai in the event of an anew attack as
wel/ as to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals
under their control. In its capacity of protecting the lives and
property of the Japanese nationals under its control, the Naval
Landing Pert maintained a small Police Force.
The Japanese Specdal Naval Landing Party in Shanghai was
responsible to the Comaanderrin-Chief of the Japanese China Seas
Fleet augt It continued so to function until April 1945, at which
time the sommand of the entire Shanghai area was assumed by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese 13th Army. The Japanese Spe-
cial Naval Landing Party in Shanghai oame under his direction
cud took preparatory steps against possible enemy assaults in the
ib3saer Japanese defense zone aril in the defense of the many Navel
-establishments. The Commander of the Japanese 13th Army at
Shanghai in April 1945 also took over the responaiblity for air
d.efense measures.
The responsibility of the Japanese Special Naval Landing
art" in Shanghai as a Polio* organisation, was limited to the
safedouirding of the areas under its eommand, and took whatever
steps fain& necessary in the maintenance of peace and order in
� the Naval sone.
11
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The Police duties in Shangh.ei were under the direct
command of the Japanese Gendarmerie Witch had powers to take
preventative measures, to conduct investigations, apprehensions,
and examinations as detained necessary.
The Japanese Consular Police assumed Police duties over
the Zapenese civilians in Sb,anghai Wile the Shanghai Municipal
Police composed mostly of Chinese, had. policing authority over
the Chinese and neutral nationals.
In maintaining peace and order in the Shanghai area, the .
Japanese Gendarmerie directed the jspanese Consular Police and
Municipal Police wb.enever necessary.
� �:,_ �
In the event of the terroristio acts in the Japanese Naval
defense zone, the investigations, apprehensions, and examinations
of the suspect or suspects and other forms of investigative
aotivity were nerflarmed by the Japanese Gssndarmerie or by the
Shanghai Municipal Police. The Special Naval Landing Party main-
tained close contact with these tvo organizations and took what-
ever steps they .requested or reconszended in the maintenanoe of
peace and order in the Naval defense zone.
The following chart shows the composition of the Japanese
Shanghai Special Naval Lending Party' as of August 100 1945 s
iMp
12
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Name of
detachment officer
R E T
THE TAPANESE NAVAL LIAISON OFFICE
THE COLTOSITION OF THE SHANGHAI SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING PARTY
AT MOST 10,k 1945
Commanding Number of amber of
officers seamen
Headquarters: Rear-Admiral
MINORU KATSUNO
-
Captain K.
FUKUSHDIA.
Lt.Com. 7.
KAEADA & 4 others
Adjutants: Lt. H. YOKOTA
and two others.
Office Lt.Com. a.
duties: MIYAM010 and
three others
Surgeon Cep.
S. KATSUYAMA.
Lt.Com. S.
, SUZUKI
. Officers & seamen attached
t.i. the Headquarters:
1
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S. � �
CRE Et' E T-
� Name of Commanding
detachment officer
Number of
off eers
Tiumb er of Total �
seamen
Arms
Headquarters Coin. K. TANAKA
Unit
25.
618
643
3 25-mm machine guns
4 13�mat machine guns
4 12-mm machine _Lune
38 1,282 1,320
12 12-cm A& guns, 3 light tanks 2 150-cm search items
31 25-mm machine-guns, 7 armored 4 110-cm search lights
ears
12-am AA gun
2 15-cm trench nx)r-
tars
1 12-cm field gun
12 18-cm trench mor-
tars
24 heavy machine-guns
14 heavy, bomb-thrower
11 13-cm machine-guns
16 machine-gun oars, .
4 15-cm mortars,
2' anti-tank guns
278-cm mortars
48 heavy machine-guns
20 heavy bomb-thrower
2 radio detectors.
Eastern Lt.Com. T.
District MATSUDA �
Unit
23 608 631 4
7
28
1.0 heavy machine-guns 19
14. heavy. bombthrowers 4
2 150-cm search lights
Pootung
Unit
Lt Y.HATANO
3 7 361
8 13-naa machine-gun
2 15-am mortars
12 8-cm mortars
8-om AA guns
15-cm mortars
7.5�cm mobile AA
Miss
4.8-cm mortars
40-nrn machine-guns
25-mm machine-guns
13-mm machine-guns
3 8-cm AA guns
. 15 heavy machine-guns
22 25-mm machine-guns
8 heavy. bomb-thrower
1 150-cm search ligh
1 radio detector
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�
Inner District Lt.Com. N.
Unit KAWAMURA
Ottieers 29 12-em AA guns
7 ft-om AA guns
Seamen 4,502 1 I-type 8-am Oh
1 12-cm field gun
4 7.5-cm mobile AA
guns
6 40-mm machine-guns 5
77 35-am maehine-guas 7
110-em search ligtts2
. 31 /3-mm machine-guns
4 12-mm machine-guns 2
15 25-cm mortars
95 8-am mortars
3 small boats
127 heavy machine-gm;
591 618 1 I-type 8-cm gm,
8 heavy bomb-taroweri
2 40-mm machine-.guns
2 radio detectors
2 35.-ram 'machine -guns,
2 medium-size gun
boats..
2 13-mm machine-guns
, 2 motor boats
16 8-cm mortars,
3 small, boats
26 heavy meohine-saas
74 heavy bomb-throwers
3 /ight %mks
7 armored oars
/6 machine-gun can
2 anti-tank guns
150-cm search light
radio detectors
medium-size gun boa
ts
motor boats
d for R I
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%THE J'APANESE NAVAL OY1IO1 INSH.ANGIIAI, CHINA.
The Tapanese Naval Office in Mang.hai was located at 27,
the Bund and was under the eoramend of Rear-Admiral nig) IMIATO.
It was responsible to the Comnander-in-Chief of the Jape-
mese China Seas Fleet and attended to liaison work and the ga-
thering of information concerning Naval operations.
This office also handled other Naval affairs specified by
the Commander-in-Chief of the japsness China Seas Fleet and
collected information under the direct command of the Chief of
Staff of the Japanese Navy in Tokyo. In this latter connection,
the Naval Office in Shanghai received awl sent information cool-
looted direotly to the Naval Gmeral Staff in Tokyo. The Naval
office also engaged in the gathering of information vital to the
operations of the Japanese China Seas Fleet.
,
The Japanese Naval Office in i.iengbai maintained close
=tact not only with other naval organizations, but also with
various dapanese official organizations. This office attended
to negotiations and settlement.. of affairs relative to naval ope-
rations and defense, Protection of conlannications, plrchasing of
military necessities and transportations.
B. ORGANIZATION AND PERSON:
(1) Officers in*Charge.
The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai was composed of one
Admiral or Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Office, three to five
Captains Comanders and Lt.Commuaders as assistants in addition
to sever/1 Junior Officers, as well as civilian employees.
. The following officers were in charge of the Naval Office
in Shanghai:
Vice-Admiral ARATA OKA
DeoeMber 1941 - septemeer 1943
Vioe-Admirel TAIICHIRO KONMO
September 1943 - Vovember 1944
Rear-Admiral KELT� MINATO
November 1944 - Auepat 1945.
a "manta te,
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(2) .The General. Affairs Sections
The General Affairs Section perfermed overall execution
of general affairs of the office and also matters not handled
by other sections of the Naval Office in Shanghai.
Specifically among its duties were the following:
a) Adjutant to the Chief of the �Tapanese Naval. Office,
- in Shanghai. In addition to regular duties as an
adjutant, he arranged travelling facilities for
� officers, sailors and civilian employees.
b) The general affairs room - handled d.rafting, recei-
ving and sending of official documents, personal
affairs and merits of servioement, pay matters and,
Other miscellaneous affairs.
c) The internal. affairs room - handled the maintenance
of the guarding and the maintenance of order in and.
our of the guard-room.
The commauding officers of the General Affairs Section ,
are as follows; '
(3)
Captain T. KITXPItet
Deoember i9ii. may 1942
Captain S. KOBETTO
Lay 1942 - July 1944
Captain B. IMABARA
July 1944 - August l945.
The Navigation Section;
This Seotion performed the usual customs duties. It also
conducted investigation in the Shanghai area concerning economi-
cal matters. Infore.ation in this regard was obtained by watching
the smuggling of goods, arms and other materials into Free China,
and the movements in and out of Shanghai of guerrilla bands.
The bul:A. or the investigative work of the Navigation Sec-
tion was carried on by Chinese. The agents reported to the
officials of the japanese Navy in their area. These agents were
eager to obtain the goodwill of the Japanese, since their
services would be rewarded with permits to bring into Shanghai
cargoes viiich otherwise would have to be smuggled. Goods, in
order to be brought in and out of Mianghail, first had to have a
Navy Certificate and then a customs Certificate. The following
men were known to be connected with the Intelligence Section of
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the Navigation Section of the 3ap3ne3e Navy in and about
Shanghai, China
LNITLILIGELIGE SECTION, MARINE CUSTOMS
Commissioner MORI TAOKA.
TAKEO OLLAE
Chief of the Political Section )
� TAKECHU FUKUffiIMA. )
Assistant HIKOTARO SA20
SELTI HIGABdITSU- )
ZUMI . )
KATSU KAWASHImA
TOKUIGH/itu NAKA.
GANA-
BARUYOSHI WAKANO
KEISAN NITTA
YOSHIO IwATI!.
saranu TANAKA'
HIROSHI BILIAKA
KOSAN IKEDA
KAROKU BIRADA
KITARO YOKOYALIA
8/ NAKAUURA
SKI YAMAGUCHI
KOMEI SUOIMoTo
YOSKIGI OGAU
SABURO FUWII
HAM KOBAYASHI
(4) The Investigative Section:
Shanghai Office
Woosung Office
Yangtzepoo Office
Pootung Office
Chung Ming Island
Office
The name investigative Section is misleading. The
duties of this section conoisted entirely of research work,
by which this section examined the problems confronting the
China Seas Fleet in the execution of its duties. Their en-
tire work was done from magazines, books and technical
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periodicals which were tiolleoted in and about Shanghai by
the Gendarmerie. They also received printed material from
Tapan. This Section performed no active intelligence func-
tion in the collection of infOrmation and data.
The officers in charge of this Section were as follows:
Captain S. KUVIABARA.
July 1944 - November 1944
Commander H. TANIOKA.
November 1944 August 1945.
(5) Press Section:
The Press Section, through newspapers, radio Stations,
News Agencies, magazines, theaters and, movies, handled the -
press releases aid publicity work for the entire China Seas
Fleet, as well as for the Naval Office in Shanghai, regarding
the war situation both on the China Continent and in the
.Pacific
The control of censorship was vested in Tokyo. In
Sb.angb.ai, the Army, Navy and the Embassy jointly controlled
censorship through a committee Which was directly under the
control of the Embassy. The Japanese Naval Office in Shang-
hai furnished a representative to that committee.
� A few days betbre the Japanese surrender, the Press
Offices were consolidated into one Section known as the EOM-
SW or the Standard Information Office which was under the
direction of Minister TSITCHIDA.
During the war, the Japanese Navy at Shanghai kept in
close contact with the Press Sections of the Army and Embassy
and eulogized the war results of the Japanese Navy.
Publicity was directed to the Chinese, third Party
Nationals and Japanese residents, throulg the following chan-
nels:
(1) Publicity materials concerning the Japanese
Navy were furnished to the Japanese Newspapers
TAIRIEIT SUMP� and the� Chinese journals, in
particular: SON PAD and Sari MAN PAO.
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(2) Similar matters in the Japanese language were
sent to the Donal. News Azency and releases in
the Chinese language were sent to the Central
Press Service of China.
(3)
Concerns magazines and mosquito papers. The
Japanese magazines TAM:KU GU:K.AN and miff
TAIRIKU and the Chinese magazine SHUN PAO
monthly and. tho SHIN WAN Pm monthly, and
others, as well as the Chinese weekly caurTa
KUO and the mosquito paper MAO 1W) were fur-
nish.ed with publicity materials concerning the
Japanese Navy.
. (4) Publicity material was also sent to the movies,
theaters and cultural organizations in and. about.
Shanghai.
�
The following personnel was attached to the Press Sec-
� Cantai ns, rotADA
December 1941 - October 1943
Captain K. DIATOZISHIMA
October 1943 - M 1945
�Captain S. KUWABARA
( 6 ) Inforriation and Liaison Section:
a) - Duties and personnel:
The Information and Liaison Section had for its duties
the investigation and supervision of the gathering of infor-
mation, liaison work and the supervision of property of
foreign nationals.
The Chiefs of the Office were as follows:
Chief of Information Room:
Cantairt T. KITAURA (Dec. 1941 - May 1942)
Captain S. KOBETTO (Ray. 1942 - July 1944) �
Captain S. KUTIABARA (July 1944- Augu at 1945)
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Chief of Liaison Room:
Commander M. MINT (Dee. 1941 . Nov; 1943) '
Commander I. TETIUA (Nov. 1943 - May 1945)
Staff officers:
1941
- Nov.
1942)
Lt.Commander O. MUM% (Dec.
Lt.Connander T. HINO ' (Nov.
1942
- Feb.
1945)
Lt.Commander M. FUCHIWAKI(Feb.
1945
Aug.
1945)
Liaieon'Roam:
PArlaster-Lt, G. Mr.3.
Paymaster-Lt. H. TORTT
Paymaster-Lt. N. OGUMI
Paymaster-Lt. T. IK2DA
Civil Officer T. NAgBA
Civilian employees:
(Dec. 1941 - May. 1943)
(Dec. 1941 - Spet. 1942)
(tsly 1943 - Tilly 1945)
(July 1945 - Aug. 1945)
(Mar. 1943 - Aug. 1945)
N. MICITRARA (Sept. 1942 - Aug. 1945)
J. TOYODA (April /943 - Aug. 1945)
I. UTSUNOMIYA April 1942 *. August 1945)
Y. IKUddIMA Dec. 1941 Zan. 1945)
T. Fazmq Dec. 1944 Aug. 1945)
S. IWASAKI Nov. 1943 Aug. 1945)
(1) The Information Room:
The information room was employed in the gathering of
investigative reports and information and the co-ordi-
nation of intormation gatberes.
Among its duties were:
1. Study and analysis of the general situation. This
was accomplished from material seat from Tokyo,
Press reports, and local information compiled as
reference material for the China Seas Fleet. Froathis
material the information room prepared analysis of the
war situation.
2. Peace negotiations with Chungking. - This Section was
unable to oonduot any activity towards the Conclusion
of Peaoe with the Chinese Government at Chungking be-
cause the Central authorities in Tokyo prohibited al/
branch officers from making independent peace
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approa.ehis. However, a rapprochement with Chung-
king was attempted on one occasions by the SAICURA
ELLIN vihose Gontmending Officer TOlir1T0 �KAMERA. . was
sent to Shanghai by Admiral SzTJSaIN NAGANO, Chief
of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. uommander
OIMIURA co-ordinated his activities with this Section
of the Navy.
3 Strengthening of the Nanking Government. The activi-
ties for the strengthening of the WANG CEIING-WEI
� Regime was done in Nanking and there was no occasion
for any activity in Shanghai except liaison work
between the Japanese Naval organization and the
Nanking Officers in Shanghai.
4. Operational materials. - This section supplied the
Japanese China Seas Fleet with operational and refe-
rence material.
5.
Analysis of the war situation. - This section per-
formed analysis of the war situation in the areas
surrounding Shanghai. This analysis was based on
�daily Press reports and information supplied by the
Shanghai Municipal Government.
6. Naval Information. - The Peace and. Reconstruction
of the Nanking Government stationed on the islands
of the China Coast, as well.as junks operating in
the coastal waters, supplied information concerning
the situation in the coastal areas. In the final
phase of the Pacific war, such information was made
difficult to obtain because of the American bombings
of the coastal areas of China.
(2) Liaison Roomt
The liaison room had for its duties the investigation
and supervision of matters which requ.ired outside contaPt
and liaison among the Japanese Army and Navy and civil orga-
nizations.
The lied. son Section handled all, matters concerning the
�Tapanese Navy requiring contact with foreign and Japanese
organization's as well as other Japanese offices.
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Those matters whioh concerned the Zapanese Navy alone
were handled by this section in consultation with the Tapa-
nese Army end Embassy office in order to maintain close co-
ordination among the three offices. In dealing with affairs
which required consultation with the Central authorities of
Tokyo, The Tapanese Army, Navy and Embassy Offices jointly
decided upon them after the reply from Tokyo was received.
As its most important duty, this section was 0=3/ended to
maintain close co-ordination among, the three offices.
The following chart sb.cws the organization of the infor-
mation and liaison section of the J'apanese Naval Office at
Shanghai:
- ) Over I -
e, vie , im int
1, St SI 416
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NAVAL RESIDENCE OFFICER MANGfiAI
Rear-Admirca VITIATO
I CHIEF OF LIAISON OFFICE'
Capt. .1KINIABARA.
Assisting: Lt.Com. FUCHIWAKI.
ii`;)-.'SISTING OFFICER
Lt.31EPA
RELIGION
LISTENIN DQII 1
POST LIAISONI
er. & I
EMBASSY' Gener
Radio No News
Utsunomiya Yamamoto
Ichijima
I �
Toyoda
tor
GENERAL
RUSSIAN
FRENCH
GERMAN
AFFAIRS
AFFAIRS
AFFAIRS
AFFAIRS
LiiiiSOII
Rumba
YUXunara
,
Tajiri
Sasaki
Bizan Iwasaki
SECRE1 T
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LIAO UTSUNOMIYA. was a Dormer college. professor of
Sociology. His duties were merely to at as liaison offi-
cer. between the churches and the Japanese Navy at 'Shanghai.
According to his superiors, he contented himself with
writing long thesis on the social aspects of various religi-
ons.
HARIIHOST= TOMDA, as a liaison's man of the Japanese
Navy, rep.r.e..sented taem 2.n discussions with the Press Bureau
and with the representatives of the Dibassy and. the Army.
TOIIO111\ rat, t.he civilian affairs officer, was super-
visor of this section and controlled the activities of the
other six sections..
NOBORCr an TorOYJCfl plz7a kept in contact
and, kept the Navy iaformed on the thite Russians situation
in Shanghai. To this section also telonged the notorious
EUGENE PI.C1C-HpvaLs. on whose activities a separate report
is -being made thould be noted that Russian Affairs, as
used by the eTaDanese Navy, confined itself to the White Russians.
In matters dealing with the U.S.S.R. were always noted as
Soviet matters.
Concerning the French, the Zapanese Navy at Shanghai
exhibited little interest since the French community was divi-
ded into Vichy-ites and de Gaul/ists and were warring between
themselves during the entire Pacific war. Both sides, it is
rumored., co-operated with the Japanese whenever it tend to
advance their cause or to weaken their opponents. Coeoperat,ion
in the main was received from the Vichy-ites since they were
more numerous than the de Gaullists.
There was, however, an underground de Gaullists movement
whieh would recruit men of French extraction and immediately
upon recruiting them, would smuggle them to Indo-China or
some other place where they could be or more assistance in
the de Gaullist movement thaa at Shanghai.
According to his Commending officers, Tani, was res-
ponsible for keeping the Navy advised of these matters, but
was entirely irresponsible and, unable to perform his duties.
TAMT., it is slid, is from a noble family in ;man and he
maintained his position more on his witeoedents than on his
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The Gen= Affairs were handled by S=G1410 .11,7A3.11.1a-
and, S./WAK.I. Their duties were to maintain. liaison With
various German officers and officials at Shanghai.
7APAN2SE LISTMING POSTS
owns �� � Vow
� Tap mentality is conpletialy unsuited to listening-
post work. They are slow, cautaous thinkers, and can
never moke a quick, decision or take prompt action before
thinking UM a suitable reason or excuse for such, and each
excuse or reason rust be safficiently water-tigat to blan-
ket its originator against loss of face.
This phase of Japanese character played a great part
in the lives and actions of the officers and men who were
direotly above us when we worked as operators in Japanese
monitor stations. It was also one of the main reasons why,
in my belief, these monitor stations played only a minor
and passive role in japsa's war effort.
Before September 20, 1944, I did not know whether or
not the Taps were monitoring American voice circuits, as
operations were still at some distance from the China Coast
and the Philippines, and I had very seldom heard any milita-
ry voice transmissions, althougq I knew that voice was being
used in communications between aircraft and. ground stations.
Prior to the above date, we took OW traffic only, and only
from one station: litaTi at Part Darwin, Australia, which was
used, by the U.S. I.Cav7. All the traffic from this station
was in five-letter oode groups, and we never got to know
what sort of material was being sent. I don't believe that
the Zaps ever did either, because a ;op officer in Shanghai
told me months later that the -U.S. Navy's 5-letter code was
almost impossible to crack, and. that only the men at Tokyo
Naval H.Q. could creak it. I do not believe that Tokyo's
listening post differed ,aoch from all the others, except
perhses in quality of radio equipment.
On Sept. 20, 1944, we heard. our first close-range voice
signals when planes from a near-by task force raided r.anila.
We were ordered to fird their frequency, and as we did. not
even have the sliditest idea of where to look, I think it was
a mere Stroke of fate that some pilot was talking as I tuned
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over 4475 ko. As soon as the Taps heard the signals, They
ordered us to eery atat was being said. It was very diffi-
eult for the first few minutes, as we didn't know the types
of calls the planes were using, no: did we know the phonetic
alphabet. However, after copying the whole day through, we
learned more then any Tep officer had learned in Naval
Intelligence School. Then came the great task: English-
speaking Tap intelligence officers could not understand that
WA had written dyant Ws, who had listened to these signals
for just one day, knew more than the Officer in Charge of
the Naval Headquarters Listening Post in ..Canilat ae was �
stumped on every line of our typed copy. He asked us to
explain massages such as this:
"BROWWIE LEADER from 21 BROWNIE. =OEM DOWN AT
/2 SALLOW FAZE 035. PILOT IS GOODYEAR, loaTERG=N.
OVER."
We had heard several versions of this message from
Several planes, and remembered such catches as : 412 miles
from SALLOW FACE," "BEARING o35", "GOODYEAR is showing
=GREEa," "I SEE A-GOODYEAR", and I'm NAMUR," so that
we had pretty mood ideaa as to the moaning of the Whole
message, but the officer began asking questions:
"Whet is 12 SALLOW FAZE 035?" - We answered that
SALLOW FADE was probably a reference point, and that 12 was
the distance in miles mad o35 the bearina. To whieh he
replied:
"DI? I do not understand. Then, is GOODYEAR EVERGREEN
the Pilot's name? See, the message says "PILOT I3 GOODYEAR,
EVERGRMIT."
It took sometime to explain that GOODYEAR was rubber
raft, and that EVERGREEN was -a dye marker which dared the
water around the raft, probably a substance such as fluro-
resecin. The officer erely blinked and asked us howls
could be so sure of ourselves. Of course) we didn't bother
to tell him that we had heard patches of conversations that
pointed to our theory, but merely answered that that we told
him was so. We ourselves were jumping to conclusions and
guessing more than we &mild have, and, strangely, were for
the most part correct; however, there were times When we
made awful mistakes, and had to do a lot of fast talking to
cover ourselves and put the blame on some Tap by saying that
he had told us it was 03.
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By the time we had explained the day's copy, it was
in the wee hours of the morning. The officer then put his
seal on the copy, phoned headquarters, giving them some of
the more important messages (which should have been given
them as soon as they were received, to be of any value), .
and left. Men we saw him putting his seal on our copy, we
understood that he would be getting the credit for what we
took, so from that very first day we resolved to jumble him
up as much as we could. .
This turned out to be CM easy job. Japanese, even
the well educated ones, understand English best when they are
spoken to in Japanese English (I don't suppose I have to
explain the term); knowing this, we gradually switched to
the use of normal English whenever we had. something to ex-
plain. This drove them to the use of dictionaries, and
finally to attempts at reading our copy by themselves, with
the help of a diotionar7. This led to some very wierd- and
comical translations of messages, and all joking aside, these
translations were handed direotlyto Headquarters without
being checked by us. The rew we aid ahem were always com-
pletely wrong and off the subject. I add here that most Tap
listening posts were run completely by Zaps, and very few
had Nisei as operators, because the military hated and, dis-
trusted the Nisei. The Nisei, of course, understand English
and make good operators, but they don't like to remain as
operators as this is a rather low rank. Most of them
climbed from the position of operator to station manager or
instructor. In almost every case, the actual copying and. much
of the translating was done by young ensigns who had learned
their English at a Tap high-school or university. I spoke to
several of these boys here in Shanghai, and watched them take
�%v ice traffic when they came to visit our station. They
couldn't copy at the rate the words cane out of a loudspeaker',
and for the most part got only call-signs, date-time groups,
target-area numbers, and "OVER and OUT". �Furthermore, none
of them could make head. or tail out of what they managed. to
write down. This is no isolated instance I believe that it
was the same in every listening post the Zaps had.
Later, we made the officers at Manila Headquarters be- .
lieve that we could copy many times better than their own
operators, end they would alwns take our version of a
message for the correct one. Which suited us very well, as.
We began to "take it easy" shelf the Taps weren't looking,
and often wrote what we thought we heard and. at times even
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made up messages when traffic was low. Making up messa-
ges was necessary, because the Zaps used to get impatient
whenever traffic died down and would tell us to search for
new frequencies or copy China - India Air Service traffic,
which was tiresome as the stations worked day and night.
� On October 17, 1944, we noticed that 2716 Ica. was
jammed with traffic, several stations working at the same '
time. After some listening, we came to the conclusion that
what we heard was a convoy, evidently in motion, ak_every
now and-then there were messages such as "reduce speed to
3 knots," "steer 270", "execute / Baker," "vessel 030, /500
yards, showing lights," eto. This was the first time we had
heard anything of the eort, but we immediately cam.e to the
conclusion that this was a group of vessels not more than
400 miles away (judging. by signal strength on that particu-
lar frequency) and that it was probably an amphibious force.
We told the ,Taps that they were probably going to make a
lending somewhere in the Philippines., but they said it was
impossible and that there was no American fleet strong
enough to :effect a landing on any island in the Philippines,
and they let it go at that. Early in the morning of Oot,.
lath, we noticed that many aircraft carriers were opining up
on 4475 Ice. for radio checks. This led us to believe even
more that there would be a landing, as the edgnals we heard
were exceptionally strong. Later that morning, we had a
light air-raid, and the Zaps ordered us to find the frequen-
cy on which the planes were working. We found a lot of
plane signals on about 4950 Ices but it seemed that there
were not the planes over Manila. On further listening, we
heard mention of iacTAN ISLAND, and looking for it in an
atlas, formed that it was off C337 CITY. The rai4 continued
all day, new planes coming over every two hours or so. It
Was a grand show, and we didn't bother to write as we were
too interested in the goings-on. It was like listening to
a running commentary on a prize-fight. This raid was no-
thing,like the ones we had over Manila, as many more planes
and carriers participated than in any raid we had experien-;
cod. The Manila raids were an "every group for itself"
affair, but in this raid they used what is known as a "figh-
ter coordinator", who met all incoming aircraft at a ren-
dezvous point, and directed them to definite objectives and
tasks. Returning planes would give him the results of
their attacks and request permission to return to their
bases. On giving them permission to return, he would cal/
their carriers, end if necessary, request a certain number ,
of planes to complete the job. Al/ this' was put on the air '
in plain langnage, except for such things as target-area
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numbers, and longitude-latitude position s.which were put in
shackle code. A large number of "bogeys's", were shot down,
and we heard many squeaky-voiced youngsters commenting on
how easy it was. We put this down on paper, and when the
flaps read it, they were not at all pleased, because they had
to admit that the precise number of jape reported down
couldn't possibly be "enemy propaganda." All reference to
the number of Taps shot down was not copied on to the final
day's report, and one Al'ap suggested that we do not emphasize
"Our" own losses. Our reply to that one was "We thougit
you wanted us to copy everything we hear". Naturally, we
continued this practice, but the Saps always saw to it that
nothing of. the sort was included in the final report. On
can hardly picture a people who will not stand for mention of
their own losses even in an official report marked "CONFI-
=MAL".
That same day, we listened to a long and. interesting
rescue mission on 4475 ko. It seems that early in the
morning a small VD had ditched in the channel between Maotay
Island and Cebu City, and the cruisers "KINGFISH" and
"OLAIVRACX" (code rumes, of course)�sent up their scout
planes to pick up the pilot, who was reported to have been
rescued by a native boat. The two planes covered the whole
ohannel at a very low altitude, buzzing every, boat they saw.
Many of the boatmen waved at the planes in a friendly manner,
but the missing pilot was not seen. The planes were ordered
not to attempt a landing on the water as the sea was rather
rough, and after all stations had come to the conclusion that
the pilot was in good hands, they were ordered to fly home.
We didn't sleep a wink that night, nor the next five
days and nights. The big attack on the Philippines which
we had been dreaming of since the first raid on Minna had
finally materialized, we thought, And we were not the least
bit mistaken, for as on as all planes had been reported
"on the deck" we tuned to 2716 kat mhielt was buzzing with
activity. All night, we listened and tuned over the the
medium-wave bands. Many channels were in operation and on
each channel, the control station went under the call sign
"HALIFAX". We took it that HALIFAX was the "Big Boss" of
all the operations, and were quite correct, b �cause many days
later, after the landings had taken place, a station called.
Tacloban Field, requesting that a jeep be provided at the jet-
ty for "HALTFAXT-ITUSELF" at a certain time, No doubt HALIFAX
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17, R
HIMSELF was old man MacArthur.
That night (were still on Oct: lath() we found several
channels on which communications were along the following
lines :
"ACE from PRIVATERR.� SALVO FLA5d."
"PRIVATEER from ACE. NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE. R7UUCE
STARSHFTT. RATE TO ONE EVERY 'MEE LINUTES."
"ACE from PRIVATEER. ROGER."
"ACE from PRIVATEER. SALVO . . FLASH. PRITI.TTXR
OUT:"
What was this? Never heard the like of it before. We
-asked the Taps; they siezed our copy, got together for half
an hour, and then enlightened us with the statement that
they didn't know, and that we had probably missed out many
words. In the meantime we talked it over: SALVO and FLASH
- artillery. STAR SHELLS - further proof of artillery.
ACE - the scout planes sent on the rescue mission the pre-
vious dm, had the call signs ACE EINGFISH and KIIM CLAM:SACK,
and no doubt the ACE in question was ACE PECCVATM, a scout
plane from the ship PRIVATEER. The only ships we knew to
carry scout planes were cruisers and battleships, so the
only conclusion we could possibly have come to was that PRI-
VATEER was a CA or BB, bombarding a target 'i and that ACE was
its air spotter. NO CHA GE, NO CHANGE varied to UP 50, NO
CHANGE, or LEFT 50, NO CHANGE, or UP 50, RIGHT 100, so it
could only have been what we now know it was - firing instruc-
tions. All this we explained to the Taps, adding that it was �
probably C7BU CITY that was being bombarded. This made them
get together for another conference, after which they all
went off to sleep. The next day they were al/ grouchy, and no
doubt tamed the whole blitz on us.
October 19th started early. Arounil 4 a.m. on 4950 ko,
a rather sleepy operator drawled "HALIFAi.to BINGO BASE.
RADIO CHECK" the answer came back "BINGO-BASE to HALIFAX.
READ YOU 5 BY 5." and so it went with BANTO BASE, TIGER
BASE, BRONCO BASE, PEDRO BASE, MAAN BASE, GALLEY BASE, AR-
CHER BASE LOCUST BASE, and all the other aircraft carriers
in the talc force. Pretty soon,- the first fighter controller
(ELMHURST 1) had reported on station at "POINT EASY" and
EALIFAX was instructing each carrier to send up certain num-
bers of VP's VT's and VB's to rendezvous with him at POINT
EASY and receive Lair target assignments, POINT EASY,
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Judging from following convorsations, appeared to be
so.methere over Ly.fT.t: GULF, and we noticed that not all
the planes were being dispatched to CEBU, but that most
of them were assigned to numbered t argot areas. Later
mention of towns such as TARO, CARI.GARA, TANAUAN, DULAG,
and TACLOBAN, showed us that the main force had been sent to
LEYTE,- iere- theycommenced shooting up airfields, beaches -
and trucks along the coastal higo.vrey. By noon we had. heard
mention of "Naval ordnance" "trajectory" and "height of,
naval ordnance." This led us to telievi that a Naval bomb-
ardment was also in progress, and a quick check between 2
and 7 megacycles proved this. We found several ,frequencies
.on which spotter-planes were working with fleet units. '
HALIFAX sent frequent orders of this type: "ALL PLANES from
HALIFAX. BLIGHT OF NAVAL G1M3.. 'RE IN TACLOBAN AREA _IT 1500
FEET." and HE'1GHT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE ALONG .BEACH IN TARGET
AREAS 5254 end 5354 AT 1000 FEET". The height increased
shortly after noon, which 'Showed us (not the Zaps. They
were too slow to follow the whole affair and were s till
using the dictionary on yesterday's copy) that the gunfire '
was going inland. That morning we had heard a message that
set us thingting; it was addressed. to HALIFAX from a plane,
and the part we received wont like this: "UNDERJATER
LITION CREWS HAVE COMPLETED MIXER WORK." We were still
working on it in our subconscious minds vhen HALIFAX. gave
the order to all planes returning to base not to fly over
Leyte Gulf. Several times _after that, planes called ILILIFAX
and requested "PERMISSION TO INVESTIGATE alIPPING "PROOMEM'ING
WESTWARD IN LEYTE GULF," vabich made HALIFAX give the order
for all planes to "OBSERVE STRICT RADIO DISCIPLME REGARDING
aiIPPING IN LEYTE GULF. BY NO MEANS, I REPEAT, BY NO !MANS
WILL ANY AIRCRAFT PROCEEDING TO OR raom TARGET AR.71.43 FLY UM
1.01TE GULF. OUT." The operator was quite peeved, and. I
believe that more than one pilot received a strong reprimand
on landing. I don't see why pilots were not notified verbal-
ly before take-off, that any dapping in the Gulf would be a
friendly landing force. As a result of these careless re-
marks, it is possible tha t the Taps on Leyte took precau-
tions against a possible landing.
Immediately after this owe (mother order from HALIFAX:
"ALL PLANB3 RESTRICT YOUR ATTACKS TO TARGra'S WEST OF COASTAL
RIGe-illAY. DO NOT, unDrm ANY- cIRCUMST.AlkICES, BOMB OR STRAFE
CRAFT APPROAC11.T.NG BEACHE3 OR PERSOMEL ON BEACH:3."
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Thus, we were sane of the first people in Manila to
learn that a major lending had taken place on Leyte. That
evening, when I went to visit my girl, I told her the news.
I cautioned her that there had been no official broadcast
from San Francisco, and. probably would not be for one or
two days, and that we were the only ones in town who knew
about it, therefore to In careful to whom she passed it O. �
The next day, half the town knew - the trustworthy half, and
the Jape were completely unaware of the fact, we had made a
� habit to give her all the news we heard, and. die in turn
p.assed it on to her friends and relatives. By this method
the Spanish community was always well informed, and I add
here that most of the middle-class Spaniards in Manila were
hand-in-hand with the guerrillas. We also told our house
servants 'the news: two of these boys were members of the
R.O.T.C. guerrillas. The Zaps who lived and worked with us
'often beat them up, and I had received. more than one promise
from these boys that they would knife these 7.aps at their
first opportunity. They had their opportunity about a
month after. we left, and I hope they tool full advantage of
it.
By evening, beach-heads hat been secured, r,adar sta-
tions and 41.A. batteries installed. Target rpotting was taken over
by OBOE Stations (0-3 0 was the first one to come on the air),
sad soon these OBOE stations were giving fire control to CHARLIE
stations (C-23, C-24 etc. We Understand that these_arA land
artillerycompanies), as well as to ships: When the beach radar
station ("P:103-1.00LA") began giving battery-control colors, we
gathered that the beadles were under light but persistent air
attack. Also, there were many American planes flying around
with inoperative This was quite a nuisance, because
PA:-.,=COLA was maintaining "FLASH RED" condition most of the
time when danger was non-existent, and this held up a lot of
the unloading of supplies at the beaches. (I learned this
from a quarrel between the operator of REPSICOLA and one on
board. an FS vessel). Of course, such occurrences are unavoidable
when there are so many factors involved, and. I must say that
despite many hitches, supplemented by red. tape and last-minute
changes, the landing was excellently carried out, and I under-
stand it came as a total surprise to the Teps, resulting in
light casualties in man and equipment during the first few
days of the operation.
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The next few days are not clear .in my�mind, as far as
the sequence of occurrences goes, because *re had almost no
sleep from the 17th to the 25th. I remember us working for
stretches of 36 and .40 hours, and then just passing out. To
further aggravate our plidat, the food we were getting was
far from our daily requirements. It consisted of one 4-inch
dried fish end.rice in the morning, two 4-inch dried fish and
� cooked grass for lunch, and cooked grass with meat scraps and
rice in the evening. Black coffee was available any time of
the day, but they rationed our sugar so that we could only
have a cup after each meal. We almost kissed the jap who
dropped in late One nit aril, bless his heart, produced, of all
things - .130T DOGS - "by order of the Commander, and with his
compliments, in appreciation of your diligence." However, a
couple of hot dogs didn't pep us up enough to get us out of
the stupor that prevented us from telling day from night, to
say nothing of the date. All we had in our minds were signals,
oall-siens, frequencies, task forces and. Ga.'s. I dreamed, ,
. in one of my pass-outs, that I had stolen a 'SET plane and. landed
safely on an American carrier, forthwith. - I was t aken to the
mess-room and fed State-side food, all the while chatting with
the pilots, whose voices and. names I knew tiro well.
� I believe it was on the morning of the 20th that sae ut
planes reported. a Tap fleet off SITLUVI IS. (at the e.-..stern .
entrance to Leyte Gulf) and another in SAMAR STRAIT; and�sti-1i
another coining in from the South into Leyte Gulf. I renelber
clearly the order given b-7 HALIF..tr. to 99 G3.7,1.17 (who was
BILA)IST 3, figjiter-coordinator) to take some planes and in-
� tercept the fleet coming up from the south. He went off with
several VT, s , VB s and VT's. The VIPs were, luckily, carry-
� ing two 500 po.und, and several 100 pound bombs each, and the
VT's each carried a large torpedo, while the VT's had full-load
machine-guns and. 8 rockets each. Soon 99 GALLEY reported to�
HALIFAX:
niim,rFAx 99 GALLEY. HAVE MADE CONTACT IATffi. LIP
FLEET GROUP. LM:0 BY TM CA's, ESCORTED BY FIVE
� DD's AND =DING om CV AND OM CTE."
"THIS IS 99 GALLEY. VICTOR TAR,E�3 SPLIT UP iND
� ATTACK THE CA's. VICTOR BEKEttS ATTACK C.n.le AND
CV's. TIEN TAKE DD's WITil LIT CALIBER B0:1B3.
VICTOR FOXES STRAFE DD's WITH ROCKETS."
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stalunea 99 GALLEY. .A.V: GOING DOWN TO ATPACK".
Then there was silence. Five minutes later, 99 GALLEY
reported that he had sunk one of the cruisers, heavily damaged
the other, and dispersed the destroyers. One of the carriers
was listing heavily with a destroyer standing by. After his
planes had expended their ammo, they *returned to base.
Right after this, HALIFAX ordered. all stations to
observe strict radio silence, and told the planes to switch
to VHF, limiting their communications to important messaees
� only. For tbe real of the day, their wee not so much as a
peep on 4950 kb, or any other channel. While looking over
the dial in the afternoon, I came over a new frequenc7 where
I heard:
",Tars IS NAVY HALIFAX, IstrE ARE UNDER ATTACK IN .
� LrrrE GULF. CALLING ALL 1=...1 ALL N Alf�TS �717.4. ER-
EMIGETCY. THIS IS NAllY HALIFAX OTTZ."
and. then, silence. nrezy now and then an excited voice would
come up on 4475 ko, saying something like "GOOD HIT, DTI. I'LL
GET THE OMER ONE'," thereupon HALIFAX would say "GLT T1T ILL
OFF TETE AIR, YOU - - -" And there we sat, biting cur nails
all afternoon. Late in the afternoon, HALIFA1C. notified all
planes that they could only land at TAFFY 1, and that TAFFY 2
end 3 have scattered and were under smoke screens. T.7e rathered
that the TAFFIES were carrier-groups. The planes were told to
lend at either Dulag or an airfield that wait under the name of
"PEPaGOIA. B1311" . This may have been Tacloban Field, but as I
remember, I believe that pert of it was still in the bends of
the raps at the time. Some time that evening we found a
frequency on Which someone was instructing someone else to load
all planes with heavy bombs and torpedoes as that was the stuff
that did all the good work. He cautioned against letting green
pilots up in heavily loaded planes, as some had already messed
up the Field in unsuccessful take-offs. He said that he weuld
give the next days instructions on a frequency that he geve in
shackle code, and that it was imperative that the Zep a were not
let in on tomorrow's plans.
We fignred this frequency would be in the VILF region, so
we didn't bother to look for it, but late that night I accidental-
ly came over a channel on which that same operator was saying
"all riert," the, I'll be seeing you in the morning." Well,
that was that; tie had &Jelled it. The next day there was more
silence. The Zaps were happy, and many said that the silence
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was due to an Anerioan retreat. We let them bask in the sun.*
shine of their thoughts, but not for long', for after the 22nd.
more and more ground stations caae on the air, and even .1.11,TSI-
CO.LA BMIE, came on the air under the call sign 11�41.2a4, %lah
to us meant that the Boss himself was ashore.. Oen Francisco
said that �the ;rap fleet had suffered .a major defeat, and. had
been reduced to but a media-sized task force. The "Manila
Tribune', aad Tokio Radio said that the Allied fleet had been
dispersed. and ha u left the forces on Leyte to the mercy, of the
Imperial Japanese Arhy. However, Tokio Radio dia not mention
how merciful the Ieruerial jak.) Army had. proved, iv allowing
American f orces to drive deeper and. deeper int.o the island. of
Leyte.
� Up to now, the .as had not taken seriously our statement
that a landin3 had been Made on Leyte - they believed only what
they heard. from Tokio Radio. This had a rather oonfusing
effect on the reports they compiled for Headquarters, because
whereas we took down traffic which alwws mentioned troops on
shore, American planes on Tacloban airfield, Araericon ships in�
Tacloban harbor, etc., the Zaps had to compile a final report
which did not Doint.too much to a landing. Also, when the Japs
announced their "victory" over the American and ihistralian
fleets in Leyte Gulf, they mentioued, that these fleets were
intercepted. in an attempted landing by the ever-vigaant jap
fleet, and that the landing had. completely failed as a resalt
of.the action taken by the Japs, although a "small nu:.th3r (-Tr
allied aersonnel had succeeded in reaching the beaches and
were beina wiped. up b, local jap garrison forces." ;ten this
report eeze through, the jape, believing it, made us understand
that we were only operators and that our duty vas tc ccpy down
traffic - not to voice opinions as if we were senior officers.
In other words, we were to hand. our copy to the ;rap officer wad
let them do all the thinking. By order of the Co:nander, "who
had been quite upset by our statemeats thich were most untrue
and of a careless nature. They further made us enderstand that
if we had been Japanese, it would have been all the worse for �
us. lIowever, this stateraent was voiced by a Ileadqu2rters repre-
sentative, 'Ere& we were later told. by EUBO, the Jcp who had been
put in charge of us by 1U311.1M.A. because he was useles:3 for any-
thing else, that we had been a swell job, and that we knew
our stuff, but that the Headquartersgine were a hard-headed lot
and .had. to be given.their own wekir. MO was joined. in his state-
ment by 'Alai an Mayeda, a young headquarters officer, who admired
and. envied us for our ability as operators. Enbo didn't seem to
give a damn for his own kind: he had. been educated in america.-
and. seemed to like foreigners. He also had a soft affection for
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the whisky bottle; going around, with a red face most of the
time. Layeda once told us, "because I am Japanese, I must
not discuss it, tut to you I can say that I wish the Japanese
could fight like Americans. We are too serious in our
fighting, while the Americans make a game of it." Nodoubt, he
had in mind the many cracks American pilots made while in
danger and in the midst of battle. We had made a habit of
writing down all the wisecracks we heard, and there were many.
.After 'the 25th, traffics died down to routine messages,
and all planes worked on Mr making It impossible for us to
hear them. By this time the Zaps had collected an assortment
of "operators", vho were to work 8-hour shifts parallel with
us working on 12-hour shifts. These "operators" were supposed
to see that we didn't fall asleep on our beat. One of the
fellows the japs produced was a Portugueb-japenese from
Shanghai, by tht name of Tomm Silva. We made friends with
him quickly, as he proved to be a swell guy. It seems that he
used to work as salesman for Yangtze Motors here in Shanghai,
and was sent to Manila early in 1944 together with his manager.
The manager returned to Shanghai, leaving Silva in �:ani/a - on
the lurch -, whereupon the Navy grabbed him and put him to work
in our station. He couldn't copy a ward to save his life, and
it. took a cOuple of weeks befb re he learned the basic fundamen-
tals of voice communication. He was of very great help to us,
because whenever .lis duty was at night, we used to turn on all
the sets in one -room and let :them blare away, while the three
of us moved into another room, shut all the doors and listened
to swell music from San Francisco over a bottle of gin or
whisky, which the Taps always had in stock. All the Zaps slept
in an adjoining house', and never got wise to our nightly cele-
brations. We were, of course, celebrating the Leyte landing,
for which we had a special affection, since we knew more about
the operation as a whole than any junior. officer bathe 11.3.Army,
or Marines at ,the time. We still think of this landing as if we
had actually taken part in it. Our reports on such nights
usually read: "2000 to 0400. Little or no traffic of importance
on 2716 and 4475 kts. Spent much time ]Joking over dial for
channels which might have been operating, but results negative."
And really, there was absolutely nothing of important to report
on. Tbven raids on Manila didn't produce much copy, as all
communication was on VHF and we had no VHF receiver. The Zaps
said they would supply us with .one soon, but none was forth-
coming, probably due to jealousy on the part of the H.Q. staff,
who were only too glad to see that our reports were getting
smaller and smaller. They, of course, copied down all the
unimportant traffic that came throug: on 2716 ke. This frequently
was now being used for harbor-control and. messages such as this
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CRT
were plentiful: �
"TOVIAL 742 from STEETCORN. PLFASE RELAY TO ZOVILL
748 'ALE FOLLO1:ING IZSSAGE - MIS IS MY 022125.
ACTION JOVIAL 748, INF0IIMATI03 JOVIAL 740 and COAD-
WOOD 340 - '11:1,1"7.7RUIOL YOUR 021630 ITEM ON (iIUTIC)
KILOCYM, ES. AFFIR:LATIVE. PITASE RFTJAY TO I: :7
ADD:XS ."
Very infbrmitive - what? These messages with reference
to previous ones sent on a TARS BAKE?. ilIGAR channel (note five-
figure shackle group in the message) were of absolutely no use
to anyone but the addressee. However, they were sent and
repeated many times, allowing Tap operators opportunity to fill-
in portions which they missed. The Zaps liked this, and as their
Superiors judged their work by volume, they were happy. We
could never get ourselves to copy suoh trash; thus H.Q. always
had. the edge on us in bulky reports. It seems that Zap bommen-
dere judged their _subordinates by efforts expended; not by
results achieved.
. In the meantime, as I am an ardent "ham", I was greatly
intrigued by the possibilities of long-skip VHF signals. I
wanted to know just how the sporadic E.layer behaved in tropi-
cal regions. With this in mind, I went to our station's repair
shop and dug out a 7N7 tube. By the end of the day I had a
simple super-regenerative VHF receiver in operation. Our
Packard-Bell disc recorder's amplifier'section provided-plenty
of audio gain, and after receiving several grunts of disappro-
val from our station engineer, who did not like my meddlin
around with sets b efore "consulting" with him, .I set up a 'la
antenna in one of our operating rooms and went to work. I had
two coils on the set, one of 5 and the other of two turns. The
five turn coil brought in the local airport statioh and SD Me
Zap planes with tremendous volume.
The next time we had a raid, I listened on my set, to the
great resentment of my superiors, Who gathered that I was merely
westing valuable time. To the delight of my superiors, I as
unsuccessful, but I was not discouraged. That. evening I made
two coils, a one-turn and a half-turn affair. The set would go
out of oscillation on the high frequency half of the Ralf-turn
coil, but at a point just before tat, I noticed a 500-cycle,
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srion r, T
wide-band carrier. II/ the Manila Radar. I called up Ensign
Mayeda and asked him the frequency of the local radar. He was
quite reluctant to divulge the "military secret", but after
some persuasion intimated, that it was in the region of 150
megacycles.. After a bit of calculation I discovered that the
antenna resonated on that frequency, end a quick check with
� Lechter wires gave a cross-check, on the antenna le,neth and the
truth of Ensign Mayeda's information. The next few days were
� raid-free, and when finally the sirens blew, I rushed to my
receiver, and sure enough, on 1.41 rac I picked up my eels whom
I had not heard for a couple of weeks, In a feet minutes, the
room was packed with Zees, all jibberine with excitement. The
racket they made, supplemented by the loud hiss of the receiver,
made it, impossible to copy a word. I got sore end chased them
all our of the room, including officers. This act they must
�have Dlamed on our high-strung nerves, for there were no
reprisals.
Signals were so thick that it was possible only to get
plane calls End scattered ortions of target instruction. -,3ut
when all planes were rei.ven orderes to return to base, the leader
called "1 MAY BRATIVP (to keep sigiale on UP, relay planes
were used to handle traffic between task force and target �seat)
and gave him the results of his attack and suggestions for
future sweeps. I noticed that the plane calls were sligitly
different from previous raids.� V:hat would have been 21 BONO
before., was 21 ABLE Bit.MCCri and so forth. As soon as their
signals died down, we heard a new group in rendezvous over Laguna
de Bay using �cells with a RAM prefex. We gathered this was
the second wave, and as the "all clear" siren had sounded, we
phoned headquarters and told them that a second group was on its
11.c. asked us ho W we knew, and we answered that we had �
heard. planes with B.AIC151 prefixes, and assumed that they were the
second wave. H.Q. however, reminded us that we EMould work more
and assume less, and asked isliat the planes were saying. 1.�:e answered
that they were merely getting rendezvoused, to ',which H.C.,e replied
"then why the hell do you think they're coming here?" and hung
up. In fifteen minutes we were under a helm/ air attack, and the
siren had not given warning (the radar did not pick them up,
because it was customary of Zap radars to stop as soon as they
had picked up enemy plEmes - to avoid being detected and con.se-
� quently stop up.) This is how badly Zap tactics stank. Over and
over again, after that instance, we could have warned I1.. of a
raid and even of turgets, as much as 20 minutes in advance, but
after that first experience with their utter stupidity, we did
not even try. That day, five waves of planes came over, each
� weve giving ample. warning beforehand.
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s ri crzET
Later, however, the Taps merely kept the city under air-raid
contri all day after the first morning alarm. ''.Te often told
them that all was clear, but they wouldn't even take our "all
clear" inforeation. This was bad for us, because both of us
had to stay in the house during emergencies, end both wanted
to go over and chat withthe gals. In the evening, as we were
sitting on the balcony, we saw a car pull UP A couple of
colonels had come to visit us. It was customary for us to
duck whenever there was brass around the place, so we didn't
care to .thow ourselves much. But when we came into
operating room, we saw something that made us sick. There
was our "engineer", showing off Er, liriEr set, and evidently
taking credit for it. The army officers were all smiles when
we walked in, but as soon as they say us they gave us a look
that hadn't been wasted in years, and asked. our asps something
th.at translated probably meant, "who the hell are these trazaps?"
Our "engineer" answered that we were operators. We stuck around
and listened, as we had learned�to understand Japanese sligatly.
It seems that these colonels were asking the "engineer" for a
diagram of the set and he was stalling. The Emu radio techni-
cian with them could not make heal or tail of my set, and I
don't wonder. Wires led from it in all directions - to a
eoramunications receiver for power, to the recorder for ampli-
fication, and to a throwshitch and a pair of leads with which
I could. use an indoor or outdoor antenna at will. After the
officers left, our engineer asked me to draw him a diagram of
the set. Later that evening, as Kazack toyed withthe receiver,
he noticed that it was being blocked by a strong carrier.
alertly after, a voice began speaking. It was a stetica-on
LEY111L, working on 98,000 kc: It was a VIV relay of a radio
correspondent broadcasting over the "Voice of Freedom". The
signal was so stronc,. that ws heard it ell over the dial. It
blocked ow; super-regeneration completely. That was the only
instance of. long distance VHF that I had experienced - a dis-
tance of 340 miles:
In November and December there was nothing for us to do
but take traffic during raids. The jap operators had learned
how to copy 2716 ko traffic and kept our daily reports -long.
I told the fTaps that there would Drobably be a lending
somewhere else in th e ialand.s on December 8th, to commemorate
Pearl Harbor, but they didn't pay *much attention. 3ure enough
there was an 0:11iMUS radio silence on the 8th, 9th, aid 10th,
and then San Francisco announced that I'vlindoCo had been invaded.
This got the sia:ls quite worried, and they told. us that in
th.e�interests of our safety, theymuld fly us out in case the
fireworks came any closer. We said that we wanted to stay
*
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"until, we saw tbc. whites of their eyes" (and hoped even longer),
but orders were orders, and on the night of Deo. 23 we were told
that we were to leave the next morning, at five. Shortly before
this, when I received a ,remonition of our departure, I told my
girl friend that then the .emericans cereal she was to get in
contact with Intelligence and tell them about us, and also pass
on the information that we wouli try to set up a station in.
alhanshai (I had salvaged a 4475 Ito crystal from some slnasb.ed
radio equipment off a Grumman, which the japs gave us) and that
our call sign would be DUODLESUG on 4475 kc. Later, in Shanghai,
we almost fainted when we hoard DJODLEBUG on 4475 kc. It seems
that Clark Field had taken that call, two :months after we had
reserved it for our own use.
L'e arrived in Shanghai on Dec. 29th 1944, and after a
short r eat were put to work in a radio workshop on the 5th
floor of the Naval Attache's Office 27, the Build. After working
there a month, and relieving the Zaps of a quantity of parts, we
were ordered to start the smae work we did in Manila. A Dr. Yama-
moto was out in charge of us by Ikushima, via() had some to Tokyo,
and. a Mr. Icaijima, Yamamoto's subordinate was giventhe post of
nursemaid to us. We installed the station in 605 Wayfoong House,
next door to Ichijima's apartment. Before leaving the workshop,
we were told to convert two junk heaps into receivers, and also
given a Viri reeeiver which we rebuilt to suit our needs. Later,
I showed Peter haw this receiver could be turned into a tre.ns-
mitter bi- changing one resister and. putting a microphone in the
cathode circuit of the detector tube. We reckoned it would
come in handy if we had a ch-ariee to talk to American planes
raiding ehanghai. We never had a chance to use it because we
were never alone in our station. However, knowing that it radia-
ted a considerably st.t)ng signal even in 'receiving hoop-up, we p
played havoc with the local, radars by parking our signal on their
frequency. *.*.'e used to play a regular game with them during air
raids. Waiting until their beam was directed away frora us, we
would turn our sigial on their frequency. Imaediately, the beam
would be directed toward us, whereupon we would switch off our
carrier. This we used to do for hours on end, and the J'egs never
succeeded in locating our paisition.
There was almost nothing to do for some time. Signals
from the Philippines on 4475 and 2716 kc. were weak and. unreada-
ble, and there were no air raids. The Jape tpt impatient. and in
the middle of February, we were visited by Lieutenants 7.1..a.ruyama,
Tanaka dud Yamawaki of the 3econdary ILQ. Listening-Post. he
ignorance and great self-assurance of these gentlemen was even
worse than anything we had experienced in Manila. All they were
interested in was A.T.O. and China Air. Bases communication. We
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did net like it when they ordered us to listen to these
stations, because they worked ceaselessly and the material
sent was either coded operational data or plain language
reports on transport-plane movements. However, .we did as
ordered, and purposely missed the first landings on iwojima
(of' course, we followed them on our own). As soon as the Zaps
noticed these signals, they told us to copy them,not believing
that we understood them perfectly.. There were the same target
,designation signals, the same landing craft signals, and the
OMB patrol-plane signals. All this was old stuff to us but
Greek to the Zees.
�
Prom than on, we told the Zaps that we would concentrate
on Naval oormiunication and leave the tiresome China traffic to
them. They agreed as China traffic yielded more bulky reports.
We oovated the loadings onOkinawa, and a few air �raids from 0-
kizursa bases on,Shenghai. 9 ever there was nothing half as
'spectacular as that we had seen in the Philippines. We held a
transmitter in readiness for any possible invasion in the
Shanghai area, but unvisited a chance to use it. Here is an
example ef the utter stupidity of' the 1.1... boys in hang)iai.
.the first' big raid on Shanghai, the ca/1 signs of the
PM standbys were .PLATD".ATE 18, 19; 20 and 4u2EB0X 45, 46.
Early the next morning, we were waiting for signs of another
raid, *hen tre heard ZIITZBOX 1 and 2-torking.with AGATE 13J, vhi-ch-
was (in: our opinion) IWOJIMIL. As soon as the Zap on duty heard
these signals, he dashed to the phone and in excited tones
notified. li.Q. that the raiders had taken off. It took some time
to make him unlerstand that these planes were not even from
Okinawa. Later we heard PLAYLIATES 18, 19, 20 call BOXM (control
station of an Okinawa air base), saying.that they were orbiting
POINT LEBRA (yesterday's rendezvous point for Shanghai-bound
planes) and inquiring as to the whereabouts of ZUTEBOX 45 and 46.
Now this was the thing we were waiting for, but H.Q. had already
sounded the alarm from the report the Zap had put in previously.
OUT reaction to this was "what's the use," and this reaction
prevailed until tie end of the war.
Now for .a bit of technical data.
Our receiving station in Han.ila oansisted of the follow-
ing receivers: Two lialloarlund super-Pro's, One 'Hal/icrafter
Diversity (out of alignment. Never repaired because enKinder
said it was in perfect condition), One Hallicrafter :Super-
pefiant, One Hallicrafter Sky Buddy, and two, broadcast receivers.
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Two recorders were also on head, but we never used. them.
.Antennas were put up vd.th no regard for trees or direction.
In Shanghai we started with one battered ROL. 6-tube all
wave set, and one GEC /0-tube affair� (British made, and-cali-
brated in rasters) also a broadcast set. We also had, a super-'
%generative VW set with a separate audio amplifier. These sets
were later supplemented by another GEC of the same type, and an
old Pilot all-wave set, and still later by an AR-77 which we
pinched from the German Embassy. When we got the AR-77, we threw
away all the junk end used the a.77 with the two GEC's, which
were quitesensitive, as standbys. Still later, in July to be
exact, we received a Tal converter (which our engineer had built
of parts which had just arrived from Japan. He left Illanila for
Tokyo in November *44 for the purpose of buying VHF parts. It
took 8 months for these parts to finally reach us).
To .conclude, I wish to state that the U.S. Navy did. a
mo
_ d job in keeping secrets. Anything revealed in voice commu-
nication had only momentary value.. Only two give-aways are
outstanding. One is the shackle code, which I believe can be
broken after �a few hours of traffic). The other is the ominous
radio silence that always precedes a lexbling, and persistent
orders to planes to Iceep away from groups of shipping, vhich of
course are amphibious forces ready for /ending.
_
X should say that the Zaps utterly failed in their radio-
snooping. Had the Germans been given as much information, they
cold have done a lot with it, as they are much more methodical.
/ don't believe that as much plain-language voice corm-
nioation was used in Europe as here in Asia.
likat"ITO YAMR.4.0TO was in charge of the Listening Post for
the :apanetie Navy.
This Post was establitited in February; .1945, for tae pur�
pose of monitoring radio signals only in the 'Pacific Ocean
areas. The first monitoring that was suocessfully completed.
was that of the landing at Iwojima. At this time, according
to YAMAMOTO, they were able to pick up voice signals from ship
to base and from plane to ship but not between ships.
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� YALIAZ.POTO stated that througi monitoring voice messages,
his office was able to predict the. landing at Okinala appro-
ximately two days in advance. However, at Okinawa, the same
situation prevailed in that his officio was capable only of
monitoring messages from base to ship and plane to ship or
base but not from ship to ship. This office was most sues:mei-
ful in monitoring bombardment assignments vhich were given from-
base to ship every evening.
Yills.LAMOTO said his section had neither equipment nor
operators to monitor CW communications.
TOLIII0 MAMBA, the officer in charge of the information
and liariton section, stated that approximately March 1945, the
Itapanese expected a landing by the, Allied Forces and picked as
the most probable landing point Hangch.ow Bay, immediately South
of Shanghai. It was at this Bay that the Japanese Forced lan-
ded in /937 at the time of the China Incident.
Because of this expected attack on Shanghai by Allied
assault forced =LISA stated that the Army which was the most
powerful unit in China took complete charge of communications
and defensive positions in and about Shanghai
KAMA stated at this time the Navy set up its Listening
^Post in order to keep itself infonned fully of the couse of the
war. However, the monitoring was very ^ineffective beeause of _
lack of' equipment and trained personnel. Radio equipment at
Shanghai, according to 1/MBA, was depleted and deteriorated to
a great extent and no replacements were received from Tokyo.
NATZBA stated that the supply of radio tubes was extremely acute
and because of this, even Radio Tokyo had on occasion been
required to cancel programs. Both the Army and Navy were
extremely jealous of conmtunication6nd refused to allow �Tapanese
civilians to become well acquainted with the work. Although he
was a Zapanese citizen, NALatt said he was a civilian dud the
Navy often was suspicious of him to such an extent that there'
were numerous communication rooms to which he was forbidden to
go although his inferiors who were regular Navy men were not
forbidden to enter these rooms. (In addition they diA not have
sufficient military personnel trained in communications.)
Lt. KATSIMISA M.ARTITAVT A advised that he entered the Tapa-
nese Navy in 1942 and after attending Navy School in Tokyo for
six =maths, he was assigned to Singapore where he was Employed
as a supply officer. Previous to entering the Navy, MAIM= �
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stated had oompleted a 'basil:es:3 School. at Tokyo. In July 1944,
LIARUYAL'L was transferred to Shanghai and shortly thereafter, he
was attached to the Listening Post at the China Seas Fleet. which
� was located at Japanese 'Marine Barracks in Hongkew.
His duty was to monitor the voice section of' the American
radio. He was also charged with keeping the Navy infrorm.ed of '
� the status of the Pacific war. This MAPITTAMAexplained, was
necessary, since sufficient information regarding the conflict
won not furnished the local office by Tokyo. MARITYAMAstated
that his equipment to iierform this task was limited to three or
four receivers of the RCA and international type manufactured
� by the United States concerns.
His assistants were three to four Naval Petty officers
who did not speak TInglish very well and accordingly were handi-
capped in their monitoring duties. His office maintained. a 24- .
hour soh edule.
VIARDIAIZA said that the most successful monitoring was done
On 'vesicle connections from ship to station, from plane to piano,
and from plane to ship. His first successful monitoring operation
was the landing of the United States Forces at Okinawa. Althougi
this was almost a year after the station had been set up,
MARCY-AMA, in great embarr.essment, explairred that while he was
monitoring American voice connections, he was not given American �
speaking personnel with which to do this monitoring and according-
ly, it was necessary to train his personnel aid while training
them, their monitoring activities were extremely unsuoceseful and
inefficient.
Lt. sin Anita advised that he was attached to the intelli-
gence communications service of the China Seas Fleet. Prior to
his entering the Navy in 1942, ADTTLIA. had had no previous comma-
nicAtions training nor was he given any during his course of
study on the Naval Office in Tokyo.
His duties were to detect and monitor the movements of
American landing Forces.
A.DtTIKA stated that he had the following equipment:
Direction Finder 9.3 type, of Japanese make,
10-15 receivers with a range from 300 Igo to
15 mo. of' the 9.2 type, Japanese make.
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With these equipments ADJIMA stated that he could minitor both
voice and OW communications. However, these communications had
to be monitored by ear and transcribed as they ,came through the
air, since his office was not equipped with recording machines.
ADJIMA stated that by measuring the velocity, strength,
and the cell signals of the American. Fleet, be ,was able, he
belieVed with some degree of accuracy, to preect the location
of the American ships. However, on one occasion was he able
to predict s, landing of American Forces.
ADJIMA stated that each day his office sent to Tokyo the
location of American ships as shown by his direction finder.
Also, American messages in code were sent to Tokyo. No attempt
to break the code was made at Shanghai. since Tokyo was the
clearing house for all coded messages.
jilSTOILTAN
HYOZO HASEGAWA was Naval Historian. He was also connected
with the information and liaison section.
**4H14HHIMISHHHI-*******
(3) The enemy properties control room:
This organization handled the investigation and supervi-
sion of enemy properties under the control of the Japanese Navy.
The following are its officers and Personnel:
Paymaster-Lt.
Paymaster-Lt.
Paymaster-Lt.
Paymaster-Lt.
Paymaster-Lt.
Paymaster-Lt.
T. KOBAYASHI (Oct.,
T. SOMA (Feb.,
N. OutiuHI (pee.,
H. IWAMA (Dec.,
KASAHARA (Dec.,
T. 'IKEDA (July,
Civilian employee:
TERASHIMA
1942 - April 1943)
1942 - June 1943 )
/942 - July 1945 )
1941 - Oct. 1942 )
1941 - Oct. 1942 )
1945 - Aug. 1945 )
(Nov., 1942 - Aug. 1945 )
In discussing the operation and duties of his office,
Admiral MINATO claimed that at no time was it necessary
for his office to set up an intelligence system or
intelligence network for the following reasons
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1) Tokyo was the center of all intelligence
activities and they were directed from Tokyo.
The Navy had not given his office any funds
with which to set up an intelligence network.
The Navy was not responsible for' operations
On the China continent, with .the exception
of Amoy where the Navy had complete jurisdic-
tion and at Hong Kong where the Navy had con-
current jurisdiction, with the Army. The
Navy was not responsible for the defense of
China. Their main activities were limited
to blockade the China coast and resisting any
assault forces of the Allies.
During most of the Pacific war, both the
Japanese Navy and Army at Shanghai felt itself
secure and did not expect an invasion or any
activity by the Allies ljn that area. Then
this feeling Was dispatched in March 1945, the
Army took over the defense of Shanghai and
according.ly the Navy had MD interest in the
espionage activities of Allied nationals, either
within or in the vicinity of Shanghai.
AUMACEJE
Informant advised that the actual intelligence work WAS
carried on for the Japanese Navy by Kikans. In most instances
these Kikans were responsible directly to the Zapanese-Naval-
Headquarters at Tokyo, japan, since this was Headquarters for
all intelligence intbrmation. In many instances these Kikans
did not report intelligence information to the Shanghai Naval
Headquarters.
In some instances, Kikans were organized for special and
specific purposes, such as the SAKURAKikan, and when its
mission was completed, the Kikans disolved. In other instances
Kikans were organized by the local Naval Headquarters to com-
plete their mission and to follow directives sent to them from
Tokyo. The most usual mission of the Kikan was to obtain
economic material and data in China.
Among the Kikans which reportedly were organized and
directly controlled by the Imperial Japanese Navy were the
following:-

SZCEZT
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�
The firm of MANNA was established in 1937 soon after the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict,, by Yin =AO an old
China hand.
MANWA began operations on a small scale because of its
inability to secure substantial financial aid. Prior to the
Pacsifie War, its staff of about ten persons negotiated small
purchases for the local Japanese Army and Navy. With the
outbreak of the war, however, MA became qu.ite active in the
Shanghai purchasing market:
At the very outset of the war, MANNA was known to possess
no capital to launch into large scale business. With every
indication of a huge upward tendency in large business dealings,
'MI, the President of LTANWA, decided that the only way to obtain
sizeable financial assistance from any of the large banks would
be to enlist the support of the Japanese Navy. After this
decision MI invited the services of Vice-A.dmiral TANNAWA T3SHIO,
retired from active service. TANNAWA readily agreed to aid
MAMA. Because of his rank and connections, as a contact man
for MAMA with the Japanese Navy, Vice-Admiral TANNAWA proved
invaluable. Reopened the road to a sudden briskness in the
business dealings of =MA.
MANV1A was registered at the Shanghai Japanese Consulate
under the name of TOKUla Kumla, (Amalgamated Organization). Sine
it was an Amalgamated Organization, TAANWA's huge profits imme-
diately were invested in the organization to expand its business
into diversified fields. =INA soon became known as the Go TO
IO_NIN. or the specified buyers or merchants of the Lope=
Japanese Navy. The operations of KOWA seemed outwardly to be
under the complete control of the Japanese Navy. There are,
however, reports, unverified at this time, that this situation
was not necessarily so.
In its position of controlling MANWA, the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy had no difficulties in placing personnel in the
organization, dictating to the organization, and controlling its
policy. There are reports that MAMA was the leading espionage
organization of the Imperial Japanese Navy in China and South-
east Asia. These reports, unverified at present, are being
investigated.
S r, C: 11 17, T 4a
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Shanghai is not a large manufacturing canter, and
cargoes existing here at the time of the war were Ill imported
from foreign countries. These cargoes the Chinese put away in
a very clever way and were unaffected by the various proclama-
tions issued by the Japanese Army against such (pods. Although
such statements were issued by the Japanese, they lacked ini-
tiative, system, and organization to round up these goods, for
imb.ich they were willing to pay fabulous prices.
- .
Zu its advantageous position of knowing in advance the
exact requirements of the Japanese Navy, and what their imme-
diate future requirements would be, MAMA, in a quiet manner,
would start buying the required goods in the local market. A;
the Navy orders came through, LUNWA, in a very conspicuous
manner, would make reorders to every seller, broker, and
commission agent.
The issuance of such orders was immediately known to the
business world. The influential cargo (mere would then adopt
a "Wait end see" policy to observe the price fluctuation. Once
buying began prices skyrocketed. �For instance, prior to the
issuance of orders by the Japanese Navy, an item such as carbon
steel of about 70% and 30% manganese content would be quoted at
CRI3 430.00 per pound. When buying began, the prioe would jump
to anywhere from CU $.120.00 to ORB ;7.15040 per pound.
�
By that time, however, =WA had purchased for the Navy
all of its requirements. This would be delivered to the Navy
at the prevailing market priOe. By this method MANKA,-built-up
a huge capital.
The position of IL1NWA as the GO TO SHO NIN for the Impe-
rial Japanese Navy was well known in the Shanghai business
World. Funds were issued by banks at the suggestion of the
Navy, for banks were glad to render aid to MANWA knowing that
their investments would be good. The market continued to show
a steady upward trend, and LIMWA's profits were enormous.
ILANWA.'s capital and assets cannot be accurately deter-
mined because they were invested, in the purchase of various
commodities in the local market. A good estimate, however,
'mould be about one-half of the alOIYA TSITSEM, information regar-
ding the &IOWA TSUSHO is being collected at the present time.
MANWA.,s cargoes and assets were impounded by the Chinese
authorities upon the cessation of hostilities. The source of
this information is, therefore, unable to give more exact
details.
SECRET - 49 -
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Informant stated that the office of PIANVIA in Shanghai
was located at 53 Foochow Road. This building at 53 Foochow
Road is occupied by the Strategic Services Unit, United States
Army.
Because of the demands made on it by the Imperial ,Tapa-
nese Navy, and with its mountainous funds, MANVITA diversified
� its operations into many fields. JLANWA operated its own ships,
but this enterprise was shortlived because of wide spread and
systematic Allied submarine operations in the Pacific. ne2T.VA
started transport of cargo on the Kimr_oN YAM* 2000 tons. This
'vessel was sunk off Singapore. The =NA I:kW, 300 tons, was
� sunk between Taiwan and Fukusb.u. =IRE ?LAM, 1600 tons an
� old ship with forty years service, was sunk off Amoy wale in
transit from Indo-China. ,Unable to purchase or charter other
ships, this project was kept in abeyance. Chartering, however,
� was actually being done on a very small scale.
Under the 1/IANWA LUMBER CON.P.ANY lumber was purchased from
the interior of China in great quantities. This lumber Company
it is reported, was fully controlled by the Zapanese Navy. How
the profits were shared, or the basis on which the work was
performed, is not 'mown. In name, however, the company was
controlled by MANWA..
MAIM% was reported to own a Receiving and Transmitting
Station, but actually this station did not belong to them. The
Zapenese Navy (BU KM FU) had full control of this-stati_onl_
and naval personnel only was hired to do the work. But since
the Navy did not have ample funds to operate this station, they
had apparently obtained assistance from LANA. to pay the staff
and expenditures.
MANWA is reported to have operated an alcohol distillery
in Pootung. This distillery is said to have been the largest
of its kind in the Shanghai area. No further details are avai-
lable at this time.
11A17:A extended its activities to cover China and I3outheast
Asia by establishing branch offices.
The following list of places where ir4ANWA had branch offi-
ces was furnished by Admiral Y1NA.TO:
C H I NA:
AMOY NANKING
CANTON PTZTGPU
CILUIGSHA PEPING
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a
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CELANGTE (HOPEI PROVINCE)
FOOCHOW
cansromANG
HANK=
HANTAN (HOPEI PROVINCE)
HONGKONG
KI1TKIANG
FRENCH risrp3 CHMA:
HANOI
HAIPHONG
SAIGON
HOIHOW
YULI
HAINAN ISLAND:
krAKASSER:
BALnPAPAN
BANDY-ERN:A.5M
JAKARTA
PONTIANAK
SURABAYA
SINGAPORE
=OKA
NAGASAKI
OSIXA
TOKYO
ir
jAPAN:
PHILIPPINES:
SHANGHAI
SEiIHMILN
SIITSIi;NG (HONAN PROVINCE)
TIINTSIN
TSINGTAD
TSINM
WM'
The Hank= branch was initiated about two years ago for
the same purpose as its mother company, that is, purchasing
for the Navy. The same is true of the Peking and Tientsin
offices which operated for about a year and a half.
C DT
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The Peking and Tientsin branches were operated under many
difficulties because this area was under the control of the
Japanese Army, with hardly a Navy man around. Financially they
also met with obstacles aLnce the head office in Shanghai would
not make monetary remittances because of the low exchange rate.
These offices were also capitalized as limited companies, which
added to their troubles. FUKUOKA. who had been the manager of the
head office in Shanghai was especially appointed to deal with
this situation in the northern offices. Nothing, however, is
known of his activities.
� Of the many branch offices the one which proved most ac-
tive and. profitable was that of Hongkong. Other outposts such
as Saigon, Bangkok, Celebes, and. Borneo were very inactive.
2. SAKURA =AN
In rune 1943, Admiral Shushin NAGANO, Chief of the Naval
General Staff in Tokyo, Tapan, sent to China Commander TokuJi
_OZA:ZRA as an emissary to investigate possibilities of talking
Peace with Generalissimo GHI4UGZai-Shek. After arriving in
Shanghai, MAMMA consolidated his mission with Commander OTANI
� of the Naval Office at Shanghai, Information mid Liaison Section.
� Commander OTANT called to Chungking agents CHFNa Dah Tung
and LIN Fn, for a conference with Commander OMURA. After nu-
merous meetings, they agreed upon the following points:
1. The Navy should furnish them a wireless-instalaa- --
tion for-contacting Chungking,
2. The Navy diould protect their lives and allow them
certain activities,
3. The liavy should furnish them with material support.
After the last conference, Commander O1ANURA. establisted
his Office on the 13th Floor of the Hamilton House at aaanghai
and called it the SAKURA hired Totnawa, LBROZAA:
:URA. and ZAWAI, and placed them in his Office to collect infor-
mation from and about Chungking.
CHTNG Deli Tung, an agent from General PM Hsung Hsi,
established the-Min:Jima Trading Company on :inkee Road, to
provide himself with cover as a merchant. Thereafter he des-
patched messages to General 11;H Hsung Hsi.
LIN Fu went to Peking to contact his superior TSTIAG Tsai,
.Chief of the Chinese Young Men's Party.
�
SECRET -'52
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liCRET
The plan of the Sakura Kikan was to buy off the democra-
tic Parties throug4 the influence of the Chinese Young Men's
Party on the one hand, and on the other hand, to get the
assistance and collaboration of Generals 1,77uH Hsvng flai and LEE
Chung an, and with their influence to press ("keneralissimo
WIANG Kai-Shek to sign the Peace agreement favorable to japan.
In order to facilitate their work, the Sakura Kikan
planned to.. bring large amounts of gold bars from Japan to China
by submarine.
This plan for Peace with China was reported to WANG Ching-
Wet who protested to TOT� and SHIGEMITSU in Tokyo. TOJO imme-
diately ordered Admiral NO to stop this movement. The
Kikan, failing to complete its mission, was closed in November
1943.
3. KENTAI YOKO
This organization was founded by Captain KOBETTO, of the
Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai. The purpose was to collect
information from Chinese circles through the medium of economic
transactions. The manager of KMTAI YOKO was TOKITARO FURUK0111.
He dealt mainly in exchange, cargo, in the port of Wendhow,
China, and through his Chinese agents, he collected information
regarding Chungking Chinese.
4. THE SHINGISHI KIKAN
Which, it is reported, was operated by Naval officers
under direct control of Navy Headquarters, Tokyo. This organi-
zation is said to have sabmitted information arid carried on
instructions received from Tokyo without consulting Shanghai
Naval Headquarters except in minor cases.
5. KODAMA KIKAN
In November 1943, TaZUTA.UTTSUYOSAI, head of the TOKO YOKO,
was found murdered in Broadlgay Mansions at Shanghai China. No
official investigation into this murder was conducted by the
Japanese Gendarmerie, which has been pointed out as a. fact, which
indicates that his murder was ordered from official circles.
KODAYA YOSHI� was ordered to take over the management of the .
TOKO YOKO. =AWL promptly changed to the Company of the KODAMA
KIKAN and hired a large number of ruffians to do intelligence
work. BB bought up military supplies, and was instrumental in
causing inflations. Under KODAMA, the people suffered untold
hardships.
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�-��-��-����-
KODAILA was arrested in apan in 1932 and charged with
cOmmunistic activities. It is reported he was released in
1936, upon intervention of .T.AMETO Kir-174I, who, at one time
W45 sPokeFelen of the GALAUSIO, and is now President of the
Board Of Information. Kiall1 gave KoD.;-m. le.3,000.- and. arranged
for him to visit China. Upon arrival in China, TADiViti, became
ae'quainted with the japanese Naval Offioe at Shaaghai.
It is reported that Vice-Admiral MILAGATA, who was Chief
of the Navy Air Corps, sent KOMI& to China for the purpose of
eolleotins, strategic ...4aterial for the Japanese Navy. It is
believed that KODE delivered '43,000,000,000.- worth of such
material to the Tanenese Navy. This material reportedly was
collected. in China through various means Cawing the last war.
KORAM.t is reported to have made a personal fortune of
0,200,000,000.-
=DMA. is reported to have been a member of the ,Kenkoku
Xei (Black Dragon Soolety), Aikokotai (PatrUtio 3QotetY)l
Kyo Youth Association, .and iCokusal ....... shu To (People's National
In addition to the KODMA. Organization, it is reported
that in 1941, KODAI9La engaged in collecting military material in
North and South China and established the Aiko Steel Factory for
this purpose. lie also reportedly manufactured military equip-
ment. KODAMA is reported to have close connections with rtajer- --
General KILIGESA, of the UM KIKAN, who established the temporary
Nanking Government.
To aid in the collection of strategic military equipment
in China, Kor,AzM& reportedly entrusted considerable work to the
DIATA brothers.
6. varrA KIKAi
The 1.7LATA Kikan was organized and operated by the IIVATA
brothers, YIXIO and. ,SAGAIRO. It was their duty to collect--
transmitting equipment and machinery for the KODK-TA organiza-
tion.
It has been reported that TgATA YUKIO was the right-hand
man of KODAY-4. and that after the war TSATA represented ia)D.Wilit
interests in China.
7. AGMOL
AWOL was established in Shanghai by Andrew and George
LIOLOSTVOW, from which it derives its name. George M0LO6Tv0W
� t I . �� � � I: � ;�z =I � :1 ese�
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M M 114 M
49 y 1.o J.
AGMOL have offices in Tientsin, at Peking and Saigon.
The Saigon office reportedly was closed in 1944.
AGVOL operated in conjunction with laliWA and was orga-
nized for the purpose of collecting material in China for
the Japanese Navy. Most of the material collected by AWOL
was reported to be jewels, gold, and precious metals of various
kinds, as well as gasoline.
AL also, at the request of the Japanese Navy, is
reported to have collected information throughout China regar-
ding economical and political affairs. In view of extensive
operations and a limited staff, it has been reported that 'OWL
was not a very active collector of intelligence.
8. OMMS
The following organizations were reported
formed by and operated under the control of the
at Shanghai and Tokyo:
'Zia RONAN
linua YOKO
NO GA ILIKAT
TOV4,YOKO
MOD=
KaTSUZILKAYA
Men' YOKO
YUKUDZ LONSU
MARISLIODEN
to have been
Japanese Navy
rENDAI SHOJI
NIPPON YUSdI
EDI TOED
alL1MEIYA
'MAN ILUNSU
LOA. SHOJI K.Z3H1
KoLazo an=
UN/IN SdANKYO
TOKA YOLO
TORAABI YOKO
RELATIONMIP ENT-TaN TIE JAPII:SE NAVY AND
SOVIETS AT SaANTall, CaINA.
The primary function, from the Japaaese point of view
in regard to the Sovietsovas to collect information regarding
the intellect of the Soviets and to win their friendship and
their goodwill, as relationship between the Soviets and the
Japanese became of paramount importance. Efforts to conplete
this mission were intensified.
In order to obtain the goodwill of the 3oviets, as well
as to collect as much available inforrAation as possible from
them, the RYUKO YOKO was set-up. This was reportedly a trading
firm. Actually, however, it did no business Whatsoever. Its
mein purpose was to promote trading and oommercial relations
between the Japanese and the U.S.S.R.
RET - 55 -
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S C R T
� This firm was amply supplied with many Army and Naval
purchasing offices. Its personnel was recruited from expe-
rienced Soviet experts in the Japanese Army and Navy. Among
the personnel were DMA, IsaaA, EBIRA KUROKI and. EBINA.
RYUKO YOKO attempted to influence local- Soviet citizens.
and business organizations, such as the MOSCOW NORODNY Bank,
Soviet Citizen's Club and the TABS Organization so that favo-
rable reports regarding the Japanese would be transmitted to
Moscow and the Soviet Edbassy at Tokyo.
information on anything regarding the Soviets was
gathered with alacrity and thoroughness, especially on matters
relating to the position of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East.
�
Attempts were made to bribe the numbers of the local
Soviet community who were thought to have "faue" with their
countrymen or who han. any connections in japan, some influence
in Tokyo or Moscow. Soviet citizens usually were allowed every
convenience and facility in their daily life. Japanese firms.
presented them with valuable presents, especially commodities,
which were at a premium during the war. One particular form of
bribery was as follows:- the cash dnortage in Shanghai was
severe and at one time 30-40% premium was necessary to obtain
cash. During these months, prior to the capitulation of japan,
Japanese firms supplied Soviet citizens with cash, thus making
.them huge presents. The Japanese presented the Soviet citizens
with 0R130100,000,000,000 - in cash. This amount could be sold
on the open market for $130,000,000,000 - thus the officials
gained to the extent of 00.000,000,000 -.
In addition, presents were made to official Soviet orga-
nizations whenever an o?portunity presented. IMAYAwas reported
to have made many gifts tc Soviet charities, including the
Soviet Red. Cross, contributions to Soviet war damaged areas, etc.
It is reported only a small amount of this sum was passed on for
official purposes.
Upon the occasion of the surrender of Germany, the Soviets
gave alarge party at the Paramount Hotel in Shanghai. The
expenses for this party were paid by the Japanese through IMAYA.
Commander SHIMURA reportedly had the task of developing
friendly relations with the TAXS Agency. SHIMURN came to Shang-
hai in February 1944 as a Staff Officer of the China Seas Fleet, 1
In Tokyo'SHIMURA was acquainted with AGRETEEF, Commercial Attache;
of the Soviet Consulate who arranged an introduction for him with
^ ...10111,1VM
U U4641.
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-56-
Approved for Release: 2022/06/22 C00909256
M. T. MOLTCHANOFF, Press Attache of the Soviet Consulate at
shanghai and V. I. SEffhTZ.OFF, the Manager of the TAS3 Agency
in China whose office was in Shanghai.
The assistants to Commander SHIMURA, Sub-Lt. TsuBouan
and Mk. HIDE, succeeded in beooming acquainted with V.A.VALIN,
President of the Soviet Club, and KULESH, the Editor of "HEW
LIFE".
After many unofficial invitations, and through bribery,
it is reported, the Japanese succeeded in obtaining the coope-
ration of the Soviets in exchanging information regarding
political development in Europe and troop movements.
Through the assistance of the Japanese Navy, the TABS
Agency in Shanghai received many conveniences, among which were
the installation of telephones, wireless, passes in curfew time
and etc. At one time it was reported that the TASS Agency and
the Japanese Nally cooperated very closely. -
In November 1944, Ma. YAKUSHAVaN arrived in Shanghai and
through his interference and that of V.V. CHILIKIN, the Editor
of the "RUSSIAN DAILY NITS", the cooperation between the Japa-
nese Navy and the Soviets.declined.
Until the declaration of war by Soviets against japan,
Commander SHIMURA made every effort to hold his connections and
offered his assistance to obtain the cooperation Of the Soviets
in the Shanghai area.
of. q wM
M M
- 57 -
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M. T. LIOLTCHANOFF, Press Attache of the Soviet Consulate at
Shangb.ai N. /. StiVisTLOFF, the Manager of the T.AS3 Agency
in China whose office was in Shanghai.
The assistants to Commander SHZMURA, Sub-Lt. TSUBOUCLII
and Mr. HIDE, succeeded in becoming acquainted with V.A.VALIN,
President of the Soviet Club, and KULESH, the Editor of "NEW
LIFE". -
After many unofficial imitations, arid through bribery,
it is reported, the Japanese succeeded in obtaining the coope-
ration of the Soviet:3 in exchanging infornation regarding
political development in Europe and troop movements.
Through the alssistance of the japanese Navy, the TABS
Agency in Shanghai received many conveniences, among which were
the installation of telephones, wireless, passes in airfew time
and etc. At one time it was reported that the TASS Agency and
the Japanese Navy -cooperated very closely.
In November 1944, M.F. TAIWSEIAMIN arrived in Shanghai and
through his interference and that of V.V. CHILTRTN, the Editor
of the "RUSSIAN DAILY MS", the cooperation between the Japa-
nese Navy and. the Soviets. declined.
Until the declaration of war by Soviets against Japan,
Commander SEIIIRIRA made every effort to hold his connections and
offered his assistance to obtain the cooperation of the Soviets
in the Shanghai area.
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A. The following chart showing the organization of MAITL
was furnished by Admiral LINATO
Weembsytion.to
The histry of Navy
Direct
Accounts & Ordnance - Supervision - The Banwa Branchl
Supplies Bureau Bureau Office in Tokyo 1
Shipping
of
PUT-
chased
Goods
Remittance
Route
Purchasing Order
The Headquarters
The Zapanese China Seas Fleet
The First Naval Office of
Accounts & Supplies
IPurchased Purchasing
goods Fund
9
BANWA
(SHANGHAI).
Contract
- - (Banwa's own fund)
Branch Office 1
Sub-
Contractor
- 58-
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.0,120.0. M
IA OM 41
LIST OF Mr.,13ERS 0? T ORGANIZATION, MAMA
MANAGING DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR
MLUAGER, EUCUTilit DEPT.
ASST. DIRECTOR,
EXECUTIVE DEPT.
EXECUTIVE DEPT.'
ft ft
AWA. Toshio (FUK1JG44 'refecture)
110 Yueh-Tang Road
Telephone 74130
?JAI, Mateo (DUKTO)
349 uhahar Road
Telephone 21275
YOKOYAMA, Miro (OKAYAY.A Prefecture)
233 'rat-Yuan Road -
YASUYA, Kensaburo (IBAH4CI Prefecture)
110 Yhth-Yang Road
Telephone 74130
GOTA, Koichi (HIROSHIMA Prefecture)
SHIMAZU, Shizuo (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture
TSURUDA, Yukinori (KAGOSHIMA Prefeotur
KURAMOTO, Masumi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
SASAKI, Kazuo (TOKYO)
SATO, Eiji
SAKURAI, Kazuo
TANG, Po.-Shou
TAMAKI, Ikuo
TOTODA, Takao
(YAMANASHI Prefecture
(SHIZUOKA Prefecture)
(FORMOSA)
(TOKYO)
(KAG.Va Prefecture)
NAKASHIMA, Kojiro (YAKANASH/ Prefectur
H/TAKA, Goiohi
SAITO, Tadao
NISHINOTO, nfro
NAGA, Shozaburo
MAEDA, Daisuke
ARIMURA1 Kumazo
C' gm. m
-,a1VAM.
(ruLUOKA Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(YAMAGUCHI Prefectur
(FUKUSHIMA Prefectur
(NA0,SAKI Prefecture
(KAGOSHIMA Prefeetu
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EXECUTIVE DEPT.
ft
ft ft
ro CO% R rib T
SHIMODA, Tokudo
ASAEDA, Muneo
TAGAMI, Take
WATANABE, Masafumi
(KIBAUMTO Prefecture)
(SHIMANE Prefecture)
(FUKUOU Prefecture)
(OITA Prefecture)
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
-
II
ft
ft
FUKUNAGA, Homo� (KUMAMOTO Prefeeture)
� SATO, Tsunao (OITA Prefecture)
TANI.GUCIrl, Michiko (HYOGO Prefecture)
suzma, Kenji (TOKYO)
Hisako (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
SAKAMOTO, Liokuzan (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
YAMAMOTO, Baru (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture
ft
It
ICATO, Tanosuke
(IWATE Prefecture)
ft
II
KANAYA, Tsuruko
(OKAYAMA Prefecture)
ft
If
MATSUZAKI, Noboru
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
II
ft
(ISHIKANA Prefecture)
ADA.CHI, Bleak�
II
ft
MASUDA., Sadaji
(TOCHIGI Prof eoture)
11
If
TANAKA, Mineko
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
TOKUYANA, Nesse
(KOREA)
If
It
=BASHI, Hanako
(KANAGAWA Prefecture)
VI
II
YASUKAWA, Mariko
(SAGA Prefecture)
TAKAHASHI, Takako
(CHIBA Prefecture)
MUM', ;Yoshi.
(SAGA Prefecture)
OTA, Teugie
(2arlE Prefecture)
,AOK/, Emik0
(HIROSHIMA Prefectur
II
It
TANAKA., Nobumi �
(aroo� Prefecture)
KAWANO, Eteuko
(GIFU Prefecture)
1.11 C P. r. �:
OD
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Approved for Release: 2022/06/22 C00909256
(SAGA Prefecture)
FIXITSBIASA Preficture
KANALuai, Bikuitatau (KAGOSEIVA Prefectur
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(IBARAG/ Prefecture)
Nakoto (113110s1ldA Prefecture
901 Ntabanknent Building
North Soo*luny Road
Telopb.one 44795
Jiro MATE Prefecture)
SATStilARA. itidebumi (NAGASAICE Prefecture
teurnma. Tel= TOTTOR/ /Prefecture)
Tokik8
Neuf /Mime
TEMMIIrAt (Miyake
SASAI�Z. Taehire
Third Floor Ai
825 Onschuen Road
won Shigeru
12411ZAWA., Attach,.
TAKESA0 Tokuju
GIFU Prefecture)
(11IYAGI Preteeture)
Prefeeture)
(XWATE Prefecture)
Ward Building
(YAMAGIIONI Prefecture)
(MOSE= Prefecture)
(TOTTORI Prefecture)
�(IBARAGI prefecture)
(YMIAGIICH/ Prefecture)
(BTOGO Prefecture)
� (ISHIKATiA Prefecture)
ZWAZAKI Woehiadehi (KAGosamA prefecture
XMO, (TOKYO)
'MATSUMOTO. Sabato (TOKYO)
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pproved for Release. 2022/06/22 C00909256
(HOKKAIDO)
ELTSUDA, Takeshi (OKAYAMA. Prefecture)
ErrASECI2A, Shigeto (NAGANO Prefecture)
'YAMADA, Kiyoshi
KARL, Takektiko
YAMAMOTO, IGLU'
MAU, Nesse .
HISHIZUMI, Keiji
NAGMAXI, Autare
Vale Akira
MOM, Mekitero
ANO. 'Mee
-Masa
(,KANAGAWA Prefeeture)
(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
(KUMAMOTO Prefeeture)
� (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
oaramoro Prefecture)
(TOSHIGI Prefecture)
� (MAYA= Prefeeture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(NAG4SAKI Prefecture)`
(ktOGO Prefecture)
Saburo (=ATE Prefecture)
Ire (KOMI Prefecture)
(INCE Prefecture)
(MISIIM Prefecture)
RAKAXAU, Ketch% (DU= Prefecture)
MAISUBIEM, Shigeri (MOO Prefecture)
ViritHEM, SlitigUko (KAGOSHIMA Prefeeture)
(NAGANO Prefecture)
KOM)
AXONE Prefecture)
orrA Prefecture)
Tiduntisai. (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
Prefeeture)
OS
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pproved for Release.
C0090925
=MU, 1912oru KOCHI Prefeeture
A-1 Roscoe ApertAssts
192 North Sseehuen Road
Telephone [phone]
ADAGE', Akira WOW Prefecture)
233 Tvalultuut Road
WAHL Nemo (0014MA, Prefeeture)
44 Bunke Terme
Scott Road
Telephone 4/104
UTstiKONLYA, Takeshi (FIRCUO4 Prefeeture)
OTAXA,Tinionto (KAGOSHIMA, Prefecture)
TSOKAGOSSI, Saimaa/ (HUGO Prefeeture)
AU, Rokssatturo (TOKYO)
MITE Prefeetare
MAXI, tuaikke (TOM)
iSISHIMORA, HiteLehi (KAMAWA Protestors)
IWATSUBO, Ryotchl (IrOKUOKA Prefeeture)
KAWAI� room � (KAGAIvA Prefecture)
AB; Hisajire (EMMA Prefecture)
ZAMISEIMA, Nasactiohl (EAT/AGANA Prefecture
XASUICUMIA, Aldnori (KAOAE3AKI Prefecture)
ZAKIGA, Ramo (KAGOSHIMA, Prefee9=40)
MATSU�, Sadayoshi (WAS= Prefecture)
ADAOSI, Yoshiaki (AICMI Prefecture)
FLICUDA� .Toshishige (10314NOTO Prefecture)
SOGIHMIA. Daieaburo (HIROsSIMA prefecture
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L.
� BUSINESS DEPT.
N.
N. -
a �
SHDIOTA/*, Toshiharu (.GOLIMA. Prefecture)
BESS�, Koichi
NULUCA, Akira
KOSEINAKA., Midas�
NBINUMA, Ybehisa
OSHIRO, Noboru
(ELIAGI Prefecture)
(M1YAGI Prefecture)
(YAMAG. ATA Prefecture)
(TOOHIGI Prefecture)
(WOW Prefecture)
NASEITINO, Kasuatasa (M1YAzAR7 Prefecture)
MATSUDA., Nobutalla
ODA. �Mortio
KATO, Masataka
OMUTA.. Teruo
/SHX/
MAEDA, Sakai
GA.1130, Kari
3ATO, Teteabure
KUKARk, Pus:4mM.
�YANG, atom
ZATANO; Ktyoshige
'UM Minoru
MBE: Kateujiro
ICADAME171 Masind
� (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
(FUKUOKA Prefecture)
(TWO)
(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture
(NAGASAKI. Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(MarAGI Prefecture)
(OITA Prefecture)
(NAGAsan Prefecture)
� (=OIL Prefecture)
(TANANA,' SRI Prefecture
,(012A Prefecture)
(NIOTO)
(KAGOSIMIA Prefect.
TACHIBASEA., Takatosio (E.130Staktk PrefeaV
MIMEM, Youstosla (NAGASAKI Prefect
2IRATA, Kiyoshi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
NIXAMO, Noiko (KRAMOT0 Prefecture
Nasaaaru (YAMAGATA Prefecture
1,1 LI 04 r. 11P 111
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BUSINESS DEPT.
ift
a
lt II
a
a
It
It II
It II
II
It II
0 II
It I,
It It
is: it
MANAGER FINANCE DEPT.
FINANCE DEPT.
rujiko
ak37./ Eani
MINE, Sat
NAMIYAEA, Takashi
TANAKA, Miohi
MEM, KAichi
UK/TA, Shigeno
MUM, Yoshio
ARDIATSU, Akiko
ElROKAWA, Shuichi
ADAM, Teruko
2117/MORI, Torao
YAMANAKA, Sadako
KUNIKAWA, Shigebira
TAXI. Xiyoko
=RADA, Kosaku
MIURA, Takeshi
16 urban Villa
Shang-To Road
Telephone [phone]
HASEGAWA, Motoaki
MARE, Hiroshi
WADA, Zunichi
Kiyohiko
(OKAYAMA Prefecture)
(SAGA Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(KANGAWA Prefecture)
(MOO Prefecture)
(A/CHI Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(SAITAMA Prefeeture)
(YAMAGUCHI Prefecture
(KADOSHIMA Prefecture
(IZNIKAWA Prefecture)
(M/YAGI Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture
(SAGA Prefecture)
(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
(HUGO Prefecture)
Terrace
(KYOTO)
(FUKUSHMA Prefecture
(TOCHIGI Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI prefecture)
XDRAKAM/, Chojiro (KYOTO)
=BASH/. Iehinari (CHIBA Prefecture)
HIRANO, Tesuicht (NAGASAKI Prefecture
m m �
- 65
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.rINAVOE DEPT.
�
IV
emenr T
(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
(KAGOSELLI. Prefecture)
(SA/TAMA Prefecture)
MAMA, Mitsuo
ONO, Eenjiro
OTSUCFU, .111.roaki
It
ft
et
vi
MAGARIROURI, Kikuji
YAMANAKA, Iwao
(SAGA Prefecture)
(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
ft
YOZORO, Kane
(itiLLIOKA Prefecture)
It
ABB, Kiyoko
(OITA Prefecture)
II
MANAMA, Eiruk0
(SAGA Prefecture)
ft
es
Yoriko
(OKAYAMA Prefecture)
ft
or
WAIZUMI, Yasuo
(KDOHI Prefecture)
�
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-66-
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Purchasedi
Goods
1
SE0 T
Chart showing organization of E.ODAMA LIMAN.
The Naval Aviation1 Direct
HeadqUarters ---- Supervision------
. (Tokyo)
Purchase
Order
Remittance
The Headquarters
The Zapanese China
Seas Fleet
Purchase
� Contract
I
i
The First Naval Office
of
Achounti and Supplies
Purchasing
fund
Purchased Goods
411��� "
I
EDDAMA OFFICE
in Tokyo �
v1
The rodama Office
in Shanghai
/AIN
\
\
\
f if 41
Branch offices
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-67-
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.2.2.2-ELLK
D. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
PERSONAL BAGSGROuND OF OUTSTANDING OFFICERS
OF 7APANESE CHINA SEAS FLEET
Vice-Admiral RYOZO FVEUDA Born Nov. 1, 1890. Entered Naval
Academy, 1907. Midshipman in 1910.
Assigned to sea duties for next two
years. Entered. the Naval Gunnery School, 1912. Entered the
Naval Torpeidb School, 1913, for six months. Again sea duties for
three years.
Entered the Naval Staff College, 1916, as Class B student
and stayed there for six months. Entered the Naval Torpedo
School again for six months before assigned to sea duties for two
years.
4
Entered the Naval Staff College as Class A student, 1919.
Instructor at 'Naval Submarine School, 1921-22. Sea duties,
1922-25, as staff officer of a combat unit.
Promoted;to the rank of Lt. Commander, Dec., 1923. instructor
at the Naval Staff College, 1925-28. Sea duties as a fleet staff
officer, 1928-43. Promoted to Commander, Dec., 1928, and to
Captain, Nov., 1933. Again instructor at the Naval Staff College,
1933-35. Made one-year official trip abroad visiting America and
purope.
Sea duties, April, 1938 - Nov., 1939. Promoted to Rear
Admiral, Nov., 1939. The Hainan Island Garrison, 1939-40. Ember
of the Naval General Staff, Dee., 1940 - April, 1941. Served at
the Amoy liaiaon office of the East Asia Development Board (loam)
May, 1941 - 761Y, 1942. Promoted to lice-Admiral, May, 1942.
Member of the Naval General Staff, Aug., 1942 - Sept., /942. The
22nd Naval Base and the Takao Garrison, Oct. 1942 - May, 1945.
Commander-in-Chief of the China Seas Fleet, May, 1945.
Vice-Admiral NAOMASA SAO= Born June 6, 1890. Entered the
� Naval Academy, 1909. Midshipman,
1912. Sea duties until 1914. Pro-
moted to First Sub-Lt., 1913, Sub-Lt., 1915, Lieutenant, 1919,
after three years' sea duties. Sea duties again before promoted
to Lt. Commander, 1925.
After three years, sea duties, promoted to Commander, Dec.,
1930. Ground duties, Dec. 1930 - March, 1933. Assigned to the.
Irapanese Naval Office in NLehukuo for two years.
ELGRET - 63 -
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M
.4 11j 41:
� Promoted to Captain, Feb., 1935. Commander of the Tokyo
Naval Communication Corps, 1935-36. Captain of BIM Settsu,
1936-38. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, 1938-40. Chief
Of Staff of the Waizuru Naval Station, Oct. 1940 - Sept. 1941.
Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok, Sept., 194 -
Sept., 1943. Promoted to Rear Admiral, Oct., 1941. Commander-
in-Chief of the 16th Combat Unit, Sept., 1943 - Nov., 1944.
Promoted to Vice-Admiral, Oct., 1944. Chief of Staff of the
China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1944.
Rear Admiral NAM OGAWA Entered the Naval Academy, 1912.
Midshipman, 1915. After three
years' sea duties, attended the
gunnery and torpedo classes. Attended the advanced gunnery class,
1921-22. After sea duties for two years, served as instructor at
the gunnery school, Dec., 1924 - Dec., 1925. Promoted to Lt. Com-
mander,"Dec., 1925. Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy in
Washington, June, 1928 - dune, 1930. After two months' sea
duties, placed on the waiting list due to illness. Inactive for
one year. Staff officer of the Naval General Staff, 1931; and
section chief of the Naval General Staff until Feb., 1939. Pro-
moted to Commander, 1932, and to Captain, 1936.
Again Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy at Washington,
1939 - Nov., 1940. The Chief of the Third Section of the Naval
General Staff, 1940-42. Promoted to Rear Admiral, Nov., 1942.
Assigned to the Cabinet's War Prosecution Institute, Dec., 1942 -
Jan., 1945. Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet,
Feb., 1945.
CamIaLLIABUZATO TANABE Born March 15, 1898. Entered the
Naval Engineering School, 1916.
Engineering Midshipman, 1919.
Again entered the Navel Engineering School after two years' sea
*duties. Three years' regular duties including one year and a
half's service at the Kure Marine Corps. Entered the Naval Staff
College as an engineering student, Dec., 1926 - Dec., 1928. Flee
staff officer, 1929-31. The Ilsizuru Naval Port, Nov., 1931-33.
Promoted to Engineer Lt. Commander, 1931. After one year of sea
duties, served as staff officer of the Kure Naval Station, 1934-3
Promoted to Engineer Commander in 1936.
Instructor at the Naval Engineering School, 1937-39. Sea
duties, Nov., 1939 - July, 1942. Promoted to Engineer Captain,
Oct., 1941. Instructor at the Naval Engineering College, 1942-43
Assistant Chief of Staff at the Kure Naval Station, Ian. 1945
July, 1945. Chief of Supplies, Engineering Comander, Chief of
the Naval Transportation Secticrn of the China Seas Fleet.
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Captain MASANORT ODAGIRI Born Oct. 2, 1904. Entered the
Naval Academy, 1921. Midshipman,
1924. Sub-Lt. after one year and
a half on a training ship and submarine. Lieutenant after three
years' service on destroyer and cruiser. After one year at the
advanced class of the Naval Academy, assigned to a battleship for
one year. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1934. Entered -the Naval
Staff College, Nov., 1934 - Nov., 1936. Served one cruiser for
one year before assigned to ground duties (the Naval Staff
College, the Bureau of Naval Construction, the Naval General
Staff).
Promoted to Commander, 1940. Served on an aircraft carrier,
May, 1941 - July, 1942. The Naval Academy, July, 1942 - March,
1945. Promoted to Captain, Oct., 1944. Assigned to the Head-
quarters of the China Seas Fleet, March, 1945.
Captain Born May 24,.1902. Entered the Naval
Engineering School, and Engineer
Midshipman, 1924. After three years
on sea, entered again the Naval Engineering School. Seven years
on sea duties. Entered the Naval Engineering College, 1934. Pro-
moted to Engineer Lt. Commander, 1936. After one year on sea,
served as instructor at the Naval Engineering School. Again sea
duties, Dec., 1939 - mar, 1941. Staff officer of the Naval Station
June, 1941- April, 1942. Assigned to the Bureau of Naval Con-
struction, May, 1942 - August, 1943. Staff officer of the China
Seas Fleet, August, 1944. Promoted to Captain, May, 1945.
91aLugluosan KOKO Born Nov. 8, 1904. Entered the
Naval Academy, 1921. Midshipman,
1924. After two years of sea duties,
studied at the Naval Torpedo School, the Naval Gunnery School,
Six years of sea duties, 1927-33. Entered the Naval Communication;
School, 1933-34. Again five years on sea. Prompted to Lt. Com-
mander, 1937. Served as instructor at the Naval Communications
Stool, June, 1939 - April, 1940. Staff officer of a combat unit,
May, 1940 - Sept. 1940. Instructor at the Naval Submarine School
Oct., 1940 - March, 1942. Fleet staff officer, April, 1942 - Nov.
1943. Promoted to Commander, 1942. Staff officer of the China
Seas Fleet, Nov., 1943. Promoted to Captain, Sept., 1945.
�
�
Commander BEIRACHNO TANI= Born Dec. 29, 1905. Entered the
Naval Academy, 1923. Midshipman,
1926. After two years' sea duties,
entered the Naval Staff College as junior student, majoring in
Chinese language. Served at the Shanghai Naval Base Command, the
Shanghai Japanese Special Naval Landing Party, the Naval General
OVIhnirAWM
ina, &V VP Mk
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Staff, Sept., 1934 - Nov.47 1938. Promoted to Lt. Commander,
1938. Entered the Naval Staff College, 1938-40. Staff offi-
cer of the Amoy Naval Base Comaand, April 1940 - Ott., 1940.
Adjutant to the Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy at
Nanking and concurrently adjutant to the Chief of the japanesa
Naval Office at Nanking, Nov., 1940 - Oct., 1941. Served as
investigation official of the East Asia Affairs Ministry, Nov.,
1941 - Oct., 1944. Promoted to Commander 1943. Adjutant to
the Chief of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai, and concur-
rently staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Nov., 1944.
Commander TADASHI SHIMURA Born Feb.9,1906. Entered the
Naval Academy 1924. Midhsipmen
1927. After one year on sea,
studied at gunnery, torpedo and communication classes. After
3iX years on sea duties, entered the Naval Torpedo School, Oct.,
1934 - July 1935. Again sea duties for three years end entered
the Naval Staff College. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1939.
Assigned to the Navy Ministry, March 1941 - Zan., 1945. Promoted
to Commander 1934. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Zan.,
1945.
Commander TAKESHI HIROKI Born Feb., 16, 1908. Entered the
Naval Academy 1926. Midshipman,
1929. After three years on sea,
trained as a naval aviator, 1929 - 1932. The Sasebo Flying Corps,
1932 - 33. After one year on sea, served as instructor at the
Kasumigaseki Flying 'corps, 1935 - 36. Trained as an advanced
flying student for one year. The Tateyama and Kisarazu Flying
Corps, 1937 - 39. Placed onthe waiting list, Maroh 1939 - Sept.;
1939. For next five years, served at the Sasebo and Yatabe -
Flying Corps. Promoted Lt, - Commander, 1941. Staff officer,
Sept., 1944 - July 1945. Promoted to Commander Nov., 19444
Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, July, 1945.
Commander GENICHIBO KONIMI Born Nov., 14, 1906. Entered the
Naval Academy, 1924. IiidshiNian
1927. After one year on sea, att-,
ted to the gunnery, torpedo and communication classes. Another
year on sea duties. Inactive for one year due to illness.
Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Station, 1930 -1934. After two
years on sea, served as instructor at the Yokosuga Marine Corps.
Sea duties, 1936 - 3$. Advanced student at the Gunnery School,
1938. Instructor at the Naval Academy Nov., 1939 - Oct., 1940.
Promoted to Lt. -GoAmander 1939. Sea duties Oct., 1940 - Nov.,
1942. Instructor at the Naval Engineering School, Nov., 1942 -
Feb., 1945. Promoted to Commander 1944. Adjutant, the China
Seas Fleet, March1945.
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Commander TOSIIINO KKAaT Born Tan. 31, 1908. Entered the
Naval Aoademy 1927. Midshipman
1930. After one year on sea,
attended to the torpedo, gunnery and communications classes.
Sea duties, 1931 - 36. Attended the Naval Staff College, 1936 - 3
Sea and ground duties in China, 1937 - 38. Sea duties, 193$ 7
40. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1941. Sea and ground duties
in China, March 1940 - May 1945. Promoted to Commander, 1944.
Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, May 1945.
Commander KAZUTOSHI ASADA.. Born July 15, 1911. Entered the
Naval Academy 1929. Midehipmen,
1932. After one year on sea,
attended to the gunnery, torpedo and communications classes.
Three years on sea before assigned tothe Japanese Special Na-.
ye]. Landing Party in Shanghai, 1937 - 38. Advanced student at
the Naval Gunnery School, 1939. Fleet staff officer 1939 - 44.
Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1941. Assigaed to the Kure Naval
Station and Tateyama Gunnery Sdhool, Dec., 1944 - Feb., 1945.
Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Feb., 1945. Promoted
to Commander, Sept., 1945.
Captain TAKESHI. SKTM/ZUTAUI Born Dec. 21,1901. Entered the
Naval Academy, and midshipman,
1922. Sea duties 1925 - 28.
Attended the Naval Torpedo School before another five years on
sea. Assigned to the wireless station on Chichijima Island,
1934 - 35. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1939. Sea duties and
fleet staff officer Dec., 1935 - Nov., 1939. Naval adjutant
to the Imperial family, 1939 - 40. Sea duties for two years.
Promoted to Commander, 1940. Assigned to the Maozuru communi-
cation corps and staff officer of the Maozuru Naval Station,
Aug., 1942 - Dec., 1943. Staff officer of the China Seas
Fleet, Dec., 1943. Promoted to Captain, May 1944.
Rear-Admiral TOKUTI TORI Born Sept. 24, 1891. Entered the
Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman
1912. Seven years of sea duties.
Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1919. Three years on sea
before entered the Naval Staff College. Promoted to Lt.-Oomman-
der, 1925. Three years on sea. Instructor of the Naval Torpedo
School and concurrently instructor of the Naval Communioations.
School, 1938 - 32. Promoted to Commander, 1931. Staff offiesr
of the Maizuru Naval Port command. /932 a� 34. Fleet staff '
officer 1934 - 36. Assigned to the Naval General Staff and
concurrently to the Navy Ministry, 1936 -.37.
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Promoted to Captain 1936. Four years of sea and ground
duties. Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section of the Nhezuru
Naval Port Command. Promoted to Rearh-Admiral /942. Assigned
to theCentral Navel Academy of the Chinese Navy, May 1943 -
Zuly 1944. Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Special Naval
Landing Party in Shanghai, August 1944.
2.mtegalJADAE IKEDA . Born Dec., 2, 1902. Entered the
Naval Academy 1920. Midshipman
1923. After two years of sea duties
entered the Naval Torpedo School. Atter three years of sea
duties, assigned to the Japanese Naval Landing Party in Sankey,
1928 -Dee., 1928. One year training in navigation 1929 - 30.
Sea duties for next eight years. Promoted to Lt. - Commander
1936. Assigned to the itnirOgraPhi0 Department in Tokyo for one
year. Sea duties 1939 - 44. Promoted to Commander 1941.
Assigned to the Shangai wpecial Naval landing Party and the
Shanghai Naval Base Command as staff officer, May 1944. Promo-
ted to Captain May 1945.
Ltt-Commander ISAMU NOMIYAMA Born May 29, 1917. Entered the
Naval Engineering School 1934. En
gineer Midshipman 1938. After two
years on sea, attached to the lbkosuga Naval Station and the
Yokosuga Marine Corps. Entered the Naval Construction School
3.943 - 44. _Sea duties 3.944 1945. Promoted to Lt. - Commander
1944. Staff officer and adjutant of the China Seas Fleet,
April 1945.
Rear-Admiral MINORU KATSUNO Born Zune 17, 1891. Entered the
Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman In
1912. Assigned to sea duties for
next six years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1918. Again
sea duties for 12 years. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant
Commander, November 1926.
Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Station, Nov., 1932 - Oct.
1932, and Adjutant to the Naval Academy :Nov., 1932 - Oct. 1935.
Promoted to Commander Nov., 1932.
Sea duties Nov., /935 - Oct., 1938.. Assigned to the
Kure Marine Corps Nov., 1938- Aug., 1944. _Promoted to the
rank of Captain in Nov., 1939, and to Rear-Admiral Nov., 1943.
Assigned to the Japanese Naval.Special Landing Corps,
(Commander-in-Chief), Aug., 1944.
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Captain =JIRO =OKI:MA. Born Mir. 10, 1902. Entered the
Naval Academy 1919. Midshipman
in 1922. Assigned to sea duties
for next five years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1927.
Again sea duties in 1928. Instructor at the -Naval Gunnery
School, 1931' - 1934. Again sea duties in 1934. Promoted to
the rank- of - Commander in 1934.
Assigned to Adjutant at the Bako Naval Base, Nov., 1933
Nove. 1937. Sea duties, Dec., 1937 - April 1938. Assigned to
the Sure Naval Base, April 1938 Oot., 1940. Promoted to
Commander in Nov., 1939. Sea duties Nov. 1940 - July 1943.
Assigned to the staff of the Shanghai. Nava Base Command,
Aug. 1943 - duly 1944. Promoted to Captain in May 1944.
Assigned to the Staff of the Japanese Navel Special Landing
Corps in Shangiai, Aug., 1944.
Lt.-Oommander YOSHIO KAWADA Born Feb. 28, 1899. Entered the
Naval Academy, 1917. Midshipman
in 1920. Assigned to the sea
duties for next two years. Entered to the Naval Gunnery School
1922 and the Naval Torpedo School 1923. Again sea duties Mar.,
1923. - Zu1y,1927. Assigned tothe Sasebo Naval Base, Aug., 1927.
Placed on the reserve-list, Nov., 1927. Mobilized as
replaoement in January 1941. Sea duties, Zan, 1941 - Tune 1943.
Promnted to the rank of Lt. - Commander, May 1943.
Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval. Base, July 1943 - Feb. 1944.
Sea duties, Mar., 1944 - Dec., 1944. Assigned to the Head-
quarters of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Zan., 1945 - March
1945. Assigned to the Staff of the Japanese Naval Special
Landing Corps in Shanghai, April 1945.
SlapSUNOWitt,. MEZAKI Born Zan. 6, 1890. Entered the
Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman in
1913. Assigned to sea duties for
..next five years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School. 1918. Again
seadities, Dec., 1919 Mar., 1937. Promoted to Lt. - Commander
in December 1925. Assigned to the Personnel Affairs Bureau of
the Ministry of Navy, March 1927 - Dee,, 1931. Promoted to tte
COmmander, Dec., 1931. Assigned to the staff of the Yokosuga
Naval Base, Dec., /931 Dec., 1937.
Promoted to Captain Dec., 1937. Assigned to the Chief of
.the Personnel Affairs Section of the Ministry of Navy, Dec.,
1937 -Sept., 1942. Placed on the reserve list in Sept., 1942,
but mobilized as replacement on the same date. Assigned to
Commander of the Japanese Navy Air Force in Shanghai District,
Sept., 19.42.
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CoMmander KErna WORX Born May. 2, 1897. Entered Naval
Academy, 1915. Midshipman in 1918.
Assigned to sea duties for next
two years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School in Dee., 1920.
Again assigned to sea duties, Dec., 1921 - Dec., 1924.
Entered the Naval Staff College, 1924. Assigned to sea
duties, Dec., 1925 - Dec., 1932. Promoted to Lt. - Conamnder,
1931. Placed on the reserve list in Dec., 1932.
Mobilized as replacement in May, 1938. Assigned to the
Port Affairs Office in Tsingtao, China May 1938 - May 1939.
Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Base May 1939 . June, 1941.
Assigned to the instructor at the Chinese Navy Training Station,
June 1941 - Aug., 1944.
Promoted to .Commander in Tune, 1943. Assigned to Comman-
der of the 2nd.Meteorological Observation Corps, Aug., 1944.
Captain =IMO 'MAMMA Born Zan. 4, 1925. Entered Naval
Academy 1910. Midshipman in 1914.
Assigned to sea duties for next
three years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, Dec., 1917.
Entered the Naval Torpedo School in May 1918. Again sea duties
for two years. Entered the Naval Staff College, Dec., 1920.
Sea duties, Dee. 1921 - June 1942. Promoted to Lt. - Commander
Dec., 1927 and Ito Commander, Nov., 1933, and then to Captain
Nev., 1939. Assigned to the Chief of the Navigation Office in
Shanghai Tune 1942.
Rear-Admiral REITO MlNAT1 Born Aug. 30, 1896. Entered Naval
Academy 1913. Midshipman in Dec.,
1916. Entered the Tokyo School of
Foreign Language, as Chinese Class student, April 1923. Promo-
ted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in Nov. 1926. Attached to
the Naval. Genera]. Staff Office, Nov., 1926,- Oct., 1929.
Attended at the London Naval Conference as one of the
suites, of the Japanese Representative, Nov., 1929 - June 1930.
Assigned sea duties, June 3.930 - June 1931. Assigned to one of
the adjutants to the Naval General Staff Office, July 1931 -
Oct., 1933. Sea duties, Nov., 1933 - Oct., 1934.
Promoted to the rank of Commander, Nov., 1934. Assigned
to the Japanese Naval. Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China,
Nov., 1934 - Sept., 1937. Sea duties, Oct., 1937 - May 1938.
Again assigned to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese
Embassy in China, June 1938 - March 1939.
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Promoted, to Captain Nov., 1938. Asaligned to the Staff
member of the Ministry of Navy, April 1939 - Nov., 1941. Sea
duties as Cain of carrier, Dec., 1941 - Feb. 1943. Comman-
der of the Naval Air Force Stationing at Iwakuli Mar., 1943 -
Oct., 1943. Assigned to the surmaster of the Naval Academy,
Nov., /943 - 03t.1 1944.
Promoted to Rear - Admiral in May 1944. Assigned to the
Chief of the Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai.
Captain sithnn KINABARA � Born Mar. 31, 1896. Entered Navel
Academy, 1915. Midshipman in Nov., 191
Assigned to sea duties for next five
years. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language as Chinese
class student in April 1923. Sea duties April, 1925 - Nov., 1929.
Assigned to the staff member of the Naval General Staff Office,
Dec., 1929 - Nov., 1932..
Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in Dec., 1930.
Again assigned to the staff member of the Naval General staff
Office, Dec.,932 - 1935. Assigned to the assistant to
the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China,
June 1935 - Nov., 1937. Promoted to Commander, Nov., 1935.
Instructor at the Naval Staff College, Dec., 1937 - May 1939.
Staff member of the East Asia Board, June 1939.- Oct., 1940.
Assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval
Liaison Office in Shanghai and concurrently staff of the Japanese
China Seas Fleet, Oct., 1940 - Nov., 1941.* Promoted to the
Captain in November 1941. Assigned tothe staff mmmber of the
Ministry of Navy, Nov., 1941 - duly 1944� Again assigned to the
assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in
Shanghai, duly 1944 - Aug., 1945.
Lt.-Commander MASAO= FUOIIITKI Born Nbv. 29, 1912. Entered
the Naval Academy in April 19304\
Midshipman in 1933. Assigned tO
sea duties for next four years. Assigned to the Sasebo Nava/ Baas,
Sept., /937 - ;an., 1938. Again sea duties, Feb., 1938 - Mar.,
1938. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language inipril
1938 as Chinese Class student. Assigned to the Sasebo Naval Base,
April, 1940 - Oct., 1941, Sea duties, Nov., /94/ - Oct., 1942.
Assigned tothe Ministry of Navy, Nov., 1942 --Deo., 1943.
Promoted to the rank of Ideutenant-Oommander Nov., 1943.
Assigned to the staff of the Yangtze River Patrol, ;an., 1944 -
Feb., 1945. Assigaed to the assistant to the Chief of the
Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai in Whrdh, 1945.
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Pa aster Vice-Admiral BUNPEI Born Nev. 2, 1893. Assistant-
OMATSUZAUA Itymaster in Deo., 1916. Sea
duties for next five years.
Instructor at the Naval Paymasters School, Dec.,-/921 - Nov.,
1929. Promoted to the/rank of staff-paymaster, 1926. Sea duties,
Dec:, 1929 - Mar., 1931. Assigned. to the staff of the Accountants
Bureau of Navy Ministry, April 1931 - Sept., 1941. Promoted to
� the fleet-paymaster in December, 1931. Promoted to the rank of
paymaster-inspector in December 1936. Sea duties, Sept., 1941 -
Oct., /942.
Promoted to the Paymaster-Rear-Admiral in November, 1942
and to Paymaster Vice-Admiral in November, 1945.
Paymaster Impactor YASUO MINYA. Entered Naval Paymasters
Saho01 1920. Midshipman in
1923. Sea duties ffior next
four years. Assigned to the Naval Air Force in lrokosuga Dec.,
1927 . March 1928. Again sea duties April 3.928 - 1932.
Assigned to the Maizuru Naval Base, Dec., 1932 - Mar. 1935.
Sea duties, April 1935 - Nov., 1935. Entered the Paymasters
School again as Special Course student, Dec. i 1935 - Oct., 1936.
Assigned to the 1st Accountant Office of the Navy, Nov., 1936.
Promoted to staff-paymaster in December 1936 and Fleet-Paymaster
Nev., 1941, and then Paymaster-Inspector, May 1945.
Captain SHIGE1VKI NATSUBARA Entered Naval Engineering
School in 1919. Midshipman
in 1922. Sea duties for next
three years. Instructor at the Kure Marine Corps, Dec., 1925 -
. Dec., 1928. Sea duties, Dec., 1928 - Aug.. 1941. Promoted to
Engineer Lieut.-Gommander in December, 1936. Assigned to the
Kemal Plant at.Biroshima, Sept., 1941 - Feb., 1943. Sea duties,
� Feb. 1943 - ;an., 1945. Assigned to the 1st Navel Supplies
Office, Jan., 19.45. Promoted to Captain in May 1945.
Paymaster Inspector Entered Navy Paymasters
HIRDatia KUNITSUKA School in 1921. Midshipman in
1924. Sea duties for next one
year. Again entered the Naval Paymasters School as Class B.
student in December 1925. Again sea duties fer next seven years,
3.926 - 32. Assigned to instructor to the Eure Marine Corps, Dec.
3.932 - Nov.V 1933. Sea duties, Dec., 1933 - Mar., 1939. Promote
to the rank of staff paymaster in Dec., 1937. Entered the Naval
Paymasters School as Class A student in April, 1939 - Nov., 1939.
Assigned to the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1939 - Oct.,
1942.
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Promoted to Fleet-Paymaster in Nov., 1942. Sea duties
� Nov., 1942 - Aug., 1943. Assigned to the let Naval Supplies
Office in August, 1943. Promoted to Paymaster Inspector in
September 1946.
Burgeon Bear-Admiral SHINTARO Dorn May 3, 1894. Graduated
WAWA from the Medical Section of the
Tohoku Imperial University in
April 1918* Second assistant surgeon in July 1916. Entered
,Naval Medical College as Class B. student, July 1916.
Assigned to the Naval Hospital at Kure, Dec., 1916 - May 1917.
Sea duties, JUne-1917 - Mar., 1918. Inspection trip to Europe
April 1918 - july 1920. Sasebo Naval Hospital, Aug., 1920 -
MAN, 1921.- �.Again-sea-duties, April 1921 �Sept., 1921. Naval
Gunnery School, Oct.,911 - Nov., 1922. Sea duties, Dec.. 1922
Mar. 1923. -Naval Academy April 1923 - Oct., 1923. Kure Naval
Hospital, Nov., 1923 - Jan. 1924. Sea dullest Feb., 1924 -
July 1924. Entered Naval Medical College as Class A student
Aug., 1924 - Nov., 1926*
Promoted to Burgeon Lieut.-Commander, Dec., 1926. Sea
duties, Dec., 1926 - Nov., 1930. Promoted to Burgeon Commander
Dec*, 1930* Euro Naval Hospital, Dec., 1930 - Nov., 1931*
Received doctorle degree in December 1932. Inspection trip for
Europe,Dec.,
Deo. 1932 - Oct., 1933. Maisuru Naval Hospital, Dec.,
1933 Novi.,-1p457,
Promoted to the rank of Surgeon Captain in Dec., 1936.
Chief of the-Medical Corps at Port Arthur Dec., 1938 - Oct.,
1939* let Section Chief at the Euro Naval Hospital, Dec., 1939
Oct., 1941. Sea duties, Nov*, 1941 Nov., 1942.
Promoted to the Surgeon Rear-Admiral in November, 1942*
Chief of Medical Section of the 11th Naval Aircraft Plant, Nov.,
1942 - Nov*, 1944. Assigned to the 4epanese China Seas Fleet,
and Sonourrently appointed to the Chief of the let Naval Hospi-
tal in Shanghai, Nov., 1944.
Technical Captain MIMI Horn Nay 2, 1899. Graduated
YUMA from the Technical Section of the
Tokyo Imperial University, Mar.,
1924. Graduated from the Construction Section of the Imperial
University in March 1927* Appointed the Naval engineer in April,
1927. Assigned to the Construction Board of the Navy Ministry,
Aprll 1927 Feb., 1933.
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� Assigned to various offices in Kure, Yokosuga, Sasebo
successively, Mar.,1933 - Zan., 1945. Promoted to Techni-
cal Commander, Nov., 1942, and to Technical Captain Nov.,
1944. Assigned to the chief of the 1st Construction Office
in Shanghai, Feb., 1945.
" on yolk im
10 Awe
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P .r2fC/IET
SURVIARY REPORT OF TEE ACTIVITIES OF:
EUGENE BOVANSI with aliases: Flok-Htivans,
Carl E. Clige, Kuriansky, Etojevnikoff
es * * wetiii
U A xm
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SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
17. 6
������miltalimin
INTRODUCTION
� � �
BACKGROUND fic PERSONAL HISTORY
MANILA MISSION
CONCLUSION
82
82
91
98
1"7 T 1.1 API
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INTRODUCTION:
LUGENL BOVANS, as he is more popularly known, was the
only foreigner directly connected with the Japanese Naval
Office. BOVANS was in charge of the Russian dock in the
Liaison Ebom. According to information received from Rear
Admiral LAI.% MATO and other top-ranking Japaneec Naval
officers, and also rrom associates in other branches of the
Liaison Room, BOVANS was a minor figure. However, from
outside sources and from newspaper reports appearing in
Shanghai papers, it was indicated that /MANS was one of the
most important man in Japanese Naval Intelligence. BOV.s.NS
gained further notoriety after heading a mission to Manila,
the alleged purpose of which was to penetrate Allied iritelli
genoe organizations and expose.the Filipino underground.
Because of many rumors to the effect that MANS and his group
were responsible for extortion and killings in Manila,
extensive investigation was conducted by this office at the
request of "Oar Crimes Commission of the China judge Advocate
Genera/1s Office. Results of the investigation failed to show
sufficient evidence of a mnx crimes violation.
BACKGROUND:
MANS' police record disclosed that he was born in
Riga, Latvia, on 19 February, 1900. According to a French
source, BDVANS first made his appearance in China in 1927 in
the company of General BORODIN, who was the Red Russian
Advisor to the Chinese. It.is rumored that subject sold out
BORODIN to the British, and when this was discovered by the
Soviets, subject was arrested and tortured by poUrifig hot oil
on his head. As a result, subject's head was severely scarred
and to cover these scars, he usually wears a black Chinese-style
skull cap.
Subject later escaped to Shanghai and was contacted by
British Intelligence. Be is reported to have bled them for
large sums of money for long and devious reports on Communistic
activities in China. After exhausting the British, subject
became an informer for the United States Treasury Department,
where he sold a tip-off to subjects of a treasury investigation
for a reported 2,000. After a short period with the Treasury
Department, he became associated with the Chinese, L few years
later, he became. an informant for Major ILi.ILL3, UGU, of
the Naval Intelligence Office. Reportedly, it as well-known 1,
Shanghai that BOVAN6 was double-crossing WILLI1:i.;:.3 by also
SBORET- - 62 -
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working for the Japanese. At the same time he was hawking
pamphlets and books, purported to have been stolen from the
Soviet Consulate.
As'var 'with japan became more evident, Japanese money
came easier for.HOVANS. He had made connections with the
Shanghai WANG CHING-WEI Government through the Japanese. Then
he -succeeded in convincing the Nanking. Reform Government that
one MA TOFF was a Soviet agent working against them, and
should be /14uidated (MAEANTOFF had previously written an
article about HOVANS in the nature of an expose). hOVANS
received p4'Mission to arrange for the liquidation and
accordingly hiret some Chinese to.do the job. Largely through
the efforts of the French Police, the Chinese were arrested
and implicated HOVANS. HOVANS was tried and convicted for
inciting the murder and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
This was on 24 November, 1941, On 8 December, 1941, the
Japanese Naval Landing Party released HOVANS from prison, and
he was installed in a suite at the Cathay Hotel and given an
office at Japanese Navy Headquarters, 2? The Bund. According
to a chart furnished by Admiral KENO NINATO of the Japanese
Naval Resident's office, HOVANS was employed in the Liaison
Room of the Japanese Naval Office on the 'Russian Desk. His
immediate superior was a Russian-speaking Japanese named FUKUHARA.
The Liaison Room, at that time, was under the command of
Commander OTANI and a civilian officer named EICHIZO IKUSHIMA.
Both were transferred to Japan in early summer of 1945. (Bee
Outline of Japanese Naval Resident's Office in Summary of
Imperial Japanese Navy at Shanghai).
'llen----AdmiraljaNATO-was---questioned-concerning HOVANS1----
connection with the Japanese Navy, 151NATO replied that subject
was known to him by the name of CLIGE:
The following is a report on HOURS submited by Admiral
MINATO:
"JAPANESE NAVAL LIAISON OFFICE IN SHANGHAI
December 12, 1945
"The man known as HOVANS was connected with the
Liaison Section of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai
since the time when Commander M. OTANI. was Chief of the
Section, (Dec. 1941 - Nov. 1943) and YOSHIZO In5HILA
(civilian employee) was member of the Section,
nUOVANS mainly reported on:
nl. The activities and tendency of neutral
nationals in Shanghai; and
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"2. The opinion and reaction of Shanghai
citizens in general with regard to the
progress of the war and its accompanying
effects.
"He also made comments on the international
situation through his personal observation.
"HOVANS was sent to the Philippines upon a request
from the �Japanese Naval Office in Manila. Therefore,
the Japanese Naval Office in shanghai has no knowledge
of his activities or work in the Philippines.
"His connections with other offices than the
Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai are not clear to us.
In view of the fact that he organized and led a theatrical
group in Shanghai, we believe that he had wide contact.
HOWever, we do not believe that he had an intelligence
net-work. We considered him as an 'information broker' �
common in Shanghai.
- "Az to his whereabouts, we knew that he was in
Shanghai up to.the time of the Japanese surrender.
"We then noticed .a'press report saying that
immediately after the Japanese surrender, HOVANS went
to Tsingtao where he was arrested a month ago."
With reference to EINATOIS statement concerning EOVANSI
mein duties, the following information is submitted:
Shortly after the capitulation of japan in August, 1945,
the U.S. 'Naval Landing Party discovered three letters pur-
portedly written to Commander OTANI and signed "C. E. CLIGE".
Only one letter is dated, that date being 14 January, 1942.
The other two letters are undated and signed 'with the initials
"C.L.C." The substance of these letters is as follows:
1st letter dated 14 January, 1942:
A request to organize Special Judicial nvestige-
tion Section under IKUSHIMA, because the M.P. or
Gendarmerie of the Japanese Army did not have the
qualifications to carry out foreign espionage. The M.P. s
business is the handling or exposing of Chinese agents
from Chungking and the Wang Ching-Wei Government. The
Judicial Investigation Section would have two sub-sections
consisting of an Espionage Section and a Sabotage 6ection.
Most of the letter is a diatribe against the Gendaraerie
and their incompetency in handling espionage ease:).
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End letter undated:
Wherein be discusses a method to prevent Allied
air-raids upon Japan, stating that "Public opinion
of Britain and the United States demands from
RooseVelt and Churchill some victory. 'To
doubt, American and British circles will try to
effect an air-raid on Japan, no matter how costly it
may prove, just for, the prestige and for the pacifica-
tion of the population...."
"If you. gather all the citizens of the Allies
and transport them to Japan, placing them there under
the protection of various patriotic organizations,
you will have a good insurance against air-raids.
For the prisoners, could be chosen the most important
cities with factories and other industrial enterprises.
All should be settled in various parts Of the cities,
in barracks, and diplomats in hotels and former
schools. Certain missionaries with their families
should also be deported from China to Japan, as well
as all men of military age, also with families. You
may rest assured that there will be no air-raids on
those cities where they will be settled under adequate
and strict protection because your spokesman will
broadcast that, on account of the unhealthy climate
in the Philippines and awful sanitary conditions in,
China, as well as in view of great excitement and
anti-foreign feelings of the Asiatics; the Japanese
Government had transported the prisoners of mar to
Japan where the climate is excellent and where they
are well protected. Thus, the air-raideon the cities,
having no military importance, but possessing factories
and works would be prevented, for neither Americans
nor Britains mould attack such cities from the air."
3rd letter. undated:
Contains a discussion of present conditions in
Shanghai under Japanese occupation and proposals to
restore Shanghai to normalcy. Ba advocated formation
of a Russian Auxiliary Detachment under Japanese
command, so that food and shelter would be provided
to the large number of watchmen and body-guards now
unemployed.
Ba suggested " there is no need to stand on
ceremonies with the Jews. Control over the Jews should
An strengthened. They should be co#paled.to revive
the life of Shanghai. They need a good 'whip and a
clenched fist. Your union with Germany - however you
may pamper them - is an order for them for anderground
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AutJUAL
hostilities, sabotage and discrediting of you."
Concerning Soviet activities in the International
Settlement, BOVALS noted that the Soviet Radio
Station in the Settlement was broadcasting in Russian,
English, German and Chinese, all Allied news and propaganda
in the guise of Tess reports. He suggested that the
Soviet radio be limited to broadcasts in Russian and
also be bound to broadcast all Domei reports._
In an effort to establish the validity of the above -
letters, Er. TOSFIO MBA, 146 Quinsan Road, B-16, Shanghai,
who headed the General Affairs Desk of the Liaison Room was
questioned. NAEBA, a graduate of University of Southern
California, tentatively identified the signature of "C. E.
CLIGE" as that of subject's, but stated he would not be able to
swear to it because he had only seen subject's signature on a
few oecaaions. Certain excerpts of the letters were read to
BANDA and he expressed doubt as to subject's ability to write
such a well composed letter. A: said subject's English
was von poor, and suggested the letters had probably been
ghost-written. NAMA further said it was not usual for HOVANS
to send communications to Commander OTANI in English, but
that subject usually gave them to FUKUHARA in Russian and
would translate them into Tapanese for OTANI.
With regard to subject's main duties, NAMBA said that
LOVANS' chief value lay in the fact that he had many contacts
in the Russian community. He said that he had read some of
subject's reports and thought that they were childish. He also
added that the Tapanese Naval Office did not trust HOVANS
completely.
Also, with regard to subject's ability in the Tapauese
Naval Office, Admiral EILATO stated that he doubted if subject
ever contributed any worthwhile intelligence information,
because he (MATO) could not recall any of subject's reports
although they undoubtedly passed through his hands. MILATO
said he could only, speak for the period from November, 19/
at which time he took over command of the Naval Office.
FURUBARA was questioned concerning his knowledge of
TIOYAIZI activities and he furnished two statements which are
contained in Appendix D. The substance of these statements
is as follows: In his first statement given on 7 December,
1945, IUKUHARA hedged and submitted only general information
concerning HOVANS. Be was interrogated again and the trans-
lation of his statement given December 24, 1945, states that
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v A .C;
HOVANS gathered intelligence chiefly on world conditions
from the radio, newspapers, magazines and conversations With
people familiar with foreign affairs. A schedule of HOVANS
daily activities as given by FUXUHARA reveals that HOVANS.
listened to world wide news broadcasts from Moscow, Honolulu,
San Francisco,' andIondon between 0400 and 0500. Between
0600 and 0700 he made and received phone calls acquiring
the local intelligence on Shanghai. From46100 to 0900 he
read three or four different Russian newspapers. About 1000
he went to the office of the Resident Naval Officer where
his duties_consisted of writing a report, interviewing
visitors, ate: He had lunch at 1300, always with a guest.
After lunch he. usually took a pan and at 3.500 be had another
appointment. Later in the afternoon he made arrangements
for his theatrical group, visited sick people, obtained free
hospitalization for needy actors, etc. In the evening he dined
with friends and admirers and usually went to a night club
until late at night. However late he returned home, he
usually began his day at 0400.
Regarding tOVAN's character, FUKUHARA states that he
was a highly emotional individual and gave Tent to his
emotions eabily. Be wasn't anxious for material wealth but
desired position-and honor in life. He met many people but
quickly tired of them. Therefore, he had many enemies and no
intimate friends.'
FUKUHARA said that IMAM had confidence in the opinions
of Er. AWAIT) (FREDEPICK WIEHL -,German agent in Shanghai)
on problems vonurniug GermanyvEngland and America, and used
them in his report.
In the course of the investigation concerning FREDERICK
ANTON wri4114 WiLiEL made the following statement concerning
HOVANS:
� "HOVANS worked from Room 741 of the Cathay
Hotel, and from the fourth floor of the Jardine
Matheson Building which had been the Navy Building
under the Japanese.
"He, himself; did little or no personal outside
work, relying as he did upon informers and employed
workers. �Among these were Captain CARNSIRA, FAUL
LOZNIKOFF, KASHIK, ARNHEM, GERSHOWITZ and a few others,
such as TERN/, etc.
"These people were known in tne'Russian and ,
foreign community as seeking' information for the
Japanese. Those who wanted to make money in this .
way sold their information to either one of RoVANs!
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wtrkers,,total about 12.,
'SWANS mostly used a system of stealing
information from the various Japanese Gendarmerie
Offices, from the Army and from the Police head-
quarters, Thus, while GERgWITTZ was working as
tasergeant in the Detective Bureau of the Police
headquarters, he would sell his information, gathered
around. the police files to BMWS. The result of
tactic brought a general hatred of HOVANS from the
Gendarmerie and the police. BOUM was branded as
a scoundrel by the police, and, as a result of this,
the police and Gendarmerie spread negative stories
about HOVANS in*Shanghai which resulted in HOURS
being hated by most Shanghailanders. In this way,
MANS mishandled his intelligence work.
� "In. addition to information .gathered about anti-
Japanese activities in Shanghai, and about gangs who
"were cutting in.on Japanese rackets and which HOVANS �
'mashed' for 'political reasons', ROVANS was re-
sponsible for many deaths of foreigners and Chinese
in Shanghai who were arrested on framed up information �
gathered by CARMIRA and LOTNIKOV, etc. and allegedly
executed or imprisoned at vne irapanese Bridge House.
HOVANS once boasted of '18 pieces finished', which
was the way he described the liquidation of 'gangsters'
by the Japanese as the result of his work.
"Incidentally, it must be statedthat every two
weeks, HOVANS performed as an actor at the White
Russian Clubhouse on Avenue Pooh in a Russian play.
While this has nothing directly to. do with his
intelligence work, it was basically an effort on his
part to suppress the antagonism of the public to his
racketeering by donating the proceeds of the perfor-
mances to Russian charity.
"Outside of Shanghai, he once took a group of
his workers to Singapore and Manila for the purpose
of counter-intelligence against the Americans and
the British there. The plan was to infiltrate his
men into the British-American intelligence workers
there, and to pose' as British-American intelligence
workers, and to thus ensnare the foreign intelligence
and turn them over to the Tapanese.authorities.
"HOVANS used the name of EUGLNE HOVANS, but this
is not his correct name, but he has been known by
this name since his conviction and imprisonment in
1941 in connection with the murder of laETOFF, who
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SLORET
was bead of the White Russian Emigrant Committee.
HOVANS, on behalf of the Japanese, hired a
Ohinese to kill WEANTOFF. He was sentenced to
15 years imprisonment, but has not served this
and is still under sentence. During his trial he
claimed that he was working for the Germans, which
turned the German Intelligence against him. When
he came out of jail, (released by the Japanese),
Lie used the name C. E. KIJEGE, or at least his car
was registered in this name, and was hired as
!advisor to the Japanese Navy.'
"After his trial, during which as above-
mentioned, BOVAN�j incurred the enmity of the
German intelligenoe, I was given the assignment
of trying to pin something on him, so that rival
Japanese factions would rid us of him - HOVANS
was at outs with all Japanese except the Navy. As
a result, I learned the following about him:
"HOVANS came from the Ukraine to the Far East
in 1917, first to Harbin where he made connections
with the Communists. In about 1927, he became
associated with the Hankow Government which was at
that time communistic and was headed by WEN KUNG-PO,
later Mayor of Shanghai and acting President of
the Nanking Government. HOVANS was a Captain in
the Chinese Communistic Army, as 'Captain PICK'.
He helped the organizers on the political side, who
were constantly harassed by other Chinese.
"BORODIN, the Russian organizer of the Hankow
Communist Governmeht eventually returned to Moscow,
after which they ran out of funds and the whole set-up
blew up. HOVANS came to Shanghai in about 193E to
1935. He got in touch with LUCHICH, a White Russian
writer who received a contract from the British
Government to write a book ca/led the 'Red Menace
Over China'. The author was allegedly Captain
EUGENE PICK, or HOVANS, but the photograph which
purports to be that of Captain PICK is actually a
photograph of LUCHICH. Very few people know that
the photograph was not of HOVANS, but HOVANS let
this information out to me when / detected this.
HOVANS claimed that he used the name Captain PICK
in Eankow. MANS managed to sell the Japanese the
idea that he was the author. of the book, although
the language of the book is not that of MANS. It
was written in English for the North China Daily News,
Shanghai, a British daily newspaper. There were quotations
in the book from British papers and' from the New�Tork
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v J.
. Times. =BICH and BOVANS apparently-had
previously furnished the material .to these
publications. The book was published in Shanghai
about 1932 to 1935.
'110VANS was, during the years immediately following
this, mixed up in all sorts of rackets,-prostitu-
tion, gambling, etc., and was in and out of jail
constantly. In about 1937, he became friendly
with RAMAN (MITI) ABIN (or RABINOVITCh), a
Latvian who was a ganGster mixed up in 'protection'
rackets, etc., and who is noarunder arrest by the
Chinese Gendarmerie since September for some offense.
Be is very tough - a real strong-arm man. RA111
and HOVANS were closely associated in the various
rackets, though each worked on his own.
"RABIN, in addition to his racket activities,
trapped some of the Chinese guerilla generals, many
of wt.= had to switch to the Tapanese to save their
lives.. The Tapanese paid him well and he had a
lot of money. Be was the owner of the 'Little
Club'. These incidents took place during 1937.
HOVANO was not involved in them, but only in
comrlsrcial rackets, but he was linked up with the
aapanese.
"HOVAN3 told me that he had an assignment
fromildmdral OTANI to infiltrate into the American
Intelligence work at the time the mar broke out.
He also told me how he had (for the Japanese) put
*small time bombs in egg crates on British ships
plying along the coast in order to spoil the re-
frigeration systems. Be said that the British 'mew
he had been responsible for this and had quite a
grudge against him for it.
"ROYAL'S often voiced to me his wonder at the
aapanese hiring him. Be thought it was only to
. keep him out of guerilla work. Be was not a
Communist, but was selfishly interested in making
money and could do very well as a guerilla. HoVidTst
activities consisted of terrorist activities to
keep the foreigners in line. reople knew he worked
for the aapanese and were afraid to cross him.
HOVAM received from the Tapanese free food and
Room 741 at Cathay Eotel, gasoline for his Austin
car, presents, expenses and a small salary. lie was
^ 11, ill
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ezcolizT
very foolish and didn't save much so now has
nothing in Shanghai.
"/ started working against him about end of
11942 on orders of Dr. hiARE, trying to pin some-
thing on him to get him into disfavor with the
Xapanese, so that either the Zapanese or the
Germane could take care of him. I wanted to pin
a German killing or something of that sort on him
which would have enabled the Germans to have him
arrested. MANS didn't like the Germans as he
had Previously (a long time before) worked for the
German Intelligence, and they didn't treat him
well financially. ELV4N6 often sent people around
to try and catch me out at the beginning. When he
got no results from his informers, he came once to
304 Ziangse Road to investigate personally and
bragged on my setup (which bragging was only 'sour
grapes').
"Ii0VANS description is; Height 5'7", weight
175 to 180 lbs, age 54, Russian appearance -
Longolian cast of countenance, round face, -pointed .
nose, good teeth with gold fillings, no hair at all,
wears black skull cap, has burn soars on his head
on top to the rear from the time when he was
tortured by the Communists. He looks husky. Le
sings in Russian opera. Be is a heavy vodka drinker,
espeoially when in any trouble. Be is a flashy,
dresser; wears a large gold ring with Chinese
characters on his left little finger; gold pocket
watch with gold chain across vest; has a sport coat
with pleats black shoes; flashy, loud silk socks;
brown suit with interwoven stripes; blue rain coat,
very faded; usually wears a light grey hat. Yost of
his suits are sportsstyles. Be walks with his
shoulders straight, very erectly, with a military
manner. Le had a cheap chromium plated cigarette
lighter of the Ronson type, with release on the
right. Be usually went armed with a pearl handled
revolver, 58, chrome or nickel plated. te speaks
very broken or pidgin English and has a very deep
voice, coarse and loud. He also speaks Chinese,
;apanese, Russian and German. Be used to have a
picture of his wife, 6 x 8 inches, also a picture
of himself as an actor, in a part from the Renaissance
Period, with long hair, etc."
�
=ILA MISSIOL:
According to information furnished by Admiral
Cl
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.1.2 41�11 a.
the Manila Mission was requested by the Japanese Naval Office
at Manila. They requested that a number of neutrals be sent
to Manila for intelligence purposes. .SincellOVAES was the
only neutral in the Shanghai Office, he was given that assign-
ment. However, other sources who were closely connected with
the Manila trip claim that the trip was conceived by
/KUSHIMA, the Civilian officer in the Liaison Room. 311T,'.:2:111L:!.
submitted plans to Conmander OTANI who drafted final plans
and sent them to Tokyo for approval. After 'they were
approved, IKUSHIMA was placed in charge of the Mission.
According to members of the Mission, the following peronLel
made the trip: HOVANS, FRANCISCO C!lii:),N-EIRO, PAUL LOL:11:03,
PIETRO TERM:, flUT AR14HEIM0 MORia6 GLazifievITZ, (a.k.a. I.G1-aZi
LEJuieF), SLAVA TOROPOVSKY, Ilanh �A2IAK, MIA, a Filipino,
and Japanese. named - IKUSHIMA, ItORI Tiowas TADI 1-161-a,
ISTILR UTSUNOMIYA, EUBO, b. IOHIMA and YOSHIDA..
The hission left Shanghai early in Juno 1944, and last
remnants of it returned late in December, 1944. HOVA-nS is
reported to have returned from Manila on August 9, 1944.
Concerning the activities of the group while in Manila,
SLAVA�TOROIOVSKY submitted a statement, the full text of which
is quoted in Appendix L. The substance of that Aateaont is
as follows:
He arrived in Manila with KAZAK, LOZNIKOFF and ICIIIJIMA
June 12, 1944, and was taken to the Bengkong & Shanghai Bank
Compound (409 Aviles Street) where /KUSH/MA had his head-
quarters. This was the residence of Admiral HIRATDL,
Japanese Naval Attache in Manila. They had a few words with
BIRAIDE and were then introduced to Commander AOY.,
IaShIMA's superior.
TOROPOVSKY and luala were billeted in a small bungalow
away from, the other members of the group. A listening post
was set up there under YOSHIDA and they were told to copy
OW traffic from VHM, a station in Port Darwin, Australia,.
whidh was used by the U.S. Davy for sending orders to all
ships in five letter code.
PAUL LOTEIKOFF soon after arrival met a Girl named
ESPAKITA DE VID,Z1 who seemed to be well acquainted in .
Filipino society. She furnished LailKOFF with typeritten
sheets of information in Ennlish which ho passed on to
CARE-BIRO was usually with LOZnIKOFF.
L' T
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TERN/ became acquainted with a Dr. tow' who once
-bold TOROPOVSKY he had travelled through Guerilla
territory in Batangas and Camarines Nortes Provinces of
Luzon.
ARNHEM and GERSHOTITZ worked together mingling in
the lower strata of Manila and acted as "stool-pigeons" for
npyArls.
TOROPOVSKY did not know much of HOVAHST activities,
other than the fact that he was blackmailing a Polish merchant
in Manila named ZALEVSKY beoause ZALEVSKYIS wife, an ial(::riC411,
had not been interned.
TAKAMI, an American-born and educated Japanese, was
answerable only to IKUalkia and Commander AOYAMA. TQLOOV;IZY
knew nothing of his activities.
TOROPOVSKY said that his contact with the group was
very limited and that by had not heard of any terroristic
acts or killings on the part of the group. He said the only
information he had was from a story which appeared in the
Shanghai Russian Daily News sometime in November, 1945,
which told of the killing of six clergymen, believed to have
been Spanish Catholic Missionaries, by HOVANS and LOJIIKOFF
during their stay in Manila. (Er. CHILIKIN, Editor of the
Daily News was later contacted and eaid Llia story had no
foundation in fact, and was written by a number 'of his
reporters, based on various rumors that they had heard).
PAM LOTNIKOFF and PUTHO TERI4I were both arrested on
authority of the War Crimes Columiesron in November, 1945.
When questioned by this office, both 'repeatedly denied being
sent to Manila for intelligence or terroristic purposes. both
claimed that they went to Manila to �buy cargo" for the
Zapanese Navy Purchasing Office. They claimed that IICUSHLIA
and MANS saw a chance to make money in Manila and as .
friends of HOVANS they were invited along to share in the
profit.
Further information concerning the activities of the
group in Manila is contained in the Counter-Intelligence
Corps investigation of BORIS GRLGOROVICTI, W4"OFFelias momas
GERSHKOVITCH. gaOFF 'accompanied the group to Manila and
when tue gronp was evaouated he was left behind as was
FRITZ ARNHEM and EORIHIKI TAR/4M1. WOFF later was reported
to the Counter..intelligence Corps by ESPANITA DL VIDLL.
During the course of that investigation Li7k,X ZAILEVOYT,
Elizalde Paint Co., Tanduay St., Manila, was interviewed, and
stated, in substance, as follows:
Ais
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.71mIlvm
Be first net Luorr in Locolta Cafe come time in Tuly,
1944. LaLMLJ-ItY had .formerly lived in Shanghai and remembered
Elzorr as a uniformed policeman in that city. laTOFF told
ZeUenrferi that nOVLES had a letter from ZALLVSKY'S parents.
1:2J0e1: eleo told him that he, with the others who had ooro,o
to Manila eTith him, were refugees from Singapore.
Although HOV.eTeS was the leader of the group, he stayed
in the beek,Lround. aele'eVSKY met the others, includin
17eTere�, froauently. when they became better acquainted
with -Lee:Teen'', they tole him that they were purchasin2,
agents for the Tapaneee Davy.
On one ocbasion, HOVelee phoned ZALEVSKY and eeked him
to cell ut his office. ArriVill:; there, 4Ale,V2la vue told
that the Tapaneee navy had a great deal against YeALeVela
and that e�LeleeVOKY could clear himself by furnishing informa-
tion. B0VLI43 was particularly interested in locating a
guerilla radio station said to be operated by a man named
T0ENj0401. 21eLIATSICT disclaimed any knowledge of it and was
later picked' up by the Tapanese for questioning. He was
allowed to Go after interrogation.
On another occasion, How.rs told ZALLVSKY that in order
to stay out of trouble, he would have to pay him (1.10Ve:-3)
30,000.00 Pesos. rZ,LLINSICY paid 20,000.00 and made a date to
pay off the balance. 110VeiXe failed to keep the appeintneet
but instead sent :]1-4T05e1,1 to pick up the money. This moeey was
given to LLATOTF.
After r1.011 left Kanila in August, 1944, 1,0nal.0L'i set
himself up as head of the group. Never very popular the
rest of the group, LeeTOTT fared even worse after HCV:,. left.
LOTia�XVr and Ci=EIRO spoke deprecatingly of 1-2201T, and
:"aercee the others appeared Prosperous, laTOFF looked raed
and poor.
At one time, L0T-I40FF and CleesUllt0 offered to act
ZeleeVeY up as a purchasing agent for the Tapancee 1.;avy.
.eeleeVeKY refused.
From time to tine, LOTI.IZ0.17F asked SALIM= for teforna-
tion about American. aed Amcricau property. -,;hen ZeleeVeeY
ICIiC to give him the inVoeaatioe, 1,04TeIKOIT threeteeee
to turn him in to the Te.eanese. In this way LOTiaae�:; cull cted
about 100,000.00 osos in bribes froe/
Th.qnestionin:, of :,-.01=0 (0:r :TOILOLA eeel by
in hanila disclosed the
C T - 4 -
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SECRET
In May, 1944, TAKLYI had a proposition with EANJA,
a Japanese firm in Shanghai which possessed a powerful
connection with the Tapanese Navy. Whereas, other companies
were unable to obtain shippihg space for exports, LIANA
was able to get this shipping space. TALAMI was exporting
lamps to the Southern territories to sell on the black .
market.
During May, 1944, Er. IKUSHIMA, a first-class member of
the Shisei-Kan, the highest "eranch of the Gunzoku (civilians
attached to the military), called TKMI into .his office. He
let LLII know that he was acquainted with his activities
in the black market through the Manwa Company and threatened
him with conscription.
As TA:KAla is an American citizen and also since he had
no stomach for active.military duty, he listened to Inals
proposition that he join IEUSHIMA. IKUSHIMA promised to get
TAKAMI a good position in the Navy counterpart of the Gunzoku.
TAEMI did not want to identify himself with the military in
any way, so he countered with the proposal that he would give
his services to IKUSHIHA gratis in exchange for IKUSRII-dAIS
protection against conscription. IKUSHIEA agreed to this
proposal.
On or about .k May, 1944, InaliMA told TAKALI something
of the mission that they were to erform. IKUSHIMA told him
that there was to be a group composed of Japanese, Koreans
and Europeans which was to be sent to Manila. TAKAMI was to
be included in this group. He did not elaborate on the work
that was to be done but told TIIKAMI that he would divulge
its mission in due course. On 28 May, 1944, TAKAMI was sent
by plane to Taihoku, Formosa, where he was to act as an
interpreter for these Europeans when they stopped there on
their journey to Manila.
He recalled that MLZOFF cake to Taihoku with
. and LOJE1KOFF. HOY.= and IKaaiMA, with two or three others,
came later, but took off for Manila first. 11`. came to
Manila from Taihoku with MLJOFF TEBNI, LO.TNIKOFF and
CAREBIRO. This group arrived in Manila on /1 'Tune, 1944.
TAKANI said that he was shocked at the group of
Europeans that IKUSHIMA had picked for this mission, whatever
it was. HOVANS, the leader, had been a notorious crook in
Shanghai,and,at one time, had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to 15 years. (When questioned by TAKALEI about this,
IEUSNIEJ. had stated that ECIWIS had dons important espionage
work for the Zapanese Government, and, therefore, was highly
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respected and trusted
another member of the
of the Orient and had
racket" in Shanghai.
the theft of diamonds
other man, including
coming here.
0 ^ M
so/ .ii
by high Japanese officials.) LOJZIKOFF,
group, was lightweight boxing champion
been mixed up in the "buy and sell
LOJNIKOFF had also been involved in
in Shanghai.� vauxii stated that the
UEJOFF, had been unknown to him before
On, or about 15 Juno, 1944, IKUSHINA called a meeting
Of the group which was held at the residenceaof the president
of the Hongkong Shanghai Bank in Aviles Street near Malacanan
Palace.* At this meeting, IKUSHIMA stated, meagrely, the
mission of this group in Manila. He told the group, including
NEXOFF, that of all the territories conquered by the Japanese,
the Philippines had taken the least kindly to the Co-Prosperity
Sphere and was the most recalcitrant. He stated that the
Army and Navy were doing what they thought best to relieve
this situation, but it still persisted and was going from bad
to worse. Therefore, it was the mission of this group of
Europeans. and Orientals to investigate and study this condition
from every angle to attempt to find the answer to this
situation and to_bring the Philippines into the line. This
group was to analyze the Filipino way of life, to study the
Filipinos! ideology, and to find the answer to this most
pressing. problem.
In addition, they wore to study the other nationals in
the Philippines to /earn what their sympathies were, to find
out how the Japanese had failed to win them. over to their side.
Further, they were to investigate the Japanese Army and-Navy,
and observe the methods that they were using to alleviate
this situation., and to make recommendations as to the improve-
ment of these methods. Japanese controlled utilities, such
as Morale�, were to be investigated to /earn if corruption
existed and to. root out the causes if such a condition
existed. imaimA stressed the point that each man had been
carefully chosen because of his past experience and each man
was to do a specific job.�
TARA= stated that it was a grandiose scheme and a very
noble one in purpose, but it was evident to him that inanimA
had been deceived by HOLES, and certainly the men that HOVANS.
had selected for IKUSHIMA were in no way qualified to carry
out such a mission. In TAKAMIls opinion, they were as fine
a group of opportunists, blackmailers and swindlers as could
be found in the Far East.
. It was TAKAMIts job to get the overall picture. He was
to observe and in that way acquaint himself with the work to
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C- 4r, ri
111 ay. Au
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r�,1
Sr CnyT
be done, so that, if necessary, he could take over the leader-
ship of the group. He also acted as interpreter and contact
man between HOVANS and IKUSHIMA for about two months, at
which time UDVANS returned to Shanghai. In August, .1944,
TAXAMI took over the leadership of the group working directly
under.ikushima.
Takami went on to say that almost from the beginning
the thing was a farce. MISHIMA was jealous of his position
and appeared to be reluctant about givinc, out any information
lest someone of the group learned too much. He mould issue
silly orders. For instance, he would detail a man to find
out the names of the members of a certain foreign chamber of
commerce when t#e information was open to everybody. He
would detail-another man to find out which puppet government
officials had what friends among the foreign colony, lie
would ask for voluminous reports and a great deal of effort
would be spent gathering information that could have been
gotten out of a business directory or telephone book. It
appeared to TAXA= that IKUSHIMA was more interested in Getting
a lot of nonsensical reports that might impress his superiors-
than he was in solving any problems or promoting any better
relations between the Filipinos and Tapanese which he had
announced as.his.intention originally.
IKUBBITit, set up CARNEIRO and IOTNIKOFF in the "buy and
sell" business so that they could observe this racket from
the "inside". This did not work out because the Filipino
"buy and tell" =I distrusted these foreigners and would have
nothing to do with them. As CARNEIRO and LOTNIKOFF were inter-
ested only in the money that they could make out of this
business, they were not interested in observing the Filipino
members of the "profession" and made no effort to promote any
better understanding. inject, they did more harm than good
because they swindled the Filipinos.
- About the end of September, 1944, TAU= had a long talk
with =MUM in which' le tried to point out the fallacy of
attempting to rectify:the'Philippine situation by using these
men. 110731111/1/4 Who had by now become quite disillusioned,
agreed with TAXA= and. the group just fell apart. Little or
no attempt was made after September to accomplish anything.
The members of the group were left on their own to work out
their own salvation. :
Originally,� the men had been paid 3,000 Pesos per month
which was ample. After :a couple of months, this became too
little on which to live and the true character of these men
clame.to the front. They became involved mall sorts of
schemes tO make money and they All had pretty bad reput:ations
around town. IKUSHIMA. in, order to save face, caned for an
accounting of their activities-from time to time, but he had
lost control over then.
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^ 1.". T1 On
ail V M.
CONCLUSION:
� Although allegations had been made that EDVANS and his
group were responsible for the deaths and torturing of
American and Filipino nationals, investigation has not shown
that to be the case. Undoubtedly, they participated in some
intelligence and espionage investigations of a minor nature
in an attempt to ferret out allied collaborators. It appears'
that the .real mission of the trip to Manila was a combination
of two things: (1) An investigation of the sympathies of
the Filipinos and reasons for the Japanese failure to win
them over to the Co-Prosperity Sphere; and (2) A trip to
Manila offered the HOVANS group a good opportunity to extend
their black market and swindling operations. HOVANS and his
group would never have consented to make the trip on reason
number one alone and the Japanese Navy would hever have
permitted the trip based only on reason number two.
It seems apparent that the group accomplished little of
an intelligence.value for the Japanese, and when it became
obvious that the Philippines would be invaded by American
forces the group disintegrated into'selfish'individuals each
attempting to make as much money as possible.
Inasmuch as the China Theater judge Advocate General's
office has indicated that there is not sufficient evidence
of a War Crimes violation against American citizens by
HOVANS or any member of his group, intensive investigation
of the case has ceased. However, informants of this office.
are still attempting to ,locate HGVANS in order that he may
be questioned concerning intelligence activities of the
Japanese Navy.
� 4.,
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�EGRET
Section II
JAPANESE LIIITARY INTELLIMNCE
IN CHINA
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XL Military Intelligence
A..Xntroduction
�fl. Higher Echelon
� C. China Eamtditionary Forces
43.. Beak:erten and Staff Officen
20 North Odra
a. Organisation
� b. Subordinate Alielleiel
C� Maine of Intielligence Collecting Machinery
d� Training and Value of Information Obtained
3. Central China
S. Organisation
b. Metkmds of Operatien
c. Training
4. South China
a. %palmation aunt Systematic Amapa:a � of Intelligence
b. Methods of Operation
c. Reporting
d� Sectional intellipace Opentionel Activity
� 8. General
Speclal. intelligence Baits
g. Foci ,of Inteiflipace Activities
5. Special Service *animations (Ethane)
a. licasnalature
b. Origins-
c. ?unctions
�44 Changes
e� Eap/oyees ot the SSD
�f. Relations beween SSD and Axis Representatives
g. SSD Organizations
Ume Man
2.ObaKikan
3. Matra Eiken
0 V C0RT
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7"-
01 rp
IA V110
4. Fuji liken
� 5. Sakurai litho
6. Saks& Won
� 7. Nina Organisation
8. Asiatic Prosperity organisation
9. Xmas& Organisation
jp. !cabin� Organisation
Take Organization
12. Bun= Pukkoba Organization
3.3. Stkaretusi Rikugunbu
6. Gendarmerie (gacceitai)
a. Organisation and Gcmaand
b. Duties
a. Strength-
& Recruiting and Training
C. Bethedo of Operation
� 1. Jurisdiction
2. Trail of Offenders
.34) Agents
D, ilwantuug
1. Organizational Structure
a. iiettunis of Operation
/221/SIT
Mill= IL
SMUT III
=CAT IV
=BIT V
MUM VI
=WIT rn
i3UT VIII
V.11.1B/T fl
alb
MUM&
I. The Third Zrukpandent Guard Unit � WADS
4. Peiping information Organ (or SIdgeksita Organ)
Peiping Spiscial Intelligence Corps
(kon
.44aloi. Organ
Emearpta Of a Report on Japanese Intelligence, Toingtao
. .
Japanese Espionage Section, South Mu
� Apuseas Sontii China Intelligence Group Five Provinces info=
Thowtment
Tat at Taingtoms Borth ChIna
yr. 112 T
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if; BURBT
AnNainfal
The Military Intelligence Service was the most important
branch of. the Japanese China Hapeditiocum,Forces. Its leaders most of .
whom, were rabid radicals, influenced and inmost cases controlled the
tactical plis staffs of Headquarters and the Armies under its command.
The conquest of Chinavthe control of its people and
exploitation of its wealth was both directly and indirectly supervised.
by intelligence.
The functions of this vast organisation were as extensive
and elaborate as any in the world, the main sections included the followings
field or combat intelligence within Armies, counter-espionage, espionage
sabotage and fifth column, policing and peace preservation, propaganda and
economic control through government monopolies. The responsibility for the.
performance of most of these functions did not lie strict], with the Chief
of Intelligence at Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, but was for the
most part the responsibility of the army commanders arid his intelligence staff;
the commanders, in turn, were not obligated to report every detail concerning
intelligence activity to Headquarters. /t was in the interest of the Army of
a certain area to operate its own organisations. to successfully execute its �
duties of either combat or occupation.
Besides organisations of the Armies, other intelligence
units,:better known as Wikans or Special Service Organizations, were
created by higher Headquarters for the performance of special issions.
These independent Iikans operated for and reported only to Headquarters.
The Military Police (lampei), in many respects independent
of Hea44parters, had many intelligence duties to perform, the most important
of which was counter-espionage.
Within the Army alone there did not exist a properly coordinated
intelligence system one with a proper flow of intelligence to the supreme
authorities, the Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo. The system was for the most
part conducted as a service to the area in which it operated and in this
respect it was extremely thorough. Such thoroughness was exemplified by the
constant repetition and overwlapping of duties or different organizations with
the same Army.
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Svnrem
B. jlisher Echelon
The imperial General Headquarters was the hot, responsible for strategy
and the prosecution of the wars and controlled both branches of the
armed forces. It, was aside up of senior Azew and Navy officers, with re-
presentatives of the Foreign Office for purposes of liaison and advice.
The relation of imperial General Headquarters to intelligence work paral-
lel-bad its 'elation to the prosecution of the war in general* Through its
Third Bureau, it directed and coordinated the intelligence activities of
all subsidiary organizations. The function of coordination was performed
by an, Inter-service Supervisory Control Board within the Third Bureau.
The General Staff was responsible for the conducting of military opera-
tions and the collection of 'intelligence. The latter function came under
the direction of the Sewn/ Department (Wil =kJ JOHO) of the General
Staff. This department was in turn divided into a series of numbered
sections, each with particular functions or with direction toward a parti-
cular area. Subdivision of which are not known in details however it has
been reported that the divisions are as follow Europe and US Division,
German and Soviet Division and Propaganda Walston. Jill intelligence re-
ceived from army units in the field was routed to the Second Department,
which was principally the main coordinator of Amy intelligence.
The Ministry of War, although a body on the same level of authority as the
General Staff, was responsible for military administration and played no
part in command functions or intelligence. In actuaLlity the Kempei Tai,
(Gendarmerie or Military Police) was responsible to the War Ministry, but
intelligence affairs of the Kempei were channeled the Commanding General
of the area in which it.operatedik tor twiamittal to the General Staff.
C, Chipk&pitiliatiloparKtorcas(CXY)
The China Itspeditianary Forces functioned wader the Imperial Headquarters
on the same rank es' the Southall Force. (Kaabosogon) and the Manchurian
forces (Kwangtung Aiwy � -Kentegun). the -1atelligsume sootiest (Dal Hike)
of Kq. .C' was charged with the istrategic collection and coordination of
in3.ligenee as received frot the North, Central. and South China Commasulen
to be used by the commanding gerusral for war plans and disiimmisustion to the
General. Staff and Imperial Headquarters.
OFf!1:,0011
,iii:14610111111
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14. jicadourrter, anj star; Olneicr
The Officer in charge of the Vat ILL Ks was the moat,
Japortat sum in the ea and although according to the head-
quarters organisation the Dal. Ichi Ka (First Section) was the
section responsible for placaning and execution of the wsr, the
. Intelligence Section in China ccultrolled this function. Lie
circumstance existed since most of the Staff Officers of the
CF were the radical .element who had been aquillad nom Japan
to the fighting front by Premier Tajo because of their political
'Intrigue and callitary purges. These radicals controlled with
tremendous paler the direction and execution, of warfare in
China, regardlows of the policies or directives of the Commanding
General, 1160 was most frequentlya jtajo sppointed officer. This
power went to the extent of defiance toward otters issued by the
General staff and often delibertirte Independent action on the part
at the headquarters CEF.
Prominent radicals who held intelligence posts in the
CV Were Lt. General WAC/11,-14. General 15UJ1, Mad= General
"0, Colonel OEM and Colonel GUM, all of when were
opponents to Siddelci =jots government and policies.
IBM mewed as rightoshard man to genera 116ZAKT. and
with the rcink of Colonel was Chief of the Dai Xi Sir 4,/3/3 .-
1939 and had as his assaistant Colonel nthaf In1939 WACE/,
after promotion to ruujor General, and WWI were remand to
the front at flardcow. At the end of the war Lt. General =HZ
was Assistant Chief of Staff of Natabosogun (Southern Forces)
TSUjl, after serving in ilardcow, returned in 1943 to
Nanking as Officer in Charge of the Pat Ni Ks, however, later
in the same year was dispatched to the South Pacific. Successors,
such as ROAM, OICATA and OGan carried on the influence of the
Second Department.
The policy which KAM and 1SUJI were endeavoring to
enforce was =caplets IsLlitary domination of China and the
dividing of -China into two states, the Worth China Provisional
Goverment and Taido Puppet Begins. They strongly opposed the
formation of the Wong Chlog Wei hoot Government.
As a result of the insubordinate -activity by these
individaalo, Tejo sent HAWKE, and SUCATA in 1939 as supervisors
to the headquarters, gas but they were gradually influenced by
the radicals and beams Involved In exploitation and fortune
seeking raolorts.
r. T
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ar 943.O had saszusged to eliminate most of the
rasliciReStaff Officals Irma ON ilieuiquatersi usually by
sending that off to the front* and there was a rapid decline
of influairwe ,on the part of the Second Department.. /nferior
and inaperienced graduates of the Nakano Special Military
etacera Sawa were placed in staff positions.
Moe Dai Ni Na devoted its attention equally toward
�Citunglcing aid Communist affairs until the outbreak of the war
against *a %sited States and Engliadip at *Joh time attempts
we isdi casmaise with the Communist forces, especially.
the New ;earth Jaw and some saccess.resulted� since active
Warfare subsided* trade developed between the two arms and
prxminent Ccessonist personallties were pamittod to travel within
occupied areas� As a result the Second Depataat could devote its
entire attention to the war against the Allies. During the dosing
months of the war and shortly attar the surrender, the Staff of
Headquarters Ca supported the Ccannist Armies with mollies and
equipment .in deliberate violation of the sztarender toms.
. The Dsi IL ita was responsible for the forming and
supenising of Special Service Orsinithmus developed for
�mpecial mission* in combat areas for penetration poses or
for econossi.c or counter espionage activities in occupied
cities. Thews missions were most trequentliy the inspiration
of the radical sdliteristic Staff Officers at heafivusrters.
�
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liittfka Orsan
Ridaka Organ was in soMplete charge of collecting informa-
tion on and from the foreign national groups awl organizations
in Peiping and Tientsin, mainly by liaison activity. This
organization overlaps the functions of both the above-mentioned
organs since activities in Chungking and Tanen were also in
its scope, and this kind of information was also collected by
radio interception. (Appendixl
Other agencies denting their efforts to intelligence in
the Peiping-Tientsin area are the Kenpei-tai, the Intelligence
and Investigation Corps of the Ambassadorial Office, North China
Telephone & Telegraph Co., North China Communications Co.,
North China Development Co. However, these are covered in
other parts of this summary..
�
It is apparent from reports received concerning the North
China area that this part of the country, furthest removed
from strategic fighting fronts, was simply in a state of
occupation and there was little need to stress intelligence
activities other than to prevent subversive uprisings and to �
suppress the guerrilla menace on the part of Ccomnist bands.
Therefore, the various Japanese Armies in this area dealt
with intelligence affairs in this- manner that the commanding
officer wished to conduct them. The *volition of intelligence
activity in the port of Teingtao, Shantung Peninsula, is a
good example of how the highly organized system, on the part
of both the Navy and Army, since 1938, changed to meet the
prevailing situation.
/n 1938, the 5th Brigade of 43rd Japanese Army Intelligence
Department, *known as Tokumu Kikan, swept into the city and
"occupied", but in time most activity was conducted against
Communists through combat intelligence teams who collected
information concerning enemy disposition, peace and order in
occupied areas, climatic conditions, and topography and terrain;
their sources were through agents, voluntary informers among
inhabitants, Imperial Collaboration Army, Peace Preservation
Units, and the Puppet Armies.
Economic, political and counter-intelligence functions,
although conducted by the UV, NOY and Gendarmerie agencies,
were mainly the duty of civilian organizations as the Koain,
the Great East Asia Ministry.
The general method of collecting intelligence from agents,
both Chinese and Japanese* was by extortion or subjection
means, such as granting privileges, contracts, etc. in return
for information. There was little security or concealing of
identity of agents; training was at a Jainism; and pay was
.1.4" C
_
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sEelovio
negligible. All of these factors existedlbecause North China,
particularly on the Shantung Peninsula4 was actually too far
from the war in China and the Pacific to be of tactical
importance. This area was simply heldsend had only a need
-10roccapation forces to maintain public peace and suppress
skirmishes on the part of guerrilla "bandits" and smal/
Communist forces. (For details, see Appendix Yt.)
. .
,In order to explain in further detail the methods of
operation, the training of personnel, and to give an estima-
tion of the value of information obtained, a general statement
of The Rehabilitation and Liaison Department of the Japanese
'Officers and Soldiers, entitled �Outline of Intelligence
Collecting Machinery of Japanese Forces", 2 December, 1945,
follows;
OUTLINE OF INTILLIGENCE QOLLECT/NG MACHINERY OF JAPANESE FORCES
Since the Manchurian incident, a bad habit of neglecting
the intelligence service was created among the Japaneae forces
in North China as they had always fought against weaker enemy
forces. The Japanese forces always were confident of winning
over the enemy. The Chinese forces were weaker in quality and
-
equipment.. Information obtained regarding the Chinese forces
was not the deciding factor :10r the victory of the Japanese
forces. It was useful only for the Japanese forces to keep
the Japanese caeualties to a ninUMUM.. Under such circumstances,
an.evil habit of neglecting the value of the intelligence
service gradually grew.
It has to be admitted under the circumstances that almost
41 of those members who were engaged in the intelligence
service were not of first ranking men in their line; that
enthusiasm of the commander in leading the service was not
sufficient; and that machinery for collecting intelligence
was also not sufficient.
. Recently, however, importance of intelligence service
was strongly urged in some quarters in favorably leading
campaigns against Chinese Communist forces. But this advocacy,
after all, failed to attract general attention. Here may be
traced one of the causes which lead Japanese forces gradually
to an unfavorable war situation.
Along with such general situation, the information
collecting machinery of the Japanese forces in North China was
Also very poor, it has to be admitted:
In North China information was collected chiefly through
interception of enemy radio communications and from secret agent'
of Chinese nationality. But those who had facilities for
intercepting enemy radio commanications were confined to Army
Headquarters or much higher army unit headquarters. Further-
more, the capacity of the facilities was extremely limited.
ift_LIMT
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SECRET
Of the Chinese secret agents employed, those who apparently
seemed excellent did not really cooperate with the Japanese
forces and thereat were generally of low mentality midmost
mire so-called doub/e agents far from sharing the same fate
with the Japanese.
Most of them, taking advantage of their positions with
the Japanese forces, indulged in lootings or other unlawful �
conduct among the Chinese populace with the result that the
Chinese public gradually Came to entertain bad feeling against
the Japanese forces and efforts were made to collect informa-
tion voluntarily brought from the local inhabitants by
rendering aid to them and winning their popularity and success
was obtained to some extent.
Those which supplemented the insufficiency caused by the
afore-mentioned poor radio interception facilities and inferior
Chinese 'secret agents were the enemy documents obtained by our
garrison its during their small engagements, examination
of war prisoners when captured and also cooperation offered by
local Chinese. In view of special circumstances taken into
consideration in operations against the Chinese Communist
forces, one division of Japanese troops usually had to defend
about 140-1160 separate localities. In those areas where
Japanese troops kept friendly relations with local Chinese
inhabitants and checked the infiltration of the Chinese
Communist troops, the local Chinese inhabitants always
volunteered valuable information although there were exceptions.
Furthermore, after each small battle, all enemy documents
captUred as well as information obtained from prisoners of
war were sent to their uppe* units and they were of great value.
Since Japanese forces held their commanding system in high
reapect, thousands of small garrisons scattered in North China
might have well bean regarded as advance units of information
collecting machinery. Under such circumstances, it was very
sold= that a special intelligence unit was dispatshed to a
certain specified locality directly by Headquarters respectively
of each Brigade, Division, Army and the Japanese North China
Army. The Chinese military authorities entertain some doubt on
this point, but this is groundless suspicion on their part.
In addition to negligence of intelligence service an afore-
mentioned, the following two factors maybe accounted
additionally for the failure to obtain successful results in
the intelligence service:
�
Small advanced Japanese garrisons were stationed at
isolated places where comsungoation was difficult,
and no adequate education regarding the collection
of information given to them.
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on, 14
160 1140 Lb aa
After the outbreak of the Pacific War, there were
frequent shifts of troops, and no thorough�going
training had to be given ups
General speaking, it took at /east six months for the
troops to acquaint themselved with special tactics to be
employed for engaging the Chinese Communist troops. Most of
the Japanese troops, however, had to be shifted to other'
theaters of war when they somehow learned it, and the fresh
troops had to repeat the same thing. ,
In short, the information collecting machinery of the
Japanese forces in North China was insufficient either in its
structure or in its capacity. It was rather annoyed by
unreliable information offered by professional Chinese secret
agents. When the war situation was generally good for Japan
effects caused by such bad information were apparently
negligible but with the progress of the War graduallyunfaVorsble, various weak points were disclosed in every
direction and the Japanese forces had difficulty in grasping
the true nature of the Chinese Communist forces.
With the above description in mind, it will be interesting
to look into the following table:
TRAINING OF MEMERS ON INTLIALIGINE SERVICSAD ILLUL OF
INFORMATION OBTAINED
i. Training:
Headquarters of the Japanese North China Army, with a
view to enhancing the ability of those in complete charge of
intelligence service of each Brigade, Division and Lamy under
its command and control as well as giving instructions in c:
out the service, assembled those members twice a year, spring
and autumn at Peiping, or, if necessary, special officers
were dispatched to each Brigade's, Division's or Army's
intelligence section for training of personnel.
/n 1944 when general inspection of all Divisions in North
China was conducted for the first time, the intelligence
sections at each Army, Division and Brigade Headquarters were
also inspected and necessary instructions were given.
In addition, general instructions were given to each
intelligence section by means of telegrams, reference booklets
published from time to time and official circular letters. �
In training and giving instructions, emphasis was
especially laid on the characteristic feature of the Chinese
Communist forces and the special fighting tactics to be
qw.nRET
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grOlin M
� a 4, Xi A
employed against the Chinese Communist forces. For that
purpose, the following booklets were published:
A series of the "Extermination of Communists"
published once in two or three months, .
"A Guide for Extermination of Comaunists"
Vol. 1 & Vol. 2.
"Suggestions on Punitive Operations against
Chinese Communist Forces".
"A Desk�Book on Intelligence Service", etc.
The authorities of each Division and Army, besides
making use of the above material, distributed among the
members of the intelligence section some reference booklets
necessary for giving special knowledge peculiar to each
locality concerned.
On the other hand, an exchange of information waz
conducted with similar information organs other than the
military once a month as a rule and they were asked to submit
a report from time to time on the information they obtained.
Originally, special training was not given Japanese
troops before being put on intelligence service. They were
given necessary training while they were on routine duties.
Here we find another trend of neglecting the value of intelli�
gence service.
At the end of 1944, it was felt necessary to have specially
trained members in intelligence service and plans were made to
train those officers graduated from the cadets' training
corps at Paoting and Shihmen for two or three months so they
might be appointed as chiefs of the intelligence sections of
the respective Divisions and Armies. Before these plans bore
fruit, the war was brought to an end.
ii. Value of Information Obtained:
Headquarters of the Japanese North China Army achieved
quite satisfactory results intercepting radio communications
transmitted by Chungking forces as the latterls supervision and
control of radio cceanuaication was poor. During actual opera�
tions the Japanese forces could relatively accurately perceive
in advance attempts and movements to be carried out by Chungking
forces.
On the contrary, it was very diffidult or in some cases
almost impossible for Japanese forces to know in advance the
3 ke
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secrets relative to military operations of Chinese Communist
forces, despite considerable efforts made: for the interception
on the part of the Japanese forces. Such being the case, the
Japanese forces had to depend on a .rough estimation bused on
incomplete information to infer the enemy attempts and move�
ments. But it was, after all, inaccurate. Probably this might
be attributed to the following' facts:
a) The elusive character of the Chinese Communist forces.
b) Inferiority of secret agents employed by the Japanese
forces.
c) Strict supervision and control of the Chinese Communist
forces over their radio communication as weil as the
poor facilities of the Japanese forces for intercepting
the emu radio communication.
Consequently, with the Progress of the general war situation
unfavorable to Japan and with the gradual withdrawal of Japanese
troops scattered in .various areas, it became all the more difficult
to grasp an accurate conception on the strength and equipment
of Chinese COmmunist forces.
On the other hand, Japanese forces had no facilities for
intercepting radio communications transmitted by the Soviet�
Mongolian forces in the Outer BOngolian area, and 61so it was
almost impossible for the Japanese forces to dispatch their
secret agents to that area. It is not too much to 54y, therefore,
that no information was obtained regarding the Soviet�Y4ongolian
forces.
Circumstanoes being as sudh, the Soviet attacks on the
Japanese forces launched on August 9 were, frankly speaking,
unexpected ones, and it was not until hostilities began between
Japanese and soviet troopsimorth of Kalgan that thE; Japanese
forces could get the general idea on the strength and equipment �
of enemy troops.
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SVPPrin
3. CentrakChini
.a4 ,Organization
The Second Section of the Headquarters, Central China Expeditionary
Forces was located at Nanking and acted as the supervising and di-
� recting office of the intelligence departments in the armies under
its =mend. The scope of its activity was greatly limited since
the Area Armies intelligence Departments furnished only matters of
extreme importance to be relayed to higher headquarters. Most fre-
quently* the Commanding General of the respective armies utilised
information obtained without relaying it to Headquarters, CEF.
Under the command of Central China's. the Sixth Area Army, and
'under it cans the 34th, 20th, 13th and llth Armies. The Staff De-
partments* containing the Intelligence Officeros well as other
sections* placed officers responsible for the collection of intel-
ligence in the subordinate divisions* brigades* and regiments. It
was the privilege of these officers to select the men under them
to carry on their investigative functions. Many of these inveati,
gators were civilians who had a knowledge of the locality or lan-
guage qualifications.
ln. Methods of Operation
14 The Army, by means of combat patrols* collected information
concerning both Communist and Nationalist forces at the fronts,
and also utilised agents in penetration operations in the guise
of merchants* smugglers, etc. The small towns near the fronts
were covered by native informants at local shops, eating places,
. and rest houses as well as by the local Peace Preservation Corps.
24 /n the lute cities, Shanghai, Nanking, Hanka', Soochow, etc.,
amuck vaster network of informants and agents existed, however,
their duties were more of a counter espionage and economic nature.
The Army played only a small role in these areas since this acti-
vity was mostly of gendarmerie function.
Shanghai* at stink city the 13th Army (NOBORI BUTAI), had its
headquarters, is an example of the tremendous overlap of activity
On the part of the numerous Japanese intelligence agencies, and
Showed the west of effort and the interservicess jealousy which
existed, and yet the extreme thoroughness to which the services
conducted espionage and counter-eapionage* propaganda, and sub-
Imrsive activities. The Army, with its allied Army Bureau
aka
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SE.Y.Y.44
(RIKW4UNBU) and Peace Preservation Corps and Puppet Armies, the Gendarmerie
and its subordinate Police Force, the Navy and .its Landing Party and Resi-
dent Office, the For sigh Office and its Consular Police and various devel-
opment companies, railroad.po/ice, etc., delved into every phase of intelp.
ligence and exploitation, and formed a tremendous and inpentratable wail
around the city. Each service, jealous and competing, had its own channel
of reporting, and instead of depending on extensive exchange of information
to coordinate their activities, chose to have its own network of agents and
informants.
C. Training
The training of intelligence officers for higher positions did not exist,
:their positions were granted only after long periods of service with the
Army. Therefore the activities conducted by the officer were not always
according to a formed plan but more according to his personal interests
and desired field of endeavor. This was predominately the policy which
resulted in the forming of special service units (KIKANS) which were
created to serve a special mission and were then disbanded upon com-
pletion or failure of the mission.
�
Lein important officers and civilian employees wyre selected to work
in intelligence departments by the following qUa/ifications:
Previous military services, particularly in intelligence.
Language abilities.
Residence in the area of service.
No training was given to these people l they were expected to learn by
. experience.
The only persons in the intelligence, service who received specialized
training were tee:battens who had studied radio operation and maintain-
ince, cryptography, andstotography, and usually these were enlisted
men.
SnitET
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4. SOUTH CHINA
a. Organization and 87atematio Arrangements of Intelligence
in South China: See Chart: Exhibit Inc )
Prior to the Japanese surrender, their South China
intelligence work was under the direction of the Staff
Department of the 23rd Japanese Army of Occupation with
Hwangtung as their designated territory. The backbone
of this organization was the Staff Department of the
Arpy Atli& utilized the Divisions, Brigades, Regiments
and other intelligence units under its control to form
its intelligence net. The Liaison Department and the
Gendarmerie, also assisted in such activities. The listed
details are:
1) Service Unites
a) 104th Division
b) 129th Division
c) 130th Division
d) 23rd Brigade
e) The 8th Independent Infantry Regiment
f) The 13th Independent Infantry Regiment
2) Other assisting unites
a) liaison Department (Renrakuh0
b) Gendarmerie
� 3) Other Special Intelligence Units (Nikans)s
Thiv,above organizations were all under the control
of the Staff Department of the Japanese Army. The Army
designated an Intelligence Staff �Mew to each Division,
an officer to each Brigade and Regiment to assume charge
of Intelligence. Under these officers-an-charge, a sub-
ordinate staff WAX formed from the rank and file. For
other organizations and unite, the same arrangement
prevailed, an officer.inpwcharge, subordinate staff and
interpreters. Details are abown on the accompanying chart.
b. MOthode of Operations
.1.) Army Cteanis:tionss (Service Units)
In this respect the Army collected informs
tion directly concerning the disposition of the
Chinese Amy and other relevant information con-
cerning Free China. Captured documents and/or
prisoners of war were sources of information.
) M 4.
, ON II eir
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5 F. C P. T
2) Intellieence Orzanizations:
These units were scattered throughout the country
headed by an Intelligence Officer who purchased
documents, newspapers and other printed matter cir-
culating in Free China. From this source a general
survey was made concerning the economic and po/itical
conditions in Free China, the excesses or scarcity of
materials, current commodity prices, national morale,
etc. which all contributed to his deductions concerning
current conditions in China. Furthermore, it was the
job of the organizations to hire Chinese and Formosans
as agents for infiltration into Free China for
espionage purposes. Radio intelligence interception,
code-breaking for military information and movements,
information concerning the China-India Air Transport,
and the disposition of the American Air Force and Navy
Units - all these activities were the tasks of these
Intelligence Units.
C. Resorting:
1) Documentary: (/) Monthly Reports
(2) Specie/ Reports as occasion demands
This method was limited to urgent and/or
important matters
For use close to Army Units, or for
urgent information
4) Close Liaison between Unit Heads: This was accomplished
through conferences of Unit Officers.
Important or complicated matters were
decided by such conferences.
d. peoti2nal Intellisenoe Operational Activities:
1) The 23rd Army under orders from Headquarters of the
Japanese China EXpeditionsw Force, collected all infor-
mation pertaining to the equipment of the Chinese. forces,
their organization and movements, tactics, the condition
and strength of the Chinese-American Air Force, coastal
-land(ng possibilities, naval unit movements, the study
of American strength and the international aspect of
Chinese-American picture, and report such information
to the imperial Headquarters through the Second Area
Command at Hankow.
2) Radio:
3) Telephones
2) important information obtained by the 23rd Army, the
13th Amy, the Tatman Army. the 5th Air Force (principally
yJaUtto.
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SrCP.ET
serial information), the 2nd Expeditionary naval
Squadron, the Southern Army and the Indo-China
Amy was circulated and exchanged among each other.
3) All intelligence departments under their respective
divisions were responsible for the collection of
intelligence and the information obtained by their
subordinate units as well. Such information other
than that relevant to immediate tactical purposes,
and al/ necessary information, was reported to the
23rd Army. Units, besides serving as clearing houses
for their sub-units, carried out intelligence
operations of their own and reported to their respective
superior Departments attached to the Army Divisions.
There were no designated intelligence organizations
attached to Brigades and Regiments. This work was
handled by the service units themselves, who were
primarily interested in combat information which might
be of immediate concern to themselves; such information
was reported to their immediate superior Units. In
their ordinary operations, the intelligence units
included pacification propaganda for which especial
office was set up. In regard to the Unite attached
to the Amy Division, their MU objective chiefly
Concerned the territory or area under the Division's
occupation, with main emphasis on information relating
to the Chinese forces immediate to them and with
secondary emphasis on the subjects of Communists and
bandits.
A) All intelligence agencies were to collect and
assimilate all information of economic and political
value for reports to the 23rd Army, They a/so
established close liaison with the German �Heise"
intelligence agency collaborating in the study and
breaking of the Allied (Chinese and American) code.
Results were reported to the 23rd Army.
5) AssistinE_Inteilizezies_Arensiess
a) Gendarmeries
14 Responsible for information and the preservation
of peace and order.
2. Investigation of Chinese intelligence agents
and their activities.
w m
ir dor V lb aka a
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3. Collection of information !maths South China
Five Provinces Intelligence Group. (Exhir nr2)
All reports were sent to the 23rd Army.
Personnel of the Liaison Department 23rd Army:
Departmeat Name and Rank
Liaison Dept. Maj. Gen. Matsui
General Affairs Capt. Harushima
Unit #1 Lt. Ikida
Unit #2 Co]. Kawai
Duties
In charge of entire Dept. .
/n charg�f personnel and
general affairs.
Administration, and director
of strategy, collection of
intelligence regarding China.
Director of affairs concerning
.Puppet Government, ArA7 and
the Police.
Unit #3 Lt. Togashi Director of economic sabotage
and the purchase of raw
materials
Unit #4 Capt. Ma'am/ In charge of the exchange of
(Okanous) reports with other members
of the Axis.
Liuchow Branch Maj. Usuta Similar to Liaison Department
Swatow Branch' Lt. Co]. Iamaoka
�do�
e. _genera:
/) Before the assumption in charge by Lt. Co].. KOBAYASHI,
the uSouth China Espionage Agency'. was headed by a
person whose name was well known throughout China,
Lt. Co]. OKADA, an intimate friend of the German
Espionage Agent, HSISS. When OKADA went to Shanghai
in December, 1944, for the peace proposals, his duties
were taken over by Lt. Col. SAIGO. When SAIGO went
to Hengyang in March, 1945, KOBAYASHI took over until �
the end of the war.
2) During hostilities, various Japanese staff officers
frequently had to leave for duty to the front and due
to their lack or incomplete knowledge of the Chinese
. language it was difficult for them to hire and dispatch
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Nor
grnprpm
good agents. Because of these difficulties, Japanese
ranking officers acknowledged the poor quality of ,
their espionage reports.
3) At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan had
already established many intelligence and espionege
. posts throughout China. Because of the friction that
arose between the men in charge and the agents, the
task was transferred to the Army in the field..
4) It can be said that the main source of enemy
intelligence was obtained through the radio, because
such reports were mostly military and political of
comprehensive nature which Tokyo and Nanking considered
to be of great value. The Japanese paid special
attention to the German "Heise" Agency and their
collaboration was very close, such as the'relatiorwhip
of ranking officers with HEISE, and the designation .
of specific personnel, technical and otherwise, for
cooperation with HEISE. The list of Japanese personnel
assisting HUSE is given below'
Unit Orzanization Name and Rank Collaboration Duties
23rd Army Lk. Col. Easesays,
23rd Army Staff Eq. Colo Okndn
" Capt. Aovama
(I Sgt. Sallekt
n Cpl. tradft
Ume Organization Major Ume
Ragami Organization Major Kagami
II II II
It it it
It ii Ii
Pfc. Nitta
23rd Army Staff Eq. Pvt. Kuno=
II II II_ ?rt. masuda
Social relationship
with Boise
Boise's intimate friend
Liaison with Heise
Interpreter
Message interception
H IS
Interception of China..
India air transport
information
if
ii
f. Ssecial IntellisIumelate (Iikans):
The material referring to the Special Intelligence
Units of South China is located under a separate section
entitled "Special Service Organizations (See Table of
Contents.)
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� i;
ge "Doi of Intellirrence Activities
Since the tide of the Pacific war turned in favor
of the Allies, especially since the American reoccupation
of Loyte and�IVA/Ala, the Japanese were contemplating the
'eventual landing along the South China coast. And from
-
the reorganization and new equipment of the Chinese Army,
they knew the time for the new Chinese offensive was near.
Because of these facts, the primary concern of Japanese
intelligence was directed toward the possible place and
date of American coastal landings, the progress in tactics
end offensive power of the rejuvenated Chinese Army, the new
types of evirmont and the probable time of the now Chinese
offensive.. Herewith is listed their primary objectives; and
territory coveredg
Objectives:
(1) Possible American landings along the South China
coasts
(a) points or landing'
(b) tine
(0 strength and stratery
(2) Time and strategy of Chinese offensive
� (3) Information relating to air transportation over
the hump
(4) Degree of success pertaining to the sabotage of
political division of China
(5) Actual condition of peace and order of occupied
South China
(6) Information pertaining to concentration of forces.
T
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THE FOCI, AREA AND DIRSCT/ON OF THB
SOUTH CH/NA JAPAUSB gtia INTELLIGENCE' OPERATMS
a 606000 ZZ/90/ZZOZ :escape' JOJ paAadd
:!SZ606000 ZZ/90/ZZ0z :escape' JOJ pancudd
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RRPTIVM
5. SPECIAL ssmaqrs ORGANIZATIONS
a. Nomenclatera:
Frequent changes in Japanese Special Service organiza-
tions, both in their names and in the functions which they
imply, are apt to cause confusion. A glossary is therefore
given in this paragraph, which sets out the names, meaning,
and period of the organization of the Special Service De-
partment (SSD).
CMUZAI BUKAN Resident officer 1929-37
(RiKUGUN: Army)
TOE= NIKAN SSD Army only
1.. Army SSD for less important areas
excluding cities Peiping, Tientsin,
Nanking, Shanghai, Canton 1929-37
2: SSD 'whole of China 1937-38
3. Solely for Puppet Government 1938-43
TOMO BU Special duties dept.,
Amy whole of China excluding
Shanghai and Nanking 1938-43
RENRAKU HU Army Liaison Department 194345
Used only for work with Puppet Gov.
RIEUGUNBU Army Department or Bureau /94345 �
b. Oritans:
Although the first organized effort to develop special
services was made by the Navy in 1929, it is be/ieved.that the
Army had them some years earlier. They existed in the form of
Military Attaches at Peiping. However, when the Chinese
Government transferred to Nanking, the Japanese, with their
increasing interest in China, desired to retain a representative
in North China and in order to avoid diplomatic protest created
the CHUZAI BIT4AN (Resident Officer) in. addition to the
Attaches' office. Resident officers were installed in every
city of importance, subsequently extending to Canton.
c. Functions:
From. 1929 to 1937, the Army Special Service Department
VAS virtually under the control of the imperial General Staff
(SAIWBO), Tokyo. This was because the maim functions of the
Special Service Department during this period were espionage
and counter-espionage (general heading GUMMI), for which
the General Staff has always been responsible as against the
4", 1,
160 L �*
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function of cooperation with governmento, propaganda,
economic and industrial affairs (general heading GUNSRI),
for which the War Office (R/KUGUNSHO) and Admirality
(KAIGUNSHO) were responsible. Later, during the occupation,
the SSD' s were concerned primarily with the control of the
native population, the establishment of Puppet regimes, and
organization of labor and supplies for the occupation forces,
in addition to intelligence activities,
d. guano
Changes took place as a result of prevailing circumstances,
and took effect over a period of months. The first took place
in-1930 when the RIKUGUN CHUZAI BUKAN activated the TOKU1U
KIKAN (Special Service Organization) to conduct similar
functions in less important areas where sections of the
organizations were formed and disbanded as the situation in
that area demanded.
At that time, sections of Tomo KUKAN were not given
special code-names; e.g., UME, MATO, etc., which applied to
later Army organizations. Thus, during the period 1929 - 1937,
there were the following SSDle:
CHUZAI BUKAN, answering directly to Tokyo, mainly
.to the General Staff. '
TOKUMU KIKAN (AIKUGUN), from 1930, in less important
areas answering to Tokyo, mainly to
the General. Staff.
Following the opening of hostilities in China in the '
summer of 1937, and the subsequent occupation of Nanking by
Japanese forces, the SSD was remodelled, and the office of
CHUZAI BUKAN terminated, with the exception of Army Departments
in Canton and Hankow, when the CHUZAI BUKAN remained in addi-
tion to the new organ.
Although the Navy retained their Attaches, the Amy
temporarily withdrew theirs until the Wang Ching Wei Puppet
Government came into being.
The Army SSD throughout China adopted the name of
RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, and was for the first time under direct
control of Headquarters, China EXpeditionary Forces, Nanking,.
which in turn was responsible to the Imperial Headauarters
and/or War Office, Tokyo, according to the nature of the work.
This Change in name and of responsibility was ordered by
Idt. Gen. KIT, Se4leh4 who was later succeeded .by Lt. Gen.
HARADA, Kumakieht. RASH/ RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN (North Army
Special Service Department) had its headquarters in Peiping
�a"PPRIT'
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� t,
'ending in control Of Army Sais in Tientein, Tainztao,
and a few northern cities. Its jurisdiction did not
extend to SSDIs inAlanidng, Shanghai and�Nankow, who
answered independently to Noq., C.B.F., Nanking. NAN=
RIKUOUN TOKUUU KINAU (South Army Special Service Department)
Zuulits neadquarters in Canton.
Sots time in 1938 the Army SSD began to adopt the same
title as used by the Navy; viz., TONDO BO. The name RIKUUN
TOKUO N/KAN, especially as regards its espionage and oonnte,e-
espionage functions, had become too well advertised in certain
areas. This change in name did not apply to the Ana,' SSD in
Nanking and Shanghai, 'tore their functions mainly were
concerned with the engineering of and subsequent collaboration
with Puppet Governments.
.Thus, during the period 19374943, there were the
following SW's.*
NINON TOE= K/KAN a- /9374938
" BU 1$584943
It U KnEAN
at Nanking ea Shanghai - /9384943
CHUZAI BUKAM a-retained at Hanka, and Canton.
The third general change of names and functions of the
SSDIs began in the spring of 1943. BIKUOUN TOL= HU, MargU
K/KAN and CHUZAI BLUM were disbanded. /n so far as their
functions vie-semis the Puppet Government were concerned, the
three were amalgamated into the REAANU En: (Liaison Department),
with the exception of Shanghai, where the SSD continued to
operate is the B/KUGUU BU.
The other branch of the Army SSD, that which dealt with
espionage and counter-espionage, was centralised under an
Intelligence Branch, known as BURYAKU J/BSH/ CLKAN at Head-
quarters, CF, Nanking. This branch was commi,iily referred to
as TOKUSHU ELKAN (literally Special Duties Organization), but
was not known officially by this tit/e. MATSU K/KAN and K/KU
EIKAN came under the category of TOKIrcHU KIKAN (literally
Special Duties CTganization),. but was not known officially by
this title. MATSU KIWI and KIKU NIKAN came under the
category of TOKMHU 1/KAN.
The HaRAKUJBU had departments in all the important
centers of ire Chinese Puppet Government, viz., in Peiping,
Nanking, Hank= and Canton, as well as in Shanghai, where it
was named BiKUGUN BU, but diffemilrom its predecessors in
that it comes under the direct control of ArAy Headquarters
in banking.
This latest organization was born out of several trial
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and error methods used by the Army andEavyinCbina. /t proved
itself more efficient and lasted until the sad of the war. The
final Change in name to that of a Liaison Organisation and the
assuming of duties along peace preservation lines came about
.when the PapsmILGovernment was given the privilege of establishing
its own government and city administrations. The old and much
dreaded TOMMV died and left the Chinese people not free of
the special service as the Japanese wished to point out, but
faced by an organization which was much closer to the people
in its prying and watchfulness.
ThelgitUKIJawas usually cansanded by an officer of
General's rank, or the rank of Colonel, according to its size
and importance. It became an organization much like a police
force with representations even covering most of the villages
in outlying districts.
Its principal function was collaboration and liaison with
the Puppet Government, for which a sub-department was maintained
(=GIs-Political Adminietration) and also departments dealing
with economics, industry, propaganda, etc.
Mention halo already been made of the existence of an
independent organisation, the R/EUGUE EMI, in Shanghai which
reportedAirectly to Nanking Headquarters and carried on the
duties of. the TOM= BU and RBEILAKU W. Hewer, this organi-
sation was also a complex intelligence organ. Details concerning
the RIEUGUN AU talwa under the eentrest-Otslava subsection. At
Shanghai there also existed the ERNRAND AU as a separate
organisation of the above.
.8. Emplorees of the SSD:
3) Civilian Emolovees: -
Japanese civil servants who served in the SSD were
generally of two kinds - young, inexperienced university
graduates and old residents of localities in which they
worked. The younger group were generally qualified in
economics, propaganda, political adsdniatration, etc.
especially as relating to China. The latter were recruited
on the spot and held such qualifications as language,
business know/edge of the areas they lived in, valuable
contacts, etc. None of the civilians received intelligence
training, but learned their duties through experience.
2) Agatat
Agents of the SSD were of various nationalities -
the greatest number being Chinese; whereas Koreans Formosans
and Ubite Russians comprised the remaincbrr. As a ;hole
there was little specialized training, and most of the
knowledge attained was through actual job participation.
ImS
i4 JWID a
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S. Pelationa_be smenSSD and Axis Representatives:
Relations between the Japanese SSD in China and the German
and Italian diplomatic representatives were maintained on the
surface lathe most cordial manner, but behind the scenes
there was a strong undercurrent of resentment which the SSD
centres had towards their =is partners. Particularly was
this the ease in connection with the Germans, who were un-
wontedly meddlesome in the workings of the SSD.
The Japanese considered China, or at least occupied
China, under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and,
as such, was, without reservation whatever, Japan's affair;
just as the Germans and /taigas would have their share
of occupied territory in Europe and Africa, should the war
end in the Axis' favor.
After the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the concessions
given to the Germans and Italians as regards information
collected by the SSD were. increased. However, it was difficult
to satisfy the insatiable demands of the German representatives
.and even of the Italians who were prone to mimic their senior
partner.
German interference in Japanese SSD operations reached
its peak after Dunkirk. On not a few occasions, the Germans
were caught redhanded Libeling off Japanese agents, thus
intercepting the information which should have reached the
Japanese. The natural outcome of such occurrences was the -
tendency on the part of the Japanese SSD to become�even more
parsimonious imparting with information. with the deteriora-
tion of their position. in Africa and Europe, and after Italy's
elimination from the war, the Germans became leas bold in
their methods. Also they learned to their cost that Chinese
did not make very trustworthy agents.
Italian representation became almost non-existent when
Italy surrendered. Those proFasciat officials who were
left, after the anti-fascists were interned, retained little
of their diplomatic powers and as far as the Japanese SSD
was concerned, there was little liaison to be conducted.
g�
SSD Organizations:
Set out below are reports concerning all SSD organizations
known to this office. This information concerning each organi-
zation explains briefly the objectives, key personnel, locations
and time of activity.
1) un MAN:
ME was organized in 1938 by Lt. General KAGLZA in
Ranking for the purpose of supporting and promoting the
SECRET
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0
m m
so to A ra
-
Puppet Regime. in Chinese it was called M.-Bak-TANG
(Plum Flower Society) and was attached to the Mi.litary
Adviser's Council. In the beginning it was active in
the protection of Puppets from attacks by the C.C. Society
and Blue Shirt Society (TAI 11) and assumed leadership in
the Country Cleaning Movement.
In 1943, Lt. General MATSUI, Chief of Staff of the
Headquarters, Ca, took charge of the organization and
changed its function to one of strategic information
gathering concerning the Chungking Goverruaent. .
It has been highly difficult to obtain information
concerning ME =AN as the Chinese authorities have
shrouded it in secrecy, comp1.ete:4 ignoring requests for
information about it or permission to interrogate members
of its staff. �
Concerning the Shanghai office, it has been learned
that Captain NAIWYMA, Seichi, was in charge and had it.
BIZAMATSU and Lt. ORM on his staff. The office had two
departments: Politicau, devoted to espionage; economic,
devoted to purchasing and exchange of war materials with
the forward Chinese Armies. These transactions were made
by the TONAli MVO NOSU (Bast Southern Development. Co.)
located in Shanghai, but with branch offices in Chekiang
Province at Bangchow, Chinhwa, Fuyang, Leuachi and Biwa�.
According to a statement by Major General Taa, Chief
of Staff of the 23rd &Ws it was this organization that
engineered the desertion and �flight of WING CHING-dal and
ULM CHUNG-MING from Chungking to Hanoi and thence to
Nanking.
In 1938, the LIAI Mission, (sometimes called the
Special Investigation Group), an independent office of
the Foreign Office, cooperated very closely with UMB
Lira, Aeiichi, who had served as Consul in Canton, organized
the mission upon his arrival in Shanghai, and received
full cooperation and financial support from Lt. General
KAGEZA, Director of LIME.
2) OBA NAN:
OBA. Masatoshi, once a loafer in Shanghai ingratiated
himself with the military clique following the battle for
Shanghai, 1937, and formed the OBA Organization. In the
pretense of doing intelligence work, he caused many anti-
Japanese to be jailed and destroyed many British and
American industrial plants. Be also assisted the Lila; NIKAId
cimnAP,
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in the formation of the Puppet Army. During the search
for Kuomintang personnel in outlying villages by the
Puppet Government, OBA managed to appropriate a huge
amount of grain for himself,
3) MATSU K/KAN (Pine Sclietz):
MATSU KIKAN, organized in 1940, was directed by
Lt. Col. CICADA, Yoshimasa, former Chief of Staff of the
23rd Amy with offices in Shanghai, Hongkong, Canton and
Benkow, and was responsible directly to Headquarters,
Nanking. The objection of the organization was to collect
information concerning political personalities and activities
in Chungking, and utilized this information to persuade .
officials to collaborate with the Puppet Regime. Prior to
the outbreak of the Pacific war, MATSU KIKAN was devoting
its efforts to obtaining foreign capital (gold) by
exporting Chinese native goods, bristles, wood-oil, etc. to
the United States. This trade was financed by SHOWA TSUSHO.
The organization was reported to have been disbanded in
/943 and that the information section joined UME KIKAN.
However, a source in Canton reports that up to the surrender,
the activities of MATSU were entrusted to a brand: of the
/TAGAKI HOUSE, with the aim of destroying the Chinese
economic structure by the purchase of metals and ores.
A) FUJI KIKAN (Shanghai Kikan):
Shanghai. Kikan was organized and operated during 1940-
/941 by Captain URANO (now Lt. Co/one/), who assigned directly
from headquarters, CF. Its duties, as were the duties of
most /Likens early in the war, were both the -limt ation of
Chungking agents and persuasion of Chinese officials to join
the Nanking Regime. FUJI K/KAN was more of a terrorist gang
than intelligence organ, and carried out its acts by holding
as hostages members of Chungking officials' families, and in
the case of enemy agents, simply shooting them. Assistants
Of MAN� were two Koreans, KANF2A4A (Kim Kyung Chai) and
TA1A5Hra0 (Choi Kyung Su).
5) SAKURA KIKAN:
This organization, directed by Major-General OKADA,
operated at Shanghai in 1940 until 1942. It's main activity
was counter-espionage directed against Chungkirg agents.
6) �AWAAINAbig
This organization, originally started by SAKAKA, operated
as an espionage organization for the 13th Army under the
direction. of Lt. Col. /CH/G44A, Intelligence
Staff Officer. It was known as the New Trading Co., (Shin
Wha Moi Ktngsu), and had its offices in the Development
Building, Shanghai. YOJ/MA Takeo was the manager as his
assistants, Capt. HALIWIOTO and Mts. NOGAg/.
. 7) U/SUIII ORGANIZATION:
This organization was originally directly under the
Headquarters, Japanese China Expeditionary Force, but was
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transferred to the 23rd Army. The main duty was the inter-
ception of military radio massages sent by the Chinese and
the American headquarters. /t was divided into two sections:
the China Section and the American. Section.
The attention of the China Section usa the Chinese 2nd
Area Command, especially the 7th War Area, .the 65th Army, the
63rd Army and the Border Region Headquarters. Messages from
these headquarters concerning troop movements and supplies
were the main objectives of interest. The main objectives
of interception for the American Section were the messages
and broadcasts from the Philippines, which was the center of
the American Naval information, Honolulu and Oahu, and the
messages that travelled between these points and the United
States. When the tide of the Pacific War became evident,
this organisation devoted its entire energy towards the collec-
tion of information concerning the points of coastal landings
which the Americans and the British forces were contemplating.
But due to lack of equipment and shortage of personnel, their
achievements in this respect up to the time of the surrender
were poor.
In their study of intercepted messages, the important
points of each message were made into copies and compared with
other messages sent out. Their time of interception ranged
from. 0800 hours to 2400 hours.
China Section:
C6I-C Captain Tano
Staff z 40 (including four officers) 40
Duty ; Radio interception of Chinese massages
American Section:
C-.1.4 Capt. Arakawa 22
Staff 4 22 (including 1 officer)
Duty Interception of American radio messages
Apparatus_ (Technical) Section:
C-I-C : Lt. Sako 6
Staff I 6 (including 1 officer)
Duty : Repair and maintenance of equipment
General Affairs Department:
C-/-C : Capt. Ian o (assumes this post also)
Staff : 8 (including 1 officer) .
Total nuMber of personnel
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2 6
Equipment used Lathe China Section;
/0 radio transmitter sets with 28 operators
9 seta require 3 men per set .
3. set requires lmanpsr set.
one to two tranalators.
Equipment used in the American Section:
7 sets with 20 operators
6 Bete require 3 operators
1 set requires 2 operators
readers and translators together 2 men
Total
'Wes of Radio Transmitters:
R C A
National
Others
Total
ID sets
u
17 sets
4 sets
3 "
/0
17_8ets
This equipment was handed over to our 38th Division and the
90th Division by the Japanese.
8) Ike Asiatic Prosperity Organization;
Thie organization was directly under the headquarters,
Japanese China Expeditionary Force whose headquarters was at
Nanking. It was originally established in Hongkong, but in
April, 1949, it was transferred to Canton under the 23rd
Army. Its main activities were the collection Of intelligence
information from documents and newspapers and the dispatching
of agents into Free China to carry out its activities,
especially information concerning military movements in South
China. From their own reports it was difficult to find good
agents for this purpose, and due to the tight anti�espionage
net set up by Chungking, these agents often, were arrested or
simply disappeared. Col. NINOUE, Capt. AOYAMA and Lt. Col.
KOBAYASHI all expressed the same doubt whether these agents
ever reached their objectives, and knew that results expected
from these people could not be reliable and therefore confined
themselves chiefly to documentary information. dhatever. .
information they had been able to obtain was concerning the
East River Communist and bandit activities.
Personnel;
Name and Rank
Major Ninoue
Capt. Aoyama
Sgt. Yatomi :
Mr. Masuda
&ging Chuen
Chang liu'
Duty-
Read of Organization
Successor to Maj. Nino=
lieramr of the Staff
Employee
Chauffeur (Chinese)
Cook
Present Address
Deceased
Nenam Concentration
(?0a) Camp
Liaison Department
2nd Area Command
Lingnan Concentration
Camp
Unknown
It
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ALLLEJLi
Sphere of Operation of the Asiatic Prosperity OrRanization
CHART # 2
Chungking
(Chan Wang)
tiongltan Wing)
noel, Xing
(Wong Jiin)
Kunming
Loting,
(Chan)u--
�
/ / ...
/ / '....
/ ../
A /'
.0.
Canton
Wong Ching
Li. Dung Wing
Li Shing Chung
San an District
pOiuMing)
B. River District
(So)
NOili The chief agent for this organization was a Chinese,
LI Sat* WING, a native of Toidhan, aged 38. Before the
war he was said to have been connected with the Chinese
qiIneshirtsu, and supplied information to the Japandse
at Hongkong after the beginning of hostilities. He cane
to Canton in March, 1945, to continue his work: by.
estab/ishing a shop as his blind under the name of CHUNG
LEE HONq situated on Tai Piiikir Road, S. This was his
headquarters where he diepatched Agents to Chungking,
Kunnidg, Nweiyang, San^nan district, the Bast River and
Loting area. Once a month his men went out utilizing
the river boats and trade-travelers as means of contact.
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SECRET.
9) Kama Organization:
This uttianiaation was part of the Japanese 5th Air
.Force at Nanking. Its main objective was the interception
of messages relating to the movements of. the American Air
Force in China. Due to the expediency of the work, it
maintained close collaboration with the German "Heise"
Agency at Canton. From March, 1944, it began to undertake
the main task of intercepting messages of the A.T.C. and
Sergeant N/TTA was designated to collaborate with the Germans.
Before collaboration with the Germans, the only duty of the
Kagami Organization was the interception of A.T.C. nssaages.
In June, 1945, this unit moved to Central China, together
with the 5th Air Force.
Personnels
Major KAGAN/ . Head of Organization
Capt. EIGENOI Staff Member
Capt. oaTo (oNi)
Capt. TAKAIA
Lt. (Uncertain romanization)
Sergeant NITTA
10) IOSHINO Orzanizatio
� This organization was attached to the Headquarters of
the Japanese China Expeditionary Force. /t was set up in
Canton on June, 1944, with Maj. Gen. IOSHINO as the head.
Its objectives were sabotage directed against ranking Chinese
military officers, sowing seeds of discord between local
Governments and the Central Government, and the instigation
of peace overtures through false propaganda of Sino-Japanese
cooperation.
Upon the recall of Maj. Gen. IOSHINO to Nanking Head-
quarters in February, 1945, Maj. Gen. TWIT (TUiDA) took
over the organization which he wound up and reorganized into
what INA known as "The South China Espionage Agency" whose
stain objective was the instigation of peace between the
Chinese forces stationed in Kwangei and the Japanese. The
results of this effort were nil.
Personnel:
Name and Rank
II It
It II
.14.0 Present Address
Maj. Gen. Y0SHIE0 Head of Organization In Japan, address unknown
Lt.Col.FUKUTALIA Assistant Head Staff Officer, 23rd Army,
at present in Shanghai.
Address unknown
Lt.(Uncertain ro� Secretary
nanization)
Sgt. EITAGAWA Secretary Liaison Department
2nd Area Command
L C a T
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07...cRET
/1) Take Organization:
The duty of this organization. was the study of the
military, political, cultural and other subjects of the
Chinese.
12) The Hunan Fukkobu Oreanizations
The principal duties of the HUNAN FUKEDBU Organization
use to avoid coercive action against the people of the
occupied area in order to gain the good will of the people,
to maintain a popular support of the people, to gain the
support of discouraged war�lords and politicians, to collect
resources and food in order to maintain the Japanese
occupation forces.
The FUNKOBU was organized under the guidance of the
Sakursbutai and the Ministry of War. The Commanding Officer
of the Changsha Organization was Major Genera/ 81I=0 TOWN/.
The following is a diagrammatic outline of the organiza�
tient
a) General Office:
1. Commanding Officer � Colonel ROUE
2. Principle � Same as Chinese Organization
3. Direct Section:
A.; Service Section: Receiving and dispatching
documents and wireless massages.
B. Accounting Section: Receiving, paying, and
auditing.
14 Economical Affairs:
1. Commanding Officer � Colonel WASH=
2. Principle � Cultivate resources, "oppress" economics,
steal material in order to fulfil the military needs.
3. Direct Section:
A. Mining Dept.: investigation, research and
cultivation.
Metal ware and a/1 materials concer
munitions and to establish cigarette,
wine and soy, leather, clothing and
dyeing, soap, alcohol and bags
factories.
Collecting material, drafting and
buying or exchange.
Currency, banks, increatie production,
loan and exchange (cooperate with
merchants to transport important
materials from interior).
Economical planning, control planning
mining research, etc. ,and concentrat
the technical experts.
Assn.:To cooperate with the merchants in
occupied area on economical affairs.'
B. Munition Dept.:
C. Collecting Dept.:
D. Finance Dept.:
E. Technical Dept.:
F. Cooperation
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et r, .m
v Li. a
/2) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization (Continued)
b) Economical Affairs: (Continued)
3. Direct Section: (Continued)
G. Representative Organization:
1) Kodama Org.: Establiduld by Naval Dept. and under
FUKKOBUIs direction. Collecting
material to supply to Naval Dept.
Pretended to be commercial organiza-
tion, but in fact an organization
to steal materials.
2) Showa Ioko:Established by Arpy Dept. and under
FILKOBU's direction. Same as Kodmna
to supply to Arpy Dept. service-metal
ware, medicine and coin.
3) Uanwal Established by Army Dept. and under
FUNKUBU's direction. Same as Showa
Yoko. Service-collecting various
food and grease.
H. Direct Companies:
1) Haien Kiang Tdg. Co.: Supervised by Capt. TAKATOF1.
Service-exchange with daily use,
commodities to military needs such as
food and grease.
.. 2) Hunan Dept. Store: Supervised by MATSUI. Service-
supply to Changsha citizens commodities
and salt. Principle - to bold people's
goodwill by C.R.B. notes.
3) Kling Ping Shan Han: SupeFvised by Capt. TAKATORY
Service and principle - same as Hunan
Dept.
4) Koan Printing Co.: Supervised by Changsha FUAKOBU.
Service-announcements and declarations
and military lists.
c) Political Affairs:
1. Commanding Officer - II. Colonel TERAHIRA.
2. Principle - to hold people's goodwill bj organizing
Puppet Government in occupied area
and to maintain social security in
order to aid Japanese to carry on
the war.
3. Direct Section:
A. Propaganda Dept.:
1) Consolation Unit: To hold consolation affairs
in certain areas.
2) Cultural Unit; Cultural Society, to control
' the publishing of puppet papers.
3) Road Unit: Organized roads maintaining units
(Maintenance)along highways and railways in order
to keep peace and increase trans-
portation.
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SECRET
12) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization (Continued)
c) Political Affairs (Continued) �
3. Direct ection (Continued)
B. Strategy Dept.:
1) Information Unit: Supervised by YANAGITA
(Civilian) ( ). Duty-Commercial
situation at Changsha. Se-
curing infoination and
surv-i11irtg guerrilla
activities. Org. More than
10 at Takung Pap Association
20 were Hupei.
2) Special Service Unit: Supervised by Capt.
SOMIYA ( ),
relative of Japanese Emperor.
Duty - to investigate
Japanese thoughts and
actions. Surveilling
working comrades.
3) Economical Special: Supervised by HARAGUCH/
Service Unit: ). Organizing
economical police and
1U440BUis plainclothes man.
Duty maintain C.H.B.
notes and prevent inflation
(high cost of living).
4) Puppet Org. Unit: Supervised by CRUZ I FUNG
). Duty-
Organizing Puppet, Provincial
City and District Government
and serial organizations.
Organizing special service
group in Interior and working
group in occupied area.
Communication Sections To
collect information from
newspapers and articles
published in Interior.
BRANCH OFFICE: Established in every county, district and
big cities of the occupied areas. The
Organization is same, but smaller.
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LlialAJLT
SECRET /NTELLIGERCE GROUP: Source advised that there was
a Secret Intelligence Group with the General
Staff of the Japanese 20th Army. Source
did not know if this Group had any special
mane, but said that it was always referred
to by ambers of the Ne4eitei as the
"Secret intelligence Group". This Group
uas headed by Capt. SOMIIA ( .
who is a relative of the Japanese Imperial
family, and uho also headed the Special
Service Unit in the Political Affairs
Section of the FUMBU. This Group con-
sisted of only two Japanese, Capt. SWIYA
and a Sergeant, but they employed about
30 Chinese, most of whom came from Hupei
Province. The main duty of this Group was
to find out the number, plan, activity
and equipment of Chinese forces.
Source also advised that Capt. SUATIA had
planned for a Group whose main purpose was
to assassinate American and British officers.
This plan was suggested a few weeks before
the surrender and was never put into effect.
COOPLZAION &TABLE OkGaNILATIONS: Source advised that
. all three organizations kept their own
records and files, but exchanged copies of
their records freely. Important cases were
forwarded to Tokyo via Japanese Headquarters
in Nanking.
Such free liaison and cooperation existed
in advanced areas, but not at higher head,.
quarters.
13) ShanEhai Rikuguau (Army Bureau):
The Japanese Army Bureau (1dkugunbu) was an independent
intelligence collecting organization, located in Shanghai,
under the direction of Major General KAWAKOTO YO6EITAgO,
AC of S, Nankingf and was under the direct supervision of
Headquarters, China SXpeditiouary Forces, Wanking, from
1 October, 1942, to the end of the war.
a) Purvose:
The general purpose of the Army Bureau was to
represent the Headquarters in Shanghai in a variety of
intelligence affairs necessary in this large city which
were not included in the functions of the 13th Army. It
acted not only as a liaison body with the Army, kiwry and
Babassy offices, but also as an intelligence collecting,
counter-espionage and propaganda agency.
S 1:4
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S 174 r 171. y,
/3) Shanghai Rikugunbu (Army Bureau) (Continued)
b) Functions:
1. Collection of political and economin intelligence con-
cerning Chinese and Foreigners by means of agents
and radio reception.
2. Liaison affairs concerning Chinese peace construction.
3. Liaison with Japanese agencies.
4. Liaison with agencies and officials of Axis and
. neutral countries.
5. Propaganda preparation and distribution..
c) Structure:
Director of the Army Bureau
Senior Staff Officers
1. First Department (Intelligence)
A. Political and Economic Section:
i. Political Information Sub-Section
Economic Sub-Section
Materials Sub-Section (Preparation and
translation of publications)
B. Foreign Affairs Section
C. Foreign Information Section
i. Reception and translation of radio broadcasts
Preparation and consolidation
2. Second Department (Liaison Office. for Chinese Affairs)
3. Information Department (Press Bureau)
� 4. General Affairs Department (Administrative)
Methods of
Through interrogation with staff officers, only
denials concerning the use of agents were received, and
emphasis was placed upon the liaison duties of the organi-
zation. However, informants have volunteered that the
Rikugunbu was the leading intelligence agency in Shanghai
throughout the war, which employed numerous Japanese,
Chinese and foreign plainclothes agents.
A special effort was made by the Rikugunbu to penetrate
and play a role in White Russian affairs to the extent of
operating a Russian language daily, the "Far Eastern
Daily Maws" owned by KUdOX/. who was also Assistant
Chairman of the Russian emigrant's Committee. Not only
was this intended as a means of controlling and prejudicing
Russian thought to favor Japan's War in China, but also
a means of cultivating Russian informants.
/n one sense, the Bureau was a special service
organization (Kikan) on. a very elaborate scale, working
directly and independently as a strategic office of the
Nanking Headquarters. However, unlike most of the Kikans,
this organization had many more departments and sections
and phases of intelligence activity to conduct than most
Likens operating usual4 on one particular assignment. /t
was the one organization in Shanghai which did most to
coordinate the efforts of all intelligence gathering agencies.
(Source: Lt. Col. WRI! AK/RA, Senior Staff Officer, Rikugunbu,
15 November, 1945. Evaluation C-7j).
ACA
T
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SPIT=
6. Gendarmerie (Kempei Tai)
a. OrRanization and Command
The Gendarmerie, a special branch of the armed forces, which conducted
Military Police functions, served both the Army and Navy, although it
MIA under the direction of the War Ministry and of the Provost Marshal
General, and therefore more closely connected with the Army.
The Kempei Tai in China was not controlled from Japan but was directly
responsible to General OKAMURA, Leiji, Commanding General, China trx..
pectionary Forces; no orders or directives were received from any higher
Kempei Tai, Headquarters in Tokyo. /f any Kempei matter was of suffi-
cient importance to report to the imperial General Staff, it was reported
through command channels by General Okamura. The Kempei, like the AMY,
was divided into the areas, North, Central and South China, the commanders
of which were responsible both to their area commanders and the Commanding.
General; in the Armies, the Amy commander did not decide policy matters
of the Kempei but merely /aid down rules and regulations which were to be
enforced by the Rempei Tai.
In Japan, the Keppei Tai Commander had no control over activities in China
but was solely responsible for operations in Japan proper under the juris-
diction of the War Ministry.
14 �taw& � Generally, the Kempei is divided into two general sections:
General Affairs Section: Concerned with natters of policy,
personnel, records, and thought control.
Services Section: Concerned with training of personnel,
security, espionage, counter espionage, supervising civi-
lian employees of the Army, policing occupied areas, guard-
ing military installations, surveillance of Japanese in
occupied areas and controlling black market.
�
The Army was responsible for handling of prisoners of war, and the
only connection that the Aempei had with prisoners was when they
were requested by the Army to provide guards for the transporta-
tion or detention of prisoners.
Reports from various parts of China, do not offer any consistent depart-
mental structure of Kempei units, although all present as duties, the
above mentioned.
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r-
SEC=
Two reports indicate that Kempei units, located at cities in Central China,
had internal departments as fellows:
TOKKO-KA (counter-espionage) - EclOcAnglas Crienta16,
and some foreigners* to expose Chungking and Comma-.
nist agents.
KLIZAI-K1' (economic affairs) - Devoting its efforts toward
control of black market activities, such as exchange
a
and dealing in gold bars, foreign currencies, forgery,
sale of prohibited war materials.
GAM-LA (foreign affairs) - investigation and control of
activities of foreign nationals, arrest and detention
of enemy nationals, confiscation of property* centre/
of neutrals..
TEISATUSU-KA (investigation section) - The personnel of *deb
was used by other sections for detective* investigation
and surveillimiPe activities who had this power of ar-
rest according to warrants issued by their office.
KS/B/-KA (garrison units) - The duties of which were patrolling
the streets in the interest of public safety, guarding
of military installations, jai/s, and poppet persona/i-
ties.
SHIHO-NA (justice section) The duties of which were the proces-
sing of prelimtnary investigative repbrts to dstermtne
need forfurther investigation* check the facts of the
case through awn sources, preparation of material for
court case at the Military Court (Gumpo Keigi).
C. Strenath
The units of the Kenpei generally were classified into three categories:
province, zone and sub-zone levels under occupying Armies.
Province: 80-1100 officer& and men, commanded by &lieutenant colonel
and included 25 civilians (SUNSOKU)
Zone: 70-80 officers &admen* commuubrd by a captain, and included
about 15-20 civilians, and 12 Chinese auxi/iary plicemen.
Sub-zone; 20 officers =dawns 10 Chinese and Japanese civilian.
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This does not include vast tutbers of informants. Ereeptions to these
strengths existed inmost /arse cities where there were numerous sub-
stations; as for example, Shangiai where there were five important sta-
tions excluding headquarters, each .of which controlled sub-stations, and
petrels.
d. Recruiting. and Training
All gendarmerie personnel were obtained from other units of the army such
as the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. No one was assigned to the Kempei
Tai upon induction. The Kempei Tai always had a standing list of volunteers
from other branches and when replacements were needed examinations were given
to the volunteers and their background was investigated. The best qualified
men were selected for the Kempei Tai, and sent to a school. Formerly the
only school was in Japan, but in the last two years schools were set up in
Peking, Manchuria, and Nanking. The school in Nanking was run by the Central
. China Gendarmerie. Unit and furnished replacements for that command. The
course in the school consisted of about four months training in police methods,
gendats policy, military discipline, etc.
There were only two MITZI schools in North Chant And Manchuria. One was
located at Peiping, and the other was located at Chang Chun (SEING KING), Man-
churia.
The curriculum at the Peiping school consisted of physical training: rough
and tumble, Judi), mob control, etc.; mental training (Shinto); superiority
of the Japanese race, unconquerability; undercover training, espionage, agent
nets, penetration, and interrogation methods. The courses varied in length
from three months and six months to one year, depending on the type of work;
police, espionage, etc. The school graduated from 200 to 300 students per
year; all of these were Japanese personnel, both military and civilian.
The school at Chang Chun was very Amiln?' to the Peking school but it was con-
siderably larger and graduated Japanese, Koreans, and White Eussians.
Refresher training was given at most units every six months to officers and
man alike lathe form of trial cases, which were to be solved in theory by
written paper.
e. Methods of Operation:
(1) Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction over persons of the Kempei Tai in law and order matters is
restricted to military personnel and persona travelling with the Army.
I r T
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� Japanese civilians came Under the jurisdiction of the Consular Police and
Chinese civilians ere under the jurisdiction of the puppet police. One
exception to this might be that in case of a riot the Idspei Tai would be
ordered by the argy commander to assist the civilian and consular police
to restore order. Also, the consulate police might request the Kempei Tai
to assist them if they were unable to cope with a situation. The Kempei
Tai did not have a liaison officer with the Consular andpuppet police.
However, the araor maintained a liaison office which dealt with the ca/su-
late.and the puppet government and this army liaison office =mid handle
the liaison between Kempei Tai and the puppet and consular police. Another
exception concerning jurisdiction over Japanese and Chinese civilians4s in
the case of suspected espionage, in which matter the Kempei Tai had the
right of arrest and prosecution over any person, bay they be enemy nationals,
Japanese civilians, or Japanese military or naval officers and men of any
rank. In the case of neutrals, an arrest my- be carried out but the neutral
is usually turned over to his consular representative for punishment.
24 Tpial of Offenders
The trial of a civilian either enemy or Japanese national was conducted in
either a civil or military court depending upon the charge and the arrest-
ing organization. .If the civilian in question was booked with apolitical
charge, which most frequently was the case, since most offenses during time
of emir were considered political affronts at Japan he was subject to a
courts martial in the Japanese Military Court (GemPo Keigi), and if found
guilty and sentenced to jail, would be placed in sanitary jail. Criminal
. trials against Japanese citizens (non-military) took place in the Consular
Court; against Chinese in Puppet Courts; against neutrals at their respec-
tive consu/ates, unless these neutrals were not nationals of countries that
had extra territoriality rights in Chinavin such a case the trial took
placein-a Puppet Court.
The Navy disk not have an organization simi/ar to the Kivapei Tai, and Kempei
Taikis responsible for order on the pert of Navy personnel. in the event
Navy personnel get into troable, the Impel. Tai turneithem over to the Navy
for disciplinary action. The only time that the Navy might have any control
over the Iempeilai would be in a case where an island garrisons commanded
� by a Navy Commander, in which case the Navy Commander would also be the over
all commander of the Kappeilai in that area.
�
EMeeptiona to this rule existed in the cities of Shanghai and Tsingtao where
the Navy, as the arrogantly superior branch of service, was undisputed in
aortae areas Of the city; they were the sole economic ezp/oiters and first-
law enforcement agency lathe area4 Slowed by the gendarmerie, and AnallY
the police. It wenn 'until early 1945 that the Kmapei Tai, because of the
Lia
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Naves loss 'of prestige and strength in the Pacific, was able to challenge
and counter Wavy orders in these areas.
3. Mat
In outlying forward areas, the agents of the Kempei Tai were under the same
covers as apecial Service men, such as storekeepers, traders and ter chants,
inn keepers, etc., moot of whom were unpaid and received Only small privi-'
ledges in return for services, in the form of permits for trade, or permis-
sion to deal in illicit goods, or the. priviledge of purchasing rice, c/oth-
irig4 and foods at lower cost than the market price.
:In the larger cities, agents were of a variety of nationalities, preciomilantli
Chinese however, although foreign agents and informants were most valuable in
- their understanding of black market, swindling, extortion -methods, blackmail,
etc. Again, these agents. received only slight monetary remuneration, and the o
only benefit they received for their services was to be able to carry on these
criminal aotivities at the expense of the population and to the benefit of
themse/vesand the officials for whom they worked. .
Maw gendarme worked in plainclothes and operated much like agents themselves,
however, they were, toward the end of the war, very disconcerted about their
personal security, since very little enemy espionage threatened their posi-
tions. Through the medium of terrorism and torture of arrested persons, a
vivid and realistic threat existed in the minds of allied sympathizers and -
operators, who cautiously observed all rules and regulations laid down by the
occupation forces and enforced by the Nempei Tai ,in every effort to retain
their own security and safety.
Because of such a situation there were few strictly loyal Chinese agents work-
ing for the National Government, the Communists, or the American Forces; they
only way they could exist and still carry on their intelligence role was to
-act as double-agents, and for their own benefit serve both sides. The Kempei
Tai did not have the excluspe right to handle double agents, and if. the Army
caught an agent they might use him without notifying the Kempei Tat.
Exh;b4 Ketvei Tai a_f tsnjt%o, N. Ch;...
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D. ammo ARM! XIIV=URICE SERVICE:
This army was considered to be the best of the Japanese Amy
Ground Forces until. 1943, at which- time it totalled 1,000,000 in strength.
However, afterwards approximately 500,000 troops were withdrawn to fight
on other fronts. Until 1943, this army was prepared and had plans to
laluuth an attack on Ruesia.
The intelligence services of the Rwantung Armor was likewise
considered to be the best not only in China, but of the whole Japanese
Army.
"*.
1. ORGAN/ZATIGNAL STRUCTURE:
The 2nd Section, Headquarters, Xwantung Arsty, was charged
with the collection of information, saminaticn and appraisal, of
information collected, investigation into the prevailing military
situation and the planning for and supervision of land services.
/t was organized as follows: Chief of the 2nd Section, a Colonel
in rank, was responsible to the Commander and the Chief of Staff,
and reported directly to Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, and had
under his jurisdiction four sub-sections which are as follows:
a. General Affairs Section - in charge of personnel, records, etc.
b. Intelligence Section - Affairs connected with information
collecting.
c. Military Investigations Section - in charge of investiga-
tions for military requirements.
d. Meteorological Section.
Besides the above duties, contact was maintained with and
supervision was given to the Public Security Bureau of the
Foreign Ministry of Manchukuo and the Investigation Section of
the South Manchurian Railway Company. 4
2. NETHODS OF OPERATION:
Generall,y speaking, the intelligence services of the
Xwantung Army were of first rate although even they had much to
improve. The results gained through the activity of it. intelli-
gence services were sufficiently fruitless in preparing any
military operation. This was exemp/ified at the time of the
Russian advance into Manchuria, their endeavor to reinforce
their Army last summer, and also in a series of incidents
occurring on the Russo-Manchurian Border. The means by which
the intelligence service gathered its information falls into the
following categories:
z
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a. Special information was secured from the decoding of
Soviet Amy radio messages of which only the simpler
three letter codes were deciphered. Ry this means, in-
formation about the disposition of Arsy groups and their
Mavements and maneuvers were obtained. However* DA
information was gained concerning the organization of
the armies, their equipment and their potential fighting
strength.
b. Aerial photography contributed much to the formulationLof
invasion plans by the Keentung Army through preparation of
topographical overwlarmaps. Aerial photography was
exclusively conducted by the 2nd, Air Force and much infor-
mation was gained concerning Soviet airfields and the
stationing of their aircraft* military installations,
warehouses, fleet dispositicm4 etc., at such pieces as
CHITA, KHAVALOVSK, igusuov and VLADIVOSTOK.
/gal observations were conducted by reconnaissance
patrols that sought information concerning the general
enemy situation and their fortresses along the frontier.
d. Information frai documents which were sent to Japanese
Special Service organs in Harbin from such places as
Moscow and Chita by Japanese diplomatic representatives
were, after translation distributed to all Army
Division Headquarters I:Manchuria. Such information
as the transfer of army units and war materials in
eastern Soviet territory* as well as books and documen-
tary material were carried by diplomatic agents who
traveled between Manchuria and Soviet Russia via the
Siberian Railway.
e. Information gained through interrogating Soviet military
deserters and civilian refugees gave little information
other than that of organizations and equipment of small
units, internal situaticm4 and military discipline of the
Red Army. Inman,' cases, the Russian Army sent 'Take"
, army deserters to willingly offer false information.
f. Sending of agents across the frontier never proved
effective and the Kwantung Army never expected much from
such missions. It was difficult to acquire qualified
persons; the Soviets had an excellent anti-espionage net-
work; and the racial differences too frequently led to
the discovery of agents. Double agents were used, but
proved unreliable and ineffective in the opinion of the
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Japanese intelligence.
Ihere was no use of Special Service organizations or likens
in this area in espionage activities and the Military
Intelligence Section conducted all of this work themselves.
However, in counter-espionage and peace preservation
activities in Manchuria, the Military intelligence played
only a small role since these natters were handled by the
Military Po/ice (Kempei) and the Peace Preserratiom Corps
respectively. However, the latter was supervised by and
responsible to the 2nd Section. These two organizations
shall be described under their respective headings.
Ever since the Manchurian incident, jiipans'from the
standpoint of possibie-,4 hostilities with Rusaia and also
the necessity of rendering assistance to Manchukuo, did
evezything in her power to foster the Xerantung ArAy and send
,the best men and eqmipmgate that army.
1Shurcet Report on. nEuaetung Anky Intelligence Service", March, 1946,
Evmluated 0,34
S.LC it .4
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SECRZT
FluIRTT., JE
THE TRIM INDEPNDENT GUARD UNIT. PPXN
(1) Duties:
The Intelligence Roan of the Headquarters tried to gather information
concerning the activities of the Communist elements and its armed forces,
which were the most important factors obstructing:construction and
Japanese endeavors to establish stability in provincial districts. The
information,gathered was utilized whenever the Japanese forces started
new operations against Red forces. The information, as soon as obtainedu
was immediately transmittedto higher command and various units velow.
For this purpose, a special section was organized in the Headquarters
under the direction of an officer especially assigned to the task. .
(2) OrganizatiorLPersonnel and Duties:
Office in charges Captain ZAC.0 =mu
Sections Remarks
Telephone & Telegrams
General Affairs
Reporting& Information
-
Special Investigation Corps
Information by Documents
Translation & Interpreting
Collection- of information,
their study and examina-
tion
Study of Communist forces,
party and population in
Red area
(3) Training& TraininkBouipments
A plan existed for giving education connected with the collection
of information to intelligence officers attached to each battalion four
times a year. However, this plan was never realized as the war came to
an end only Lour months after the plan was considered.
No plan ever existed for special education to be given to non-
commissioned officers and enlisted men.
Sams documents and books were given from higher commands for the
purpose of educating. Otherwise, no special equipment was employed for
training.
(4) Cases of Success and Failure
bile inmost cases, information was gained through Chinese organs
cooperating with the Japanese or from villagers, action promptly taken
by Japanese forces on the basis of these informations rarely mst with
success as Corwinist forces had every excellent system of preventing
-3 B R T
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ci
against any Leakage Of military secrets. In this, the racial traits of
Chinese population, too, counted much.
Notable among the cases of success was the case in which the
Japanese forces, after encircling the main body of Rod forces in
Leinchenhsien in June, 1945, successfully dealt a serious blow to a
large body of Communist forces which tried to rescue their comrado units
in Japanese encirclement. This was due to information the Japanese
obtained in time..
/n guerrilla warfare, on the whole, it has always been extremely
difficult to get ahead of enemy movement. It was found that for an
efficient working of our intelligence network, quite a number of personnel
would be needed to work exclusively for that, while actually it was not
the case. �
Each battalion relied on necessary information on the agents of
the Esin UnE441 Cooperatives and other native organs in close contact
with local villagers for the sane purpose. Eneekv prisoner, too,
sometimes, offered valuable information. Chinese spies, however, were
seldom employed, because their efficacy was very doubtful.
(Source: %-;ummary Report on Enemy and Non-Enemy Intelligence Organizations
in Tsinataou, 10.December, 1945. BE/80. Evaluation: C-3)
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i �
This organ: was mainly in charge of collecting information on the
Chungking forces and in the north-western part of China, and was organised
as follows:
Chief of the means
Assietant officer:
�Information Squad:
General Affairs Squad:
Iiktionel Ks Shigekawa
Sub-lieutenant Sonde
7 men
5 men .
Notes No regular intelligence officers and awn existed. As the Chief of
the organ. had long been in China, he himself called on maw seniors and
friends for the collection of necessary information.
?Mainz and Education:
As there were no regular intelligence officers or men, there was no
necessity of considering this question.
Except giving necessary suggestions and guidance from the Chief of
the Organ during his personal contact, no regular training was conducted
for the members of the Organ.
iii.Pisoatch of Intelliflence Mentes
a) In the Muhameddan Circles:
Keeping close contact with the Mohammedans of the Chingcheng
Temple (belonging to the North China Association of AU-Chime
Mohammedan Federation) the branch temples of which are scattered
in various places in North China, the Peiping Organ gathered
various information obtained from Mohammedan circles in North
China.
Peiping Organ gave no specified command or order to the
Mohammedans concerned and only sought for useful information
during the course of ordinary conversation with than. They were
under no obligation. Those Mohammedans who were used to bring
information were:
RAN trader, at Boohoo, south-eastern part of Kam.
province.
HAN SHOO-TANG, formerly soldier, at Raining, east of Chinghai
Laker eastern part of Chinghai Province.
.11.�
E T
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� PEIPING INFORMATION ORGAN (OR SRIGENAWA ORGAN)
MA SHI4,:local HUhammedan, at Changkiachwan, south-eastern
part of tenon Province.
On the other hand, efforts were made to keep close contact
with the Mohammedan traders coming to Peiping from the south-
eastern part of Kamm Province. As they were large in number,
their names in detail are not available here.
b) At the Time of the Ronan Operation:
At the time of this operation., Chinese traders, farmers
and Mohammedans of Ronan Province were locally empleyed as
secret agents and were dispatched to InFang and Sian, but no
success was obtained as almost all of them did not return.
Intelligence Agents in the Peiping-lientain Area:
As afore-mentioned under the beading of nMake-up, there
were no regular intelligence agents at this Peiping Organ.
However a number of the Chinese with whom. the Chief of the Organ
became acquainted during his long stay in China were utilized se
medium of information.required.
lapenee Required:
Current Expenditure: 120�500 FEB monthly.
b) , Extra disbursements were made in case of military operations.
For instance a sum of 180,000 was Appropriated at the time of the
Henan Operation in the spring of 1944.
v. 'Activities outside Peiping Area outlined:
a) With the outbreak of the Ronan Operation in the spring of 1944,
the Peiping Organ was order to transfer in. Henan Province and was
engaged in the main in the survey of military geography and was
also in charge of the collection of information necessary for the
maintenance of local public peace.
The members of the Organ returned to Peiping in the latter
part of April, 1945. later thOy went to the Japanese homeland on
a furlough and came back to Peiping in the latter part of July.
1Before they were Omen anew duty the war was brought to an end.
(b) The principal activities undertaken:by-the Peiping Organ in
the past are as follows:
L12,1:
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-
A
- Just after the outbre0c of the China Affair:
Participated in the formation of the Public Peace Maintenance
Association of the special municipality of Tientsin.
Keeping close contact with the members of.the Chinese Youth ,
Corps who were residing in NorthNChina supported the development
of the same Corps.
Created the Mainmin College in Peiping and took care of the
institute until the first students elapsed four months of study.
Participated in the campaign to support General WU Pei-fu
in 1939.
, Participated in the conference between General Yen Esi-shan
and the Japanese forces in North China regarding the peace
problem. about 1941 or 1942.
After the Outbreak of the Greater East Asiatic Wars
=Attempted to make some connection with the Chungking authorities
regarding peace negotiations, and launched various political
activities. Despite mach exertions it ended in failure.
Attempted to persuade General KO CHU-KUO to have his forces
jointly carry out with the Japanese torces punitive. operations
against the Chinese cols:mist forces, but it failed.
Engaged in launching peace negotiations with Chuna*ing through
Chang Hsueh-ming, Li Yuraiu and other generals, but it was in vain..
SBORET
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SECHE
�XHIBIT .t
PEIPING SPECIAL INTELLIGSKE CORPS
(.1) ata
The main duty of this corps was to gather various information
needed by the North China Arpy both from the political and strategical
necessities. For this purpose, this corps at Normal times tried to
gather information concerning the situation. in. Northwest Region of
China and the regions in. the vicinity of Peiping, while at the time of
the prosedution of specific operations, information concerning the
movements of enemy forces lathe specific areas.
(2) The Orranization, and the equipment utilised:
I. Chinese Section
General Affairs Room:
Sao (Work) Corps:
Account Room:
No. 1 Room:
Ordnance Rooms
NO. 2 Rooms
5 Sub.-Lieutenants and 3 civilians
Captain and 5 officers
2nd Lieutenant and 2 civilians
5 civilians, 3 engineers and 2 interpreters
3 engineers
10 engineers and 7 civilians
Xt. Direction of Detector Section
Chiefs 2nd Lieutenant BRING� IALANAKA
1. Peiping Corps: 3 engineers and 3 enlisted men
2. Tsinan Corps: 5 enlisted men
3. Chinchow Corps: 5 enlisted men
T4BLE C7 THE WUIRONT EWLOTED TOE PEIPING
SPECIAL INULLIGffiNCE CORPS
James
National Receivers
R.C.A. Receivers
Zenith Receiver
Philco Receiver
Radio Locators
(Special receiving
sets, type 94, model 5)
� Quantity
3
4
3.
Total 13.
pamarks
Peiping
) 1 at Tabun
) 3. ht Cans:show
a r` CI 17 It
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Wectives
Pw.
GAINED JUT THE PEIPINGSPECIAL /ETELLIGENCE
CORPS IN DX/PHBRIM LIMY'S CODED IllWilka,'
&tents of Success
in Deciphering
Northwest District Unable to decipher
Radio Station
Radio Station with Able to decipher
Lanchow as centeriOnost of them
mostly re traffic �
Zenon Provincial Successful after '
Gov't. � one month
Headquarters, N.W. Suceessful to a
Supply District certain. extent
Xenan & its
environs
Unsuccessful* es-
pecialky those for
military operations
CentraluChitung Successful after
War Zone one month
Categories of
Codes Used Remarks
None
Category No.
1 & 1106 21,
for political
propaganda
category No.
52$ intended
for political
propaganda
Lost information
was gained in
pltari language
massages
Information was
gained re traffic
situation in
Northwest area
Information gained
here was useless
and discarded
Same code used for
long period; most
of informational
messages deciphered
Employed 2-word
unit Rarusu
Length of Eansu
1,000 words
Shansi-Chahar- Successful after k.iine as above
Chitung War Zona one month
lath Group Army Succesuftlafter Sane as above
one month
NOTE: The Japanese wire succesaful in deciphering some others, but the
category of the codes used in these was similar to those mentioned
above.
(3) Educatien & Trainirur
a. For the purpose of interception of wireless messuges and
deciphering of coded messages, no special. systematic education
has ever been given. Some general training was given the men
in Nanking and was Blurt over to Peiping. All the education
and training needed was intended to be given the men while
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" rn
00 AD Jai Ai
actually on duty.
Direction Detector. Thirteen noo-commissioned officers and
soldiers were assigned about February this year for about
three months since then to receive special education in this
connection. The educationo haellmer, was confined to the
treatment of the apparatus and measurement of the distance
as them= assigned to this task had already been educated
on communications. These thirteen s= cams from. various
communications units stationed in North China.
C. Equipment for training. There existed no special equipaent,
documents or books for the training.
do Cases of success and failure:
al. Cases of Snobs= s
SometimeswhIlead/itary operations were in progress, the
Chinese forces used easily-decipherable codes for the
transmission _of important messages, with the result that
we gained access to important information. Sometimes,.
again, the Chinese failed to codify the names of the
transmitting and receiving agents and naturally we could
eau/2y find hints to their identity.
During the Ronan campaign, 1944, following cases occurred:
The. Chinese forces used codes, which had been in use for
a long time and which the Japanese had already succeeded
in deciphering. It was customary for General CHIANG
TUG-WEN, Commander4s4hief of:the let War Zone, to add
his own signature and address in plain language, with the
result that this afforded the Japanese an easy hint as to
the whereabouts of the headquarters of the let war zone. -
The wireless stations used br local militiamen in Ronan
Province used to exchange messages among themselves asking
shout their respective location and their intention of
� future movements and so forth, supplying us mith valuable
information.
2. Cases of Failnre
The Japanese were unaware that the CommUnist forces were
wing the Hansugtype codes and that their coded messages
were interspersed with those in conversation type, and
were trying to decipher then in the same manner as applied
to those sent by the Central. Army forces. This resulted
in our failure to find out Bay hints at all to decipher
them.
P #41,1 1121 M
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1
P
S. Actual Results Gained:
1.Nbile important coded messages could never be deciphered
by the Japanese, easier ones were successfully deciphered.
However, the lack of strict discipline on the part bf
the men working for respective radio stations resulted in
affording us maw times with hints and valuable information. �
2. Apparently the Communist forces were using three categories
of codes; (1) for military operation, (2) for political �
propaganda, and (3) for transmitting messages and instructions.
As for their deciphering, the Japanese side was never
'successful in deciphering that for military operations,
while they were in a better position as regards the other
two categories. The respective radio stations apparently
used different kinds of call signs for tranAmitting and
receiving messages connected with military operations.
As regards the actual results gained by the employment of
direction detectors,, it cantos said that the results on the
whole were entirely unsatisfactory, due, mainly, to the
fact that we had little past experience and very scarce
material to Ircaarupon and also because we had to change the
call signs so repeatedly and such short intervals.
4. The actual results gained as regards our endeavors in
deciphering the emcee coded messages are shown in the
table No. 4 attached hereto.
(Source: "Summary Report on Enemy and NonEnemy Intelligence Organizations
in Taingtao", 10 December, 1945, MAO. Evaluations 0-3).
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PVCRVT
EXHIBIT Jr
HIDAXA ORGAN
Make-un:
wnls organ was in complete Charge of the collection of various infor-
mation-on and from the third states as well as the connection with the
military and other intelligence organizations.
It was organized as follows:
Chief Of"the Hidaka Organ:
The Hidaka Organ -
PeitAAR Office
Colonel Takaaki Hidaka.
Peiping Office
nentsin Office
Chief: Colonel T. Hidaka
Assistant: 2nd Lieutenant, Shimura
Classification. of Works:
1) General Affairs& Accounts:
- Personnel
Hiscellaneous Works
Guarding
Connection
Rations
Transportation
2) Guidance of White Russians
Problems dealingsith
Great Britain
U.S.A.
Germany
Italy
France -
Soviet RAMA&
)) Dealing with the Japanese
Side:
Warrant Officer:
Interpreter:
ditto -
ditto
Lance Corporal:
Sergeant-Major:
Junior Emp.t
ditto
ditto
Yamashita
Watanaba
Hagahara
Hakanishi
Urano
Sasaki
/dami
Sachimori
Ueda
Outline of Activitims:
AS the main purpose of this organ was in the sollecttan of information
on and from the third states, there were no special intelligence agents.
Informatiomwas chiefly gathermilV the contact of the members of the Organ
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with the nationals of the third states residing in China.
Information on the Soviet Union was mainly obtained through the
connection with the Soviet people in China while effort,a were also made to
small out some information while assisting the white Russiaus without
� nationality or during the course of issuing travelling certificates for
them.
Information on Great Britain, the United States, Germany, France -
and Italy was gathered through the contact with the members of the German,
French and Italian Ambassadorial officers in China as well as by the trans-
lation of foreign books and journals, thus grasping the outline situation
in foreign countries..
As auxil4 ary. means for supplementing the above information inter-
ception of wireless message transmitted by Britain and the United States
was carried out.
For carrying out the above duties, appro:dmately 150,000 FRB espense
was disbursed monthly..
ill.. Training and Educations
No special training or education was given to the member of the Organ.
Accordingly there were no facilities and materials for the education
although general cultural books and journals published in foreign countries
were provided as many as possible for their general information.
iv. Success and Failure Rxr�erienced.s
Since the Ridaka Organ was in North China, its object of activities
was chiefly concentrated an the Soviet Union, and as its Tientsin Office
had much opportunity to contact with the Soviet peopley information on their
movements were collected to some satisfactory extent. But as such infor-
mation was only concerned with the Soviet people residing in North China,
almost no information on the situation in the Soviet territory was obtained.
As to the United States and Britain, various information was gathered
through then allied Germany and Italy and also France.
Information on the political and cultural fields of the foreign
countries was generally obtained through the translation of the latest
books and journals published in the respective countries. But the process
to obtain these materials was not systematic, the information thus obtained
was rather obsolete and not so much valuable as to be useful for the con-
fronting operation or for taking suitable measures politically and financially
In short, the activities of this Organ was not so effective con-
sidering the relatively large number of personnel it held. (Sources The
Rehabilitation and Liaison Department of the Japanese Officers and Soldiers
Report entitled �Outline of intelligence Collecting Machinery of Japanese
a.
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Forces" 2 December, 19434 Evaluations C 3.)
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EXHIBIT 2-
(1) Functions and Personnel offilDAKA Organization
Organization, functions and personnel as per attached Chart.
Explanation:
1. The Organization., is located in Peiping under the Chief of Second
Section of North Chine Headquarters of Japanese Army Forces.
2. The organization has been receiving orders tram the Commander-in-
Chief of North China Forces up to end of war in order to collect various
informationl as fellows: (Besides this the organization has been instructed
to supervise Non-nationals, the Chinese and Japanese residents.) Necessary
information and data to observe the activities of Britain and America, and
to observe the anti-Japanese movements '(both military and political) of
Soviet Russia; general activities of Yenan, especiaLkv the propaganda
system and necessary information to observe their anti-Chungking policy;
military, political and economic activities of Chmking and its relations
with Britain and America; movements of Outer-Mongolia; supervision of
Chinese politicians and other personnel cooperating with the Japanese;
supervision of important Japanese elements; and observance of popular
feelings among other foreigners.
3. Sixty men worked under colonel HIDAKA and about three hundred
indirectly in. order to accomplish the above mentioned duties.
4. The moat important system used in collecting information was
interception Of wire/eta message:, and this system was organized as follows:
Yenan Interception Unit; Fuknyama Reception Unit; Tominaga Reception Unit;
Italian Reception. Unit; D.N.B. (German)Reception Unit; Broadcasting
Stations Reception Unit; and Chunghwa Aviation Company Reception Unit.
(2) Outline of Activitiea in Various Sections
1. The Commanding Officer of the organization gives instructions to
each section and collects the necessary information.
The examination of and report on the information obtained is done
by the Commanding Officer himself. When reporting the information to the Aruv
General Staff IA Japan, War Ministry* General /Headquarters in North China*
Kwantung Army, Korean Army (Japanese Forces in Korea) and various armies
under the North thine Headquarters by telegram, or in written report, he
must get authorization from the Chief of Staff of North China Headquarters.
2. The Urano OrganizatLomiaTientsin is directly under the command of
Colonel HIDAhA and collects information in compliance with the duties of
above-mentioned Organization.
All the information collected in the Utano Organization is
forwarded directly to Colonel HIDAKA in Peiping without being examined.
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Therefore, Colonel Urano has no responsibility whatsoever regarding the
value of this information. The whole responsibility lies in Colonel
RID:XA alone, in. the judgment of value of information collected oy the
whole organizations.
3. Outline of information collected through interception of wireless
messages:
Collection Of information from various countries is done by inter-
ception of broadcasting and news services. The Commanding Officer of the
organization gives the instructions to each of the Reception sections
regarding the respective stations to intercept and have them report daily.
All the information thus collected is classified as below and filed so
as to be used as data in. the judgaent of the situation
Aaerican Affairs:
War situation in Asia
War situation in Europe
U.S Army (Strength, Name of units, Names of Staff
Members, armaments, morale, training, etc.)
U.S. Air Corps (Strength, names of units, names of Staff
Members, types of planes)
U.S. Navy (Organization, names of Staff Members, Names
of aarehips, movements)
4'ar Industries
Political movement
Economic situation
Diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia
Diplomatic relations with Great Britain
Diplomatic relations with Chungking
Diplomatic relations with Central Asia
Anti-Japanese propaganda.
b) British Affairs:
Classification as above.
c) Soviet Russian Affairs:
Soviet-German War situation
Anglo-Soviet relations
Activities of Comintern
Strength, movements and kind of troops in Eastern Siberia
(movemeas of troops to or from European Theater)
Political situation in Soviet Russia
Economic situation in Soviet Russia .
Transportation situation in Soviet Russia
Transportation of supplies from U.S. to Soviet Russia
Transportation of arms and planes fromU.S. to Soviet Russia
Anti-Japanese propaganda
Diplomatic movements against Chungking
Movements regarding Soviet aid to Yenan
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German Affairs.:
il(lita4 situation
Political situation
Economic situation
Propaganda situation
..e) Balkan Affairs:
f) Middle:East, Near East and Central Asiatic countries
Chungking Affairs:
Operation
Organization
.41i.r Forces
U.S. Air Forces and Army in China
Political activities of Chungking
Anti-Tenan movement
Economy and Production
Supplies through the India-Emma route
Commerce and airway networks �
Anti-Japanese peace movements
Political and Economic activities against the Northwestern
Provinees -
b) Itmanidleires
Propaganda within themselves
� Propaganda against outside
':A.ctivities of Ten= Army
Economic situation
Political situation
Amy forces, strength, organization and armaments
4. Tenan Reception Section (In Peiping and. Tientsin)
The lenan Reception Section in Peiping consisted of six men
including its Chief, using four wireless sets of eight or ten tubes. All
the operators excepting the section Chief were Chinese. The object of the
reception were Yesuln lisiallua News Service, Propaganda broadcast of the
*Japanese /d.beration League in Japanese andmessages4nYmeish sent from
Tema to Chungking. .
. The Reception Section in Tientsin under Branco Organization used
the same system as in Peiping with one receiver and two operators.
5. Ptkoyama Reception Section (Peiping)
This Section comprised twenty operators (all Japanese), two
receivers in Turkish language, and thirty other employees. They used one
set of high speed receiving sets and about eight sets of ten-tube receivers.
The object of reception were U.P., and Reuter News Services sent
from Chungking to America, telegrams sent from Chungking to New Delhi and
Ankara Broadcast.
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. Tominaga Reception Section (Peiping)
This Section was operating on messages (excluding code messages)
sent within Soviet Russia, especially messages sent among the principal
citiee,werl&wide broadcast from Moscow, Habarovsk broadcast, Ulan-Batoor
broadcast and messages sent among the principal cities along the North-
western China Route,
The Section comprised six Japanese operators, eight Chinese
operators, ten Russians, four Mongolians and fifty other Japanese employees.
They used one set of high speed receiving sets and ten ordinary
receivers.
7. Italian Reception Section (Peiping)
This Section comprised fifteen exatalianMarine operators
using four sets of their own receiving apparatus, working mostly on Soviet
news services -gent out from Siberia. With one set they were taking air-
transportation information of the Indo-China air route, and information
concerning the passenger and cargo transportation by air in China.
�
8. D.N.B. (German News Agency) Reception Section (Peiping)
This Section operated with four Chinese operators, three Chinese
employees and three German correspondents. The object of reception as
concentrated on the Anglo-American information and. in order to get the
information concerning the 1-ropean situation, they mostly listened in to
the London Renter mews and partly to the U.P., A.P., and Reuter News
Services sent out from New York and Washington. �
94 Broadcasting Station Reception Section (Peiping)
They operated with six Chinese and four Japanese listeners,
most.kv catching the Chungking broadcast and partly listening in to the
broadcasts from Los Angeles,- San. Francisco and Hawaii, etc.
10. Chunghwa Aviation Company Reception Section (Peiping)
� They worked on the information concerning the air transportation
on the Indo-China route and the passenger and cargo transportation in
China, with fourteen Japanese operators and six Japanese employees.
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104 :Information Services by Agents and informerst
Information was available through the Agents and Informers in
_Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Kagan and other principal cities. The object
was principally placed on Chungking and necessary information to watch
the activities of Soviet Russians in North China. The organization and
functions of this system is as follows:
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a) There are very few agents with a fixed salary, working
exclusively in collecting information; but in general the infor-
mation was made available through the organizations of the
Russian /migrant Bureau, German correspondents and the Axis
organizations such as German and Italian officials etc. /n these
operations the instruction's were directly given by Colonel
HIDAKA or Lt. Colonel URANO and there were very few occasions
when they used their man 4nd1re0t1y.
b) There were no instances whatsoever when the agents were
sent to distant places outside North China, as, e.g. Chungking,
Yenan, etc.
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c) - Through the /migrant Bureau. This Bureau consisted of the
White Russian /migrant Bureau, Hebrew Association, Latvian
Association, Lithuanian Association and Polish Association. The
Central Organization to deal with these groups was situated in,
Tientsin and local organizations in Peiping, Kalgan, Tsingtao.
and Cliefoo respectively. The Chairmen of the respective national
associations were charged with taking control and directing
various nationals under the order of Japanese Military Authorities.
During this period, various meetings and conferences took place
and this naturally enabled us to listen in to the information
from various districts.
As the 'White Russians were mostly interested in the develop-
ments of Soviet Russiat their observations of Soviet Russia's
secret propaganda activities were comparatively correct, but,
other information was not so reliable.. The Russian /migrant
Bureau in Tientsin was operating a newspaper called "Vozrojdenie
Azii" in Russian language for propaganda purposes. The Chief
Editor of this organ, PASTOCEIN, is an extreme anti-Soviet and
anti-Communist element ana haa a fairly correct judgment con-
cerning the Soviet information.
dl White Russian Agents.
Among two thousand White Russians in Tientsin, there were
two hundred who were confirmed extreme anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist elements. From these elements twenty persons were
available as agents and they were very willing to cooperate with
the Japanese Authorities.
e) Utilization of the German News Agency and German Correspondents.
The opinion and Observations of the German news correspondents
were fully utilized.
Dr. Herbert Mueller, Director of the Peking office of the
D.N.B�, had a'personal taste in gathering news and information.
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Commanding English perfectly, he personally listened into the
Reuter newscasts and was extremely clever in judging the develop-
ments in the situation.
In the sane office were two other German correspondents,
Herr Lueckenhaus and Dr. Abshagen. Working as the Dicector of the
New York office of the D.X.b. up till America's participation
in the war, Lueckenhaus was well versed in American affairs and
his observations on American situation were worth listening to.
Nr.:4'lbehagen remained in England more than tOn years as a
correspondent and was well acquainted with the higher political
classes .of England and naturally thought much of as an expert on
English and European affairs. �
. Dr. van Briessen, another German correspondent in Peking
was more or less oi .Liberal tendencies. 4bile having a good brain,
he was considered of anti-German inclinations.
Mr. Cordes, still another German correspondent, was a �Chinese
Nisei", had a perfect command command of Chinesepenjoyed a wide
and extensive friendship among Chinese colleagues .and had a taste
for Mongolian affairs.
Dr. Herbert Tichy, considered of snore or less anti-German
idea, travelled extensively in various countries as a newspaper
correspondent. His specialty was Indian and China's Eorthwestern
affairs.
f) Special Correspondent in Peking of the German Fuehrer's
Headquarters.
, Siegfried Fulkrug, special correspondent in Peking of the
Fuehrer's Headquarters, was working under the orders of Lt. Colonel
Alhardt in Shanghai, and was entrusted, among other things, with
the sowiding out of developments in Soviet Russia. Besides this
he was also spying on the situation in Japan and Chungking.
While Fulkrug was not considered as a big hand, he had a very
able subordinate in the person of Dr. iHeissig, an anthropologist
and arehaeologist, well versed in Mongolian Wngue, who was
capable to a high degree of judging developments in Siberia and
Mongolia.
Fulkrug had his agents in Harbin, who gathered information
on Russia, This infatuation was offered to Colonel HIDAKA
exchange for some concerning Japan and so forth011eiving
Germany's capitulation, be was considering iispatching his own
agents from Peking for the same purpose. However, this plan never
materialized on account of Japan's surrender.
g) Communicatione & Equipment
The H1p4KA Organization primarily did not intend to employ
to any large extent spying agents, nor did it send than over any
long distances, with the result, naturally, that the Organization
was not in possession or employment of any special means of
communication. The only method they employed was to meet Agents
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ataL eecret place or else to obtain the necessary information
by means of telephone, mail or by courier.
(3) Training Plans
. . , The HIDAKA Organization never gave any special training to
its staff members and its agents. However, it endeavoured to increase
their.efficirmy along the following lines:
. . 1. Whenever they committed any mistakes or blunders while executing
their appointed duties, they were called to pay due attention to theme
When they finished their appointed tasks, judgment on their results was
given by responsible parties with a view to letting them become aware of
their merit or the contrary.
. 2. The staff members and agents were afforded with opportunities
to 'witness for themselves how the other organizations on similar lines,
of the army or of the newspaper Offices, were functioning.
3. Impetus was given to bring to a higher level their personal
knowledge, common sense and so forth. For this they had a special
fixed program for their education, subjects which comprised mathematics,
foreign languages, physics, history, economics, history of ideology,
military science and so forth. Lessons on these subjects were given by
officers and able men among the staff mothers. And, for the education
of these officers, the Director of the Organization, Colonel FleaKe,
took charge.
Emphasis was given on the education id Chinese language. They were
asked to take lessons at night schools or else at the residencee of teachere,
For textbooks for these lessons, quite a number of documentary records, �
novels and other literature was employed up until the end of the war.
Fallowing the termination of hostilities, all of these were destroyed by
Lire.
According to the memory, principal anong these books were those
concerning the education of American 0-men, secret agents of Japan, �
German spying system education given at the Chinese Lilitary Acedthee for
gathering information. A book specialiy. recorded the activities of
international spies on Biberia-Manchuria border area.
(4)
Expenditures
� 1.0 Officers and civilians working for this Organization received
salaries fixed by army regulations and did not get any special allowances.
-2. Regular agents got salaries, according to their respective
abilities, which were supposed to be barely enough for a minimum standard
living. The lowe.et was 500 Yen FRB. They, however, were allowci,d to
make purchases at eertain designated Japanese agencies at lover prices.
The highest pay they got was around.1,000 Yen FRB. -
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3. irregular agents got payment in kind, e.g. flour, sear,
tobacco, coal, etc.
4. whenever these irregular agents brought any valuable inforaa�
tion, they got additional payment in cash, ranging from 100 to 1100C
Yen F4B.
5. Just prior to the termimtion of the war, the average oonthly
expenditure was around 200,000 Yen 14'6 mostly for the purpose of
employment of some liaison personnel, for mintaining epecial connections
with the Chinese and also for keeping in contact with GerLlen aid
Italian organs.
(5) Evaluation of Information.
The evaluation of respective information brought in was under.L.ken
by Colonel EIDp. personally, under his own responsibility.
This was done on the following program:
1. Comparieon of various information gathered fraa different
sources.
2. Getting in contact with similar organs within the army-.
Inquiry is made whether these have also got the same informAion or
not, and, if sop campare the accuracy or dependency of either of them.
3. in case particular information is considered of extrr...gee
importance, order is given to a responsible person to en:It:ire into all
circumstances, in an endeavour to ascertain the reliability of the same
information.
44 In deciding on the reliability of a particular piece of
information, the ability of the particular agent who brought it in was
taken into consideration. Information was reported to responsible
parties classified A, B and C, according to their degree of reliability.
Any 'rumour" or npropagandistie reports' was reported as such.
(6) Oases of Siaggnaing..WLESWAILEE
:It often occurred that valuable information which came into its
hand lest its intrinsic value through its failure to' accurately evaluate
or through the delay in reporting.
As the cause for all this, the following may be considered:
1. Prejudices of the man who receives the. information stood in
the way.
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2. Failure to correctly judge the ideological tendency of the par�
ticular agent who brings in such information.
3. Failure to Vford ample assurances for livelihood'to the agent.
4. Luck of patience in the mployment and use of the agents.
iimong the causes as enumerated above, Item]. is .considered the most
important. This was especially true as regards the situation just
prior to the outbreak of the hostilities between Lussia Geraiany-
and between Japan and lussia. The Organization failed to compare all
information in hand in time or to report this information without delay
to responsible quarters.
The Organization had no "scoop" to speak of.
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