STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, AND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03044095
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 121
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2021
• Case Number: F-2020-01878
• Publication Date: July 29, 1953

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SECUR I TY I NFORAT I ON
SEC
EY DOC. NO. rsB D-47
DATE July 29, 1953
COPY NO.
EYES ON4
WHEN ,ANNEX D
IS INCLUDED
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,...Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AS OF JUNE 30. 453, AND
PROGRESS REPORT OF. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
NCTE BY DIE SECRETARY
This report was approved by the Board at its Meeting, July 29,
1953.
t
Charles Ec-adhinson
Secretary to the Board
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PSB 100,47
July 24, 1953
STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AS OF JIRE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the
Psychological Strategy Board
pursuant to the memorandum. dated May 27, 1953 addressed to the Acting
Director of the Psychological Strategy Board by Mr. JUMOD S. Lay, Jr.,
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. �
CONTENIE Page
I. Status of the Program on Juno 30, 1953 � 2
II, The Work of PSB . 9
III. Report of the Department of State Annex A
Report of the Department of Defense Annex B
Rcport of the Mutual Security. Agency. Annex C
*Report of the Central Intellip:ence Agency Annex D
Psychological Program . Expenditures Annex E
..1,���= MI OM+.
* The Report of the Central Intellig, nce Agency is specially classified,
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I. STATUS OF THE PROGRAM ON JUNE 30, 1953
1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status
of ctr national psychological programs as of June 30, 1953, based largely
on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and agencies responsi-
ble for operations.
GENERAL
2. While the President's Comittee on International Information
Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view
to basic improvements in the U.S. position, the struggle, on the psycho-
logical as on other fronts, was conducted with increased vigor, The most
far-reaching opportunity cam( with Stalin's death. The President's speech
of April 16 was signally successful in capitalizing on the situation by
appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace and friendship.
The world at large received the speech with great enthusiasm, and the
follow up support through psynhological exploitation added to the initial
success,
3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been
guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be keyed in
with political action. After Stalin's death, the next major occasion for
such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
Plans and operations were stepped 110 accordingly, with prospect of
conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to take full advan-
tage of the consequences of Stalinlo death.
4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological
front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioriation in the
attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Communist press and public opinion in
Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U, S. foreign policy
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(the possible trend back to isolationism), and alleged anti�Coraraunist
"hysteria". These unfavorable attitudes in combination with a generally
more receptive reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet
"peace offensive" now constitute an intensification of anti-4merican
feeling among significant elements of European opinion.
5, World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the
development .of U, S. foreign trade policies. At the same time that we
are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it has felt
that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be opened
up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their
practices in the field of East�West trade, in combination with tho new
Soviet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun to have
an adverse psychological impact around the world.
6. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures based on
Thailand was set in motion as the result of the invasion of Laos and the
accompanying threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
7. While our overt psychological capabilities have been reduced by
personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and appropriations cuts,
covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, and faster and more
energetic teamwork was secured thro1.01 closer relations with the NSC and
the operating agencies.
REAS
8. Within the USER itself, radio still constitutes the only important
means used currently to roach the Russian people. jamming by the Russian
radio of our broadcasts continues to present a major problem. There was
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however, a perceptible increase in effectiveness of our radio resources
in the last six months due to the inauguration of Radio Liberation and
the stepped-up activity of Radio Free missia. In addition to the radio,
leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Soviet military forces sta-
tioned outside the USSR.
9. Similarly, in Communist Chine, the major psychological activities
presently available are radio and leaflet drops. Both of these are being
substantially increased. Through Hongkong, increased use is being made
of overt, grey and black propaganda channels with the Chinese hainland.
10. In the European Satellites likewise, radio is our major propau.
ganda communications medium. AIAS, RFE, and VOA have contributed to the
building up of pressures that may be instrumental in weakening the
Kremlin's control of the satellites. In most of these Satellite States,
progress in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributable,
has been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potential.
There has, however, been increased actionl'including leaflet drops, in
certain satellites - notably Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania.
11. A high degree of access to East Germany was maintained despite
increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire area has
been continuously subjected to U. S. psychological programs through
mainly indigenous channels,
12, In Western Europe, the presence of U. S. Armed Forces and the
Military Aid program provided a significant psychological impact.
Increased emphasis on troop acceptance Programs enlisting the positive
cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has brought
about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem of avoiding
friction between U. S. military personnel and foreign populations,
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13: Among the principal problJits that have confronted U. Si psy-
chological efforts in ,Uestern Europe during the past six months are
increased criticism of the U Si and especially since Stalin's death,
the Soviet "Peace Offensive"; It is evident that manyi if not all,
Western European governments have been influenced to some extent by the
Kremlin's tension-reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard
progress toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of
'iJestern defenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European
integration:
14: The U; S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation
by the Department of State's Information Program of the President's
Inaugural addresS and of his April 16 speech challenging the new leaders
of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words.
Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the
world in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were
sent to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery; One of these
was shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated audience of
6,000,0004 Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the
speech were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in
thirty-five languages had been produced and shipped by May 24
15. In Italy, U. Si efforts to aid the reelection of the Democratic
Center Parties fell considerably short of their objective. The DeGasperi
Coalition was returned to office by a slender margin and the Communists
and extreme Rightists registered significant gains:
16. In France, the municipal elections in May showed that the
Communists had suffered a slight set-back in rural areas, but had main-
tained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities: Govern-
mental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a
relaxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the
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Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of some Congres-
sional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in con-
junction with the Kremlin's peace campaign, appear to have contributed
to an increase in neutralism.
17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a
marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism.
Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be
preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti-
American feeling:
(1) The belief that the U.S. is deeply divided on
basic international policies,
(2) The development of the Soviet "peace offensive", and
(3) The desire to exercise a more positive and inde-
pendent initiative in international affairs.
18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off
greatly increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems
of German ratification of the. EDC. With this exception, however, U. S.
psychological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as their pro-
jection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in pro-
moting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany integrated
into eestern defense efforts. Since late harch German press opinion has
reflected a decline in confidence in U. 6. leadership. This was tempo-
rarily halted by the President's April 16 speech, but has since been re-
sumed. The two major factors contributing to this are: (1) the
Soviet "peace offensive" and (2) lack of agreement within the U, S. on
policy towards Germany.
19. In the Near and Niddle East and South Asia, neutralism, and
the tendency to associate the U. S. with "colonialism", continued to
present a major obstacle to the attainment of U. S. psychological ob-
jectives. In the Arab States, the alleged pro-Israel bias on the part
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of the Li: S: remained a major handicap, although the visits to Middle
Eastern capitals by Secretary Dulles and Ni', Stassen may have allevi-
ated this problem, at least temporarily: IIA has continuously exploited
the beneficial aspects of these visits in its output to the area:
Turkey, Pakistan and Greece appear to be the brightest spots in this
area, psychologically speaking.
20: In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks raised
major psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners
necessitated special measures to deal with ',brain washing". Steps were
taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on information
matters concerning Korea through the channels of the Psychelogical
Operations Coordinating Committee. The offer of a reward to hIG pilot
defectors was followed by an immediate and significant shift in Communist
air tactics over the Korean battle area.
21. In Japan, severe economic problems and growing neutralist
resistance to the U. S. Objective of Japanese rearmaments have been
trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory. "Grey', and
unattributable activities have progressed favorably.
22. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psychological
action increased in a number of countries, for the most part in the
field of unattributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction
in many Latin American countries directed mainly against American economic
policies. To help offset thisi a major psychological move was Dr. hilton
Eisenhower's goodwill tour of South .merica initiated late in June.
SPECIAL ITEhS
23. Emergency assistance provided by U. Si Armed Forces in cases
of national catastrophe has made m8t3ria1 contributions to U. S. psycho-
logical efforts in The Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran,
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Ecuador, and Japan'.
24. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had a
similarly favorable effect.
25. Carefully planned exploitation of U. S. leadership in the
atomic field, lath a coordinated public information program on the
Nevada weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain
news leaks that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explo-
sion of a thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, contributed to
the U.S. psychological effort.
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II. THE WORK OF PSB
PS B D6-47
$1117 29, 195,
During the first half of 1953, the work of PSB was marked by a
vigorous shift in emphasis from long-range planning to include more
immediate implementation and operational activities. This change re-
flected the advent of a new Administration, and especially the assumption
of the Presidency by General Eisenhower. The President's stature made
his inauguration on January 20 a major factor in the world psychological
struggle, doubly so because of the strong views which he was known to
hold on the importance of seizing the initiative in the cold war.
This found direct expression in the designation of Mr. C. D. Jackson
as Special Assistant to the Ii-osideat, and his appointment, along with *4
Harold E. Stassen, new Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to member-
ship on the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. Jackson was elected Chair-
man of the Board.
MAJOR ACTIVITIES
The impact of these organizational changes on the work of FSB was
further heightened by important psychological developments in the inter-
national field during this period, including the death of Stalin, the
intensified "peace offensive" of thc successor regime in the Kremlin,
the renewal of armistice negotiations in Korea, and the outbreak of large-
scale anti-Communist ,and anti-Soviet rioting in East Germany,
A number of special projocts were undertaken by FSB as a result of
these events and changes, some at the request of the National Security
Council, others on the initiative of the new Chairman of the Board,
These special projects included the following major activities of the
staff undertaken in cooperation with representatives of the Departments
of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Mutual
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Program of Psychological Pr ti, for Sta/in's Paving from Power
(PSB D-24)
Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death (PSB D-40)
During the early months of the reporting period, preparatory plan-
ning in anticiption of Stalin's eventual death continued under PSB
including the drafting of a contingency guidance. When Stalin's illness
was reported, the National Security Council requested the preparation of
a plan for psychological exploitation of Stalin's death (NSC Action No.
728 4(3), March 4, 1953). The resulting FSB D-40, "Plan for Psychological
Exploitation of Stalin's Death", was finally approved on 41.11 23, super-
seding ESB D-24, The Presidential address of April 16 was the major
initial move provided for in the Plan. Such an address had been agreed
upon by the NSC, and PLB was assigned the task of coordinating appropriate
follow-up by departments end agencies of the Government (NSC Action No,
734 March 12, .1953). To assist it in complying with this assignment,
as well as in implementation of ISB D.40, the Board established an inter-
departmental working group which reports twice monthly to the Chairman.
Volunteer Freedom Corp
NBC Action No. 724 (February 25, 1953) approved in principle NSC
143, "Proposal for a Volunteer Freedom. Corps", and directed that a
detailed plan be prepared by an ad hoc committee composed of representa-
tives of State, Defense, CIA and PSB staff. A "Ftoposed Basis for Psycho-
logical Operations Planning to Exploit the Volunteer EYeedem Corps,"
dated Kroh 20, 1953, and "A National Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Volunteer Freedom Corps," dated March 311, 1953, submitted by the PSB staff
representative, Were intensively utilized by the ad hoc committee in pre
paring the relevant sections of its report to the Council, The Psychological
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Supporting Plan for I ,plementing NSC 143 was included in the ad hoc com�
mittee report of April 14 to the NSC 21anning Board. After the rioting
broke out in Fast Germany in mid�June, the PSB recommended to the NSC
that consultation with the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic
of Germany be initiated by the State Department immediately with a view
to implementation as soon as possible of the Volunteer Freedom Corps plan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the feasibility of implementation
is directly dependent upon continued fiscal support by the Congress and
successful negotiations by the Departaent of State with the foreign govern�
ments concerning the recruiting and stationing of these VFC units in their
respective countries.
Interim U.S. iSycholorical Ilan for Fuloit4ion of Unrest in Satellite
Europe (PCB D-45)
NSC fiction No. 817-2. (June 18) directed TSB to prepare recommendations
as to policies and actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states.
A summary statement of the recommendations was approved by the Board on
June 240 and by the NSC or June 25. The comments of the member agencies
on the complete plan (PSB D-45) were coordinited through normal
procedures and approved by the Board on July 1. This plan provides for
en integrated and phased exploitation of actual and latent unrest in the
satellite stateLI to embarrass Soviet Control in those areas without jeo�
pardizing fundamental American objectives.
U. S. Iluchelogical Strategy with Renect to the Thai Peoples of SEA
t5-23)
Shortly after the Viet Ninh invasion of Laos, the NSC directed the
FSB (NSC Action 788 D.:� 13 Nay) to develop P plan for coordinated psycho�
logical operations based on Thailand, and to submit this plan to the NSC
for consideration.
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A FSB panel was already workinf on an over-all psychological plan
for Southeast Pzia. Using this background, a new plan was developed,
calling for a more vigorous exercise of U.S. leadership in Southeast
Asia in two phases, (1) consolidztion of Thailand as a secure louse, and
(2) eventual extension of U.S. psychological programs beyond the Thel
boundaries if and when conditions perniti By June 30, the plan had been
approved in principle and was nearing readiness for subrission to the
NEC.
Korea
Emergency Plan - Break Off of Korean
firmistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)
This contingency plan provides psychological objectives and courses of
action in the event of the breakdown or break off of armistice negotiations.
Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (FSB D-70)
This plan covers the period immecl tely following the conclu3ion of
an armistice and the Department of St. to has already begun work on the
preparation of a new guidance dealing with the period of UN General Assembly
approval of the proposed ,rmistice agreement and the opening of a Korean
political conference.
Guidance on Prisoner of War Exchange in Korea
At the recruest of the Department of Defense, the FJ6 staff undertook
to prepare a coordinated interdepartmental guidance on the POW problem in
Korea and in particular on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.
This guidance was submitted to the Chairman of the PSB and transmitted by
him to the members of the Board as a checklist of relevant psychological
considerations;
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Communist Brainwashing
As a result of a letter of February 19 from the Secretary of Defense
to the Under Secretary of Stcte and the Director of Central Intelligence
,:nd of subsequent conversations between the last-named and the FSB staff,
an. Ad Hoc Interdepartmental. Committee was set up to work with various
scientific advisers to ascertain what counter-measures can be undertaken
against so-called communist ttbrain-washing" techniques. A member of the
PEB staff, who chaired the committee, remains in close contact with the
military officers in charge of reputri-tion of the first American prisoners
of war, and he has certain continuing responsibilities in connection with
the foreign and domestic pnychologicr1 aspects of the problem.
Doctrinal FroTrml_PEB D-12
In September 1951, the Board authorized the establishment of an inter-
departmental panel to study and make recommendations about "doctrinal
(ideological) warfare afainst the USSR". At that time, the Board approved
a paper which noted the Soviet ideoloficn1 efforts which had gained in-
fluence upon the intelligentsia throufhout the world and had predisposed
them towards communist viewpoints. The panel, studying the Soviet approach
and possible U.S. counter-sction, developed a U.S. Doctrinal Program
(rsB D-33) as a means of restoring U.E. influence and mininizing communist
influence among the worldly intellectLals. This Doctrinal Progran visualizes
a long-term intellectual movement, employing a permanent literature and r
series of scholarly activities to break down the doctrinaire thought
patterns which have aided Commix ism and to foster greater underst nding and
acceptance for the traditions and viewpoints of America and the Free World:
As of June 30, the proposed program had been circulated for Board z-pprov:1;
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Presidentls Ealagency Immigration Program
On April 22, 1953, ircsident Eisenhower recommended to the Congress
emergency legislation to admit 240,000 immigrants into the U.S. during
the next two years. The President indic'ted the categories of people
to be covered wore escapees from Communism and the victims of economic
conditions in the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
On the initictive of the Chairm-n of ILB, members of its staff intensively
supported this recommendation by -ssistRnce in the preparation of legisla-
tion to be introduced into Congress and by other means nocessrwy to bring
about its enactment. This was a completely coordin ted staff effort,
bearing in mind the potential impact of the program on the Italian General
Elections which wore to occur on June 7th and 8th, the objectives outlined
in iSBIs Escapee Program, and the possibilities such legislation would have
in helping to bring about greater solil-rity within NATO. Through the
rEB Coordin-ting Committee for D-15b, the operating agencies were able
to rimk-.e prrticul-rIy good use of the introduction of the bill in the
Senate and the introductory st tomcat by Senator Watkins as well as of
the supporting testimony of Cabinet members.
Armaments iublicity iljcy
A member of the PSB staff is repn,senting Mr. C. D. Jackson in the
deliberations of an Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy.
This group was dLsirn -LA by the NSC r2anning Board in March to develop
a Government publicity policy for the benefit of the AmericRn public on
the subject of the arn,nents race with the USSR,
On May 8 an Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee (NSC 151) went
to the Council which considered it on May 27, and its action on that
data (NSC Action No, 799 a) included a. direction to rsB
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".,,to prepare for Council consideration an
outline plan of the specific stops, including
Speeches by Government officials, which Should
be taken to carry out the recommendations
contained in NSC 151".
Presidential speech on this subject was in draft on Jane 30,
Irocedural Guidance for Famine Reli-f Products
A PSB staff paper setting forth an operational plan for exploitation
of possible psychological advantages which might be derived from gifts
of U.S. surplus food to countries within the Soviet orbit was submitted
for Board consideration.
Prosidontts Flood Relief Committee
A PSB staff member served in an advisory capacity on the Inter-
Agency Working Group on Flood Relief.
IMPLEY7NTATION ACTIVITIES
The increased emphasis on special projects and short-term plans of
a quasi-operational nature, as well as the maturing of more and more long-
range PSB plans, led to a sharp increase in the follow-up work of PSB
in cooperation with the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the
NSA. In addition to coordin.tion activity on plans and projects described
above, the following approved P:]B plans were in the process of active
implementation by government departments and agencies during the reporting
period:
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(a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction
of Communist Pourer in France (PSB D-140)
(b) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction
of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15b)
Coordination of the implementation of these two plans has been
carried out by a Washington, Interdepartmental Committee working with
counterpart Committees in Taxis and Rome acting under the immediate
supervision of the respective Ambassadors. USCINCEUR has appointed a
Liaison Representative who has met with the Paris Committee.
Municipal elections held throughout Prance in May indicated a slight
over-all decline in communist electoral strength, but future prospects for
effective anti-communist action were not bright as the reporting period
closed with a prolonged French political crisis. Efforts started some
months ago to lift parliamentary immunity from six communist deputies have
not yet been successful.
Prior to the national elections in Italy, the Washington and Rome
Committees undertook a number of actions designed to further the objectives
of the plan, including psychological exploitation of the President re pro-
posed emergency immigration program. The precarious majority obtained by
the Center parties, and the gains of both Left Wing and Right Wing extre-
mists, underline the continuing gravity of the situation. In the light of
post-election comment from the U.S. Embassy in Italy, the plan to reduce
communist power in that country is to be reviewed for the purpose of
preparing a revised post-election strategy.
(0) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit
Escapees (PSB D-18/a)
The Escapee Program was established in implementation of U.S. defector
policy as set forth in NSC 86/1 with respect to improving the conditions of
reception and care afforded recent escapees from Communism, and promoting
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their permanent resettlement. The Prorram which was administered by the
Department of State during the reporting period also provides opportunity
for meeting and confuting, with evidences of friendship and practical
concern for the victims of Communism, the damaging Soviet propaganda which
has in the past exploited inadecuate conditions and the general neglect
which greeted escapees on their arrival in the Free World.
During the past six months, the Program has achieved substantial
results at a minimum cost to the Government. In Europe, care and main�
tenance activities are carried on in each of the major countries of
first asylum, benefiting 14,890 currently registered escapees through
the provision of supplemental food, clothing, medical and dental care,
sanitary and living facilities, and amenity supplies. Resettlement is
promoted by documentation, training, counseling and sinner services
performed in Europe, immigration opportunity searches undertaken in
Canada and several Latin American countries, and the provision of funds
for transportation for escapees qualifying for movement. Through these
methods 4,709 escapees had been resettled or were awaiting passage by
June 1, 1953.
United States assistance has directly brought about a marked im�
provement in the conditions of asylum and opportunities for resettlement
offered escapees, and has also stimulated increased contributions by
local government authorities and voluntary agencies. These activities
hove afforded material for utilization through information media abroad,
have contributed to intelligonce acquisition and related programs, and
have provided a basis for successful rebuttal in the General Assembly of
Czechoslovak charges of subversion under the Mutual Security Act,
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Soviet and satellite sensitivity to the fact of continued escape from
behind the Iron Curtain, and of assistance to this group on the part of
the Free World has been demonstrated by repeated press and radio attacks
on the Escapee Program, by internal propaganda designed to conceal or
minimize the continuing outward flow of escapees, by increasingly severe
security measures and border controls, by the bringing of charges before
the General Assembly, and by legal measures directed at particular
individuals and groups of emigres.
During the year, program activities were extended under the authority
of 3ection 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949# as amended,
on a limited basis to South Asia and the Far East. Some 300 Kazakh
refugees from Sinkiang Province who escaped to Kashmir are boing assisted
either to resettle in rural Kashmir or to move onward to Turkey. A select
group of trained and educated refugees from China now stranded in Hong
Kong will be assisted to resettle in Formosa or other suitable areas of
the For East under contractual arrangements with Aid Refugee Chinese
Intellectuals, Inc.
National Psychological Program with Respect to
Escapees from the Soviet Orbit: Phase "B"
(PSB D-1&/la)
Approved by the Board on January 1, 1953, this Flan is essentially
a program for encouragement of escape from the Soviet orbit for psychological
purposes and for psychological employment of key satellite personnel.
On the recommendation of the Board, the NSC amended NSC 86/1 to
insure that the term "key satellite personnel" includes any satellite
national whose escape would be of significant psychological value to the
Free World. An observer from the stiff of PSB has been designated to
meet, as the agenda recuires, with the Inter-Agency Defector Committee
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which functions under CIA to execute NSCID 13 and 14. Plan D-18a/1a
provides for military use of escapees to derive psychological advantages.
Incisive action in this regard resulted from appointment of a special
committee by the NSC at the direction of the President. This task group,
carrying forward the work of the Phase 1B" panel, made a comprehensive
study and developed plans for the erection of a Volunteer Freedom Corps
(NEC 143).
In addition, overt programs such as those under IIA have given increased
attention to escapees. Other uses of escapee personnel encompass such
activities as the Free Europe Tiniversit, in Exile (sponsored by the
National Committee for a Free Europe), and certain of the operations in
its appropriate area of the Committee for Free Asia, which offer opportuni-
ties for special exploitation of the potential for non-communist leadership
among these people, The program in Europe has the capability of absorbing
profitably more qualified candidates then have appeared thus far. Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberation have increased their propaganda exploita-
tion of escapees and are using in their programming current escapees offering
substantial value.
(e) Flan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (FSB NSC 127/1)
National Overt Proprganda Policy Guidance for
General War (PSB D-31/1)
The substance of these plans has been integrated into the current
war plans of both JCS and CIA. The Department of State chairs an inter-
departmental subcommittee of the Psychological Operations Coordinating
Committee consisting of represent tives of State, Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency and the MUtual Security Agency for the purpose of
drafting an "X-Day" Plan in implementation of NSC 127/1,
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(f) A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological
Program with Particular Reference to Cold War
Operations under NSC 10/5 (PSB D-31)
Work on this project was in effect taken over by the President's
Committee on International Informction Activitiese
(g)
National Psychological Strategy with Respect
to Germany (PSB D-21)
and
(h) Nationrl Psychological Strategy with Respect
to Berlin (D-21/2) (Supplement to FSB D-21
dated October 9, 1952)
A supplementary psychological plan for Berlin was approved by the
Board on February 3, 1953. Supporting Flans for implementing this program
as well as the an for West Germany as a whole, were developed by the
Department of State and Department of Defense, coordinated and approved
by other member agencies. A special Coordinating Committee has been es-
tablished in Bonn under the auspices of the U.S. High Commission. Under
the active chairmanship of the HICCC Pablic Affairs Officer, the Committee
brings together representatives of State, Defense, NSA, and CIA. Reports
from this Committee outline detailed action taken and indicate progress in
implementing the German and Berlin Plans, which have now become, in effect,
the charters for the Government's information and other psychological
programs in the area.
Possible revision of these plans is under preliminary staff considera-
tion as a result of recent developments in Germany and in Europe generally,
as well as of modifications of U.S. policies.
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(i) Psychological Strategy Program for Japan
(PSB D-27)
Follow-up work on the Japan plan, which was approved by the Board
on January 15, 1953, has resulted in the setting up of two Committees
in Tokyo for the coordinated implementation of this program. The first
Committee is a high-level group chaired by the Ambassador himself. The
second is a working-level Committee headed by the Ptblic Affairs Officer
and including also representetives of Defense and CIA. Preparation of
supporting plans, however, has been slow. The State Department is now
working on a revision of the US country paper for Japan which follows
very closely the content of PSB D-27. The preliminary steps have been
taken to include NSA in the coordinatexi implementation of the Plen if
and when an expected FOA program for Japan is approved.
(j) Psychological Strategy Program for
the Middle East (PSB D-22)
Implementation of this an is proceeding under the active supervision
of the Middle East Coordinating Panel in Washington. After the visit of
the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Director of NSA, to the Middle
E,st, the Panel held a special meeting toward the end of the reporting
period to take into account the resultant new policy attitudes toward
Middle Eastern problems. A recuest fer comments on D-22 from the field
resulted in replies from five of the ten Diplomatic Missions in the area.
The comments received were uniformly favorable and several of them wore
enthusiastic. The Washington Panel is considering the problem of
establishing in the field the necessary coordinating mechanism to implement
this regional program.
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PLAJNING ACTIVITIES
Plans Authorize and in Process of Development:
Plans in various stages of preparation on June 30 included the
following:
(a) Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe
(PSB D-38)
A regional psychological strategy plan to increase the willingness
of Europeans to support mutually agreed security goals in Western Europe
by reducing anti-U.S, attitudes was completed and sent to the Board
members on June 30 for approval by vote slip action.
(b) Program for Support of the Orthodox Church
(PSB D-39)
Possible ways of utilizing the worldwide influence of the Orthodox
Church as a means of checking increasing Soviet influences in the Eastern
hediterranean and as a method of weakening Soviet control within the
Soviet Orbit is the basis for this plan. A program for the non-attributable
support and assistance to non-Russian leadership of the Orthodox Church
was informally concurred in by the member agencies and forwarded to the
Board members for vote slip approval*
(c) Plan for Exploitation of Dissidence in the Soviet
Bloc: USSR, Armed Forces (PSB D-43)
This plan to exploit the bases for schism between the regime and the
military establishment of the Soviet Union and to increase dissidence within
the Soviet Armed Forces where significant vulnerabilities are indicated,
awaits final clearance prior to early submission to the Board.
(d) Iranian Contingency Plan
A PSB chaired interdepartmental panel will coordinate psychological
planning in relation to the possible partial or complete loss of Iran, a
contingency which had not been assumed in the approved psychological
strategy plan for the Middle East.
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(e) Indo-China
A special program for the use of U. S. Influence in Support of U. S:
Objectives in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was drafted and in the process
of interdepartmental clearance at the end of June.
(f) Psychological Strategies in North Africa
This papery including a study of the Psychological Data, a report on
the Status of Power helations, and an illustrative plan for U. S. psycho-
logical action in the area, was in the process of clearance and completion
on June 30.
heview and hevision of Approved Plans
A procedure was developed during the period, under which all completed
plans are regularly reviewed by the staff with a view to determining
whether revision is required; Early revision of the French and Italian
Plans is now contemplated.
EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE
Evaluation hethods
VJork was continued with Government research offices engaged in de-
veloping techniques for evaluating psychological operations. Progress
in this field has been made through:
a, examining current evaluation research projects in the
Government to determine their relevance to PSB needs,
b, alerting Government research units to the continuing
need for research, particularly on evaluation criteria
for psychological operations, and assisting them in
fixing priorities for major research projects.
c, holding conferences on evaluation techniques and criteria.
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d. suggesting specific evaluation projects for Government
research units, such as a Handbook on Statistics for Psywar.
Evaluations and Pre-planning Situation Estimates
During the reporting period, the following projects in this category
were carried out:
a: An Evaluation of the Psycholoqical Effect: of the U. S. National
Effort in Italy, (PSB D-29): This paper, Which was drafted
during the final quarter of 1952, was noted by the Board on
January 15, revised, and distributed for information, It
concluded that U. S. policies and programs have contributed
substantially to the attainment of our national objectives in
Italy, but that the situation was still grave and that withdrawal
of our support might well lead to the collapse of the Government
then in power (February.1953). Accordingly, it concluded that
there should be no slackening of our effort in the crucial period
ahead.
b. An Evaluation of the Psychological. Impact of U S. Foreign
Economic Policies in the U. K. (FSB D-36): This paper identi-
fied some adverse puchologipal results of certain aspects of
our economic policies towards the U, K., especially in the
military aid and tariff ar3a5. It was approved by the Board on
January 15) and after further coordination, it was transmitted
to the N$C, and, through the State Department, to other
interested agencies:
c. Evaluation of the Psycholor:ical Impact of U. S. Foreign
Economic Policies in France (PSB D-37): The completed. paper
was accepted as a reference document by the Board on January 15.
It outlines the psychological causes behind the difficulties
encountered by France in pursuing free world objectives, notes
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the ps7cholocical obstacles raised by our policy- towards
France, and proposes actions to obtain French cooperation.
d. Psychological Plan for the iteduction of Communist Power in
France (PSB D-14M: An evaluation of this plan, including
suggestions for its revision, was ready for consideration on
June 309
e. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Escapees (PSB D-18a):
An analytical report on the first year's operation of the
United States Escapee Program is nearing completion,
f. Soviet Sensitivities: An evaluative report on this subject,
prepared in an interdepartmental committee, was completed and
submitted to the Acting Director for approval and interdepart-
mental circulation for information as a staff study.
g. A review of the psychologieal situation and related factors
in Yugoslavia involved the assembly of basic intelligence and
strategic considerations, for possible use in planning.
h. The Malenkov Test Case: Before the death of Stalin and in
conjunction with PSB D-24 an extensive review of classified
and other data on halenkov was completed. It was decided that
data were inadequate for an intensive psychological analysis
of the man; but other Malcukov studies were recommended� The
project uncovered deficiencies in the organisation and coordina-
tion of biographic information in the Government.
Latin Americat A pre-planning estimate of the psychological
situation in this region was nearing completion at the end of
the reporting period.
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Intelligence Support
Staff members continued to work in liaison with the intelligence-
producing agencies of the Government to provide intelligenee support and
guidance to the Board and the Staff, This function includes selecting
from, and, in some cases, synthesizing the output of the agencies, arranging
for new research where necessary, and setting up staff briefings by experts
from outside the staff.
In this period, sitilar services were also developed to meet the
needs of the Chairman of the Board for Government intelligence on such
psychological subjects as foreign opinion trends, and international re-
actions to particular programs, actions and statements of the United
States Government or its officials. This mission for the Chairman has
required a greater emphasis upon the rapid procurement and processing of
current intelligence from the agencies on a daily basis.
Psychological Support for USUN
As a result of discussions between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. C. D.
Jackson, and subsequent PSS action at the informal meeting of June 3, a
PSB-thaired committee of the member agencies was established to organize
an anti-communist psychological campaign focussed upon the General Assembly
scheduled to convene on the 15th of September. At the close of the reporting
period, the committee was in action and early documentation had been
supplied to Ambassador Lodge.
ATTACHMENTS
Annex
Annex
Annex
* Annex
Annex
*The report
A Report of the Department of State
B Report of the Department of Defense
C Report of the Mutual Security Agency
D Report of the Central Intelligence Agency
E Psychological Progmm - Expenditures
of the Central Intelligence Agency is specially classified
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SECR2,1
THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of State)
ANNEX A
PSB 1147
July 29, 1953
1. During the period between December 31, 1952 and June 30, 1953, the
Department of State undertook to carry out, through the foreign informa�
tion and educational exchange programs conducted by the International
Information Administration and in conjunction with programs carried out
by other governmental agencies, the following major substantive tasks
derived from relevant public laws, approved papers of the National
Security Council, approved papers of the Psychological Strategy Board
and programs agreed to by the Psychological Operations Coordinating
Committee:
(1) Sustaining and increasing the confidence of other
peoples and other governments in the high purpose and the
trustworthy character of the United States as a leader of the
free world.
(2) Exploiting to the advantage of the free world the
series of events in the Soviet Union and its satellites,
including Communist China, ensuing upon the death of Stalin�
(3) Promoting the achievement of an honorable armistice
in Korea and greater stability in Asia generally.
(4) Promoting measures designed to bring about a greater
degree. of integration among the nations of Europe, with particular
reference to the treaty establishing the European Defense Community.
(5) Countering, particularly in Latin America, the Near
and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, attitudes hostile
to the United States and disposed toward neutralism.
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(6) Demonstrating to the people of Italy in advance of the
general election the advantages accruing to them because of their
association with the free world.
2. The execution of the first task listed in 1 above involved primArilY
(1) exploiting the global prestige of the President by
(a) the wide dissemination in radio broadcasts, press
releases, pamphlets and magazine articles of the Inaugural
Address;
(b) the preparation and distribution of a documentary
film on the inauguration;
(c) the preparation and the distribution of press and
photographic materials concerning the career and the philo-
sophy of the President;
(d) full coverage of the Message on the State of the
Union;
(e) the preparation and the distribution of press and
photographic materials concerning the most important officers
of the Administration;
(2) exploiting the initiative taken by the President on behalf
of peace and security in his address before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1953, particularly by
(a)
assuring that copies of the speech were presented
to foreign offices all over the world in advance of delivery;
(b) delivery of kinescopes of entire speech to seventy-
three posts within a day of its delivery, one of which was
shown over BBO-TV on April 2D to an estimated audience of
six million;
(c) the production and shipment on May 2 of a documentary
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ANNEX A
PSB Dr,47
July 1953
film on the speech in thirty-five languages;
(d) preparation and dissemination of five million
pamphlets, handbills and leaflets on the speech;
(e) distribution to all missions of a seventy-two
page =wry of world-wide editorial opinion;
(f) preparation of photographic illustration of the
speech in ten editions of the magazine "Free World" distri-
buted throughout the Far East;
(g) the preparation and distribution of pamphlets based
on the speech, "What Disarmament Means" and "A Time to Turn
the Tide of History;"
(3) exploiting the visits of the Secretary of State and the
Director of Mutual Security to Europe and the Near and Riddle East
and South Asia and the visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower to Lttin
America.
(4) increased emphasis upon programs designed to reveal
the moral values and the spiritual attributes that animate the
people of the United States in their personal attitudes and their
public actions
(5) citing the scheduled tripartite meeting at Bermuda as
evidence of unity of free world and its ceaseless search for
amicable adjustments of differences
(6) supporting the committee in Japan in planning and
carrying out the year-long celebration (1953-1954) of the hundredth
anniversary of the visit to Japan of Admiral Perry
3. The execution of the second task listed in 1 above involved primarily
(I) challenging the new leaders of the USSR to demonstrate
their professions of peaceful intent by deeds, not words, particularly
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PSB D-47
J47 29# 1953
in connection with the conclusion of a truce in Korea, the conclusion
of a treaty of peace with Austria and the release of prisoners of
war still held by the USSR
(2) suggesting to the governments of Germany, Italy and
Japan that they demand the release of their nationals still held
as prisoners of war in the USSR
(3) exploiting the renewed effort of the United States, the
United Kingdom and France to conclude a treaty concerning Austria
and the refusal of the USSR to participate
(4) exposing the withdrawal after the death of Stalin of
the charges against the doctors as evidence of the dominance of
expediency over principle in the conduct of affairs within the
USSR
(5) demonstrating that conciliatory gestures of the new
regime, while constituting recognition of need to placate opinion
within and without the orbit, do not as yet demonstrate reduction
of capabilities or change of intention on the part of USSR
(6) emphasizing to the satellites of Europe the insecurity
of the regimes under which they now live, and particularly as the
result of demonstrations in East Germany and Czechoslovakia the
potential for freedom that exists in the area and the betrayal by
the USER of the working populations
(7) exploitation of the report of United Nations International
Labor Organization Comittee on forced labor as evidence of unchanged
conditions within USSR
(8) full but sober coverage of the Wels Escapee Center in
Austria, including address by Ambassador Thompson emphasizing purpose
of escapee program.
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PSB B.47
Jay 29, 1953
4. The execution of the third task listed in 1 above involved primarily
(1) demonstrating the unremitting patience and determination
of the United Nations Command to achieve an armistice on reasonable
terms
(2) developing for global dissemination through personnel
detailed to the Far East Command pictorial, written and transcribed
material designed to demonstrate the humane treatment of prisoners
of war by the United Nations Command and the justice of its position
with regard to repatriation
(3) countering by reasoned argument and sober discussion the
opposition of the Republic of Korea to an armistice
(4) exploitation of the wide support, particularly by the
government of India, to the proposals of the United Nations Comtand
for a solution of the problem of repatriation
(5) continued exposure of the charges that the United Nations
Command employed biological warfare in Korea, including preparation
of a fourth supplement to the kit on biolorical warfare, arrangement
with the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom for a pamphlet to be
written by a British: journalist, exploitation of a denunciation of
the charges by Pandit Nehru, and plans for dealing with the matter
in the United Nations should it reappear there
(6) encouraging, in conjunction with the governments of
Vietnam, France and the United Kingdom, greater psychological
activity against the Viet-Minh;
(7) promoting a special program In India designed to counter
the appeal of Soviet Communism among students
(8) increasing activity, it cooperation with the Government
of Thailand, in the north and the northeast areas of the country
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PSB /06.47
jay 2% 1953
to counter increased Communist propaganda in connection with the
invasion of Laos.
5. The execution of the fourth task listed in 1 above primarily involved
(1) continued promotion, increasingly by the provision of
materials and data for the use of indigenous groups, of understanding
of the objectives of the United States in Europe and so to promote
the ratification of the treaty establishing the European Defense
Community and of the contractual agreements with Germany
(2) continued promotion, again largely through indigenous
groups, of data and materials revealing the advantages to be
gained by Europeans through closer integration militarily, economically
and politically
(3) providing grants to 1459 nationals of other NATO countries,
including 34 journalists, to visit the United States and 1083 grants
to nationals of the United States to visit other NATO countries
(4) increased emphasis on the cultural attainments of the
United States
(5) the inauguration to Spain of a series of broadcasts designed
to acquaint the people of the country with the objectives of the United
States in Europe, to diminish their sense of isolation and so to
provide a basis for the better understanding of the current negotiations.
(6) the continued functioning of binational committees for
promoting good relations between local communities and the United
States forces stationed within them
(7) the timely allocation of $50 million in counterpart funds
for use in West Berlin at the time of the riots in Eastern Germany
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ANNEX A
PSB D-47
July 294 1953
(8) the exclKnge of notes constituting a cultural agreement
between the United States and the Federal Republic
(9) publicity for the visits to this country of Chancellor
Adenauer and Mayor Reuter, including appropriate public dissemination
of the communique issued following the visit of Chancellor Adenauer.
6. The execution of the fifth task listed in 1 above primarily involved
(1) executing with the cooperation of the government of Austria
plans to assure minimum publicity for the Congress in Defense of the
Rights of Youth held in Vienna,
(2) exploitation of the interest shown by the Secretary of
State and the Director of Mutual Security in their visit to the
Near and Middle East and by Dr. Milton Eisenhower in his visit to
Latin America of national culture and popular efforts to better the
condition of the countries conerned
(3) cooperation with the governments of Egypt, TUrkey and Iraq
in information programs directed at the armed forces of the countries
concerned with the purpose of developing internal stability and
individual responsibility and exposing Soviet Communism
(4) provision to the Ministry of Education in Iraq of material
exposing Soviet Communism for distribution among students
(5) cooperation in Morocco and Libya with United States forces
and local groups to facilitate acceptance of the presence of United
States forces in the area
(6) the provision to Radio Ankara of scripts exposing Soviet
Communism for short-wave broadcasts to the satellites of Europe
(7) cooperation between the USIS Near East Regional Service
Center in Beirut and the Technical Cooperation Administration for the
production of photographs and pamphlets
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PSB D-47
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(8) arranging for broadcasts to Argentina from Radio Carve
In Montevideo
(9) initiating an extensive program of personal contacts in
Brazil to counteract doctrines hostile to the United States
(10) initiating a program in Chile designed to hamper
agitation for nationalization of the copper industry
(11) increasing emphasis on cultural attainments of the
United States in conjunction with demonstrating United States
interest in Latin American culture.
(12) discrediting of Communist-dominated Continental Cultural
Congress held at Santiago, Chile
(13) continuing efforts to prevent dissemination to nearby
countries of Communist-inspired doctrine emanating from Guatemala.
7. The execution of the sixth task listed in 1 above involved primarily
a carefully planned and executed proartm, largely in support of indigenous
groups, includilg political parties and trade unions, to provide films,
pamphlets, posters and exhibits emplwsizing Italy's economic progress,
agrarian reform and renewed international prestige and the threat of
Communism to the retention of these gains.
8. Major obstacles or difficulties encountered in carrying out the tasks
include
(1) Differences between the United States and the peoples
and the governments of other countries in estimating the capabilities
and the intentions of the USSR, particularly in view of the con-
ciliatory gestures made by the leadership of the USSR following
the death of Stalin.
(2) The increasing preoccupation of the nations of Western
Europe with internal, and particularly economic, problems, the
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instability of the governments of several of these countries and
their concern with past rivalries rather than present dangers and
future opportunities.
(3) The growth of strongly nationalist sentiment in many
newly independent states and the tendency to identify the United
States as a defender of practices associated with colonialism.
CO The preoccupation of the Arab States with Israel and their
tendency to identify the United States as its champipn.
(5) Widespread ignorance and misunderstanding abroad of the
evidence presented, the facts proven and the procedures involved in
trial, the sentencing and the execution of judgment in the case of
the Rosenbergs.
(6) The inability of the United Nations Command to ensure
the cooperation of the Republic of Korea with regard to measures
deemed necessary to achieve an acceptable armistice in Korea.
(7) The adverse reaction abroad to widespread publicity of
charges made and measures taken during the cOurse of congressional
investigations into various aspects of the foreign information
and educational exchange program.
9. Major changes that have occurred in the foreign information and
educational exchange programs include
(1) a reduction in force from 14,064 persons to 11,882.
Those now employed include 1508 nationals of the United States
employed in missions overseas and 2741 in the United States and
7633 local employees in missions overseas.
(2) a net increase of six, from 195 to 201, in the number of
overseas outposts. However, current plans call for the closing
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of 13 posts early in fiscal year 1954.
(3) the closing of twelve libraries overseas, eleven of which
were in Germany
(4) a reduction in short�wave broadcasts from 43 hours and
45 minutes to 33 hours, particul..rly in programs in Spanish and
Portuguese to Latin America, in Portuguese to Portugal, Harm/
Malay, English,. Korea, French and Italian
(5) the eli;ination of twelve domestic transmitters and the
suspension of contracts for the construction of major domestic
transmitting facilities
(6) the testing of two megawatt transmitters, one in Okinawa
and one in the Fhillipines, for early broadcasting on medium bands
to the Far East
(7) the relay by the improved facilities in Colombo of daily
programs in Hindi and Urdu, followed by broadcasting of transcriptions
in Tamil and Bengali
(8) the simultaneous relay by Munich of the program in Hindi
to audiences in East and South Africa
(9) the increase by 100% of religious broadcasts, planned in
cooperation with many religious groups, to peoples behind the
Iron Curtain
(10) the transformation of the Wireless Bulletin to the
Wireless File, designed for adaptation for publication in accordance
with local needs
(11) the initiation of the experimental use of folk-lore in
notion pictures as a means of reaching sensitive areas with politically
significant measages
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(12) the distribution within India of 4500 sets of 101 paper-
back books as expendible libraries
(13) the appointment of Dr. Robert L. Johnson, former President
of Temple University, to be Administrator of the International
Information Administration
(14) the establishment of a Plans Board in the office of
the Administrator.
(15) the appointment of Mr. Cheever Cowdin� former chairman
of the board of Universal Pictures, to be Assistant Administrator
of the Informational Motion Picture Service and the appointment of
Mr. Cecil B. deNille as principal consultant
(16) the appointment of Mr. Leonard Erickson, formerly of
McCann-Erickson, to be Deputy Administrator for the International
Broadcasting Service.
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Jallv 29$ 195:7'
10, Actual or estimated expenditures and estimated carry-over are as
follows: (The expenditures shown cre in millions of dollars to the nearest
tenth.)
Sub-
Radio
Grand
IIA
Fulbright
NSA
Total
Construction
Total
Actual 1951
,) 67.0
4.8
NA
0 71.8
23.04
95.2
Actual 1952
89.0
790
10.6
106.6
19,4
126.0
Estiaated 1953
84,6
7.9
U.
104.0
.9
103.1
The estimated carry-over of IIA funds available after June 30, 1953
is a7.5 million for radio acquisition and construction. This availability
may be reduced by the Congress in order to provide obligation authority
liquidation cost of the Department of state under the appropriation
"Salaries and Expenses Department of State."
For 1954, IIA has requested of the Congress
,87.9 million in the 114
appropriation, permission tp obligate 12,2 million of the radio acquisi-
tion and construction carry.pover funds, and ,8.9 million in Fulbright
.local currencies of the Exchange of Persons program, or a total of ,109.0
million requested for 1954.
IIA cannot furnish any estimates of periods of time beyond FY 1954
at this time. No estimates beyond those presently pending before the
Congress will be made until approprJations have been made, the report of
the President's Committee on International Information has been analyzed,
the new Information Agency has been established, and the program for 1954
has taken place, Thereiano basis for any valid projections beyond 1954
before these steps have been completed.
The above figures do not include the Public Affairs program in
Germany or Austria or the NSA Information Program other than the certain
Nati themes which the Bureau of the Budget intended to be transferred to
IIA on July. 1, 1953.
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SEMIANNUAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITY STATUS REPORT
of the
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
for the period from 1 January through 30 June 1953
SECTION
SUMMARY
1. Presented below is a summary of the status of the Department of
Defense activities having psychological effects for the period from
1 January through 30 June 1953.
2. General Comments
The Department of Defense released information designed to make
clear the United States position with respect to truce negotiations and
the prisoner-of-war situation. Background press conferences were ar-
ranged through which the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants
briefed news media representatives on the American stand in Korea,
3. In conjunction with other agencies, the Department of Defense
carried on a continuous program to inform the public of developments in
biological and chemical warfare research. Documentary evidence was pro-
vided to both the United States repreoentative to the United Nations and
to news media, to combat the Communist propaganda accusations.chnr7ing the
United States waged germ warfare in Korea.
4. hilitary Posture
a. The most significant contribution of the Department of
Defense with respect to the national psychological effort was
the continued maintenance of U. S. military power in a strength
to provide evidence of its readiaess to resist aggression. The
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deployment of portions of U. S. military power in Europe contin-
ued to be a significant unifying force against boviet aggressionj
although the psychological impact of such deployment among Euro-
peans was probably lessened by the isolation of large-scale mili-
tary power in Korea for the past two years'.
be In connection with the Viet inh invasion of Laos,
French authorities requested and received military equipment and
supplies on a priority basis, demonstrating U. S. ability to sup-
port friendly nations in meeting military emergencies.
5. Also of note was the timely psychological exploitation of tech-
nological leadership in military weapons through 4 coordinated public
information program on the atomic bomb tests this Spring at the Nevada
Proving Ground and similar programs on other weapons.
6. Goodwill Efforts
Goodwill efforts of the military Service in overseas areas were
promptly executed and effectively exploited: Emergency supplies and
assistance have been provided in England, Holland; Turkey, Greece: Iran,
and Ecuador, demonstrating U: S. preparedness and interest in the welfare
of other nations: Military leaders have demonstrated an increased aware-
ness and desire to gain from the psychological implications of mercy mis-
sions, improved community relations and counter-propaganda, Many in-
stances of the observance and particioations of U: S. Military personnel
in indigenous ceremonies and the consummation of well considered good will
tours are in evidence These are believed to be of great significance for
the support they provide to fundamental and long-lasting attitudes of
friendship: imbedded in the "grass roots" of foreign peoples.
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7. Military Assistance Programs
The Military Assistance Program has continued to be one of our
greatest psychological assets. A new joint Service regulation aimed at
maximizing psychological advantage in the release of information covering
training, equipping and reimbursable aid to foreign nationals has been
issued during the period. Offshore procurement has maintained U. S. in-
fluence in the Far. East and Europe and has made a major contribution in
Italy.
8. Repatriated U. 5. Prisoners of War
By virtue.of massive unfavorable press reaction, special at-
tention in this report has been devoted to the so-called "special cases"
of repatriated U. S. prisoners. Considerable attention was accorded this
matter as far back as April 1952 and in mere concentrated fashion since
January 1953 when it became necessary to cope with the actual situation.
In view of the status of truce negotiations optimum handling of the situ-
ation was not possible since routine medical and persDnnel policies as
well as public demands had to be met. The Department of Defense will
continue to devise correct policies for handling the situation in spite
of press sensationalism. As evidence of its success, within a period of
two months such sensationalism has run its course and a general acceptance
of a realistic standard operating procedure has evolved,
9, Defection
The public announcement of an approved plan and the establish-
ment of facilities to receive and. reward PITO pilot defectors who would
deliver their jet aircraft to the United Nations Command was followed by
an immediate and significant shift in Communist air operations and tactics
over the Korean battle area.
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Significant progress of the Department of Defense in the development
of plans, capabilities, and organizational means for contributing further
to the national psychological effort.
1. Intra-departmental activities, including plans, forces, training
programs, and indoctrination courses'
a. Office of the Secretary of Defense
(1) Psychological Advantage of MAP: Consistent with
previous policy guidance, a joint Service regulation, published
on 24 March 1953, sets policy and procedures relative to the re-
lease of information concerning: (a) training of foreign nation-
als, (b) off-shore procurement, (c) equipping of foreign military
powers, (d) reimbursable aid, and (e) announcements of the assign-
ments of pers)nnel to MDAP duties, Its purpose is dual: (a) to
ensure the proper control and coordinated release of such data,
with due consideration for security; and (b) to effect the timely
and psychologically advantageous release of such information within
both the U. S. and the country of primary cohcern.
(2 ) Psychological Advantage of U. S. Weapons Develop-
ment: Continued progress was made under previously reported pro-
grams by Department of Defense agencies in: (a) providing policy
guidance on release of maximum data on atomic energy, guided
missiles and other new weapons consistent with military security;
(b) establishing procedures for clearing release; and (c) prohibit-
ing the release of uncleared information. (See Section III)
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(3) Foreign Information Policy: Direct and timely
coordination between Departmert of Defense agencies continues
the effective processing of I'Foreign Inforwation Poliey Guidance."
(4) Organization: On 10 January 1953, tbe Secretary
of Defense approved a directive activating the Iftpartifent of
Defense Committee on Psychological Operations. This body was
established to develop a policy governing and to provide for
the utilization of resources of the Armed Forces in cold war.
(5) Research and Development: The Advisory Group on
psychological and unconventional warfare in the Research and
Development Board completed on, 6 Ppril its six4ionth survey of
research and development in this field, making a number of recom-
mendations on each of the following: (1) the basis of a balanced
and integrated program and (2) the organizational machinery and
fiscal support necessary to implement such a program. The report
was .accepted and its implementation recommended by the RDB on
29 April. It was then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for
consideration, Present budgetary limitations have necessitated
drastic readjustments of standing priorities in all Defense fields.
Therefore, no approved estimate can be made until full considera-
tion has been given to the new policy.
b. NaLg4ofs of Staff
(1) The receipt of a SHAPE paper setting forth the
views of SACEUR with respect to his wartime unconventional war-
fare responsibilities has generated further Joint Staff consider-
ation of this in conjunction with the previously submitted SACEUR
paper outlining his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.
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(2) Specific actions were taken by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to facilitate and strengthen world-wide unconventional
warfare planning, including allied planning,
(a) Strengthening CINCFE's unconventional war-
fare staff.
(b) Approval of steps to strengthen U. S. un-
conventional warfare planning representation at the Stand-
ing Group level,
(c) Delineation of certain responsibilities
among the Services and providing policy concerning points
of contact for Allied planning in the field of Evasion and
Escape.
(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved and CINCFE
has implemented a psychological warfare defection program aimed
against Communist air crews in Korea. Early reports indicate 4
resultant shift in hed air tactics and impeded operational ef-
fectiveness due to more stringent anti-defection measures.
(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Serviees provided
comments and recommendations in response to a request for informa-
tion by the President's Committee on International Information
Activities.
(5) Overseas Commands: CINCFE authorized U. S.
participation in the United Nations Command (UNC), Joint Psycho-
ldgical Committee (JPC) (activated 1 January 1953) whieh provides
a central and top-level directorate for the review And defining of
combat theater psychological warfare policy. A significant gap
has thus been filled in the over-all ccorlination of a cohesive
UNC effort.
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c. Significant Service Activities
(1) Plans:
(a) A "Psychological Varfare Plan in Support of
the Deployment of Chemical Munitions to the Far East Command,"
11 December 1952, remains ready for implementation upon call.
(b) Plans for the evacuation and utilization of
Radio Free Europe (National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.)
and Radio Russia (American Committee for the Liberation of
the Free Peoples of Russia, Inc.) are being developed by
USAREUR.
(2) Troop Information and Education: This program
continues on a world-wide basis to orient Service personnel with
respect to national and international affairs. As one significant
facet of this activity, members of the U. S. Armed Forces are in-
formed as to the language, habits, and customs of the various coun-
tries in which they serve. Allied with this, committees composed
of Service representatives and native civilians continue efforts to
generate closer harmony between J. S. military and foreign pcpula..
tions. The iNpact of this programming upon non-U. S. personnel
cannot be denied. In the field of Armed Forces Radio Service alone,
the estimated foreign audience in Europe is reported at the 80 mil-
lion figure.
(3) UNG Orientation Program for Communist POWs: The
Civil Information and Education Division (CI&E), integrated into
PsyWar Section, FECON during December of 1952, continues effectively
to pursue its mission by providing a program of education and recre-
ation for North Korean and Chinese POs. In the performance of its
functions, GI&E provides the opportunity for these P010-s to gain
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general and vocational knowledge, as well as to acquire technical
skills, which,can develop attitudes favorable to the furtherance
of U. S. and U. N. objectives.
(4) Communist Indoctrination of U.S. Captured Person-
nel:
(a) Background Evidence confirmed early De-
partment of Defense estimates that the Communists were sub.
jetting U. N. personnel held as prisoners of war to inten-
sive ideological indoctrination. This problem was recognized
as early as April, 1952. The solution appeared to depend on
striking a balance between two completely conflicting factors:
(a) The necessity of informing. the public in event P0'4's had
been successfully indoctrinated, if and when returned, and
(b) Taking care not to create undue alarm which might
jeopardize national policy with respect to the question of
non.forcible repatriation. The Secretary of Defense requested
the PSB to investigate the advisability of propaganda exploita-
tion by charging the Communists with a new type of war crime.
(b) hepatriated U.S. Personnel: When it appeared
that some prisoners might be released by the Communists in
the exchange of sick and wounded, a press release was made
and background material isE;ued. Care was required in prepar-
ation of this material, however, in order not to prejudice
the negotiations then current. any conflicting interests
made handling of the repatriation exceedingly difficult.
These included the natural "get the boys home" urge similar to
the ones experienced in 1945 and 1946, requirements for a
routine medical and permnnel processing, a covert requirement
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to enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation to evloit
activities of some returnees, necessity for protecting the
identities and reputations of innocent men, and the natural
desire of the press for exclusive and sensational stories.
Initially, a bad press was received on the operation.
This has now run its course; some of the more responsible
publications have implied that the Department of Defense
position was correct.
(c) Repatriated U. S. Personnel: On the basis of
interim research results, highlighted by data secured on
personnel returned to U. L.. control during the period 20
through 26 April 1953, Service concern with respect to
Communist treatment of American prisoners of war and the
serious ramifications stemming therefrom has been justified.
Reports indicate that some American prisoners of war have
been subject to extreme inducements and coercion, More-
over, some appear to have succumbed, under duress, to re-
lentless Communist pressures, Five (5) members of the
group of twenty-three (23) Army persannel studied at the
Valley Forge AXTV Hospital were held to have been so highly
indoctrinated as to render reclamation virtually impossible
and to constitute grave U. S. security risks, A recent
surveillance report indicates that one (1) of the returned
group not processed through Valley Force joined a Communist
organization ("American Committee for Protection of Foreign
Born") in the San Francisco Bay area on 13 May,
(d) Current Procedures: Data secured within
FECOM and at Valley Forge Irmy Hospital from repatriated
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U. 5. returnees are being collated and evaluated in conjunc-
tion with other source reports on Communist indoctrination
techniques. Continuing DTartment of Defense and Federal
Bureau of Investigation surveillance and interrogation of
all U. S. returnees is in process with the view of completely
exploiting informational resources currently at hand. Plans
have been developed to fulfill both security and rehabilita-
tion requirements inherent to the projected mass return of
U. S. personnel upon completion of Armistice arrangements.
There is continuous research to establish a basis for deter-
mining a possible program to take psychological advantage of
Communist indoctrination as a form of war crimes or atrocity.
(e) Countermeasures: TI&E Activities, a Chaplain
"Character Guidance" lecture series, and training materials
on Communist interrogation-indoctrination methods are re.
quired, and currently are under development and study.
(5) Although no overt effort was made to promote defec-
tions of Polish jet pilots, two Polish Lieutenants successfully
escaped from the Iron Curtain and landed their IG 15 planes at
Bornholm, Denmark. Pilots immediately requested political asylum
and voluntarily surrendered their aircraft to Danish authorities:
Through negotiations with Danish and British officials, the U. S4
received custody of the two flyers.
(6) Interrogations of the defecting Polish pilots reveal
the presence in Poland of additional aircrew members who favor
defection. As a result, Department of Defense has generated staff
action ',thereby appropriate agencies may encourage defection of
Polish aircrew personnel and contribute to deterioration of the
Polish Air Force command structure.
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2. Inter-departmental activities, including plans, forces, training
programs, and indoctrination courses.
a. Psychological Strategy Board; Emphasis was placed on
PSB papers for Southeast Asia, Germany and Berlin, Japan, and
the middle East.
b. Psycnologlical Operations Coordinating Committee (PCC):
(1) Participation continues on the inter-departmental
committee charged with nreparation and transmission to FECOM of
the "Speaial Korean information Guidance" (SKIG). Within FECOM,
�
the formal establishment of two reviewing committees has contributed
significantly to the coordination of an aver-all and cohesive psych-
ological effort. The Korean Information Guidance Committee (NIGC)
reviews, analyzes, and makes recommendations to CINCUNC based on
data reported via the daily, inter-departmental PCC cable. This
body, further, is charged with the develppment of concepts within
the psychological warfare field for submission to a central and
top-level directorate within UNC in the Far East, the Joint Psych-
ological Committee (JPC). (See e-ection II, subparagraph 1 b. (5).)
(2) X..Day Plan, "helltionship of U. S. Official Foreign
Information Organization (Personnel, Facilities, Equipment) to U.S.
hilitary Commanders," 30 SePtember 1952, remains under consideration,
awaiting outcome of the President ts reorganization plan 7 and 8.
c. Department of State;
(1) Pending the determination of world-wide base require-
ments, the Department of State has deferred action to secure and
finalize an agreement providing for the wartime use of Radio
Luxembourg.
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(2) In coordination with the Department of State, the
Department of Defense assisted in -securing voluntarystatellient
documentation from dorth Korean and Chinese POWs which invali-
dates contentions alleging brutality and abuse in UNC POW camp
treatment and screening. This project continues,
(3) Through an inter-departmental committee to combat
Communist propaganda, the Departwent of Defense assisted in the
conduct of a constant analysis of the various gambits of the
Soviet propaganda ranging from the intense 'Tate America Campaign!,
to the new "peace" line dating from March 1953. This group has
bought intediate and long-range means of forestalling or counter-
ing such propaganda and has reached agreement on certain conclu-
sions and recommendations regarding measures the United States
should adopt toward these various Soviet efforts,
(4) Germ7arfare: I continuous counter-measures cam-
paign was carried on by the Department of Defense in coordination
with the Department of State, nnd other agencies, to combat Com-
munist propaganda Charges that the United States had waged biolog-
ical and chemical warfare in Korea,
(a) Through an inter-departmental committee,
progress was made in developing plans and -weans for set-
ting forth the U. S. position regarding such false charges.
(b) Through the Department of State, assistance
was provided to the L. S. Representative to the United
Nations, As a positive program, every effort has been made
to release as much information as possible consistent with
military security. Some indications as to the success of
these countermeasures may be reflected in the obvious de-
crease of Communist germ warfare charges in the U. N.
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SECTION III
ANNEX 13'
FIB D-47
July 29 1953
Military activities having psychological implication 3 conducted
by the Department of Defense during the reporting period.'
1. Disr)..ays of StrenFitll
22. Significant news releases were made covering facets of
U. S. military strength and technical ability. Effort was directed
toward securing the maximum favorable psychological effects regarding
release of such data. Major releases within this informational
area included:
(1) Continuing emphasis upon development and potential
use of nuclear weapons in a tactical role: Supporting evidence
was readily available from coverage of the series of closely-
spaced atomic tests at Yucca Fitts which included the deployment
of ground troops and the successful firing of the 280-mm
artillery piece.
(2) Steady development of the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROMA)
troop strewth and cmbat efficiency. (See 6�c IV, Subpara. 4 A_(1))
124, Certain news leaks tended, to some extent, to reinforce
expository comment concerning U.S. strength status and technological
capacity; significant amen(); these for the period were:
(I) Speculation that the U.S. had successfully test-detonated
a therm nuclear device at Eniwetok Atoll with results vastly
more devastating than heretofore known to mankind.
(2) Comment from Paris concerning the projected deployment
of U.S. artillery battalions equipped with the new 280-mm gun
to Europe for integration into the NATO Command.
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(3) Quotations of a member of the Congressional Committee -
on Atonic Energy to the effect that the U S now holds sufficient
atonic weapons in stockpiles to permit forceful and immediate
retaliation against aggressive attack and to backstop the
conduct of a major war.
cp A favorable report has been made by State Department on
psychological value of the B-29 flights conducted over Malaya on
15 December 1952.
2. Comb,ined Maneuvers and Exercifes: A total of six such operations
were conducted within NATO. All wore command post shake�downs of portions
of the NATO Staff alignment, except RENDEZVOUS, a naval maneuver in the
losiditerranean which was participated in by fleet elements of the U.S.,
France Great Britain, Italy, Greece, lnd Turkey, Salient portions of
this exercise involved the simulated atomic bombing of Toulon, and the
landing of Turkish and Greek forces in Greece and Turkey respectively.
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PSB D-47
July 29# 1953
SECTION TV
Implications of Department of Defense activities producing psycho-
logical effects in foreign areas, including good-will efforts and related
activities of the Services in such areas.
I. Psychological Rogulte of Presence of U. S, Personnel Abroad:
a, Through the Committee on Acceptance of Americans Abroad,
which is designed to improve relations between Americans and
foreign nationals, the Department of Defense has continued to
monitor and assist, as epproprilte, the activities of coordinating
subcommittees in each country in Europe in which American troops
are located, and in Japan.
124. Although committee reports indicate that their work has
boon fairly effective, nevertheless some of the problems inherent
in the stationing of U.S. nilitry and civilian personnel abroad
remain. From time to time reports are received of friction between
foreign nationals and U.E. nationals in various areas. Subsequent
analysis, however, has shown that most of these frictions were in-
consequential and to be expected. In addition to cementing closer
troop-civilian relationships, effort to improve the area orient-
ation training of all U.S. personnel selected for assignment
overseas has continued.
2. MDAP Prorram: Of tht total MDAP deliveries of $5.3 billion
to date, the volume of military equipnent shipped to our partners in the
Mutual Security Program in the first our months of calendar year 1953
has totaled $1,436 million. U. S. information offices have emphasized
that positive accomplishments in the international re-armament effort
are not the responsibility of the U.S. alone: That while the U.S. is doing
its share, it is necessary that our p-rtners shoulder their shares of the
burden.
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ANNEX B
PSB D-47
July 290 1953
3. Offshore Procurpme4t (9SO,i
a. Contracts placed by Department of Defense procurement agencies
abroad from FY 1952 and FY 1953 VDU funds totaled $1,757,127,310 as
of 30 May 1953. Of this, $1,722,717,860 has been placed in Europe
and 04,409,450 has been placed in the Far East. Contracts were
let in all European NhT0 countries as well as in West Germany and
Switzerland, while contracts in the For .East were let in Japan and
Formosa.
b Although OSP basically fulfills military requirements,
supplementary economic and political aspects are involved. For
example, the coordinated policy of the U. S. Government, agreed
upon between Defense, State, and the Director for Mutual Security,
provided that procurement agencies of the Department of Defense
in Europe would try to place about
150 million in OSP contracts
in Italy prior to the holding of the Italian elections in an effort
to support the DeGasperi governmnt. This target was exceeded and
although the DeGasperi govi.rnmeni did not achieve the electoral vote
hoped for, this project undoubtcely contributed to keeping DeGasperi
in office.
c. As a result of OSP contracts, jobs have been created or
employment sustained in a variety of European defense industries
including weapons, ammunition., electronics, automotive vehicles
and spare parts, construction equipment, small water craft, and
aircraft equipment and spare parts. The aggregate impact of these
contracts on the economies of the nations participating have had
beneficial results. Increased employment has been achieved in
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, lreece, and The Netherlands, and continued
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PSB D-47
:uly 29 1953
industrial activity assured in varying degrees in all of the parti
cipating countries, Efforts continue to place contracts so as to
benefit non-Communist segments of the countries involved:
4. 2uRport to Friendly Nations:
a. Republic of Korea:
(1) The ROMA was expanded from twelve to sixteen divisions.
This action was publicized widely to show the steady development
of a modern ROK fighting machine. The ROK Defense Ministry there-
upon claimed, that it could man 85 per cent of the 155-mile line
of contact. The 13 May authorization for activation of an additional
four divisions will bring RONA combat power up to twenty divisions
(2) On 25 February the U.S. agreed to pay $85 million to the
RON in settlement of Korean "Won" issued to U.S. troops in Korea.
This served to bolster the South Korean public's confidence in
the new 1Whan" currency and raised to a reported $159:990,440 the
amount of ROK currency bought by the U.S. during the was.
(3) Continued civil relief and rehabilitation was made avail-
able to the South Korean people through Civilian Relief in Korea
(CRIK), United Nations Korean Relief Ar:Lency (UNKRA), and voluntary
private programs.
124. The Ryukyu Islands: The civil information and education opram
in the Ryukyus was continued to include the "Exchange of Persons
Pi.ogram", whereby Ryukyuan national leaders and students were
brought to the U.S. for periods of study.
2.1. Indochina: C-119 aircraft wore lent to French forces in Indo-
china for the purpose of transporting heavy equipment to repulse
the aggressive Communist attack on Laos: Some twenty-one additional
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ANNEX B
PSB D-47
July 195,
C-47 aircraft on loan from FEAF to the French in Indochina remain
in that area past the 1 April due date for their return upon recom-
mendation of CINCUNC.
d. Thailand: Upon request of the Thai government at the time of
the invasion of Laos, a shipment of aircraft and a quantity of ammuni.
tion was provided. The Secretary of State commended prompt action
in this matter.
5. NATO Editors' Tours:
Four U.S. tours have been conducted: Three being for editors
and correspondents and one for information officers from various
NATO countries. All the European NATO countries have had representa-
tives on one or more of these trips. A total of forty-four foreign
nationals have participated.
b. Reports from Public Affairs Officers in NATO countries indicate
that the U.S. tours constitute one of the most effective single
activities in the U.S. infornatien program.
6. Resident Foreign correspondeqgi Numerous special interviews,
feature story material releases and occasional special trips to U.S.
military installations are arranged by DOD for foreign correspondents re-
siding in the U.S. In addition to general stories, attempts were made to
effect special guidance in line with the particular political and psycho-
logical problems of a particular country or area of the world,
7. Good-will Efforts
ax Headquarters, USAF and Readqurrters, USAFE have approved a
good-will tour of NATO countries by Major Fred Blesse, USAF, jet
air ace of Korean fighting, to be conducted in summer of 1953.
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PSB D-47
Jay 29, 1953
12AL Top officers of Headquarters, TJEUE participated in anni-
versary ceremonies of the RICHTOFEN WING, composed of veteran
German fliers and named in honor cf the firmed German World War I
ace, 15 April 1953.
.9.2. U. 8. Ambessader to Ecuador reports that airlift conducted
by 5 USAF C-47 's during spring floods along the Quito-Guayaquil
railway in April 1953 caused admiration in all circles.
dx. In response to appeals of Turkish government officials for
relief in earthquake-torn areas during March 1953, ULAF "Flying
Boxcars" loaded with medicine, blankets and food were dispatched
from Germany to Istrnbul and the Dardanelles province of Canakkrlow
e. U.S. military units of Europe gave prompt and generous assis.-
trnce to the Dutch and English during the February flood disaster along
the North Sea coastline. At the initiative of responsible U.S,
representrtives, American helicopters, transport planes, naval ampbibi-
MB and rescue craft arid communic-tion facilities were mobilized and
committed to the saving of life el-id property. Participating aircraft
were named "rescuing angels" by grateful Hollanders and an American
airman was presented Britainta second highest award for rescuing
stranded villagers during the height of the storm. Money and clothing
were contributed to the Dutch victims of the flood by ships companies
of the destroyers BRI;TCL and JOHNSON and by the personnel of the
aircraft carrier WRIGHT in nemory of the welcome recorded that ship
by the people of Rotterdam in September 1952. The American Amb(ssador
to The Netherlands concluded "the friendly attitude of The Netherlands
people teward the U.S. n y well h've reached r postwar high".
An earthqurke at Taroud, Iran, on 14 February caused serious
damage and threatened starvation to the population. Highlighting
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PSB D-47
July 29, 1953
numerous and effective relief services performed by American
military and Red Cross personnel in this disaster was the airdropping
of 3000 Kgs of bread to the people of Taroud,
EA. On the occasion of extending a personal welcome to his home-
coming Korean brigade, Emperor Haile Selassie was entertained
February 7 by Commander Middle East Forces on board the U.S.S.
DUXBURY BAY cruising from Massawa to Djiboute. The trip was reported
by American Embassy despatch as h(ving boon a gesture greatly appre-
ciated by the Emperor as well as the Ethiopian officials and public
and as a most helpful contribution to U.S.-Ethiopian relations�
h. Arrangements are being made by the. Navy for dedication of
the nearly completed St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, Memorial Hospital
erected as a gift of the American people in gratitude for the heroic
efforts of the townspeople of St. Lawrence and Lawn in the rescue of
survivors of the U.S.S. POLLUX and U,S.S. TRUXTUN when wrecked in a
gale near St. Lawrence in Februar.s, 1942,
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SECTION V
ANNEX B
PSB D-47
Aily 29, 1953
Lessons learned through evaluation of Department of Defense psych-
ological activities during this period,
Requirements which, if met, would assist in the development of
a more effective contribution of the Department of Defense to the
national psychological effort,
a. A positive national psychological strategy, to include
a determination of intermediate objectives and priorities for
direct support tasks, without resort to "cold" or "hot" war
qualifications.
b. A review of Public Law 402 and NSC 59/1 with the object
of including provision for the fuller utilization of existing
military potentials in support of the current national psycholog-
ical effort.
c. The enunciation of national policies for the conduct of
unconventional warfare within multi-national structures. National
clandestine Service agreements, with international implications
likely to affect the conduct of U. s, military operations in time
of war, are of concern to the (hint Chiefs of Staff,
2. Psychological opportunities brought to light by analysis of past
activities and their relationship to future courses of action,
In view of the lessons learned in fostering cordial troop-
civilian relations in Europe a program providing for the accept-
ance of American perscnnel to be stationed in Spain has been
inaugurated. For the first time, USAF installations and American
personnel will be maintained on Spanish soil starting Fall of 1953.
In order to build good will from the start, a USAF committee has
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PSB D-47
July 29, /953
been established to conduct a study of likely community relations
problems and recommend actions for proper orientation of American
civilians and military personnel concerned with stationing troops
in Spain.
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SECTION VI
ANNEX B
PSB D-47
Jay 29, 1953
New evidence of reactions to activities conducted during previous
reporting periods.
1. The report situation, by country, of the implementation of
POC D-38/lfollows;
a. Iceland: No major developments; the waiting list of
U.S. personnel for matriculation in the Icelandic course estab-
lished at Reykjavik University points up a desire on the part of
our personnel to develop cultural understanding.
b. United Kingdom: There were indications that accounts of
British ill-feeling toward American Servicemen had been greatly
exaggerated by that segment of the British press which was de-
voted to communistic, chauvinistic, or sensationalized editorial
policies. It is maintained that the public relations situation
is basically healthy and is primarily the result of the conduct
of U, S. troops themselves. The British Government has estab-
lished a high-level committee, under the Air Minister, to hold
civil-military relations under control. Some twenty-seven groups
and associations are represented on this committee; its effort
is aimed toward maintaining proper direction of local comittees
in whiph commanding officers, Chaplains, and unit PIO's take part.
c. Frances France appears to be leading the way in an effort
to resolve difficulties in French-American relations. By continu-
ing joint effort, at both central and local levels, significant
steps have been taken in the direction of improved relations. The
"Franco-American Committee" mechanism is developing to the point
where the resolution of frictions rapidly can become reality.
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AMPEX D
PSB 047 .
J41 29, 1953
d Italy!: Despite a Committee report from home dated
26 January which asserted that the presence of U. S. troops in
Italy (in Leghorn, Florence, and Naples) does not constitute a
serious public opinion problem at present, there were reported
indications that the public reaction in Italy was characterized
by increasing sensitivity to "U. S. intervention" in Italian
affairs. Utilization of this "interventionist" line of attack
by Communists and neo-Fascists to influence the numerous splinter
parties arrayed against the DeGa.speri government may intensify
troop-civil relations problems. lioreover, it has been noted
that - as yet - no rer)resentatives of the Italian government have
joined the established committee in Rome;
e. West Germapzi Comparison surveys indicate that there
has been a gradual improvement in the status of troop-civil rela-
tionS.
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ANNEX 13
PSB D-47
July 29e 1953
SECTION VII
The actual and estimated psychological and unconventionel warfare
expenditures of the Department of Defenso for the fiscal year 1951
through 1958.
1. Background Regarding Expenditurql: The psychological and un�
conventional warfare role of the units responsible to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff requires that capabilities be dev(loped in peacetime so that specialized
equipment and trained personnel may be immediately available to the military
commander in support of his psychological warfare and unconventional
warfare missions. The major portion of expenditures presented provide for
the specialized equipment, training, material and research necessary, to
meet projected wartime requirements.
2. The expenditures listed below do not include such activities as
goodwill visits, disaster aid, denonstrttions, MDAP, and many other normal
military activities having psychological implications, expenditures for
which cannot be separately identified.
3. Special Assumptions: In the preparation of estimates for fiscal
years 1954 through 1958, the following assumptions have been made:
aL That hostilities in Korea will terminate at the close of
FY 1953.
h That domestic and foreign price levels and cost indices
will remain relatively stable.
st. That no now areas of operational activity will be opened.
4. Military Force Expenditures: The figures reported in the
following table cover Service expenditures for unconventional and psycho�
logical warfare with the exception of research and development, which
is presented separately. These expenditures are shown in millions of
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PSB D-47
3a7 Z9, 1953
dollars to the nearest tenth. There are no unobligated or carry-over
funds to report as of 30 June 19534
FISCAL
PERIOD
����������0�������
ARM;(
�����������4010.���
NAV%
AIR
1951
5.0
None
21.0
1952
15.1
.6
21.0
2953
)4,9
.7
21.6
1954
8.6*
0.***
3.8
1955
8.6
.1
****
1956
8.6
.1
1957
8.6
.1
1958
1
TOTALS
_gh.
82.0**
1.8
67.4
TOTAL
26�0.
36.7
41.2
12.5
8.7
8.7�
8.7
4.7._
15142
*DA Figures from FY 54 on are based, additionally, on assumption
that Army PtyWar troop strengths will remain constant with the
exception that FECOM staffs will be reduced to current EUCOM
levels.
**DA funding reports on psychological warfare operation;, it
does not include Special Forces activities or unconventional
warfare operations.
***Navy reduction from 193 due to .6 million becoming reimbursable
from CIA for Navy personnel costs.
****usAF estimates beyond 7Y 54 are not available due to adjustments
in process necessitated by revised FY 54 budget.
51 Service Research and Development Exnenditures: The figures
reported in the table next following lists actual and estimnted expenditures
for fiscal years 1951 through 1958 and esti= ted carry-over funds on 30
June 1953. The expenditures are for non-material or social science
research conducted under technical objectives assigned by the Research
and Development Board,
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PSB D-47
014y 29k 3953
6. It will be noted that estimates for FY 1954 are considerably
below expenditures for the past tvo years due to existing budget policy,
The present budget figures are -consequently presented as interim estimates
until such time as the future status of psychological and unconventional
warfare research is clarified,.
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ANNEX B
PSB D-47
at/y 292 /953
ADVISORY GROUP ON PSYCHOLOGICAL AND UNCOAVEJTIONAL VARFAhE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
'1aelington 25, D. C,
ACTUAL AkiD ESTIMATT EXPENDITURES OF DEPARTMENT
01 DEFEJSE ON MY0HOLOC4CAL AND UNCbPV&ATIONAL
WARFARE hON-mAT ER IEL EARCH, FY :951 THLOUGH
FY 1'1158 AS OF Arat 1953
FY '54
plus
Estimated 'FY 154* FY 153
Carry,over (Less Carry-
Expenditures June 30, 153 Car- over Estimated Expenditures**
FY151 FYI52 FY153 1953 ry-oval Funds FY155 FiI56 FYI57 FYI58
Army
.2
1.2
0
.8
.8
1.1
112
1.3
1,4
Navy
.2
.1
.05
0
.05
;05
.05
.05
,05
.05
USAF
.7
,9
.7
.7
.2
.9
HHi�
TOTAL
1.1
1,9
2.0
.7
1.0
1.7
1.15
1m25
105
1.45
(The expenditures shown rre in millions of dollrrs to the nerrest tenth)
* Interim estimates pending consideration by OSD of fiscal recommendations of
Final Report of the Advisory Group on Psychological and Unconventional Warr
fare to the RDB (RDB-PC 202/34), dated 6 April 1953
** Project estimates based on current policies for reduced fiscal support,
*** Air Force reports that estimated expelditures for FY 1955 and beyond are not
available since projection of USAF program plans is uncertain at this time.
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Report of the Mutual Security Agency
to the Psychological Strategy Board
on the National Psychological Effort
January 1 - June 30, 1953
(Part I: Europe)
ANNEX C
PSB D-47
Jay n, 1953
1. Status of Programs
A. TaS.:s As:agned
The specific tasks of 1,.SA are set forth by Congress in the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, Sec. 2 (a): if to strengthen the
mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free
world,..." and in Sec. 2 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952:
1,� the Congress believes it essential that this Act should be so
administered as to support concrete measures for political federation,
military integration, and economic unification in Europe."
The Information Division of PISA has had the job of helping
to bring about the results set forth above by the media techniquescom-
mon to information activity. Funds for this purpose have been avail-
able by authority of Sec. 115 (j) of the retained provisions of the
Economic Cooperation Act, which orders the giving of "full and contin-
uous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media,
so as to inform the peoples of the participating countries regarding
the assistance, including its purpose, source, and character, furnished
by the American taxpayer,"
It is necessary to say at the outset that Information activity
as such is silaply an instrument that assists in attaining the objectives
of policy. The very fact that there is a Mutual Security Program is the
greatest affirmative factor in MSAls psyChological program. It is a
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*Idly 29, 1953
mistake, in the opinion of NSA Information directors, for the United
States in its public utterances to over-emphasize the military aspects
of its overseas economic program; instead, it should show how the
military aspects of the program complement the total economy.
The NSA task in Europe during the first half of 1953 has been
to create and to nurture in the minds of Europeans the faith that the
United States would continue under the new Administration to support
mutual security activities on an effective scale* Its job also has
been to keep its friends in power and to fight Communism.
B. Methods and Techniques Employed to Accomplish Tasks
Substantively, the ASA method of acoomplishing its aims is to
provide funds to help America's European friends produce needed material
and to provide the leadership capable of leading and persuading them to
act in the mutual interest. The off-shore procurement program is one
example of the method employed. Placing of important "hardware" con-
tracts at a strategic time during an election campaign is a refinement
of such a technique.
The NSA Information Division has sought to get maximum useful
effect from such substantive acts by publicizing them through all media,
explaining the beneficial effect.
Thus, in conjunction with USIS, the Eisenhower April 16 speech
was given maximum publicity - such as wide distribution of the full text -
as evidence of U. S. devotion to peace and world economic progress*
Thus also IBA built and financed large exhibits (which bore the names of
local sponsors) for use in Italy during the election campaign, as an aid
to the Embassy's public affairs program. Currently MLA's regional office
in Paris is concentrating on a program to arouse new interest in the
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PSB D-47
July 29s 1953
shift of the productivity program to OEEC as evidence of European ac-
ceptance of the idea of productivity, European direction of the program,
and continued U. S. support of European economic improvement. The re-
cent East German riots against the Communist government are being
pointed out - through indigenous outlet- . as evidence that life under
the Reds is unbearable for the worker. This is important in combating
neutralist sentiment as in France and in helping to win workers away
from the Communist.dominated labor unions.
C. The media most in use are the conventional ones - the press,
the radio, the cinema, exhibits at fairs and other gatherings, distribu-
tion of pamphlets, mobile units capable of reaching remote places and
fitted out to make use of the cinema, the loud speaker, the poster -
all audio visual devices, This is done everywhere in cooperation with
the International Information AdminiAration, and the proportion of
expenditure and effort by media is governed by the experience of the
country mission. Thus, in Greece, the IZA has provided numerous com-
munity radio sets for remote areas, adding an estimated 2,0001000 listen-
ers to U. S.-inspired programs over the Greek radio. A radio news
service has been made available to broadcasters in several countries
the PBA messages being interspersed in the news, An example of fast,
effective action was the making of a documentary film, �The Oldest
Enemy," based on the Dutch floods of February and which showed how
nations working together (actually, the NATO countries) could minimize
the effects of catastrophe and by collective effort avoid catastrophe
save in exceptional circumstance. This film, made within three weeks
of the disaster, was shown in movie houses in many countries, The moral
of the film was brought out by the deeds it pictured. The application
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ANNEX C
POI D-47
ittIF *43 t955
of the lesson to the more abstract danger of the Russian menace .as easy
for the simplest of spectators.
D. lhat success was achieved in carrying out assigned tasks (in
terms of B'ind e)T
�
The principal contribution that MSA has made to this type of
activity is the development of a regional center capable of servicing and
advising multi-national projects quickly.
Although subject to policy guidance.and scue budgetary direc-
tion from Washington, the regional Information center connected with the
Office of the Special Representative in Europe was and is in many ways
self-contained. It has learned that effective use can be made of talent-
ed non-Americans.Speaking the languages of the target groups, using
skills and techniques familiar to those groups, such nonAmericans have
made much MSA/SRE-produced material more effective than had it been
produced in America. European groups working toward the same goals of
economic, political, and military unity that we seek have turned to the
SRE for technical help as well as for funds. The work nproductiviten
and what it means have become well known in Europe, where five years ago
neither the idea nor the name was known to many. Now the idea repre-
sented by productivity has become a target of the Reds, a seeming indica-
tion that the idea is hurting them.
E. Tasks not carried out or not completed.
The goals the U S. has set as requested by kISA constitute a
continuing campaign of persuasion, assistance, leadership. However)
specific immediate gains contributing to the thole have been made.
These include the re-election of the De Gasperi Government in Italy,
the actual beginning of operations of the Coal and Steel pool, and the
decision by OLEC to administer the productivity campaign.
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PSI) D-47
290 1953
F. What ancillary results, if any, were obtained as a la:product
of programs?
In seeking to counteract Red propaganda, IBA has in France
been able to learn ahead of time, occasionally, what turn the next Red
propaganda line would take*
G. Major obstacles or difficulties encountered.
1. Increased feeling in Europe that present U. S. adminis-
tration is controlled by "reactionary" or anti-European elements in
Congress.
2* The "stretch-out" of U. S. contribution to NATO was al-
lowed to become public under such circumstances that it was made to
seem to Europeans that the U. a. was losing interest in NATO while ask-
ing its allies to add to their loads.
3. Responsiveness to the Soviet "peace offensive" by all but
the most responsible European leaders.
4. Political jockeying in 2rance, and to some extent in Italy
and Germany, which subordinated foreign policy to party interests.
5. Ability of anti-American groups and some neutralists like
Le Monde, to make propaganda capital of newsworthy events, like the
Rosenberg case and the Rhee recalcitrance.
6. Unfavorable reaction of many Europeans to the withdrawal
of some books from American libraries abroad. The public conduct of the
matter gave anti-Americans a good propaganda subject and gave pause to
some of our friends.
7. Continued economic distress of lower income groups in
Italy, France and Greece.
8. Growing conviction among many public opinion molders that
EDC will not become a reality and that Russia does not contemplate armed
aggression in the vest in the discernible future.
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9, The French government's inability to keep a Cabinet in
office' long enough for it to have a policy for which it can be respon-
sible.
10. Occasional utterances by U. S. leaders which are made to
seem to show that this government is not sure of its policy. The recent
speech by Senator Taft which was interpreted as threatening a "go it
alone policy is of this category.
11. Occasional failures of coordination sometimes have ad-
verse effects. A case in point was Public testimony before a Congres-
sional committee by an evaluation team leader who was critical of con-
tinued aid to Italy. This testimony would have been just as valuable
for Congressional purposes after the June 7 Italian election as it was
when given before the election - and it quite possibly figured in the
way some votes went in a close election*
2. Summary of major developments in Psychological Programs
A.
(1) Principally, the letting of contracts under criteria that
took into account economic and political conditions of that country and
Europe as a whole, rather than the single criterion of cost.
(2) Continuation of American forces in urope and the appoint-
ment of a third Al&rican as commander of SAPE.
(3) Speedy assistance given the Dutch during the floods.
(4) The granting of ,.?50,0,101000 for stockpiling and other
purposes in west Berlin, and its announcement during the East German
riots, is another example of substantive action being taken at a propi-
tious time and favorably exploited.
(5) The up-coming hSA pact with Spain already presents an
Information problem which will become more acute as the treaty is signed.
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hany European friends of the United States want to know how we justify
helping Franco Spain. The Information Officer in Norway has cited the
need for a statement on this subject. A Belgian exchange student stated
the problem thus: PI have listened to VOA and have been impressed by
American idealism. How can you help Spain and keep on talking the way
you do an VOA?"
(6) The signing of the Foreign Aid bill by the President will
offer a new opportunity for a strong statement similar to the April 16
speech. The Mutual Security Actis statement of purpose emphasizes
America's interest.. A statement by the President re-emphasizing the
broader philosophy of mutual aims of the common man would be of great
psychological value.
B. Public announcement of the letting of contracts was timed for
the best effect psychologically. Thus, signing of huge aircraft con-
tracts with England Holland, Belgium, and Italy was timed to occur dur-
ing the April NATO meeting. dide coverage was given the Dutch flood co-
ordinated relief via all media, including a quickly-made documentary
film.
C. Principal developments during the reporting period were
(1) further integration of NSA and State Department informa-
tion programs,
(2) the recommendation of the President to form one United
States Information Agency using the resources of the present IIA and
NSA, and
(3) the melding of the MBA and Point. Br programs, which should
make the same substantive resources go farther and which by indicating
prolongation of technical and economic aid reassure our friends.
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D. most significant is the close cooperation by SRE and the De-
fense Department in 'carrying out a program to smooth U S. troop rela-
tions with local camuunities, The Armed Services have researched the
problems involved, and ShE has with its resources in funds and techni-
cians sought to provide the answers. Pamphlets, exhibits, and films
are being produced for this puipose� and it appears as of this report
that relations already are lees strained than they were six months ago:
Explanation beforohand of why U. S. troops are there that they are
really NATO troops .4. is the key to the problem.
Ei NSA in Europe continues to work closely with other governments
and with international groups, particularly NATO. A caravan explaining
NATO, designed' operated and financed by SRE/NSA and sponsored by NATO,
traveled in Greece and Turkey during much of the time covered by this
report. It is now touring France again, The Train of Europe, under
OEEC sponsorship, has been touring the continent* Coverage of NATO
maneuvers for and in conjunction with �trier agencies has been the rule,
NSA has assisted groups like the European Movement and the Union of
European Federalist* to carry on their unifying work, as well as the
ICFTU in aiding the free trade union movements,
3. Significant changes which have occurred since the previous report.
(a) Change of U. S. administration with consequent European "wait
and seen psychology;
(b) Death of Stalin and accession of either new dictator or an
oligarchy, with the same "wait and seen psychology natural to Western
Europe;
(c) Soviet "peace offensive," for Whatever it may mean;
(d) Korean situation (hoped for armistice and Rhee complication);
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11), 1953
(e) East Berlin riots and Czechoslovak riots) indicating possible
other explosions for which plans should be made;
(f) dragging of the EDC ratification schedule;
(g) Change in SRE organization and in Paris regional U. S. Repre-
sentative;
(h) Yugoslav, Turkish, Greek pact,
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
NSA in cooperation with State and Defense has worked out a plan
for continued analysis and evaluation of Information programs in Europe
and elsewhere. Implementation of the idea has been stymied by a direc-
tive from Washing-on suspending all public opinion surveys abroad, Such
surveys are valuable and can be conducted via private agencies without
necessarily embarrassing the U. 3,
2. Notwithstanding evidence of a rise in neutralism) the outstand-
ing psychological characteristic of urope today appears to be the will-
ingness of the majority of the people of every nationality to trust the
good intentions) good faith) and ability to act effectively of the U. S.
Many Emmpenns)however) are skeptical of the abilities and ultimate in-
tentions of othPr European countries,
3. The recognition of the U. S. desire to improve Europe's overall
economic health (as exemplified by ECA) is consistent with the European's
belief in U. S. good intentions and relative unselfishness. Emphasis on
strictly military aspects is not good psychologically) because it gives
the Reds an nI told you so" line) and because military emphasis is ids-
leading. However) an armaments industry) like any other, creates the
wages and the demand for other consumer goods) which aids the general
economy.
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4. It is noteworthy that while the "peace offensive" has cut down
Russian "hate America" material, local Communist parties have not les-
sened.their harping on this theme.
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(Part II: Far East)
PSB D-47
Jay 29k 1953
1. Summary of Program
A. Tasks Assigned Mutual Security Agena
No tasks per se have been assigned mSA for the Far Last area
in the overall psychological program, In the four Far East countries
participating in the mutual Security Program - Formosa, The Associated
States of Indochina, Philippines and Thailand - the MSA Missions provide
extensive technical assistance designed to strengthen both governments
and communities through the improvement of public health, food produc-
tion, education and public administration and through the more effective
utilization of their national resources.
In Formosa, MSA is also providing economic aid to counter
inflationary pressures, to bolster the government budget and to support
the military build-up through the importation of supplies, such as petro-
leum, food and cotton, required by the armed forces, and through the con-
struction of joint-use facilities, such as roads, bridges, ports, ware-
houses and barracks. In Indochina, MSA also provides direct military
support by constructing joint-use facilities, assisting in the care and
rehabilitation of war refugees and by financing relocation projects de-
signed to aid in the pacification of North Viet Nam. In the Philippines,
MSA has the corollary task of inducing the Philippine Government to under-
take the extensive administrative and legislative changes which the Bell
Mission deemed essential to the creation of political and ecohoMic sta-
bility,. The psychological effects grow out of such technical assistance
and economic aid programs... The data given in the following pages are
presented against this background.
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B. Methods and Techniques Employed in Accomplishing These Tasks
NSA Missions have carried on three types of informational work.
First, they have conducted general information activities designed to
increase understanding and to secure public acceptance of the NSA pro-
gram. Second, they have disseminated specific information in order to
secare the requisite wide-scale participating in programs to improve
health practices and agricultural techniques. Third, they have strength-
ened the information services of the participating governments.
This work has been carried on tarough the usual channels of
press and photo stories, newsreels, motion pictures and radio programs;
wall newspapers, posters, picture leaflets, calendars, regular magazines
and the like. In some instances this work has led to the establishment
of photo laboratories, motion picture production units, radio transmis-
sion stations and printing plants.
C. Concepts of Operations in the Far East
The high level of illiteracy has required emphasis upon the
use of pictorial forms of communication; motion pictures, posters,
picture leaflets, cartoon strips and exhibits NSA believes that the
tangible accomplishments of the aid programs constitute the most con-
vincing proof of U. S. friendship and support.
D. lbat Success was Achieved in Carryiu out the Assigned Tasks
All the Far East Missions have publicized the contribution
made by NSA toward improving health, food production and the general
economic well-being of the people,.
In Formosa, MSA, the Joint Commission on hural Reconstruction
(JCRR) and USIS jointly sponsor the magazine "Harvest," which supplies
the farming People with agricultural information as well as with
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international and local news items. This magazine has reached a circula-
tion of 42,000 and has been so successful that it may be possible to
place it upon an entirely self-supporting basis within the coming year.
hore than 3c0 farmers' associations, organized with the help of the JUR,
are well-provided with MSA and JCER material such as posters and pamphlets
explaining the projects undertaken by the J0Rh. These projects and fiSA
activities in general are well publicized by the local press and radio
and enjoy wide popular support.
In Viet Nam, "Countryside," the farmers' journal published by
the Vietnamese Government with ASA financing and technical assistance,
has reached a circulation of 50,000. mSA and USIS also sponsored a highly
successful exhibit at the big "Kermesse," a fair attended by more than
1,20,000 people* This exhibit, based on the theme, "Toward Peace in
Viet Nam," depicted the natural resources of Viet Nam, the nations friendly
to Viet Nam, and the military, economic and productive power that supports
the Free ,vorld in its efforts to establish peace and security. The
Aission has supported the government's information service by providing
training in the use of informational media to specialists selected by the
French and by Viet Nam. The radio programs prepared with NSA assistance
and designed to explain the policies of the Associated States Governments
to village audiences are increasing in popularity*
In Thailand, the use of joint USIS and NSA exhibits has expanded
with the Thai Government duplicating many of the exhibits and giving them
further circulation. A substantial portion of both the town and rural
population see these exhibits at numerous fairs where the response has
been gratifying.
In the Philippines, hSA has assisted the Government in develop-
ing its information services, thereby enabling it tO increase its support
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among the people. Economic assistance, designed to improve the statue
of the farmer-on-the.-land and of the. arban worker, provided in conjunc-
tion with U. S. military aid under the M.D.A.P., has substantially con-
tributed to the Philippine Governmentis efferts to establish peace and,
order.
E.
Tasks not carried out or not completed
afin,r������������������
None to be reported.
F. Ancillary Results
None,
G. Major Obstacles
In Formosa a major objective of hSA assistance is to achieve
economic stability which is essential to the maintenance, of confidence
in the competence and permanence of the National Government of the Re-
public of China. A major obstacle to the achievement of this objective
is the necessity for supporting a 550,000-man military establishment
which makes no ccntribution to the economy of the island.
In Indochina, the technical assistance program has been handi-
capped to some extent by the terms of the basic agreements between
France and the Associated States which provide that non-French technical
experts shall be employed only when French experts are not available,
This provision has been a serious obstacle only in the field of publid
administration,
In the Philippines and Thailand the major obstacles to the
achievement of hSA objectives are those inherent in all under-developed
economies - widespread illiteracy, a shortage of skilled and professional
workers, inadequate investment capital and relatively inefficient govern-
mental administration.
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In the Philippines, in addition, there has been some friction
between the U. S. representation and the quirino Government resalting
from the disclosures of the Hardie report on land tenure conditions and
from charges that the Americana have been attempting to influence the
coming elections.
2. Summary of major developments in the psychological programs during
the reporting period
Since the operations of the Far East STEhs are not a part of an
over-all psychological program, there is nothing to report under-this
section.
3. Significant changes which have occurred since the period covered by
the preceding report. (Far East-Philippines, Formosa, Associated
States of Indo China, and Thailand)
Gradually during the reporting period, the emphasis of the work of
the NISA/STLks has moved from general information to more emphasis on
program support and the build-up of the local government's information
services, This change will continue in the coming period as NSA with-
draws entirely from the area of general information,
The suspension of U. S. technical assistance to Burma, at the re-
quest of the Burmese Government, has shown other under-developed coun-
tries that American assistance programs are truly cooperative in nature
and will not be imposed on countries which prefer not to participate in
them.
Throughout the Far ,ast countries receiving LSA assistance there
has been a general increase in the use of technical assistance publica-
tions, with an accompanying increase in understanding of and respect
for American technical achievements.
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L. B, Substantive Subjects or Activities Which Cut Across Area Lines
(1) Role of Japanese
Conditions remain substantially unchanged since the last
report, although in its own self-interests the Philippine Government is
moderating its hostility toward Japan. This moderation of attitude has
been shown by the Government's grant of amnesty to Japanese war criminals
held in the Philippines by its recently-expressed willingness to consider
the question of Japanese membership in ICAO separately from its repara-
tions claims by its extension of the barter agreement with Japan and by
the increasing volume of trade between the two countries, a trade which
on balance is favorable to the Philippines. Some moderation of the popu-
lar attitude is also reported as evidenced by a slackening in overt
demonstrations of hostility toward individual Japanese on the streets of
Manila.
5 Steps taken to Implement Approved PSB Plans
This phase of the work has been handled by USIS. In most instances
the Country Plan has been developed with close cooperation and assistance
of .2SA officials.
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MUTUAL SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAIvi
ANNEX C
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jhly 29, 1953
Project Obligations and Estimated Personnel and Administrative
Support Obligations
(In millions of Dollars and Dollar Equivalents
of Foreign Currencies)
FY 1951 FY 1952 FY 1953
18.8 20.3 20.5
Carry-over Funds
Available for
Obligation after
June 301 1953
None
FY 1954 FY 1955 FY 1956 FY 1957 FY '58.
7.6 Program transferred to U.S?
Information Agency by Re-
organization Plan, No, 8
Notes'
1, The FY 1954 figure of �j7.6 million is scheduled for transfer to the new USIA
under Reorganization Plan No. 8. This figure excludes 0.0 million of
Mutual Security Information themes already transferred to International
Information Administration by the Bureau of the Budget and merged with the
IIA Program and FY 1954 appropriation request currently before Congress.
2. Figures for FY 1951, 19521 and 1953 include small amounts for NSA audio-
visual training and other informationEupport of Technical Assistance
activities in the Far hast, but exclude amounts for similar support by
Technical Cooperation Administration of its Point 4 activities,
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CIA REPORT Ti THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Janucry � June 1953
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July 29, 1953
CIA REPORT TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
GENERAL APPRAISAL
The effectiveness of political-psychological (FP) operations is not
easily or promptly susceptible to satisfactory assessment other than in
exceptional cases. At any stage, in its development, CIA successes are
measured by the number and importance or operating assets acquired as
well as by accomplishments in terms of achievinr U. S. objectives.
The major accomplishments of political action and propaganda opera-
tions in Western Europe have been in the area of European unification
along the lines of the Atlantic unity concept, and in reducing the lx(b)(1)
and influence of Communism. Covert operations have been chiefly in (b)(3)
support of overt U.S. Government actions to achieve greater military,
economic and political cooperation.
(W(1)
CIA political and psychological operations substantially (b)(3)
reduced the threat of Communist political control, although in Italy,
CIA fell'somewhat short of its objective to attain an effective majority
for the democratic parties in the June national elections. In combatting
Communism, actions to expose and counter Communist maneuvers promote
political stability. As an example, CIA operations in the field of
labor have virtually eliminated the Communist potential to call effec-
tive political strikes in Italy.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
In the European satellite area, CIA's major efforts continued to
center on the build.mp of operating potential, Past experience has
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
aitty- '29), l95
demonstrated that covert PW0 while serving to foster hope and rally the
anti-regime sentiments of the people, to be fully effective, requires (b)(1)
(b)(3)
concrete evidence of Communist weaknes and resistance activity, as well
as tangible signs of growing Western strength in the area. In this frame
of reference, Albania,
remains the weakest link in the Soviet chain of
satellites.
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(b)(1
'ANNEX ib)(3)
iS13 D-47
307 29, 1553
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ANNU D (b)(1)
PSB D-1,1(b)(3)
Jay 29, 1953
The outstanding events of PW significance occurring during the period
were the death of talin and the transition of power within the USSR.
The importance of both events was area wide
2. STATUS OF PSYCHOLOCICLL PROC$'AMS
L. Eathods and Telbnirues Employed 1.1 Appomplishing,these Tdsks:
CIA engages in cold wc.r :ptivities through the covert use of tech-
niques employing mass propcganda media, front organizations and agents
who induce pro-Western orientation of groups and individuals. It employs
a wide variety of persuatite means to obtain its ends includinE denial,
coercion, material and financial inducement and deception, as well (ID)(1)
(b)(3)
positive identificatioa of individual, group and national interests of
foreign elements with U.S. aims.
B. Concepts of Operations by Area:
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(b)(1)
ANNEX D (b)(3)
PSB D-47
July 29, -1953
C,. Major obstacles and Diffieulties Encountered;
In general Western Europeans were highly critical of undertakings
which were popularly accepted both as primarily in the interest of the
United tates and U.S. inspired. Certain powerful types of propaganda
are most effective when staged against a background of unwavering U.S.
strength. Unfortunately, views projected from the platform of U.S. debate
sometimes reflect lack of resolution and uncertainty poorly understood
abroad. The effect is to undermine confidence in U. S. governmental
concepts and leadership, e.g., the confusing role of legislative cam,
mittees in speaking or acting on international policy matters, without
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ANNTIC D (b)(3)
PSD D,47
j217 29, 1953
executive re sponsibility.
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
July 29, 1953
agents is the desire to aid in the unification of a free Horea.
Past and present policies of the United States and its Western
allies toward the Middle East have resulted in deep�seated resentment on
the part of the Arabs towards the U.S. role in the creation of the state
of Israel and the Arab refugee problam; in growing antipathy throughout
the Arab, Asian, and African world directed against the colonial powers
and against what is considered an equivocal policy on the part of the
U.S. towards the principle of self�determination; and in fear of being
drawn into what is regarded as a power struggle between two great rival
blocks. Other problems have arisen from the basic weaknesses of the area
itself in terms of its vulnerability to attack or subversions, the
political instability of most of its governments, and the economic and
social deficiencies which exist throughout the region. Aggravating
these weaknesses and contributing to the prevailing unrest are the rrowth
of nationalism and racism, and the decline in the British and French
power ,positions in the area, creating a vacuum which the local authorities
are incapable of filling. Suspicion on the pert of the governments
and peoples of the area towards any kind of foreign activity, a reluctance
not only to participate with the Vest in regional defense planning but
even to accept Western material aid or advice, the belief that U.S.
interest in the area arises only from a desire to counter Communism com�
pounded with a fear that the area will become a theatre of operations
in a Soviet�Western power stmgfle, an apathy towards problems transcending
the immediate area, governmental control of existing informational outlets,
and widespread illiteracy are all obstacles which make it difficult to
reach significant segments of the target population.
The major obstacles encountered in mounting Soviet Russia operations
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(W(1)
(b)(3)
have been those which have resulted from the efforts of the regime to cut
off completely all communication between its citizens and the outside
world.
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PSB 104.7
Jaly P9* 1953
20 PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTI(Y7S TATTN AGAIN T THE SOVITI BLOC
A, =la
Radio Free Russia, the clandestine radio of a subsidized Great
Russian emigre organization in Germany (1TS), broadcast a regular one-
half hour program four times daily to the Soviet occupation forces in
Germany, Poland end the Baltic States,
Radio Liberation, sponsored by a controlled priv14-
(WO)
ganization, the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevisi,b)(3)lad-
cast half-hour programs which were repeated several times daily to the
Soviet occupation troops in Germany, Austria, Poland and the Baltic States
since 1 March. In late March the station inaugurated daily ten minute
broadcasts in five major languages to the Caucasus area.
The Great Russian emiire organization also produced and distributed
through its networks from Berlin into Eastern Germany, about 270,000
propaganda leaflets each month directed to Soviet occupation forces.
These accounted for at least two defections of Soviet military personnel
and the development of several other prospective defectors. Approximately
400,000 leaflets produced by another emigre group on the subject of
Stalints death were distributed by all nets in April and May and an
(W(1)
additional 700,000 were distributed in June in conjunction with en e:(b)(3)
panded defection inducement campaign.
B. Far East:
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ANNEX D
PSB D.47
July 29, 1953
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
.710.7 29; 1953
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(W(1)
(b)(3)
ANNEX D
ISB D4.7
July 29, 1953
Efforts in Italy were concentrcted on improvemAnt of the democratic
parties' position in the June 7 national elections, and weakening of the
influence of Communist and undemocrstic parties. Political preparations
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
.1047 29, 195,
culminated in May in the distribution of millions of pamphlets and
posters, dovr to door campaigning, spcecbes, showing of motion picture
films and general electioneering through the democratic parties, civic
groups, a free labor union, various cooperative movements and Catholic
welfare organizations. Progress was made through the support of a nom.
Communist labor union, in reducing the strike capabilities of Commini(b)(1)
(b)(3)
labor organizations. This union held Agency inspired May Day Rallies
throughout Italy, effectively demonstrating against the Communists' use
of strikes for political reasons.
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ANNEX D
ESB D-47
lay 29, 1953
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ANNEX
(b)(3)D
PSB D*47
Jaly 9, 1953
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ANNEX D (b)(3)
PSB D-47
Jet 291 1953
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ANNEX D
FSB D-47
467 �29# 1953
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(b)(1)
ANNEX D ODX3)
PSB D-47
J417 79, 1953
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ANNEX D 00)(3)
PSB D-47 1�
11l17 29) 1953
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W,K1)
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AANEX D
PSB D6,47
Jay 29, 2953
E. International: The major successes of the National Committee for a
Free Europe were achieved through Radio Free Europe, which has been one of
the prime:Ty-al instruments contributin to the pressures that the Western
World can apply' on the Satellite nations as a means of loosening Soviet
control and exploitation.
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ANNEX D
Pq3 47
1.) 1953.
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ANNEX D (b)(3)
FSB D-47
Jay 29, 1953
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
Ally 79, 1953
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ANNEX D
PS 13 D-47
ailsr 29, 1953
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(b)(1)
ANNEX D (b)(3)
PSB D-47
JOT 24 1953
5. SUNNARY OF SIGNIFICANT AREA. CHANGES
A. igpSR: Announcement of the doctor's plot, its subsequent reversal and
the counter-purge against those responsible for it; Stalin's death; the
new Soviet "peace offensive".
B. Satel4tes and East Germany: Death of President Xlement Gottwald; defec-
tion of two Slovak fliers; pardon of William Catis; East Berlin riots;
Polish attack on U.S. intelligence activities in Poland; Bulgarian decree
threatening severe retaliation against members of escapee families; Rumanian
preparations for the World Youth Congress and Festival to be held On
(b)(3)
Bucharest in July and August.
C. Eurone: Popular endorsement of the middle-of-the-road coalition
lustrian Government and Soviet rejection of the Western Allies' invitation to
resume treaty discussions; ratification in West Germany of the EEC treaty and
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ANNEX D
PSB
Jay 291 1953
Contractual Agreements; signins of the Balkan Pact by Greece, Yugoslavia
and Turkey; failure of Be Gasper! Government to obtain the minimum vote
necessary to benefit from Italy's new electoral law; marked strengthening
of Yugoslav ties with the West; formation and downfall of the Mayer
Government, sustained strength of the Communist Party and dissolution of
the DeGaulle party in France.
D. Near East: Hardening of Egypt's attitude toward an acceptable settle-
ment with the U.K. on the Sue z issue; strengthening of Turkish ties with
Western nations; the series of tests of strength between Mossadeq and his
opposition and dissuasion of Shah to abdicate; U.S. grant of wheat to
Pakistan; filling of the post of Minister of the Interior in Afghanistan
by an individual favorably disposed toward the U.S.; USSR denunciation of
India's Korean resolution.
E. Far East: Chinese Nationalist troops combined operations with
Karen insurgent forces against Burmese military and civilian elements in
the Shan States and the U,N, resolution looking toward the evacuation of
the Nationalist's troops; military invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh;
demands from the King of Cambodia for increased independence; pressure
maintained by the Soviets to establish an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow;
QPIrinols illness, Nagsaysay's nomination by the Nacionalista Party and
Romulo's candidacy representing the newly formed Democratic Party in the
Philippines; fs11 of the Japanese Liberal Party administration in March
and elections for the House of Representatives and the House of
Councilors in April; release of North Korean prisoners bf war by President
Rhee,
F. Western Hemiseh9re: Softening of Peron 'a bitterly anti-U.S. attitude;
passage by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies of a bill excluding foreign
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ANNEX D
PSB D47
JOU* 29, 1953
capital from its petroleum industry; failure of the Ibanez supporters
to receive a majority in either the Chilean Senate or Chamber of Deputies;
deterioration of Communist strength in Panama. President Eisenhower's
proposals of 16 April for world peace.
6. SUBSTANTIVE ACTIONS CUTTING ACROSS AREA LINES
A.. Soviet Peace Campaign: The new Soviet "peace offensive" may be
interpreted as a significant move in the master plan designed to negate
U. S. psychological warfare capabilities during the time of power transi-
tion, secure internal support for the new regime, create dissension and
confusion among the Western Mies by concessions designed to appeal
to the neutralist sentiment on the European continent, wreak havoc on
the EDC front and keep a rearmed Western Germany from being committed on
the side of the West. It appears aimed at isolating the United States
from its allies if, indeed, the U.S. is not captivated by the Soviet
"new look".
In the Scandinavian countries, the peace program had little effect,
although the Danish Government made certain concessions to neutralists
because of increased popular dissatisfaction with rearmament requirements.
Reaction in the low countries was minimal, except for a softening of the
non-Communist attitude in Belgium. The French Socialist Party is receptive
to Communist peace proposals because of its conviction that a neutral
position between the U.S. and Soviet extremes is best for the country.
Soviet appeasement moves are profundly affecting French public opinion,
which generally believes that the danger of war is receding. In Italy,
in view of the election results, renewed emphasis on the peace propaganda
line may be expected. The peace program in the U.K. is receiving greater
attention from non-Bevan labor elements, as the result of the Prime Minister
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
July 29,1953
strongly expressed desires for a Four-Pbwer conference.
The 0p6ace offensive" in Eastern European areas, as the result of
amnesties declared in the Soviet Union and the Satellites, isolated acts
such as the release of William Gatis� and lifting of ration restrictions
in several areas, have developed a strong psychological warfare weapon
for the Soviets. Soviet overtures toward the unification of Germany on
the basis of withdrawal of troops and free elections represent powerful
appeals in support of communist objectives.
Soviet gestures in the Near East alonE this line have not been without
effect
In other parts of the world the effect of the peace campaign was
obscure, or as in the case of South Asia, accepted with Skepticism as the
result of the invasion of Laos.
B. ptsgn's Death and SlacquaLsaal_ The death of Stalin and transition in
the party hierarchy overshadowed all other events during the reporting period
Immediate world reaction to Stalin's illness and subseruent demise was one
of intense speculation. Considerable disarray became manifest at once
within the Saiellites.
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AMEX D
PSB D-47
29, 1953
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7. STEPS TAKEN TO PTTEMENT APPROVED PSB PLANS
ANNEX D
T1'13 10-47
Jay 29, 1953
A, PSB D-7 (Psychological Ojeration Plan Incident to Korean Cease-
Fire Negotiations
PSB 3.19 (Breakoff of Korean, Amiltioe aggotiationd: CIA produced
a supporting plan to D-7 and 3-19 in the Fall of 1952.
B. FSB D-18a (Illase A -Psychological OmEations Plan for Soviet Orbit
Escanei71--
(Fhase B - A National Psychological Program with Respect
to Escapees from the -oviet Orbit): FSB D6a8a calls for
the reception, care and resettlement of escapees (Phase A) and stimulation
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
auly P9* 1953
of their flow and assurance of their maximum exploitation (Phase B).
The Phase A program is the responsibility of the Department of StFte
and requires no implementation by CIA. The Phase B program calls for
increased attention to escapees, but does not require new Agency plans
or operations. The major project advocated by D6.18a (Phase B) calls for
the activation of a "freedom corps". This project has been developed
under NSC 143 and is now awaiting implementation by the Department of
State and Defense. CIA support, prinarily emigre relations and publicity
build-up, awaits action by State and Defense. Appropriate CIA personnel
have been alerted to the support acts on required
The inducement effort, the increased utilization of Iron
Curtain escapees and the propaganda value of inherent escapees are
receiving close attention.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM - EXPENDITURES
ANNEX E
PSB D-47
July 29, 1953
The table below is a summary of the total costs of our national
psychological programs, The figures are taken from expenditure
figures contained in the appended progress reports of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the tiutual Security Agency.
Estimated
Expenditures Carry-over
Actual Actual Actual Funds,June Estimated Expenditures
FY-'51 FY-'52 FY-'53 30, 1953 FY..154-Y-155 tY-I36 FY-I37 FY-T58
(the expenaTaFes shown are in millions of dol1ars-I-6-M nearest tenth,
Foreign In-
formation
(State) 95,2 126.0 103.11 17.5 -2 109003 -4
Foreign In-
formation
(ILA) 18.8 203 20.5 none 7.65 -
Ulitary -
Unconventional
Psywar
(Defense) 27.1 38.6 43.2. .7 13.56 -
Unconventional
(CIA) 7
Escapee Program
(State)
Strategic Plans
and Coordina-
tion (FEB)
1.148
0,4 0.5
ea Oa ���
AO VW.
���
4.1 9.2 8.5 6.9 4.5
9
flea. 006 0.6 0.6 0,6 0.6
IDENTIFIABLE
ToTAL....1141#1 185.3 168.7 22.3 139.9
1. Estimated
2. For radio acquisition and construction
3. Total requested IIA Congressional Appropriation
4# In view of impending changes, including setting up of new information agency,
no valid basis exists for projections beyond 154
5, This figure of 7.6 is scheduled for transfer to the new USIA under reorganiza-
tion Plan No 8. It excludes 7.0 million already transferred to IIA by Buret.,
of Budget
6. Interim estimate
7. These figures are being supplied directly to the President by the Director of
Central Intelligence
8. FY '52 & 153 shown together by reason of short period of operation in fiscal
152; included in FY-153 total
9. No basis for estimate
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PSE D-47
July 29, 1953
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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
Xuly 29, 1953
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