STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, AND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03044095
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
121
Document Creation Date: 
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date: 
May 17, 2021
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2020-01878
Publication Date: 
July 29, 1953
File: 
Body: 
Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECUR I TY I NFORAT I ON SEC EY DOC. NO. rsB D-47 DATE July 29, 1953 COPY NO. EYES ON4 WHEN ,ANNEX D IS INCLUDED PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD Washington STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,...Sec- tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. SECURITY INFORMATION PIVrii!9dCI414,1 KI I Y Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 89 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WASHINGTON, D. C. STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF JUNE 30. 453, AND PROGRESS REPORT OF. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD NCTE BY DIE SECRETARY This report was approved by the Board at its Meeting, July 29, 1953. t Charles Ec-adhinson Secretary to the Board SECURITY INFORMATION la SECRET 1 of 1 Page Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8983 r Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB 100,47 July 24, 1953 STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF JIRE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board pursuant to the memorandum. dated May 27, 1953 addressed to the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board by Mr. JUMOD S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. � CONTENIE Page I. Status of the Program on Juno 30, 1953 � 2 II, The Work of PSB . 9 III. Report of the Department of State Annex A Report of the Department of Defense Annex B Rcport of the Mutual Security. Agency. Annex C *Report of the Central Intellip:ence Agency Annex D Psychological Program . Expenditures Annex E ..1,���= MI OM+. * The Report of the Central Intellig, nce Agency is specially classified, SECURITY INFORMATI9N TOP SECRET of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Q �J Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY TNFORMTION TOP UCRET PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 I. STATUS OF THE PROGRAM ON JUNE 30, 1953 1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status of ctr national psychological programs as of June 30, 1953, based largely on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and agencies responsi- ble for operations. GENERAL 2. While the President's Comittee on International Information Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view to basic improvements in the U.S. position, the struggle, on the psycho- logical as on other fronts, was conducted with increased vigor, The most far-reaching opportunity cam( with Stalin's death. The President's speech of April 16 was signally successful in capitalizing on the situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace and friendship. The world at large received the speech with great enthusiasm, and the follow up support through psynhological exploitation added to the initial success, 3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be keyed in with political action. After Stalin's death, the next major occasion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped 110 accordingly, with prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to take full advan- tage of the consequences of Stalinlo death. 4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioriation in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Communist press and public opinion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U, S. foreign policy SECURITY INFORMATION 2 TOP SECRTT of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8983 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSD D-47 July 29, 1953 (the possible trend back to isolationism), and alleged anti�Coraraunist "hysteria". These unfavorable attitudes in combination with a generally more receptive reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet "peace offensive" now constitute an intensification of anti-4merican feeling among significant elements of European opinion. 5, World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the development .of U, S. foreign trade policies. At the same time that we are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it has felt that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be opened up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their practices in the field of East�West trade, in combination with tho new Soviet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun to have an adverse psychological impact around the world. 6. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures based on Thailand was set in motion as the result of the invasion of Laos and the accompanying threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. 7. While our overt psychological capabilities have been reduced by personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and appropriations cuts, covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, and faster and more energetic teamwork was secured thro1.01 closer relations with the NSC and the operating agencies. REAS 8. Within the USER itself, radio still constitutes the only important means used currently to roach the Russian people. jamming by the Russian radio of our broadcasts continues to present a major problem. There was SECURITY INFORMAMN TOP SECRET of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 29, 1953 however, a perceptible increase in effectiveness of our radio resources in the last six months due to the inauguration of Radio Liberation and the stepped-up activity of Radio Free missia. In addition to the radio, leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Soviet military forces sta- tioned outside the USSR. 9. Similarly, in Communist Chine, the major psychological activities presently available are radio and leaflet drops. Both of these are being substantially increased. Through Hongkong, increased use is being made of overt, grey and black propaganda channels with the Chinese hainland. 10. In the European Satellites likewise, radio is our major propau. ganda communications medium. AIAS, RFE, and VOA have contributed to the building up of pressures that may be instrumental in weakening the Kremlin's control of the satellites. In most of these Satellite States, progress in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributable, has been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potential. There has, however, been increased actionl'including leaflet drops, in certain satellites - notably Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania. 11. A high degree of access to East Germany was maintained despite increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire area has been continuously subjected to U. S. psychological programs through mainly indigenous channels, 12, In Western Europe, the presence of U. S. Armed Forces and the Military Aid program provided a significant psychological impact. Increased emphasis on troop acceptance Programs enlisting the positive cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has brought about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem of avoiding friction between U. S. military personnel and foreign populations, SECURITY INFULHATION TOP SECT of 2t-Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 CA J Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECUItIIT INFO4E4TION tOP SECRET PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 13: Among the principal problJits that have confronted U. Si psy- chological efforts in ,Uestern Europe during the past six months are increased criticism of the U Si and especially since Stalin's death, the Soviet "Peace Offensive"; It is evident that manyi if not all, Western European governments have been influenced to some extent by the Kremlin's tension-reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard progress toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of 'iJestern defenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European integration: 14: The U; S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by the Department of State's Information Program of the President's Inaugural addresS and of his April 16 speech challenging the new leaders of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words. Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery; One of these was shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated audience of 6,000,0004 Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the speech were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in thirty-five languages had been produced and shipped by May 24 15. In Italy, U. Si efforts to aid the reelection of the Democratic Center Parties fell considerably short of their objective. The DeGasperi Coalition was returned to office by a slender margin and the Communists and extreme Rightists registered significant gains: 16. In France, the municipal elections in May showed that the Communists had suffered a slight set-back in rural areas, but had main- tained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities: Govern- mental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a relaxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the SECURITY INFORhATION SECRET of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 ' Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECHEt PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of some Congres- sional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in con- junction with the Kremlin's peace campaign, appear to have contributed to an increase in neutralism. 17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism. Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti- American feeling: (1) The belief that the U.S. is deeply divided on basic international policies, (2) The development of the Soviet "peace offensive", and (3) The desire to exercise a more positive and inde- pendent initiative in international affairs. 18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off greatly increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems of German ratification of the. EDC. With this exception, however, U. S. psychological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as their pro- jection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in pro- moting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany integrated into eestern defense efforts. Since late harch German press opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U. 6. leadership. This was tempo- rarily halted by the President's April 16 speech, but has since been re- sumed. The two major factors contributing to this are: (1) the Soviet "peace offensive" and (2) lack of agreement within the U, S. on policy towards Germany. 19. In the Near and Niddle East and South Asia, neutralism, and the tendency to associate the U. S. with "colonialism", continued to present a major obstacle to the attainment of U. S. psychological ob- jectives. In the Arab States, the alleged pro-Israel bias on the part SECURITY INFORNATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 6f- 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY. INFCRhATION TOP SECRET PSB D-47 Jay 29, 1953 of the Li: S: remained a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals by Secretary Dulles and Ni', Stassen may have allevi- ated this problem, at least temporarily: IIA has continuously exploited the beneficial aspects of these visits in its output to the area: Turkey, Pakistan and Greece appear to be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking. 20: In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks raised major psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners necessitated special measures to deal with ',brain washing". Steps were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on information matters concerning Korea through the channels of the Psychelogical Operations Coordinating Committee. The offer of a reward to hIG pilot defectors was followed by an immediate and significant shift in Communist air tactics over the Korean battle area. 21. In Japan, severe economic problems and growing neutralist resistance to the U. S. Objective of Japanese rearmaments have been trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory. "Grey', and unattributable activities have progressed favorably. 22. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psychological action increased in a number of countries, for the most part in the field of unattributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction in many Latin American countries directed mainly against American economic policies. To help offset thisi a major psychological move was Dr. hilton Eisenhower's goodwill tour of South .merica initiated late in June. SPECIAL ITEhS 23. Emergency assistance provided by U. Si Armed Forces in cases of national catastrophe has made m8t3ria1 contributions to U. S. psycho- logical efforts in The Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran, SECURITY INFWATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 -2 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFCRNATION ---"TOP SEC REIT PSB D-47 442y 29, 1953 Ecuador, and Japan'. 24. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had a similarly favorable effect. 25. Carefully planned exploitation of U. S. leadership in the atomic field, lath a coordinated public information program on the Nevada weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain news leaks that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explo- sion of a thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, contributed to the U.S. psychological effort. SECURITY INF QUA TION 8 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SCRET II. THE WORK OF PSB PS B D6-47 $1117 29, 195, During the first half of 1953, the work of PSB was marked by a vigorous shift in emphasis from long-range planning to include more immediate implementation and operational activities. This change re- flected the advent of a new Administration, and especially the assumption of the Presidency by General Eisenhower. The President's stature made his inauguration on January 20 a major factor in the world psychological struggle, doubly so because of the strong views which he was known to hold on the importance of seizing the initiative in the cold war. This found direct expression in the designation of Mr. C. D. Jackson as Special Assistant to the Ii-osideat, and his appointment, along with *4 Harold E. Stassen, new Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to member- ship on the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. Jackson was elected Chair- man of the Board. MAJOR ACTIVITIES The impact of these organizational changes on the work of FSB was further heightened by important psychological developments in the inter- national field during this period, including the death of Stalin, the intensified "peace offensive" of thc successor regime in the Kremlin, the renewal of armistice negotiations in Korea, and the outbreak of large- scale anti-Communist ,and anti-Soviet rioting in East Germany, A number of special projocts were undertaken by FSB as a result of these events and changes, some at the request of the National Security Council, others on the initiative of the new Chairman of the Board, These special projects included the following major activities of the staff undertaken in cooperation with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Mutual SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EUURITY INFOR1CTION TOP SECRPT Security Agency: PSB D1-47 Ady 29, 1955 Program of Psychological Pr ti, for Sta/in's Paving from Power (PSB D-24) Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death (PSB D-40) During the early months of the reporting period, preparatory plan- ning in anticiption of Stalin's eventual death continued under PSB including the drafting of a contingency guidance. When Stalin's illness was reported, the National Security Council requested the preparation of a plan for psychological exploitation of Stalin's death (NSC Action No. 728 4(3), March 4, 1953). The resulting FSB D-40, "Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death", was finally approved on 41.11 23, super- seding ESB D-24, The Presidential address of April 16 was the major initial move provided for in the Plan. Such an address had been agreed upon by the NSC, and PLB was assigned the task of coordinating appropriate follow-up by departments end agencies of the Government (NSC Action No, 734 March 12, .1953). To assist it in complying with this assignment, as well as in implementation of ISB D.40, the Board established an inter- departmental working group which reports twice monthly to the Chairman. Volunteer Freedom Corp NBC Action No. 724 (February 25, 1953) approved in principle NSC 143, "Proposal for a Volunteer Freedom. Corps", and directed that a detailed plan be prepared by an ad hoc committee composed of representa- tives of State, Defense, CIA and PSB staff. A "Ftoposed Basis for Psycho- logical Operations Planning to Exploit the Volunteer EYeedem Corps," dated Kroh 20, 1953, and "A National Psychological Strategy Plan for the Volunteer Freedom Corps," dated March 311, 1953, submitted by the PSB staff representative, Were intensively utilized by the ad hoc committee in pre paring the relevant sections of its report to the Council, The Psychological SECURITY INFORMLTION TOP sEci ET, � Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 4t. of 26 Paget Ct ("1 r- Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SEcRET PSB Di-47 Jay 29, 1953 Supporting Plan for I ,plementing NSC 143 was included in the ad hoc com� mittee report of April 14 to the NSC 21anning Board. After the rioting broke out in Fast Germany in mid�June, the PSB recommended to the NSC that consultation with the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany be initiated by the State Department immediately with a view to implementation as soon as possible of the Volunteer Freedom Corps plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the feasibility of implementation is directly dependent upon continued fiscal support by the Congress and successful negotiations by the Departaent of State with the foreign govern� ments concerning the recruiting and stationing of these VFC units in their respective countries. Interim U.S. iSycholorical Ilan for Fuloit4ion of Unrest in Satellite Europe (PCB D-45) NSC fiction No. 817-2. (June 18) directed TSB to prepare recommendations as to policies and actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states. A summary statement of the recommendations was approved by the Board on June 240 and by the NSC or June 25. The comments of the member agencies on the complete plan (PSB D-45) were coordinited through normal procedures and approved by the Board on July 1. This plan provides for en integrated and phased exploitation of actual and latent unrest in the satellite stateLI to embarrass Soviet Control in those areas without jeo� pardizing fundamental American objectives. U. S. Iluchelogical Strategy with Renect to the Thai Peoples of SEA t5-23) Shortly after the Viet Ninh invasion of Laos, the NSC directed the FSB (NSC Action 788 D.:� 13 Nay) to develop P plan for coordinated psycho� logical operations based on Thailand, and to submit this plan to the NSC for consideration. SECURITY INFORMATION yop SECRET 11 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 r- � Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECIlET PSA D-47 Jay 29) 1953 A FSB panel was already workinf on an over-all psychological plan for Southeast Pzia. Using this background, a new plan was developed, calling for a more vigorous exercise of U.S. leadership in Southeast Asia in two phases, (1) consolidztion of Thailand as a secure louse, and (2) eventual extension of U.S. psychological programs beyond the Thel boundaries if and when conditions perniti By June 30, the plan had been approved in principle and was nearing readiness for subrission to the NEC. Korea Emergency Plan - Break Off of Korean firmistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d) This contingency plan provides psychological objectives and courses of action in the event of the breakdown or break off of armistice negotiations. Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (FSB D-70) This plan covers the period immecl tely following the conclu3ion of an armistice and the Department of St. to has already begun work on the preparation of a new guidance dealing with the period of UN General Assembly approval of the proposed ,rmistice agreement and the opening of a Korean political conference. Guidance on Prisoner of War Exchange in Korea At the recruest of the Department of Defense, the FJ6 staff undertook to prepare a coordinated interdepartmental guidance on the POW problem in Korea and in particular on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. This guidance was submitted to the Chairman of the PSB and transmitted by him to the members of the Board as a checklist of relevant psychological considerations; SECURITY IWORNYLTION TOP SE,CRET of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMiTION TOP SECT.ET PSB D-47 :uly 29, 1953 Communist Brainwashing As a result of a letter of February 19 from the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of Stcte and the Director of Central Intelligence ,:nd of subsequent conversations between the last-named and the FSB staff, an. Ad Hoc Interdepartmental. Committee was set up to work with various scientific advisers to ascertain what counter-measures can be undertaken against so-called communist ttbrain-washing" techniques. A member of the PEB staff, who chaired the committee, remains in close contact with the military officers in charge of reputri-tion of the first American prisoners of war, and he has certain continuing responsibilities in connection with the foreign and domestic pnychologicr1 aspects of the problem. Doctrinal FroTrml_PEB D-12 In September 1951, the Board authorized the establishment of an inter- departmental panel to study and make recommendations about "doctrinal (ideological) warfare afainst the USSR". At that time, the Board approved a paper which noted the Soviet ideoloficn1 efforts which had gained in- fluence upon the intelligentsia throufhout the world and had predisposed them towards communist viewpoints. The panel, studying the Soviet approach and possible U.S. counter-sction, developed a U.S. Doctrinal Program (rsB D-33) as a means of restoring U.E. influence and mininizing communist influence among the worldly intellectLals. This Doctrinal Progran visualizes a long-term intellectual movement, employing a permanent literature and r series of scholarly activities to break down the doctrinaire thought patterns which have aided Commix ism and to foster greater underst nding and acceptance for the traditions and viewpoints of America and the Free World: As of June 30, the proposed program had been circulated for Board z-pprov:1; SECURITY INTORD*TIODI TOP SECRET 13 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECLET PSB D-L.7 July 29, 1953 Presidentls Ealagency Immigration Program On April 22, 1953, ircsident Eisenhower recommended to the Congress emergency legislation to admit 240,000 immigrants into the U.S. during the next two years. The President indic'ted the categories of people to be covered wore escapees from Communism and the victims of economic conditions in the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the initictive of the Chairm-n of ILB, members of its staff intensively supported this recommendation by -ssistRnce in the preparation of legisla- tion to be introduced into Congress and by other means nocessrwy to bring about its enactment. This was a completely coordin ted staff effort, bearing in mind the potential impact of the program on the Italian General Elections which wore to occur on June 7th and 8th, the objectives outlined in iSBIs Escapee Program, and the possibilities such legislation would have in helping to bring about greater solil-rity within NATO. Through the rEB Coordin-ting Committee for D-15b, the operating agencies were able to rimk-.e prrticul-rIy good use of the introduction of the bill in the Senate and the introductory st tomcat by Senator Watkins as well as of the supporting testimony of Cabinet members. Armaments iublicity iljcy A member of the PSB staff is repn,senting Mr. C. D. Jackson in the deliberations of an Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy. This group was dLsirn -LA by the NSC r2anning Board in March to develop a Government publicity policy for the benefit of the AmericRn public on the subject of the arn,nents race with the USSR, On May 8 an Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee (NSC 151) went to the Council which considered it on May 27, and its action on that data (NSC Action No, 799 a) included a. direction to rsB SITURITY INFORMATION iLL. TOP_SECRET of 26-ritges Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 �-. Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EBB � SECURITY ITi'ORMLTION D-47 SIMET Ju1y 29, 1953 ".,,to prepare for Council consideration an outline plan of the specific stops, including Speeches by Government officials, which Should be taken to carry out the recommendations contained in NSC 151". Presidential speech on this subject was in draft on Jane 30, Irocedural Guidance for Famine Reli-f Products A PSB staff paper setting forth an operational plan for exploitation of possible psychological advantages which might be derived from gifts of U.S. surplus food to countries within the Soviet orbit was submitted for Board consideration. Prosidontts Flood Relief Committee A PSB staff member served in an advisory capacity on the Inter- Agency Working Group on Flood Relief. IMPLEY7NTATION ACTIVITIES The increased emphasis on special projects and short-term plans of a quasi-operational nature, as well as the maturing of more and more long- range PSB plans, led to a sharp increase in the follow-up work of PSB in cooperation with the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the NSA. In addition to coordin.tion activity on plans and projects described above, the following approved P:]B plans were in the process of active implementation by government departments and agencies during the reporting period: pECURITY INFORMATION TOP SCRET 15 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET, PSB De47 July 29, 1953 (a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Pourer in France (PSB D-140) (b) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15b) Coordination of the implementation of these two plans has been carried out by a Washington, Interdepartmental Committee working with counterpart Committees in Taxis and Rome acting under the immediate supervision of the respective Ambassadors. USCINCEUR has appointed a Liaison Representative who has met with the Paris Committee. Municipal elections held throughout Prance in May indicated a slight over-all decline in communist electoral strength, but future prospects for effective anti-communist action were not bright as the reporting period closed with a prolonged French political crisis. Efforts started some months ago to lift parliamentary immunity from six communist deputies have not yet been successful. Prior to the national elections in Italy, the Washington and Rome Committees undertook a number of actions designed to further the objectives of the plan, including psychological exploitation of the President re pro- posed emergency immigration program. The precarious majority obtained by the Center parties, and the gains of both Left Wing and Right Wing extre- mists, underline the continuing gravity of the situation. In the light of post-election comment from the U.S. Embassy in Italy, the plan to reduce communist power in that country is to be reviewed for the purpose of preparing a revised post-election strategy. (0) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees (PSB D-18/a) The Escapee Program was established in implementation of U.S. defector policy as set forth in NSC 86/1 with respect to improving the conditions of reception and care afforded recent escapees from Communism, and promoting SEC TIE INFORMATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 16 of 26-rages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INIi`ORMATION TO F' SECRET PSB D-47 ALly 29, 1953 their permanent resettlement. The Prorram which was administered by the Department of State during the reporting period also provides opportunity for meeting and confuting, with evidences of friendship and practical concern for the victims of Communism, the damaging Soviet propaganda which has in the past exploited inadecuate conditions and the general neglect which greeted escapees on their arrival in the Free World. During the past six months, the Program has achieved substantial results at a minimum cost to the Government. In Europe, care and main� tenance activities are carried on in each of the major countries of first asylum, benefiting 14,890 currently registered escapees through the provision of supplemental food, clothing, medical and dental care, sanitary and living facilities, and amenity supplies. Resettlement is promoted by documentation, training, counseling and sinner services performed in Europe, immigration opportunity searches undertaken in Canada and several Latin American countries, and the provision of funds for transportation for escapees qualifying for movement. Through these methods 4,709 escapees had been resettled or were awaiting passage by June 1, 1953. United States assistance has directly brought about a marked im� provement in the conditions of asylum and opportunities for resettlement offered escapees, and has also stimulated increased contributions by local government authorities and voluntary agencies. These activities hove afforded material for utilization through information media abroad, have contributed to intelligonce acquisition and related programs, and have provided a basis for successful rebuttal in the General Assembly of Czechoslovak charges of subversion under the Mutual Security Act, UCURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 17 of -26-7ages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 MURITYINFOFiMATTON TOP SECRET PSB D-47 :ay 29, 1953 Soviet and satellite sensitivity to the fact of continued escape from behind the Iron Curtain, and of assistance to this group on the part of the Free World has been demonstrated by repeated press and radio attacks on the Escapee Program, by internal propaganda designed to conceal or minimize the continuing outward flow of escapees, by increasingly severe security measures and border controls, by the bringing of charges before the General Assembly, and by legal measures directed at particular individuals and groups of emigres. During the year, program activities were extended under the authority of 3ection 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949# as amended, on a limited basis to South Asia and the Far East. Some 300 Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang Province who escaped to Kashmir are boing assisted either to resettle in rural Kashmir or to move onward to Turkey. A select group of trained and educated refugees from China now stranded in Hong Kong will be assisted to resettle in Formosa or other suitable areas of the For East under contractual arrangements with Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc. National Psychological Program with Respect to Escapees from the Soviet Orbit: Phase "B" (PSB D-1&/la) Approved by the Board on January 1, 1953, this Flan is essentially a program for encouragement of escape from the Soviet orbit for psychological purposes and for psychological employment of key satellite personnel. On the recommendation of the Board, the NSC amended NSC 86/1 to insure that the term "key satellite personnel" includes any satellite national whose escape would be of significant psychological value to the Free World. An observer from the stiff of PSB has been designated to meet, as the agenda recuires, with the Inter-Agency Defector Committee SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 18 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB 11.47 Ally 29, 1953 which functions under CIA to execute NSCID 13 and 14. Plan D-18a/1a provides for military use of escapees to derive psychological advantages. Incisive action in this regard resulted from appointment of a special committee by the NSC at the direction of the President. This task group, carrying forward the work of the Phase 1B" panel, made a comprehensive study and developed plans for the erection of a Volunteer Freedom Corps (NEC 143). In addition, overt programs such as those under IIA have given increased attention to escapees. Other uses of escapee personnel encompass such activities as the Free Europe Tiniversit, in Exile (sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe), and certain of the operations in its appropriate area of the Committee for Free Asia, which offer opportuni- ties for special exploitation of the potential for non-communist leadership among these people, The program in Europe has the capability of absorbing profitably more qualified candidates then have appeared thus far. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation have increased their propaganda exploita- tion of escapees and are using in their programming current escapees offering substantial value. (e) Flan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (FSB NSC 127/1) National Overt Proprganda Policy Guidance for General War (PSB D-31/1) The substance of these plans has been integrated into the current war plans of both JCS and CIA. The Department of State chairs an inter- departmental subcommittee of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee consisting of represent tives of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the MUtual Security Agency for the purpose of drafting an "X-Day" Plan in implementation of NSC 127/1, SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET: 19 of 26-Tages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INEOWTION PSB D-47 TOF.SECRET 41y 29, 1953 (f) A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5 (PSB D-31) Work on this project was in effect taken over by the President's Committee on International Informction Activitiese (g) National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21) and (h) Nationrl Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin (D-21/2) (Supplement to FSB D-21 dated October 9, 1952) A supplementary psychological plan for Berlin was approved by the Board on February 3, 1953. Supporting Flans for implementing this program as well as the an for West Germany as a whole, were developed by the Department of State and Department of Defense, coordinated and approved by other member agencies. A special Coordinating Committee has been es- tablished in Bonn under the auspices of the U.S. High Commission. Under the active chairmanship of the HICCC Pablic Affairs Officer, the Committee brings together representatives of State, Defense, NSA, and CIA. Reports from this Committee outline detailed action taken and indicate progress in implementing the German and Berlin Plans, which have now become, in effect, the charters for the Government's information and other psychological programs in the area. Possible revision of these plans is under preliminary staff considera- tion as a result of recent developments in Germany and in Europe generally, as well as of modifications of U.S. policies. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 20 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SEC:TT PSB D-47 a427 29, 1953 (i) Psychological Strategy Program for Japan (PSB D-27) Follow-up work on the Japan plan, which was approved by the Board on January 15, 1953, has resulted in the setting up of two Committees in Tokyo for the coordinated implementation of this program. The first Committee is a high-level group chaired by the Ambassador himself. The second is a working-level Committee headed by the Ptblic Affairs Officer and including also representetives of Defense and CIA. Preparation of supporting plans, however, has been slow. The State Department is now working on a revision of the US country paper for Japan which follows very closely the content of PSB D-27. The preliminary steps have been taken to include NSA in the coordinatexi implementation of the Plen if and when an expected FOA program for Japan is approved. (j) Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East (PSB D-22) Implementation of this an is proceeding under the active supervision of the Middle East Coordinating Panel in Washington. After the visit of the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Director of NSA, to the Middle E,st, the Panel held a special meeting toward the end of the reporting period to take into account the resultant new policy attitudes toward Middle Eastern problems. A recuest fer comments on D-22 from the field resulted in replies from five of the ten Diplomatic Missions in the area. The comments received were uniformly favorable and several of them wore enthusiastic. The Washington Panel is considering the problem of establishing in the field the necessary coordinating mechanism to implement this regional program. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SKEET 21 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 79; 1953 PLAJNING ACTIVITIES Plans Authorize and in Process of Development: Plans in various stages of preparation on June 30 included the following: (a) Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe (PSB D-38) A regional psychological strategy plan to increase the willingness of Europeans to support mutually agreed security goals in Western Europe by reducing anti-U.S, attitudes was completed and sent to the Board members on June 30 for approval by vote slip action. (b) Program for Support of the Orthodox Church (PSB D-39) Possible ways of utilizing the worldwide influence of the Orthodox Church as a means of checking increasing Soviet influences in the Eastern hediterranean and as a method of weakening Soviet control within the Soviet Orbit is the basis for this plan. A program for the non-attributable support and assistance to non-Russian leadership of the Orthodox Church was informally concurred in by the member agencies and forwarded to the Board members for vote slip approval* (c) Plan for Exploitation of Dissidence in the Soviet Bloc: USSR, Armed Forces (PSB D-43) This plan to exploit the bases for schism between the regime and the military establishment of the Soviet Union and to increase dissidence within the Soviet Armed Forces where significant vulnerabilities are indicated, awaits final clearance prior to early submission to the Board. (d) Iranian Contingency Plan A PSB chaired interdepartmental panel will coordinate psychological planning in relation to the possible partial or complete loss of Iran, a contingency which had not been assumed in the approved psychological strategy plan for the Middle East. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SMIT .�������� Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 22 of 26 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECUItITY INFOiLiviATION TOP SECtILT PSB D-47 .747 29, 1953 (e) Indo-China A special program for the use of U. S. Influence in Support of U. S: Objectives in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was drafted and in the process of interdepartmental clearance at the end of June. (f) Psychological Strategies in North Africa This papery including a study of the Psychological Data, a report on the Status of Power helations, and an illustrative plan for U. S. psycho- logical action in the area, was in the process of clearance and completion on June 30. heview and hevision of Approved Plans A procedure was developed during the period, under which all completed plans are regularly reviewed by the staff with a view to determining whether revision is required; Early revision of the French and Italian Plans is now contemplated. EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE Evaluation hethods VJork was continued with Government research offices engaged in de- veloping techniques for evaluating psychological operations. Progress in this field has been made through: a, examining current evaluation research projects in the Government to determine their relevance to PSB needs, b, alerting Government research units to the continuing need for research, particularly on evaluation criteria for psychological operations, and assisting them in fixing priorities for major research projects. c, holding conferences on evaluation techniques and criteria. SECUL(ITY INFOMATION TOP SECkET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 23 of 26 Pages p. c1P,". Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 29, 1953 d. suggesting specific evaluation projects for Government research units, such as a Handbook on Statistics for Psywar. Evaluations and Pre-planning Situation Estimates During the reporting period, the following projects in this category were carried out: a: An Evaluation of the Psycholoqical Effect: of the U. S. National Effort in Italy, (PSB D-29): This paper, Which was drafted during the final quarter of 1952, was noted by the Board on January 15, revised, and distributed for information, It concluded that U. S. policies and programs have contributed substantially to the attainment of our national objectives in Italy, but that the situation was still grave and that withdrawal of our support might well lead to the collapse of the Government then in power (February.1953). Accordingly, it concluded that there should be no slackening of our effort in the crucial period ahead. b. An Evaluation of the Psychological. Impact of U S. Foreign Economic Policies in the U. K. (FSB D-36): This paper identi- fied some adverse puchologipal results of certain aspects of our economic policies towards the U, K., especially in the military aid and tariff ar3a5. It was approved by the Board on January 15) and after further coordination, it was transmitted to the N$C, and, through the State Department, to other interested agencies: c. Evaluation of the Psycholor:ical Impact of U. S. Foreign Economic Policies in France (PSB D-37): The completed. paper was accepted as a reference document by the Board on January 15. It outlines the psychological causes behind the difficulties encountered by France in pursuing free world objectives, notes SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECBE; Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 24 of 26-Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY- INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 29, 1953 the ps7cholocical obstacles raised by our policy- towards France, and proposes actions to obtain French cooperation. d. Psychological Plan for the iteduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14M: An evaluation of this plan, including suggestions for its revision, was ready for consideration on June 309 e. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Escapees (PSB D-18a): An analytical report on the first year's operation of the United States Escapee Program is nearing completion, f. Soviet Sensitivities: An evaluative report on this subject, prepared in an interdepartmental committee, was completed and submitted to the Acting Director for approval and interdepart- mental circulation for information as a staff study. g. A review of the psychologieal situation and related factors in Yugoslavia involved the assembly of basic intelligence and strategic considerations, for possible use in planning. h. The Malenkov Test Case: Before the death of Stalin and in conjunction with PSB D-24 an extensive review of classified and other data on halenkov was completed. It was decided that data were inadequate for an intensive psychological analysis of the man; but other Malcukov studies were recommended� The project uncovered deficiencies in the organisation and coordina- tion of biographic information in the Government. Latin Americat A pre-planning estimate of the psychological situation in this region was nearing completion at the end of the reporting period. SECURITY INFORFATION PS TOP SECRET of 23-Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET PSB 138�447 401 �29, 1953 Intelligence Support Staff members continued to work in liaison with the intelligence- producing agencies of the Government to provide intelligenee support and guidance to the Board and the Staff, This function includes selecting from, and, in some cases, synthesizing the output of the agencies, arranging for new research where necessary, and setting up staff briefings by experts from outside the staff. In this period, sitilar services were also developed to meet the needs of the Chairman of the Board for Government intelligence on such psychological subjects as foreign opinion trends, and international re- actions to particular programs, actions and statements of the United States Government or its officials. This mission for the Chairman has required a greater emphasis upon the rapid procurement and processing of current intelligence from the agencies on a daily basis. Psychological Support for USUN As a result of discussions between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. C. D. Jackson, and subsequent PSS action at the informal meeting of June 3, a PSB-thaired committee of the member agencies was established to organize an anti-communist psychological campaign focussed upon the General Assembly scheduled to convene on the 15th of September. At the close of the reporting period, the committee was in action and early documentation had been supplied to Ambassador Lodge. ATTACHMENTS Annex Annex Annex * Annex Annex *The report A Report of the Department of State B Report of the Department of Defense C Report of the Mutual Security Agency D Report of the Central Intelligence Agency E Psychological Progmm - Expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency is specially classified SECURITY INFORMATION TOP sraiu of g* Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY IN,FORMATION SECR2,1 THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM (Prepared by the Department of State) ANNEX A PSB 1147 July 29, 1953 1. During the period between December 31, 1952 and June 30, 1953, the Department of State undertook to carry out, through the foreign informa� tion and educational exchange programs conducted by the International Information Administration and in conjunction with programs carried out by other governmental agencies, the following major substantive tasks derived from relevant public laws, approved papers of the National Security Council, approved papers of the Psychological Strategy Board and programs agreed to by the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee: (1) Sustaining and increasing the confidence of other peoples and other governments in the high purpose and the trustworthy character of the United States as a leader of the free world. (2) Exploiting to the advantage of the free world the series of events in the Soviet Union and its satellites, including Communist China, ensuing upon the death of Stalin� (3) Promoting the achievement of an honorable armistice in Korea and greater stability in Asia generally. (4) Promoting measures designed to bring about a greater degree. of integration among the nations of Europe, with particular reference to the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. (5) Countering, particularly in Latin America, the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, attitudes hostile to the United States and disposed toward neutralism. SECURITY INFORMkTION ET of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 ; LI - Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 �ECURITY INFORMATION pECRET PSE ANNEX A D.,47 July 29, 1953 (6) Demonstrating to the people of Italy in advance of the general election the advantages accruing to them because of their association with the free world. 2. The execution of the first task listed in 1 above involved primArilY (1) exploiting the global prestige of the President by (a) the wide dissemination in radio broadcasts, press releases, pamphlets and magazine articles of the Inaugural Address; (b) the preparation and distribution of a documentary film on the inauguration; (c) the preparation and the distribution of press and photographic materials concerning the career and the philo- sophy of the President; (d) full coverage of the Message on the State of the Union; (e) the preparation and the distribution of press and photographic materials concerning the most important officers of the Administration; (2) exploiting the initiative taken by the President on behalf of peace and security in his address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1953, particularly by (a) assuring that copies of the speech were presented to foreign offices all over the world in advance of delivery; (b) delivery of kinescopes of entire speech to seventy- three posts within a day of its delivery, one of which was shown over BBO-TV on April 2D to an estimated audience of six million; (c) the production and shipment on May 2 of a documentary SECURITY INFORMATION. SECRT,T 2 of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFOIMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB Dr,47 July 1953 film on the speech in thirty-five languages; (d) preparation and dissemination of five million pamphlets, handbills and leaflets on the speech; (e) distribution to all missions of a seventy-two page =wry of world-wide editorial opinion; (f) preparation of photographic illustration of the speech in ten editions of the magazine "Free World" distri- buted throughout the Far East; (g) the preparation and distribution of pamphlets based on the speech, "What Disarmament Means" and "A Time to Turn the Tide of History;" (3) exploiting the visits of the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security to Europe and the Near and Riddle East and South Asia and the visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower to Lttin America. (4) increased emphasis upon programs designed to reveal the moral values and the spiritual attributes that animate the people of the United States in their personal attitudes and their public actions (5) citing the scheduled tripartite meeting at Bermuda as evidence of unity of free world and its ceaseless search for amicable adjustments of differences (6) supporting the committee in Japan in planning and carrying out the year-long celebration (1953-1954) of the hundredth anniversary of the visit to Japan of Admiral Perry 3. The execution of the second task listed in 1 above involved primarily (I) challenging the new leaders of the USSR to demonstrate their professions of peaceful intent by deeds, not words, particularly SECURITY .INPORmATIO11 SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB D-47 J47 29# 1953 in connection with the conclusion of a truce in Korea, the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Austria and the release of prisoners of war still held by the USSR (2) suggesting to the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan that they demand the release of their nationals still held as prisoners of war in the USSR (3) exploiting the renewed effort of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to conclude a treaty concerning Austria and the refusal of the USSR to participate (4) exposing the withdrawal after the death of Stalin of the charges against the doctors as evidence of the dominance of expediency over principle in the conduct of affairs within the USSR (5) demonstrating that conciliatory gestures of the new regime, while constituting recognition of need to placate opinion within and without the orbit, do not as yet demonstrate reduction of capabilities or change of intention on the part of USSR (6) emphasizing to the satellites of Europe the insecurity of the regimes under which they now live, and particularly as the result of demonstrations in East Germany and Czechoslovakia the potential for freedom that exists in the area and the betrayal by the USER of the working populations (7) exploitation of the report of United Nations International Labor Organization Comittee on forced labor as evidence of unchanged conditions within USSR (8) full but sober coverage of the Wels Escapee Center in Austria, including address by Ambassador Thompson emphasizing purpose of escapee program. ,IrCURITY INFORMATION SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFOITATION pECRET, ANNEX A PSB B.47 Jay 29, 1953 4. The execution of the third task listed in 1 above involved primarily (1) demonstrating the unremitting patience and determination of the United Nations Command to achieve an armistice on reasonable terms (2) developing for global dissemination through personnel detailed to the Far East Command pictorial, written and transcribed material designed to demonstrate the humane treatment of prisoners of war by the United Nations Command and the justice of its position with regard to repatriation (3) countering by reasoned argument and sober discussion the opposition of the Republic of Korea to an armistice (4) exploitation of the wide support, particularly by the government of India, to the proposals of the United Nations Comtand for a solution of the problem of repatriation (5) continued exposure of the charges that the United Nations Command employed biological warfare in Korea, including preparation of a fourth supplement to the kit on biolorical warfare, arrangement with the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom for a pamphlet to be written by a British: journalist, exploitation of a denunciation of the charges by Pandit Nehru, and plans for dealing with the matter in the United Nations should it reappear there (6) encouraging, in conjunction with the governments of Vietnam, France and the United Kingdom, greater psychological activity against the Viet-Minh; (7) promoting a special program In India designed to counter the appeal of Soviet Communism among students (8) increasing activity, it cooperation with the Government of Thailand, in the north and the northeast areas of the country SECURITY INFORMATION SMUT Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of 12 Pagea Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 zumm INFORMATIgN pECRET ANNEX A PSB /06.47 jay 2% 1953 to counter increased Communist propaganda in connection with the invasion of Laos. 5. The execution of the fourth task listed in 1 above primarily involved (1) continued promotion, increasingly by the provision of materials and data for the use of indigenous groups, of understanding of the objectives of the United States in Europe and so to promote the ratification of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community and of the contractual agreements with Germany (2) continued promotion, again largely through indigenous groups, of data and materials revealing the advantages to be gained by Europeans through closer integration militarily, economically and politically (3) providing grants to 1459 nationals of other NATO countries, including 34 journalists, to visit the United States and 1083 grants to nationals of the United States to visit other NATO countries (4) increased emphasis on the cultural attainments of the United States (5) the inauguration to Spain of a series of broadcasts designed to acquaint the people of the country with the objectives of the United States in Europe, to diminish their sense of isolation and so to provide a basis for the better understanding of the current negotiations. (6) the continued functioning of binational committees for promoting good relations between local communities and the United States forces stationed within them (7) the timely allocation of $50 million in counterpart funds for use in West Berlin at the time of the riots in Eastern Germany SECURITY INEORMATION SECRET 6 of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB D-47 July 294 1953 (8) the exclKnge of notes constituting a cultural agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic (9) publicity for the visits to this country of Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Reuter, including appropriate public dissemination of the communique issued following the visit of Chancellor Adenauer. 6. The execution of the fifth task listed in 1 above primarily involved (1) executing with the cooperation of the government of Austria plans to assure minimum publicity for the Congress in Defense of the Rights of Youth held in Vienna, (2) exploitation of the interest shown by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security in their visit to the Near and Middle East and by Dr. Milton Eisenhower in his visit to Latin America of national culture and popular efforts to better the condition of the countries conerned (3) cooperation with the governments of Egypt, TUrkey and Iraq in information programs directed at the armed forces of the countries concerned with the purpose of developing internal stability and individual responsibility and exposing Soviet Communism (4) provision to the Ministry of Education in Iraq of material exposing Soviet Communism for distribution among students (5) cooperation in Morocco and Libya with United States forces and local groups to facilitate acceptance of the presence of United States forces in the area (6) the provision to Radio Ankara of scripts exposing Soviet Communism for short-wave broadcasts to the satellites of Europe (7) cooperation between the USIS Near East Regional Service Center in Beirut and the Technical Cooperation Administration for the production of photographs and pamphlets SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 (8) arranging for broadcasts to Argentina from Radio Carve In Montevideo (9) initiating an extensive program of personal contacts in Brazil to counteract doctrines hostile to the United States (10) initiating a program in Chile designed to hamper agitation for nationalization of the copper industry (11) increasing emphasis on cultural attainments of the United States in conjunction with demonstrating United States interest in Latin American culture. (12) discrediting of Communist-dominated Continental Cultural Congress held at Santiago, Chile (13) continuing efforts to prevent dissemination to nearby countries of Communist-inspired doctrine emanating from Guatemala. 7. The execution of the sixth task listed in 1 above involved primarily a carefully planned and executed proartm, largely in support of indigenous groups, includilg political parties and trade unions, to provide films, pamphlets, posters and exhibits emplwsizing Italy's economic progress, agrarian reform and renewed international prestige and the threat of Communism to the retention of these gains. 8. Major obstacles or difficulties encountered in carrying out the tasks include (1) Differences between the United States and the peoples and the governments of other countries in estimating the capabilities and the intentions of the USSR, particularly in view of the con- ciliatory gestures made by the leadership of the USSR following the death of Stalin. (2) The increasing preoccupation of the nations of Western Europe with internal, and particularly economic, problems, the UCURITY INFORMATIOU SEJPITT Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8 of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 instability of the governments of several of these countries and their concern with past rivalries rather than present dangers and future opportunities. (3) The growth of strongly nationalist sentiment in many newly independent states and the tendency to identify the United States as a defender of practices associated with colonialism. CO The preoccupation of the Arab States with Israel and their tendency to identify the United States as its champipn. (5) Widespread ignorance and misunderstanding abroad of the evidence presented, the facts proven and the procedures involved in trial, the sentencing and the execution of judgment in the case of the Rosenbergs. (6) The inability of the United Nations Command to ensure the cooperation of the Republic of Korea with regard to measures deemed necessary to achieve an acceptable armistice in Korea. (7) The adverse reaction abroad to widespread publicity of charges made and measures taken during the cOurse of congressional investigations into various aspects of the foreign information and educational exchange program. 9. Major changes that have occurred in the foreign information and educational exchange programs include (1) a reduction in force from 14,064 persons to 11,882. Those now employed include 1508 nationals of the United States employed in missions overseas and 2741 in the United States and 7633 local employees in missions overseas. (2) a net increase of six, from 195 to 201, in the number of overseas outposts. However, current plans call for the closing SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 0,ELR IT! INFORM/1110N SECRET ANNEX A PSB D747 4111Y, 2911. 1953 of 13 posts early in fiscal year 1954. (3) the closing of twelve libraries overseas, eleven of which were in Germany (4) a reduction in short�wave broadcasts from 43 hours and 45 minutes to 33 hours, particul..rly in programs in Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America, in Portuguese to Portugal, Harm/ Malay, English,. Korea, French and Italian (5) the eli;ination of twelve domestic transmitters and the suspension of contracts for the construction of major domestic transmitting facilities (6) the testing of two megawatt transmitters, one in Okinawa and one in the Fhillipines, for early broadcasting on medium bands to the Far East (7) the relay by the improved facilities in Colombo of daily programs in Hindi and Urdu, followed by broadcasting of transcriptions in Tamil and Bengali (8) the simultaneous relay by Munich of the program in Hindi to audiences in East and South Africa (9) the increase by 100% of religious broadcasts, planned in cooperation with many religious groups, to peoples behind the Iron Curtain (10) the transformation of the Wireless Bulletin to the Wireless File, designed for adaptation for publication in accordance with local needs (11) the initiation of the experimental use of folk-lore in notion pictures as a means of reaching sensitive areas with politically significant measages ZECURITY INFORMATION SECRET of 12 Pages 112 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 (12) the distribution within India of 4500 sets of 101 paper- back books as expendible libraries (13) the appointment of Dr. Robert L. Johnson, former President of Temple University, to be Administrator of the International Information Administration (14) the establishment of a Plans Board in the office of the Administrator. (15) the appointment of Mr. Cheever Cowdin� former chairman of the board of Universal Pictures, to be Assistant Administrator of the Informational Motion Picture Service and the appointment of Mr. Cecil B. deNille as principal consultant (16) the appointment of Mr. Leonard Erickson, formerly of McCann-Erickson, to be Deputy Administrator for the International Broadcasting Service. SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET 11 of 12 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORi,iATION SECRfff ANNEX A PSB D-47 Jallv 29$ 195:7' 10, Actual or estimated expenditures and estimated carry-over are as follows: (The expenditures shown cre in millions of dollars to the nearest tenth.) Sub- Radio Grand IIA Fulbright NSA Total Construction Total Actual 1951 ,) 67.0 4.8 NA 0 71.8 23.04 95.2 Actual 1952 89.0 790 10.6 106.6 19,4 126.0 Estiaated 1953 84,6 7.9 U. 104.0 .9 103.1 The estimated carry-over of IIA funds available after June 30, 1953 is a7.5 million for radio acquisition and construction. This availability may be reduced by the Congress in order to provide obligation authority liquidation cost of the Department of state under the appropriation "Salaries and Expenses Department of State." For 1954, IIA has requested of the Congress ,87.9 million in the 114 appropriation, permission tp obligate 12,2 million of the radio acquisi- tion and construction carry.pover funds, and ,8.9 million in Fulbright .local currencies of the Exchange of Persons program, or a total of ,109.0 million requested for 1954. IIA cannot furnish any estimates of periods of time beyond FY 1954 at this time. No estimates beyond those presently pending before the Congress will be made until approprJations have been made, the report of the President's Committee on International Information has been analyzed, the new Information Agency has been established, and the program for 1954 has taken place, Thereiano basis for any valid projections beyond 1954 before these steps have been completed. The above figures do not include the Public Affairs program in Germany or Austria or the NSA Information Program other than the certain Nati themes which the Bureau of the Budget intended to be transferred to IIA on July. 1, 1953. SECURITY INFCRMATION SLCRi'a ...��������1������10.1110 12 of 12 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMRTION -TOP SECRET ANNEX PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 SEMIANNUAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITY STATUS REPORT of the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE for the period from 1 January through 30 June 1953 SECTION SUMMARY 1. Presented below is a summary of the status of the Department of Defense activities having psychological effects for the period from 1 January through 30 June 1953. 2. General Comments The Department of Defense released information designed to make clear the United States position with respect to truce negotiations and the prisoner-of-war situation. Background press conferences were ar- ranged through which the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants briefed news media representatives on the American stand in Korea, 3. In conjunction with other agencies, the Department of Defense carried on a continuous program to inform the public of developments in biological and chemical warfare research. Documentary evidence was pro- vided to both the United States repreoentative to the United Nations and to news media, to combat the Communist propaganda accusations.chnr7ing the United States waged germ warfare in Korea. 4. hilitary Posture a. The most significant contribution of the Department of Defense with respect to the national psychological effort was the continued maintenance of U. S. military power in a strength to provide evidence of its readiaess to resist aggression. The SECUhITY INFORMATION -1 -77-SECRET of 2E Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 deployment of portions of U. S. military power in Europe contin- ued to be a significant unifying force against boviet aggressionj although the psychological impact of such deployment among Euro- peans was probably lessened by the isolation of large-scale mili- tary power in Korea for the past two years'. be In connection with the Viet inh invasion of Laos, French authorities requested and received military equipment and supplies on a priority basis, demonstrating U. S. ability to sup- port friendly nations in meeting military emergencies. 5. Also of note was the timely psychological exploitation of tech- nological leadership in military weapons through 4 coordinated public information program on the atomic bomb tests this Spring at the Nevada Proving Ground and similar programs on other weapons. 6. Goodwill Efforts Goodwill efforts of the military Service in overseas areas were promptly executed and effectively exploited: Emergency supplies and assistance have been provided in England, Holland; Turkey, Greece: Iran, and Ecuador, demonstrating U: S. preparedness and interest in the welfare of other nations: Military leaders have demonstrated an increased aware- ness and desire to gain from the psychological implications of mercy mis- sions, improved community relations and counter-propaganda, Many in- stances of the observance and particioations of U: S. Military personnel in indigenous ceremonies and the consummation of well considered good will tours are in evidence These are believed to be of great significance for the support they provide to fundamental and long-lasting attitudes of friendship: imbedded in the "grass roots" of foreign peoples. SECURITY INFMMATION. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of - of 22, Pages t Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORnATION TOP TICRET-' ANNEX B PSB D-47 Jay 29, 1953 7. Military Assistance Programs The Military Assistance Program has continued to be one of our greatest psychological assets. A new joint Service regulation aimed at maximizing psychological advantage in the release of information covering training, equipping and reimbursable aid to foreign nationals has been issued during the period. Offshore procurement has maintained U. S. in- fluence in the Far. East and Europe and has made a major contribution in Italy. 8. Repatriated U. 5. Prisoners of War By virtue.of massive unfavorable press reaction, special at- tention in this report has been devoted to the so-called "special cases" of repatriated U. S. prisoners. Considerable attention was accorded this matter as far back as April 1952 and in mere concentrated fashion since January 1953 when it became necessary to cope with the actual situation. In view of the status of truce negotiations optimum handling of the situ- ation was not possible since routine medical and persDnnel policies as well as public demands had to be met. The Department of Defense will continue to devise correct policies for handling the situation in spite of press sensationalism. As evidence of its success, within a period of two months such sensationalism has run its course and a general acceptance of a realistic standard operating procedure has evolved, 9, Defection The public announcement of an approved plan and the establish- ment of facilities to receive and. reward PITO pilot defectors who would deliver their jet aircraft to the United Nations Command was followed by an immediate and significant shift in Communist air operations and tactics over the Korean battle area. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET of 28 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 0 (.4, � Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORIIATION TOP SECRET SECTION II ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 Significant progress of the Department of Defense in the development of plans, capabilities, and organizational means for contributing further to the national psychological effort. 1. Intra-departmental activities, including plans, forces, training programs, and indoctrination courses' a. Office of the Secretary of Defense (1) Psychological Advantage of MAP: Consistent with previous policy guidance, a joint Service regulation, published on 24 March 1953, sets policy and procedures relative to the re- lease of information concerning: (a) training of foreign nation- als, (b) off-shore procurement, (c) equipping of foreign military powers, (d) reimbursable aid, and (e) announcements of the assign- ments of pers)nnel to MDAP duties, Its purpose is dual: (a) to ensure the proper control and coordinated release of such data, with due consideration for security; and (b) to effect the timely and psychologically advantageous release of such information within both the U. S. and the country of primary cohcern. (2 ) Psychological Advantage of U. S. Weapons Develop- ment: Continued progress was made under previously reported pro- grams by Department of Defense agencies in: (a) providing policy guidance on release of maximum data on atomic energy, guided missiles and other new weapons consistent with military security; (b) establishing procedures for clearing release; and (c) prohibit- ing the release of uncleared information. (See Section III) SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET -16; of 28 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 j Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORPIATION TOP SECRET-- ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 (3) Foreign Information Policy: Direct and timely coordination between Departmert of Defense agencies continues the effective processing of I'Foreign Inforwation Poliey Guidance." (4) Organization: On 10 January 1953, tbe Secretary of Defense approved a directive activating the Iftpartifent of Defense Committee on Psychological Operations. This body was established to develop a policy governing and to provide for the utilization of resources of the Armed Forces in cold war. (5) Research and Development: The Advisory Group on psychological and unconventional warfare in the Research and Development Board completed on, 6 Ppril its six4ionth survey of research and development in this field, making a number of recom- mendations on each of the following: (1) the basis of a balanced and integrated program and (2) the organizational machinery and fiscal support necessary to implement such a program. The report was .accepted and its implementation recommended by the RDB on 29 April. It was then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for consideration, Present budgetary limitations have necessitated drastic readjustments of standing priorities in all Defense fields. Therefore, no approved estimate can be made until full considera- tion has been given to the new policy. b. NaLg4ofs of Staff (1) The receipt of a SHAPE paper setting forth the views of SACEUR with respect to his wartime unconventional war- fare responsibilities has generated further Joint Staff consider- ation of this in conjunction with the previously submitted SACEUR paper outlining his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities. sEC PITY ir(5157SSMr---- of 28 Paves Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECREf ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 (2) Specific actions were taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to facilitate and strengthen world-wide unconventional warfare planning, including allied planning, (a) Strengthening CINCFE's unconventional war- fare staff. (b) Approval of steps to strengthen U. S. un- conventional warfare planning representation at the Stand- ing Group level, (c) Delineation of certain responsibilities among the Services and providing policy concerning points of contact for Allied planning in the field of Evasion and Escape. (3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved and CINCFE has implemented a psychological warfare defection program aimed against Communist air crews in Korea. Early reports indicate 4 resultant shift in hed air tactics and impeded operational ef- fectiveness due to more stringent anti-defection measures. (4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Serviees provided comments and recommendations in response to a request for informa- tion by the President's Committee on International Information Activities. (5) Overseas Commands: CINCFE authorized U. S. participation in the United Nations Command (UNC), Joint Psycho- ldgical Committee (JPC) (activated 1 January 1953) whieh provides a central and top-level directorate for the review And defining of combat theater psychological warfare policy. A significant gap has thus been filled in the over-all ccorlination of a cohesive UNC effort. SECURITY INFORIAITON TOP SECRET of 28 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 -SECURITY INFORMATIQN TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 zuly 29, 1953 c. Significant Service Activities (1) Plans: (a) A "Psychological Varfare Plan in Support of the Deployment of Chemical Munitions to the Far East Command," 11 December 1952, remains ready for implementation upon call. (b) Plans for the evacuation and utilization of Radio Free Europe (National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.) and Radio Russia (American Committee for the Liberation of the Free Peoples of Russia, Inc.) are being developed by USAREUR. (2) Troop Information and Education: This program continues on a world-wide basis to orient Service personnel with respect to national and international affairs. As one significant facet of this activity, members of the U. S. Armed Forces are in- formed as to the language, habits, and customs of the various coun- tries in which they serve. Allied with this, committees composed of Service representatives and native civilians continue efforts to generate closer harmony between J. S. military and foreign pcpula.. tions. The iNpact of this programming upon non-U. S. personnel cannot be denied. In the field of Armed Forces Radio Service alone, the estimated foreign audience in Europe is reported at the 80 mil- lion figure. (3) UNG Orientation Program for Communist POWs: The Civil Information and Education Division (CI&E), integrated into PsyWar Section, FECON during December of 1952, continues effectively to pursue its mission by providing a program of education and recre- ation for North Korean and Chinese POs. In the performance of its functions, GI&E provides the opportunity for these P010-s to gain SECURITY INFORMATION TOP 'SECRET of 28 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORM:TION TOP SECRET - ANNEX 13' PSE3 D-h7 July 291, 1953 general and vocational knowledge, as well as to acquire technical skills, which,can develop attitudes favorable to the furtherance of U. S. and U. N. objectives. (4) Communist Indoctrination of U.S. Captured Person- nel: (a) Background Evidence confirmed early De- partment of Defense estimates that the Communists were sub. jetting U. N. personnel held as prisoners of war to inten- sive ideological indoctrination. This problem was recognized as early as April, 1952. The solution appeared to depend on striking a balance between two completely conflicting factors: (a) The necessity of informing. the public in event P0'4's had been successfully indoctrinated, if and when returned, and (b) Taking care not to create undue alarm which might jeopardize national policy with respect to the question of non.forcible repatriation. The Secretary of Defense requested the PSB to investigate the advisability of propaganda exploita- tion by charging the Communists with a new type of war crime. (b) hepatriated U.S. Personnel: When it appeared that some prisoners might be released by the Communists in the exchange of sick and wounded, a press release was made and background material isE;ued. Care was required in prepar- ation of this material, however, in order not to prejudice the negotiations then current. any conflicting interests made handling of the repatriation exceedingly difficult. These included the natural "get the boys home" urge similar to the ones experienced in 1945 and 1946, requirements for a routine medical and permnnel processing, a covert requirement SECURITY INFORMTICN TOP SECRET of 28 Paces Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFCRMATION TO? SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 to enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation to evloit activities of some returnees, necessity for protecting the identities and reputations of innocent men, and the natural desire of the press for exclusive and sensational stories. Initially, a bad press was received on the operation. This has now run its course; some of the more responsible publications have implied that the Department of Defense position was correct. (c) Repatriated U. S. Personnel: On the basis of interim research results, highlighted by data secured on personnel returned to U. L.. control during the period 20 through 26 April 1953, Service concern with respect to Communist treatment of American prisoners of war and the serious ramifications stemming therefrom has been justified. Reports indicate that some American prisoners of war have been subject to extreme inducements and coercion, More- over, some appear to have succumbed, under duress, to re- lentless Communist pressures, Five (5) members of the group of twenty-three (23) Army persannel studied at the Valley Forge AXTV Hospital were held to have been so highly indoctrinated as to render reclamation virtually impossible and to constitute grave U. S. security risks, A recent surveillance report indicates that one (1) of the returned group not processed through Valley Force joined a Communist organization ("American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born") in the San Francisco Bay area on 13 May, (d) Current Procedures: Data secured within FECOM and at Valley Forge Irmy Hospital from repatriated SECURITY INFORMATION 9 - TOP SECRET of 28-Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SLCURITT LTORAATION TOP SECRET AIMEX B PsB D-47 July 290 1953 U. 5. returnees are being collated and evaluated in conjunc- tion with other source reports on Communist indoctrination techniques. Continuing DTartment of Defense and Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance and interrogation of all U. S. returnees is in process with the view of completely exploiting informational resources currently at hand. Plans have been developed to fulfill both security and rehabilita- tion requirements inherent to the projected mass return of U. S. personnel upon completion of Armistice arrangements. There is continuous research to establish a basis for deter- mining a possible program to take psychological advantage of Communist indoctrination as a form of war crimes or atrocity. (e) Countermeasures: TI&E Activities, a Chaplain "Character Guidance" lecture series, and training materials on Communist interrogation-indoctrination methods are re. quired, and currently are under development and study. (5) Although no overt effort was made to promote defec- tions of Polish jet pilots, two Polish Lieutenants successfully escaped from the Iron Curtain and landed their IG 15 planes at Bornholm, Denmark. Pilots immediately requested political asylum and voluntarily surrendered their aircraft to Danish authorities: Through negotiations with Danish and British officials, the U. S4 received custody of the two flyers. (6) Interrogations of the defecting Polish pilots reveal the presence in Poland of additional aircrew members who favor defection. As a result, Department of Defense has generated staff action ',thereby appropriate agencies may encourage defection of Polish aircrew personnel and contribute to deterioration of the Polish Air Force command structure. SECURITY INFORIATION TOP SEMI 10 of 2g-Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SUCURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Annex PSD D-47 Jay 29, 1953 2. Inter-departmental activities, including plans, forces, training programs, and indoctrination courses. a. Psychological Strategy Board; Emphasis was placed on PSB papers for Southeast Asia, Germany and Berlin, Japan, and the middle East. b. Psycnologlical Operations Coordinating Committee (PCC): (1) Participation continues on the inter-departmental committee charged with nreparation and transmission to FECOM of the "Speaial Korean information Guidance" (SKIG). Within FECOM, � the formal establishment of two reviewing committees has contributed significantly to the coordination of an aver-all and cohesive psych- ological effort. The Korean Information Guidance Committee (NIGC) reviews, analyzes, and makes recommendations to CINCUNC based on data reported via the daily, inter-departmental PCC cable. This body, further, is charged with the develppment of concepts within the psychological warfare field for submission to a central and top-level directorate within UNC in the Far East, the Joint Psych- ological Committee (JPC). (See e-ection II, subparagraph 1 b. (5).) (2) X..Day Plan, "helltionship of U. S. Official Foreign Information Organization (Personnel, Facilities, Equipment) to U.S. hilitary Commanders," 30 SePtember 1952, remains under consideration, awaiting outcome of the President ts reorganization plan 7 and 8. c. Department of State; (1) Pending the determination of world-wide base require- ments, the Department of State has deferred action to secure and finalize an agreement providing for the wartime use of Radio Luxembourg. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SLCRT 11 of 28 Pares Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 5.1 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 ,ECURITY INFCEMTION TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 (2) In coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense assisted in -securing voluntarystatellient documentation from dorth Korean and Chinese POWs which invali- dates contentions alleging brutality and abuse in UNC POW camp treatment and screening. This project continues, (3) Through an inter-departmental committee to combat Communist propaganda, the Departwent of Defense assisted in the conduct of a constant analysis of the various gambits of the Soviet propaganda ranging from the intense 'Tate America Campaign!, to the new "peace" line dating from March 1953. This group has bought intediate and long-range means of forestalling or counter- ing such propaganda and has reached agreement on certain conclu- sions and recommendations regarding measures the United States should adopt toward these various Soviet efforts, (4) Germ7arfare: I continuous counter-measures cam- paign was carried on by the Department of Defense in coordination with the Department of State, nnd other agencies, to combat Com- munist propaganda Charges that the United States had waged biolog- ical and chemical warfare in Korea, (a) Through an inter-departmental committee, progress was made in developing plans and -weans for set- ting forth the U. S. position regarding such false charges. (b) Through the Department of State, assistance was provided to the L. S. Representative to the United Nations, As a positive program, every effort has been made to release as much information as possible consistent with military security. Some indications as to the success of these countermeasures may be reflected in the obvious de- crease of Communist germ warfare charges in the U. N. SCUktITY INFORMTION TO SCICET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of 28 Pares B(3 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET SECTION III ANNEX 13' FIB D-47 July 29 1953 Military activities having psychological implication 3 conducted by the Department of Defense during the reporting period.' 1. Disr)..ays of StrenFitll 22. Significant news releases were made covering facets of U. S. military strength and technical ability. Effort was directed toward securing the maximum favorable psychological effects regarding release of such data. Major releases within this informational area included: (1) Continuing emphasis upon development and potential use of nuclear weapons in a tactical role: Supporting evidence was readily available from coverage of the series of closely- spaced atomic tests at Yucca Fitts which included the deployment of ground troops and the successful firing of the 280-mm artillery piece. (2) Steady development of the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROMA) troop strewth and cmbat efficiency. (See 6�c IV, Subpara. 4 A_(1)) 124, Certain news leaks tended, to some extent, to reinforce expository comment concerning U.S. strength status and technological capacity; significant amen(); these for the period were: (I) Speculation that the U.S. had successfully test-detonated a therm nuclear device at Eniwetok Atoll with results vastly more devastating than heretofore known to mankind. (2) Comment from Paris concerning the projected deployment of U.S. artillery battalions equipped with the new 280-mm gun to Europe for integration into the NATO Command. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET � 13 of 28 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 P 0 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SE URITY INDDRMATION TOP SEGRAT ANNEX B PSB D-47 Ally 29, 1955 (3) Quotations of a member of the Congressional Committee - on Atonic Energy to the effect that the U S now holds sufficient atonic weapons in stockpiles to permit forceful and immediate retaliation against aggressive attack and to backstop the conduct of a major war. cp A favorable report has been made by State Department on psychological value of the B-29 flights conducted over Malaya on 15 December 1952. 2. Comb,ined Maneuvers and Exercifes: A total of six such operations were conducted within NATO. All wore command post shake�downs of portions of the NATO Staff alignment, except RENDEZVOUS, a naval maneuver in the losiditerranean which was participated in by fleet elements of the U.S., France Great Britain, Italy, Greece, lnd Turkey, Salient portions of this exercise involved the simulated atomic bombing of Toulon, and the landing of Turkish and Greek forces in Greece and Turkey respectively. SECURITY INFORMATION 20P SECRET 14 of 25 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29# 1953 SECTION TV Implications of Department of Defense activities producing psycho- logical effects in foreign areas, including good-will efforts and related activities of the Services in such areas. I. Psychological Rogulte of Presence of U. S, Personnel Abroad: a, Through the Committee on Acceptance of Americans Abroad, which is designed to improve relations between Americans and foreign nationals, the Department of Defense has continued to monitor and assist, as epproprilte, the activities of coordinating subcommittees in each country in Europe in which American troops are located, and in Japan. 124. Although committee reports indicate that their work has boon fairly effective, nevertheless some of the problems inherent in the stationing of U.S. nilitry and civilian personnel abroad remain. From time to time reports are received of friction between foreign nationals and U.E. nationals in various areas. Subsequent analysis, however, has shown that most of these frictions were in- consequential and to be expected. In addition to cementing closer troop-civilian relationships, effort to improve the area orient- ation training of all U.S. personnel selected for assignment overseas has continued. 2. MDAP Prorram: Of tht total MDAP deliveries of $5.3 billion to date, the volume of military equipnent shipped to our partners in the Mutual Security Program in the first our months of calendar year 1953 has totaled $1,436 million. U. S. information offices have emphasized that positive accomplishments in the international re-armament effort are not the responsibility of the U.S. alone: That while the U.S. is doing its share, it is necessary that our p-rtners shoulder their shares of the burden. SECURITY INFORMATION 15 TOP SECRET of 28-Fages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8- Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 gECURITY INFORMATIOp TOP SEC:T.4i ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 290 1953 3. Offshore Procurpme4t (9SO,i a. Contracts placed by Department of Defense procurement agencies abroad from FY 1952 and FY 1953 VDU funds totaled $1,757,127,310 as of 30 May 1953. Of this, $1,722,717,860 has been placed in Europe and 04,409,450 has been placed in the Far East. Contracts were let in all European NhT0 countries as well as in West Germany and Switzerland, while contracts in the For .East were let in Japan and Formosa. b Although OSP basically fulfills military requirements, supplementary economic and political aspects are involved. For example, the coordinated policy of the U. S. Government, agreed upon between Defense, State, and the Director for Mutual Security, provided that procurement agencies of the Department of Defense in Europe would try to place about 150 million in OSP contracts in Italy prior to the holding of the Italian elections in an effort to support the DeGasperi governmnt. This target was exceeded and although the DeGasperi govi.rnmeni did not achieve the electoral vote hoped for, this project undoubtcely contributed to keeping DeGasperi in office. c. As a result of OSP contracts, jobs have been created or employment sustained in a variety of European defense industries including weapons, ammunition., electronics, automotive vehicles and spare parts, construction equipment, small water craft, and aircraft equipment and spare parts. The aggregate impact of these contracts on the economies of the nations participating have had beneficial results. Increased employment has been achieved in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, lreece, and The Netherlands, and continued SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 16 of 28 'ages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 :uly 29 1953 industrial activity assured in varying degrees in all of the parti cipating countries, Efforts continue to place contracts so as to benefit non-Communist segments of the countries involved: 4. 2uRport to Friendly Nations: a. Republic of Korea: (1) The ROMA was expanded from twelve to sixteen divisions. This action was publicized widely to show the steady development of a modern ROK fighting machine. The ROK Defense Ministry there- upon claimed, that it could man 85 per cent of the 155-mile line of contact. The 13 May authorization for activation of an additional four divisions will bring RONA combat power up to twenty divisions (2) On 25 February the U.S. agreed to pay $85 million to the RON in settlement of Korean "Won" issued to U.S. troops in Korea. This served to bolster the South Korean public's confidence in the new 1Whan" currency and raised to a reported $159:990,440 the amount of ROK currency bought by the U.S. during the was. (3) Continued civil relief and rehabilitation was made avail- able to the South Korean people through Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK), United Nations Korean Relief Ar:Lency (UNKRA), and voluntary private programs. 124. The Ryukyu Islands: The civil information and education opram in the Ryukyus was continued to include the "Exchange of Persons Pi.ogram", whereby Ryukyuan national leaders and students were brought to the U.S. for periods of study. 2.1. Indochina: C-119 aircraft wore lent to French forces in Indo- china for the purpose of transporting heavy equipment to repulse the aggressive Communist attack on Laos: Some twenty-one additional SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 17 of 2S-Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECPET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 195, C-47 aircraft on loan from FEAF to the French in Indochina remain in that area past the 1 April due date for their return upon recom- mendation of CINCUNC. d. Thailand: Upon request of the Thai government at the time of the invasion of Laos, a shipment of aircraft and a quantity of ammuni. tion was provided. The Secretary of State commended prompt action in this matter. 5. NATO Editors' Tours: Four U.S. tours have been conducted: Three being for editors and correspondents and one for information officers from various NATO countries. All the European NATO countries have had representa- tives on one or more of these trips. A total of forty-four foreign nationals have participated. b. Reports from Public Affairs Officers in NATO countries indicate that the U.S. tours constitute one of the most effective single activities in the U.S. infornatien program. 6. Resident Foreign correspondeqgi Numerous special interviews, feature story material releases and occasional special trips to U.S. military installations are arranged by DOD for foreign correspondents re- siding in the U.S. In addition to general stories, attempts were made to effect special guidance in line with the particular political and psycho- logical problems of a particular country or area of the world, 7. Good-will Efforts ax Headquarters, USAF and Readqurrters, USAFE have approved a good-will tour of NATO countries by Major Fred Blesse, USAF, jet air ace of Korean fighting, to be conducted in summer of 1953. �ECURITY INFORMATION TOP _SECRET 18 of 2U-pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 P 0 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SEOURIT INFORMATION TOP SECREI ANNEX B PSB D-47 Jay 29, 1953 12AL Top officers of Headquarters, TJEUE participated in anni- versary ceremonies of the RICHTOFEN WING, composed of veteran German fliers and named in honor cf the firmed German World War I ace, 15 April 1953. .9.2. U. 8. Ambessader to Ecuador reports that airlift conducted by 5 USAF C-47 's during spring floods along the Quito-Guayaquil railway in April 1953 caused admiration in all circles. dx. In response to appeals of Turkish government officials for relief in earthquake-torn areas during March 1953, ULAF "Flying Boxcars" loaded with medicine, blankets and food were dispatched from Germany to Istrnbul and the Dardanelles province of Canakkrlow e. U.S. military units of Europe gave prompt and generous assis.- trnce to the Dutch and English during the February flood disaster along the North Sea coastline. At the initiative of responsible U.S, representrtives, American helicopters, transport planes, naval ampbibi- MB and rescue craft arid communic-tion facilities were mobilized and committed to the saving of life el-id property. Participating aircraft were named "rescuing angels" by grateful Hollanders and an American airman was presented Britainta second highest award for rescuing stranded villagers during the height of the storm. Money and clothing were contributed to the Dutch victims of the flood by ships companies of the destroyers BRI;TCL and JOHNSON and by the personnel of the aircraft carrier WRIGHT in nemory of the welcome recorded that ship by the people of Rotterdam in September 1952. The American Amb(ssador to The Netherlands concluded "the friendly attitude of The Netherlands people teward the U.S. n y well h've reached r postwar high". An earthqurke at Taroud, Iran, on 14 February caused serious damage and threatened starvation to the population. Highlighting EDCURITY INFORMATION TOP SECFET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 19 of 28 pages j Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURIT:LINFORMATION TOP SECRFT ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 numerous and effective relief services performed by American military and Red Cross personnel in this disaster was the airdropping of 3000 Kgs of bread to the people of Taroud, EA. On the occasion of extending a personal welcome to his home- coming Korean brigade, Emperor Haile Selassie was entertained February 7 by Commander Middle East Forces on board the U.S.S. DUXBURY BAY cruising from Massawa to Djiboute. The trip was reported by American Embassy despatch as h(ving boon a gesture greatly appre- ciated by the Emperor as well as the Ethiopian officials and public and as a most helpful contribution to U.S.-Ethiopian relations� h. Arrangements are being made by the. Navy for dedication of the nearly completed St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, Memorial Hospital erected as a gift of the American people in gratitude for the heroic efforts of the townspeople of St. Lawrence and Lawn in the rescue of survivors of the U.S.S. POLLUX and U,S.S. TRUXTUN when wrecked in a gale near St. Lawrence in Februar.s, 1942, SECURITY INFORMATION 'TOP SECRET 20 of 28 pages . Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8 (j `d, "u Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INF CR-VATION TOP SECRET SECTION V ANNEX B PSB D-47 Aily 29, 1953 Lessons learned through evaluation of Department of Defense psych- ological activities during this period, Requirements which, if met, would assist in the development of a more effective contribution of the Department of Defense to the national psychological effort, a. A positive national psychological strategy, to include a determination of intermediate objectives and priorities for direct support tasks, without resort to "cold" or "hot" war qualifications. b. A review of Public Law 402 and NSC 59/1 with the object of including provision for the fuller utilization of existing military potentials in support of the current national psycholog- ical effort. c. The enunciation of national policies for the conduct of unconventional warfare within multi-national structures. National clandestine Service agreements, with international implications likely to affect the conduct of U. s, military operations in time of war, are of concern to the (hint Chiefs of Staff, 2. Psychological opportunities brought to light by analysis of past activities and their relationship to future courses of action, In view of the lessons learned in fostering cordial troop- civilian relations in Europe a program providing for the accept- ance of American perscnnel to be stationed in Spain has been inaugurated. For the first time, USAF installations and American personnel will be maintained on Spanish soil starting Fall of 1953. In order to build good will from the start, a USAF committee has SECURITY INFORkiATION TOP SECRET ....��������.1�11,������� 21 of 26 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY_INFCRPATION TOP 3EoRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 29, /953 been established to conduct a study of likely community relations problems and recommend actions for proper orientation of American civilians and military personnel concerned with stationing troops in Spain. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 22 of 23 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET SECTION VI ANNEX B PSB D-47 Jay 29, 1953 New evidence of reactions to activities conducted during previous reporting periods. 1. The report situation, by country, of the implementation of POC D-38/lfollows; a. Iceland: No major developments; the waiting list of U.S. personnel for matriculation in the Icelandic course estab- lished at Reykjavik University points up a desire on the part of our personnel to develop cultural understanding. b. United Kingdom: There were indications that accounts of British ill-feeling toward American Servicemen had been greatly exaggerated by that segment of the British press which was de- voted to communistic, chauvinistic, or sensationalized editorial policies. It is maintained that the public relations situation is basically healthy and is primarily the result of the conduct of U, S. troops themselves. The British Government has estab- lished a high-level committee, under the Air Minister, to hold civil-military relations under control. Some twenty-seven groups and associations are represented on this committee; its effort is aimed toward maintaining proper direction of local comittees in whiph commanding officers, Chaplains, and unit PIO's take part. c. Frances France appears to be leading the way in an effort to resolve difficulties in French-American relations. By continu- ing joint effort, at both central and local levels, significant steps have been taken in the direction of improved relations. The "Franco-American Committee" mechanism is developing to the point where the resolution of frictions rapidly can become reality. SECURITY INFOREATION TOP sEctlEt 23 of 28 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INPOR4TION TOP ,:EtFt.E.11 AMPEX D PSB 047 . J41 29, 1953 d Italy!: Despite a Committee report from home dated 26 January which asserted that the presence of U. S. troops in Italy (in Leghorn, Florence, and Naples) does not constitute a serious public opinion problem at present, there were reported indications that the public reaction in Italy was characterized by increasing sensitivity to "U. S. intervention" in Italian affairs. Utilization of this "interventionist" line of attack by Communists and neo-Fascists to influence the numerous splinter parties arrayed against the DeGa.speri government may intensify troop-civil relations problems. lioreover, it has been noted that - as yet - no rer)resentatives of the Italian government have joined the established committee in Rome; e. West Germapzi Comparison surveys indicate that there has been a gradual improvement in the status of troop-civil rela- tionS. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET - of 28 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATICN TOP SECRET ANNEX 13 PSB D-47 July 29e 1953 SECTION VII The actual and estimated psychological and unconventionel warfare expenditures of the Department of Defenso for the fiscal year 1951 through 1958. 1. Background Regarding Expenditurql: The psychological and un� conventional warfare role of the units responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires that capabilities be dev(loped in peacetime so that specialized equipment and trained personnel may be immediately available to the military commander in support of his psychological warfare and unconventional warfare missions. The major portion of expenditures presented provide for the specialized equipment, training, material and research necessary, to meet projected wartime requirements. 2. The expenditures listed below do not include such activities as goodwill visits, disaster aid, denonstrttions, MDAP, and many other normal military activities having psychological implications, expenditures for which cannot be separately identified. 3. Special Assumptions: In the preparation of estimates for fiscal years 1954 through 1958, the following assumptions have been made: aL That hostilities in Korea will terminate at the close of FY 1953. h That domestic and foreign price levels and cost indices will remain relatively stable. st. That no now areas of operational activity will be opened. 4. Military Force Expenditures: The figures reported in the following table cover Service expenditures for unconventional and psycho� logical warfare with the exception of research and development, which is presented separately. These expenditures are shown in millions of AELURITY INFOPMATIO11 TOP SECRET 25 of 28 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 3a7 Z9, 1953 dollars to the nearest tenth. There are no unobligated or carry-over funds to report as of 30 June 19534 FISCAL PERIOD ����������0������� ARM;( �����������4010.��� NAV% AIR 1951 5.0 None 21.0 1952 15.1 .6 21.0 2953 )4,9 .7 21.6 1954 8.6* 0.*** 3.8 1955 8.6 .1 **** 1956 8.6 .1 1957 8.6 .1 1958 1 TOTALS _gh. 82.0** 1.8 67.4 TOTAL 26�0. 36.7 41.2 12.5 8.7 8.7� 8.7 4.7._ 15142 *DA Figures from FY 54 on are based, additionally, on assumption that Army PtyWar troop strengths will remain constant with the exception that FECOM staffs will be reduced to current EUCOM levels. **DA funding reports on psychological warfare operation;, it does not include Special Forces activities or unconventional warfare operations. ***Navy reduction from 193 due to .6 million becoming reimbursable from CIA for Navy personnel costs. ****usAF estimates beyond 7Y 54 are not available due to adjustments in process necessitated by revised FY 54 budget. 51 Service Research and Development Exnenditures: The figures reported in the table next following lists actual and estimnted expenditures for fiscal years 1951 through 1958 and esti= ted carry-over funds on 30 June 1953. The expenditures are for non-material or social science research conducted under technical objectives assigned by the Research and Development Board, ZURI7 INFORMATION TOP' SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 26 of 28 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY IIVORIvIATION TOP �SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 014y 29k 3953 6. It will be noted that estimates for FY 1954 are considerably below expenditures for the past tvo years due to existing budget policy, The present budget figures are -consequently presented as interim estimates until such time as the future status of psychological and unconventional warfare research is clarified,. SE,CURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 27 of 28 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORilTION � TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 at/y 292 /953 ADVISORY GROUP ON PSYCHOLOGICAL AND UNCOAVEJTIONAL VARFAhE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD '1aelington 25, D. C, ACTUAL AkiD ESTIMATT EXPENDITURES OF DEPARTMENT 01 DEFEJSE ON MY0HOLOC4CAL AND UNCbPV&ATIONAL WARFARE hON-mAT ER IEL EARCH, FY :951 THLOUGH FY 1'1158 AS OF Arat 1953 FY '54 plus Estimated 'FY 154* FY 153 Carry,over (Less Carry- Expenditures June 30, 153 Car- over Estimated Expenditures** FY151 FYI52 FY153 1953 ry-oval Funds FY155 FiI56 FYI57 FYI58 Army .2 1.2 0 .8 .8 1.1 112 1.3 1,4 Navy .2 .1 .05 0 .05 ;05 .05 .05 ,05 .05 USAF .7 ,9 .7 .7 .2 .9 HHi� TOTAL 1.1 1,9 2.0 .7 1.0 1.7 1.15 1m25 105 1.45 (The expenditures shown rre in millions of dollrrs to the nerrest tenth) * Interim estimates pending consideration by OSD of fiscal recommendations of Final Report of the Advisory Group on Psychological and Unconventional Warr fare to the RDB (RDB-PC 202/34), dated 6 April 1953 ** Project estimates based on current policies for reduced fiscal support, *** Air Force reports that estimated expelditures for FY 1955 and beyond are not available since projection of USAF program plans is uncertain at this time. SECURITY INFORMATION 28 TOP SECRET of 2E�pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ��������������/����.� Report of the Mutual Security Agency to the Psychological Strategy Board on the National Psychological Effort January 1 - June 30, 1953 (Part I: Europe) ANNEX C PSB D-47 Jay n, 1953 1. Status of Programs A. TaS.:s As:agned The specific tasks of 1,.SA are set forth by Congress in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Sec. 2 (a): if to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world,..." and in Sec. 2 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952: 1,� the Congress believes it essential that this Act should be so administered as to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe." The Information Division of PISA has had the job of helping to bring about the results set forth above by the media techniquescom- mon to information activity. Funds for this purpose have been avail- able by authority of Sec. 115 (j) of the retained provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act, which orders the giving of "full and contin- uous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media, so as to inform the peoples of the participating countries regarding the assistance, including its purpose, source, and character, furnished by the American taxpayer," It is necessary to say at the outset that Information activity as such is silaply an instrument that assists in attaining the objectives of policy. The very fact that there is a Mutual Security Program is the greatest affirmative factor in MSAls psyChological program. It is a SECURITY INFORMATION AoRta 1 of 17 pages 1MM �-�11�M�1.1�011.11. Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8 Tc - Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFCRMATION ANNEX C RET- PSB D-47 *Idly 29, 1953 mistake, in the opinion of NSA Information directors, for the United States in its public utterances to over-emphasize the military aspects of its overseas economic program; instead, it should show how the military aspects of the program complement the total economy. The NSA task in Europe during the first half of 1953 has been to create and to nurture in the minds of Europeans the faith that the United States would continue under the new Administration to support mutual security activities on an effective scale* Its job also has been to keep its friends in power and to fight Communism. B. Methods and Techniques Employed to Accomplish Tasks Substantively, the ASA method of acoomplishing its aims is to provide funds to help America's European friends produce needed material and to provide the leadership capable of leading and persuading them to act in the mutual interest. The off-shore procurement program is one example of the method employed. Placing of important "hardware" con- tracts at a strategic time during an election campaign is a refinement of such a technique. The NSA Information Division has sought to get maximum useful effect from such substantive acts by publicizing them through all media, explaining the beneficial effect. Thus, in conjunction with USIS, the Eisenhower April 16 speech was given maximum publicity - such as wide distribution of the full text - as evidence of U. S. devotion to peace and world economic progress* Thus also IBA built and financed large exhibits (which bore the names of local sponsors) for use in Italy during the election campaign, as an aid to the Embassy's public affairs program. Currently MLA's regional office in Paris is concentrating on a program to arouse new interest in the SECURITY INFORMAT ION SLORET 2 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ' ANNEX C PSB D-47 July 29s 1953 shift of the productivity program to OEEC as evidence of European ac- ceptance of the idea of productivity, European direction of the program, and continued U. S. support of European economic improvement. The re- cent East German riots against the Communist government are being pointed out - through indigenous outlet- . as evidence that life under the Reds is unbearable for the worker. This is important in combating neutralist sentiment as in France and in helping to win workers away from the Communist.dominated labor unions. C. The media most in use are the conventional ones - the press, the radio, the cinema, exhibits at fairs and other gatherings, distribu- tion of pamphlets, mobile units capable of reaching remote places and fitted out to make use of the cinema, the loud speaker, the poster - all audio visual devices, This is done everywhere in cooperation with the International Information AdminiAration, and the proportion of expenditure and effort by media is governed by the experience of the country mission. Thus, in Greece, the IZA has provided numerous com- munity radio sets for remote areas, adding an estimated 2,0001000 listen- ers to U. S.-inspired programs over the Greek radio. A radio news service has been made available to broadcasters in several countries the PBA messages being interspersed in the news, An example of fast, effective action was the making of a documentary film, �The Oldest Enemy," based on the Dutch floods of February and which showed how nations working together (actually, the NATO countries) could minimize the effects of catastrophe and by collective effort avoid catastrophe save in exceptional circumstance. This film, made within three weeks of the disaster, was shown in movie houses in many countries, The moral of the film was brought out by the deeds it pictured. The application SECURITY INFORMATION 3 SECRET of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 0 u Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFOWIATION SECRET ANNEX C POI D-47 ittIF *43 t955 of the lesson to the more abstract danger of the Russian menace .as easy for the simplest of spectators. D. lhat success was achieved in carrying out assigned tasks (in terms of B'ind e)T � The principal contribution that MSA has made to this type of activity is the development of a regional center capable of servicing and advising multi-national projects quickly. Although subject to policy guidance.and scue budgetary direc- tion from Washington, the regional Information center connected with the Office of the Special Representative in Europe was and is in many ways self-contained. It has learned that effective use can be made of talent- ed non-Americans.Speaking the languages of the target groups, using skills and techniques familiar to those groups, such nonAmericans have made much MSA/SRE-produced material more effective than had it been produced in America. European groups working toward the same goals of economic, political, and military unity that we seek have turned to the SRE for technical help as well as for funds. The work nproductiviten and what it means have become well known in Europe, where five years ago neither the idea nor the name was known to many. Now the idea repre- sented by productivity has become a target of the Reds, a seeming indica- tion that the idea is hurting them. E. Tasks not carried out or not completed. The goals the U S. has set as requested by kISA constitute a continuing campaign of persuasion, assistance, leadership. However) specific immediate gains contributing to the thole have been made. These include the re-election of the De Gasperi Government in Italy, the actual beginning of operations of the Coal and Steel pool, and the decision by OLEC to administer the productivity campaign. SECURITY INFCRMION 4 SECRET of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SXRET ANNEX C. PSI) D-47 290 1953 F. What ancillary results, if any, were obtained as a la:product of programs? In seeking to counteract Red propaganda, IBA has in France been able to learn ahead of time, occasionally, what turn the next Red propaganda line would take* G. Major obstacles or difficulties encountered. 1. Increased feeling in Europe that present U. S. adminis- tration is controlled by "reactionary" or anti-European elements in Congress. 2* The "stretch-out" of U. S. contribution to NATO was al- lowed to become public under such circumstances that it was made to seem to Europeans that the U. a. was losing interest in NATO while ask- ing its allies to add to their loads. 3. Responsiveness to the Soviet "peace offensive" by all but the most responsible European leaders. 4. Political jockeying in 2rance, and to some extent in Italy and Germany, which subordinated foreign policy to party interests. 5. Ability of anti-American groups and some neutralists like Le Monde, to make propaganda capital of newsworthy events, like the Rosenberg case and the Rhee recalcitrance. 6. Unfavorable reaction of many Europeans to the withdrawal of some books from American libraries abroad. The public conduct of the matter gave anti-Americans a good propaganda subject and gave pause to some of our friends. 7. Continued economic distress of lower income groups in Italy, France and Greece. 8. Growing conviction among many public opinion molders that EDC will not become a reality and that Russia does not contemplate armed aggression in the vest in the discernible future. SECURITY INFORMATION ITCRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 5 of 17 pages b Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX C PSB D-47 July 2f, 1953 9, The French government's inability to keep a Cabinet in office' long enough for it to have a policy for which it can be respon- sible. 10. Occasional utterances by U. S. leaders which are made to seem to show that this government is not sure of its policy. The recent speech by Senator Taft which was interpreted as threatening a "go it alone policy is of this category. 11. Occasional failures of coordination sometimes have ad- verse effects. A case in point was Public testimony before a Congres- sional committee by an evaluation team leader who was critical of con- tinued aid to Italy. This testimony would have been just as valuable for Congressional purposes after the June 7 Italian election as it was when given before the election - and it quite possibly figured in the way some votes went in a close election* 2. Summary of major developments in Psychological Programs A. (1) Principally, the letting of contracts under criteria that took into account economic and political conditions of that country and Europe as a whole, rather than the single criterion of cost. (2) Continuation of American forces in urope and the appoint- ment of a third Al&rican as commander of SAPE. (3) Speedy assistance given the Dutch during the floods. (4) The granting of ,.?50,0,101000 for stockpiling and other purposes in west Berlin, and its announcement during the East German riots, is another example of substantive action being taken at a propi- tious time and favorably exploited. (5) The up-coming hSA pact with Spain already presents an Information problem which will become more acute as the treaty is signed. SECURITY INFORMATION ' SXRET 6 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 r Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX C PSB D-h7 Aar 29? 1953 hany European friends of the United States want to know how we justify helping Franco Spain. The Information Officer in Norway has cited the need for a statement on this subject. A Belgian exchange student stated the problem thus: PI have listened to VOA and have been impressed by American idealism. How can you help Spain and keep on talking the way you do an VOA?" (6) The signing of the Foreign Aid bill by the President will offer a new opportunity for a strong statement similar to the April 16 speech. The Mutual Security Actis statement of purpose emphasizes America's interest.. A statement by the President re-emphasizing the broader philosophy of mutual aims of the common man would be of great psychological value. B. Public announcement of the letting of contracts was timed for the best effect psychologically. Thus, signing of huge aircraft con- tracts with England Holland, Belgium, and Italy was timed to occur dur- ing the April NATO meeting. dide coverage was given the Dutch flood co- ordinated relief via all media, including a quickly-made documentary film. C. Principal developments during the reporting period were (1) further integration of NSA and State Department informa- tion programs, (2) the recommendation of the President to form one United States Information Agency using the resources of the present IIA and NSA, and (3) the melding of the MBA and Point. Br programs, which should make the same substantive resources go farther and which by indicating prolongation of technical and economic aid reassure our friends. SECURITY INFORMATION SEP,RET 7 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX C PSB D-47 July P9, 1953 D. most significant is the close cooperation by SRE and the De- fense Department in 'carrying out a program to smooth U S. troop rela- tions with local camuunities, The Armed Services have researched the problems involved, and ShE has with its resources in funds and techni- cians sought to provide the answers. Pamphlets, exhibits, and films are being produced for this puipose� and it appears as of this report that relations already are lees strained than they were six months ago: Explanation beforohand of why U. S. troops are there that they are really NATO troops .4. is the key to the problem. Ei NSA in Europe continues to work closely with other governments and with international groups, particularly NATO. A caravan explaining NATO, designed' operated and financed by SRE/NSA and sponsored by NATO, traveled in Greece and Turkey during much of the time covered by this report. It is now touring France again, The Train of Europe, under OEEC sponsorship, has been touring the continent* Coverage of NATO maneuvers for and in conjunction with �trier agencies has been the rule, NSA has assisted groups like the European Movement and the Union of European Federalist* to carry on their unifying work, as well as the ICFTU in aiding the free trade union movements, 3. Significant changes which have occurred since the previous report. (a) Change of U. S. administration with consequent European "wait and seen psychology; (b) Death of Stalin and accession of either new dictator or an oligarchy, with the same "wait and seen psychology natural to Western Europe; (c) Soviet "peace offensive," for Whatever it may mean; (d) Korean situation (hoped for armistice and Rhee complication); SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET 8 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORKZION SEoRET ANNEX C PSB D-47 11), 1953 (e) East Berlin riots and Czechoslovak riots) indicating possible other explosions for which plans should be made; (f) dragging of the EDC ratification schedule; (g) Change in SRE organization and in Paris regional U. S. Repre- sentative; (h) Yugoslav, Turkish, Greek pact, GENERAL OBSERVATIONS NSA in cooperation with State and Defense has worked out a plan for continued analysis and evaluation of Information programs in Europe and elsewhere. Implementation of the idea has been stymied by a direc- tive from Washing-on suspending all public opinion surveys abroad, Such surveys are valuable and can be conducted via private agencies without necessarily embarrassing the U. 3, 2. Notwithstanding evidence of a rise in neutralism) the outstand- ing psychological characteristic of urope today appears to be the will- ingness of the majority of the people of every nationality to trust the good intentions) good faith) and ability to act effectively of the U. S. Many Emmpenns)however) are skeptical of the abilities and ultimate in- tentions of othPr European countries, 3. The recognition of the U. S. desire to improve Europe's overall economic health (as exemplified by ECA) is consistent with the European's belief in U. S. good intentions and relative unselfishness. Emphasis on strictly military aspects is not good psychologically) because it gives the Reds an nI told you so" line) and because military emphasis is ids- leading. However) an armaments industry) like any other, creates the wages and the demand for other consumer goods) which aids the general economy. SECURITY INFCREATION SECRET 9 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 2 ' Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFCRPIATION SECRET -- - ANNEX 0 PSB D-47 09t 1953 4. It is noteworthy that while the "peace offensive" has cut down Russian "hate America" material, local Communist parties have not les- sened.their harping on this theme. SECURITY INFCRMATION SECRET 10 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 �1 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX c SECRI (Part II: Far East) PSB D-47 Jay 29k 1953 1. Summary of Program A. Tasks Assigned Mutual Security Agena No tasks per se have been assigned mSA for the Far Last area in the overall psychological program, In the four Far East countries participating in the mutual Security Program - Formosa, The Associated States of Indochina, Philippines and Thailand - the MSA Missions provide extensive technical assistance designed to strengthen both governments and communities through the improvement of public health, food produc- tion, education and public administration and through the more effective utilization of their national resources. In Formosa, MSA is also providing economic aid to counter inflationary pressures, to bolster the government budget and to support the military build-up through the importation of supplies, such as petro- leum, food and cotton, required by the armed forces, and through the con- struction of joint-use facilities, such as roads, bridges, ports, ware- houses and barracks. In Indochina, MSA also provides direct military support by constructing joint-use facilities, assisting in the care and rehabilitation of war refugees and by financing relocation projects de- signed to aid in the pacification of North Viet Nam. In the Philippines, MSA has the corollary task of inducing the Philippine Government to under- take the extensive administrative and legislative changes which the Bell Mission deemed essential to the creation of political and ecohoMic sta- bility,. The psychological effects grow out of such technical assistance and economic aid programs... The data given in the following pages are presented against this background. SECURITY INFORMATION .SECRET 11 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORhATION, ANNEX C PSB D-47 Ally 29, 1953 B. Methods and Techniques Employed in Accomplishing These Tasks NSA Missions have carried on three types of informational work. First, they have conducted general information activities designed to increase understanding and to secure public acceptance of the NSA pro- gram. Second, they have disseminated specific information in order to secare the requisite wide-scale participating in programs to improve health practices and agricultural techniques. Third, they have strength- ened the information services of the participating governments. This work has been carried on tarough the usual channels of press and photo stories, newsreels, motion pictures and radio programs; wall newspapers, posters, picture leaflets, calendars, regular magazines and the like. In some instances this work has led to the establishment of photo laboratories, motion picture production units, radio transmis- sion stations and printing plants. C. Concepts of Operations in the Far East The high level of illiteracy has required emphasis upon the use of pictorial forms of communication; motion pictures, posters, picture leaflets, cartoon strips and exhibits NSA believes that the tangible accomplishments of the aid programs constitute the most con- vincing proof of U. S. friendship and support. D. lbat Success was Achieved in Carryiu out the Assigned Tasks All the Far East Missions have publicized the contribution made by NSA toward improving health, food production and the general economic well-being of the people,. In Formosa, MSA, the Joint Commission on hural Reconstruction (JCRR) and USIS jointly sponsor the magazine "Harvest," which supplies the farming People with agricultural information as well as with SECURITY INFORMATION S1XRET 12 of 17�Fages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Q ' Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SLCURITY INFCREATION ANNEX 0 SLaBET P313 D-47 Juy 29, 1953 international and local news items. This magazine has reached a circula- tion of 42,000 and has been so successful that it may be possible to place it upon an entirely self-supporting basis within the coming year. hore than 3c0 farmers' associations, organized with the help of the JUR, are well-provided with MSA and JCER material such as posters and pamphlets explaining the projects undertaken by the J0Rh. These projects and fiSA activities in general are well publicized by the local press and radio and enjoy wide popular support. In Viet Nam, "Countryside," the farmers' journal published by the Vietnamese Government with ASA financing and technical assistance, has reached a circulation of 50,000. mSA and USIS also sponsored a highly successful exhibit at the big "Kermesse," a fair attended by more than 1,20,000 people* This exhibit, based on the theme, "Toward Peace in Viet Nam," depicted the natural resources of Viet Nam, the nations friendly to Viet Nam, and the military, economic and productive power that supports the Free ,vorld in its efforts to establish peace and security. The Aission has supported the government's information service by providing training in the use of informational media to specialists selected by the French and by Viet Nam. The radio programs prepared with NSA assistance and designed to explain the policies of the Associated States Governments to village audiences are increasing in popularity* In Thailand, the use of joint USIS and NSA exhibits has expanded with the Thai Government duplicating many of the exhibits and giving them further circulation. A substantial portion of both the town and rural population see these exhibits at numerous fairs where the response has been gratifying. In the Philippines, hSA has assisted the Government in develop- ing its information services, thereby enabling it tO increase its support SECURITY INFORIATION 13 SECRET of 17 pages 0 IT/ Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C ' SECRET PSB D-47 Jay 29, 1953 among the people. Economic assistance, designed to improve the statue of the farmer-on-the.-land and of the. arban worker, provided in conjunc- tion with U. S. military aid under the M.D.A.P., has substantially con- tributed to the Philippine Governmentis efferts to establish peace and, order. E. Tasks not carried out or not completed afin,r������������������ None to be reported. F. Ancillary Results None, G. Major Obstacles In Formosa a major objective of hSA assistance is to achieve economic stability which is essential to the maintenance, of confidence in the competence and permanence of the National Government of the Re- public of China. A major obstacle to the achievement of this objective is the necessity for supporting a 550,000-man military establishment which makes no ccntribution to the economy of the island. In Indochina, the technical assistance program has been handi- capped to some extent by the terms of the basic agreements between France and the Associated States which provide that non-French technical experts shall be employed only when French experts are not available, This provision has been a serious obstacle only in the field of publid administration, In the Philippines and Thailand the major obstacles to the achievement of hSA objectives are those inherent in all under-developed economies - widespread illiteracy, a shortage of skilled and professional workers, inadequate investment capital and relatively inefficient govern- mental administration. ShCURITY SECRET 14 of 17-pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 ^-1 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFULATION ANNEX C SECRET - PSB D-47 Agy P90 1953 In the Philippines, in addition, there has been some friction between the U. S. representation and the quirino Government resalting from the disclosures of the Hardie report on land tenure conditions and from charges that the Americana have been attempting to influence the coming elections. 2. Summary of major developments in the psychological programs during the reporting period Since the operations of the Far East STEhs are not a part of an over-all psychological program, there is nothing to report under-this section. 3. Significant changes which have occurred since the period covered by the preceding report. (Far East-Philippines, Formosa, Associated States of Indo China, and Thailand) Gradually during the reporting period, the emphasis of the work of the NISA/STLks has moved from general information to more emphasis on program support and the build-up of the local government's information services, This change will continue in the coming period as NSA with- draws entirely from the area of general information, The suspension of U. S. technical assistance to Burma, at the re- quest of the Burmese Government, has shown other under-developed coun- tries that American assistance programs are truly cooperative in nature and will not be imposed on countries which prefer not to participate in them. Throughout the Far ,ast countries receiving LSA assistance there has been a general increase in the use of technical assistance publica- tions, with an accompanying increase in understanding of and respect for American technical achievements. S CUitITI INF CRFLATION CRET 15 of 17 pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 o o ( Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFO REIATION SECRET ANNEX C PSB D-47 Ju1/- 290 1953 L. B, Substantive Subjects or Activities Which Cut Across Area Lines (1) Role of Japanese Conditions remain substantially unchanged since the last report, although in its own self-interests the Philippine Government is moderating its hostility toward Japan. This moderation of attitude has been shown by the Government's grant of amnesty to Japanese war criminals held in the Philippines by its recently-expressed willingness to consider the question of Japanese membership in ICAO separately from its repara- tions claims by its extension of the barter agreement with Japan and by the increasing volume of trade between the two countries, a trade which on balance is favorable to the Philippines. Some moderation of the popu- lar attitude is also reported as evidenced by a slackening in overt demonstrations of hostility toward individual Japanese on the streets of Manila. 5 Steps taken to Implement Approved PSB Plans This phase of the work has been handled by USIS. In most instances the Country Plan has been developed with close cooperation and assistance of .2SA officials. SECURITY INFORMATION SECIIET 16 of 17�Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 C Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION tECRET MUTUAL SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAIvi ANNEX C PSB 0-47 jhly 29, 1953 Project Obligations and Estimated Personnel and Administrative Support Obligations (In millions of Dollars and Dollar Equivalents of Foreign Currencies) FY 1951 FY 1952 FY 1953 18.8 20.3 20.5 Carry-over Funds Available for Obligation after June 301 1953 None FY 1954 FY 1955 FY 1956 FY 1957 FY '58. 7.6 Program transferred to U.S? Information Agency by Re- organization Plan, No, 8 Notes' 1, The FY 1954 figure of �j7.6 million is scheduled for transfer to the new USIA under Reorganization Plan No. 8. This figure excludes 0.0 million of Mutual Security Information themes already transferred to International Information Administration by the Bureau of the Budget and merged with the IIA Program and FY 1954 appropriation request currently before Congress. 2. Figures for FY 1951, 19521 and 1953 include small amounts for NSA audio- visual training and other informationEupport of Technical Assistance activities in the Far hast, but exclude amounts for similar support by Technical Cooperation Administration of its Point 4 activities, SECURITY INFORMATION SEoRET 17 of 17�pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 �.) Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECUI3,ITY INFORAATION TOP SECRET CIA REPORT Ti THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD Janucry � June 1953 EYE ON SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET AN D PSD D-47 347 29, 1953 of 3k Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY INFMATION TOP SECRET ANNTIC D PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 CIA REPORT TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD GENERAL APPRAISAL The effectiveness of political-psychological (FP) operations is not easily or promptly susceptible to satisfactory assessment other than in exceptional cases. At any stage, in its development, CIA successes are measured by the number and importance or operating assets acquired as well as by accomplishments in terms of achievinr U. S. objectives. The major accomplishments of political action and propaganda opera- tions in Western Europe have been in the area of European unification along the lines of the Atlantic unity concept, and in reducing the lx(b)(1) and influence of Communism. Covert operations have been chiefly in (b)(3) support of overt U.S. Government actions to achieve greater military, economic and political cooperation. (W(1) CIA political and psychological operations substantially (b)(3) reduced the threat of Communist political control, although in Italy, CIA fell'somewhat short of its objective to attain an effective majority for the democratic parties in the June national elections. In combatting Communism, actions to expose and counter Communist maneuvers promote political stability. As an example, CIA operations in the field of labor have virtually eliminated the Communist potential to call effec- tive political strikes in Italy. (b)(1) (b)(3) In the European satellite area, CIA's major efforts continued to center on the build.mp of operating potential, Past experience has EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET. Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY 02...111Z2LINFORAI TOP SEOlen ANNEX D PSB D-47 aitty- '29), l95 demonstrated that covert PW0 while serving to foster hope and rally the anti-regime sentiments of the people, to be fully effective, requires (b)(1) (b)(3) concrete evidence of Communist weaknes and resistance activity, as well as tangible signs of growing Western strength in the area. In this frame of reference, Albania, remains the weakest link in the Soviet chain of satellites. EYES �Ng SECURITY INPORMATION TOP SUITT Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) of Pz--:ges 8(jbjj Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYE 011 SECURITY I ORrIA.TION, TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 3ECT.TRITY IV0aMATION TOP SECITT (b)(1 'ANNEX ib)(3) iS13 D-47 307 29, 1553 A OF 14, Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLy SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SPOUT ANNU D (b)(1) PSB D-1,1(b)(3) Jay 29, 1953 The outstanding events of PW significance occurring during the period were the death of talin and the transition of power within the USSR. The importance of both events was area wide 2. STATUS OF PSYCHOLOCICLL PROC$'AMS L. Eathods and Telbnirues Employed 1.1 Appomplishing,these Tdsks: CIA engages in cold wc.r :ptivities through the covert use of tech- niques employing mass propcganda media, front organizations and agents who induce pro-Western orientation of groups and individuals. It employs a wide variety of persuatite means to obtain its ends includinE denial, coercion, material and financial inducement and deception, as well (ID)(1) (b)(3) positive identificatioa of individual, group and national interests of foreign elements with U.S. aims. B. Concepts of Operations by Area: EYES ONLY 17C7-0JTY INFORMATION TOP SEMI of 4.1,/,_ Pages p cl c) c) c) Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES pNIX OCURIIYINFoRwappr TOP SECRET (b)(1) ANNEX D (b)(3) PSB D-47 July 29, -1953 C,. Major obstacles and Diffieulties Encountered; In general Western Europeans were highly critical of undertakings which were popularly accepted both as primarily in the interest of the United tates and U.S. inspired. Certain powerful types of propaganda are most effective when staged against a background of unwavering U.S. strength. Unfortunately, views projected from the platform of U.S. debate sometimes reflect lack of resolution and uncertainty poorly understood abroad. The effect is to undermine confidence in U. S. governmental concepts and leadership, e.g., the confusing role of legislative cam, mittees in speaking or acting on international policy matters, without EYES oply S7CURITY IHFORMLTION TOP SECRU. Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of , 34 , Pczes g Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES 01\114 SECUP IT INFORMATION TOP SECRET (W(1 ) ANNTIC D (b)(3) PSD D,47 j217 29, 1953 executive re sponsibility. EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORWTION TOP SECRTI--- of .44 Pn ge s 8(3 (-; Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONIY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX D PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 agents is the desire to aid in the unification of a free Horea. Past and present policies of the United States and its Western allies toward the Middle East have resulted in deep�seated resentment on the part of the Arabs towards the U.S. role in the creation of the state of Israel and the Arab refugee problam; in growing antipathy throughout the Arab, Asian, and African world directed against the colonial powers and against what is considered an equivocal policy on the part of the U.S. towards the principle of self�determination; and in fear of being drawn into what is regarded as a power struggle between two great rival blocks. Other problems have arisen from the basic weaknesses of the area itself in terms of its vulnerability to attack or subversions, the political instability of most of its governments, and the economic and social deficiencies which exist throughout the region. Aggravating these weaknesses and contributing to the prevailing unrest are the rrowth of nationalism and racism, and the decline in the British and French power ,positions in the area, creating a vacuum which the local authorities are incapable of filling. Suspicion on the pert of the governments and peoples of the area towards any kind of foreign activity, a reluctance not only to participate with the Vest in regional defense planning but even to accept Western material aid or advice, the belief that U.S. interest in the area arises only from a desire to counter Communism com� pounded with a fear that the area will become a theatre of operations in a Soviet�Western power stmgfle, an apathy towards problems transcending the immediate area, governmental control of existing informational outlets, and widespread illiteracy are all obstacles which make it difficult to reach significant segments of the target population. The major obstacles encountered in mounting Soviet Russia operations EYES ON 2121JRITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 8 of...316, Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 B`- Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES VW ANNEX D SECURJTY INFOEWTION FSB N,47 TOP SECRET :Ray 29, 1953 (W(1) (b)(3) have been those which have resulted from the efforts of the regime to cut off completely all communication between its citizens and the outside world. EYES ony SECURITY IwortmATION TOP sEcrIT of 34 , Pr- ge s Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 MUM sEcuRrrtnroRmanN TOP SECRET ANNEX D PSB 104.7 Jaly P9* 1953 20 PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTI(Y7S TATTN AGAIN T THE SOVITI BLOC A, =la Radio Free Russia, the clandestine radio of a subsidized Great Russian emigre organization in Germany (1TS), broadcast a regular one- half hour program four times daily to the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, Poland end the Baltic States, Radio Liberation, sponsored by a controlled priv14- (WO) ganization, the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevisi,b)(3)lad- cast half-hour programs which were repeated several times daily to the Soviet occupation troops in Germany, Austria, Poland and the Baltic States since 1 March. In late March the station inaugurated daily ten minute broadcasts in five major languages to the Caucasus area. The Great Russian emiire organization also produced and distributed through its networks from Berlin into Eastern Germany, about 270,000 propaganda leaflets each month directed to Soviet occupation forces. These accounted for at least two defections of Soviet military personnel and the development of several other prospective defectors. Approximately 400,000 leaflets produced by another emigre group on the subject of Stalints death were distributed by all nets in April and May and an (W(1) additional 700,000 were distributed in June in conjunction with en e:(b)(3) panded defection inducement campaign. B. Far East: EYES ONg SECURITY INFORWITION TOP SECI7T of 14 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 ��+.1. oNiz ara-M-21.9M-14111 TOP sERET EYES OICY SECURITY INA:OVATION TOP stqaT ANNEX D PSB D.47 July 29, 1953 (b)(1) (b)(3)ges Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) gyEs OILT ;SEM:MITI/ INMEM,ATION TOPPOItET EYES TIZ MILALT! IEFLUATM TOP SECRET ANNEX D PSB D-47 .710.7 29; 1953 of 34 ,Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONI7 SECURITY PTOWTION TOP SECRET (W(1) (b)(3) ANNEX D ISB D4.7 July 29, 1953 Efforts in Italy were concentrcted on improvemAnt of the democratic parties' position in the June 7 national elections, and weakening of the influence of Communist and undemocrstic parties. Political preparations EYES ONIY SECURITY INF9RmATIoN TOP SECRET of �IL_ Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 89 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURIZY INFORMATION - TOP SECPET ANNEX D PSB D-47 .1047 29, 195, culminated in May in the distribution of millions of pamphlets and posters, dovr to door campaigning, spcecbes, showing of motion picture films and general electioneering through the democratic parties, civic groups, a free labor union, various cooperative movements and Catholic welfare organizations. Progress was made through the support of a nom. Communist labor union, in reducing the strike capabilities of Commini(b)(1) (b)(3) labor organizations. This union held Agency inspired May Day Rallies throughout Italy, effectively demonstrating against the Communists' use of strikes for political reasons. EYES ONLY SECURITY ;NFOrtiviATIOV TOP 0.TRET of , 14, Pages cjL Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SWIM EYES ONLY gcu ITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX D ESB D-47 lay 29, 1953 of 2.Pages (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 4 EYES ONIY SECURITY INFORMATIO11 TOP SECRET EYE � ONLY aURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET (W(1) ANNEX (b)(3)D PSB D*47 Jaly 9, 1953 14, of 42,1 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX D (b)(3) PSB D-47 Jet 291 1953 (b)(1) EYES ONLY OCURITY INFORMATION TOP CLET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) EYES 0=1' sEmITY INFOINATION TOP SECVT EYES ONIX SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX D FSB D-47 467 �29# 1953 20 or3 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 b�,"_; Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONIY pCURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATTON TOP SECTiET (b)(1) ANNEX D ODX3) PSB D-47 J417 79, 1953 21 of _24�,,jages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY 1..7FORMATION TOP SECRET EYES ONLY �ECURITY INFORMATION TOP ,S1MRET (b)(1) ANNEX D 00)(3) PSB D-47 1� 11l17 29) 1953 22 of 311 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8,1 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET W,K1) (b)(3) AANEX D PSB D6,47 Jay 29, 2953 E. International: The major successes of the National Committee for a Free Europe were achieved through Radio Free Europe, which has been one of the prime:Ty-al instruments contributin to the pressures that the Western World can apply' on the Satellite nations as a means of loosening Soviet control and exploitation. EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATIO , TOP SECZT of lh Pages (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Ey-a, ONLY 3ECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX D Pq3 47 1.) 1953. (b)(1) (b)(3) , of 314 Page Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY jgCURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET EYES ONW SECUFtITY INFoRmATipN TOP SECRET (W(1 ) ANNEX D (b)(3) FSB D-47 Jay 29, 1953 of Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES OMIT SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ETES ONLY SECURITY INFORIATION TOP SECI= (b)(1) (b)(3) ANNEX D PSB D-47 Ally 79, 1953 26 of 37 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) EYES ONLY SECURITT INFORMATION TOP SECRE7 EYES ONLY pCURITY TNFORMATION TOP stc-pg ANNEX D PS 13 D-47 ailsr 29, 1953 of Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES. ONLY SECURITY INFATION TOP z2CRET (b)(1) ANNEX D (b)(3) PSB D-47 JOT 24 1953 5. SUNNARY OF SIGNIFICANT AREA. CHANGES A. igpSR: Announcement of the doctor's plot, its subsequent reversal and the counter-purge against those responsible for it; Stalin's death; the new Soviet "peace offensive". B. Satel4tes and East Germany: Death of President Xlement Gottwald; defec- tion of two Slovak fliers; pardon of William Catis; East Berlin riots; Polish attack on U.S. intelligence activities in Poland; Bulgarian decree threatening severe retaliation against members of escapee families; Rumanian preparations for the World Youth Congress and Festival to be held On (b)(3) Bucharest in July and August. C. Eurone: Popular endorsement of the middle-of-the-road coalition lustrian Government and Soviet rejection of the Western Allies' invitation to resume treaty discussions; ratification in West Germany of the EEC treaty and EYES ONU �ECURITY INFORNAT;ON TOP 5MCRET , 28 of , Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 8963 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET ANNEX D PSB Jay 291 1953 Contractual Agreements; signins of the Balkan Pact by Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey; failure of Be Gasper! Government to obtain the minimum vote necessary to benefit from Italy's new electoral law; marked strengthening of Yugoslav ties with the West; formation and downfall of the Mayer Government, sustained strength of the Communist Party and dissolution of the DeGaulle party in France. D. Near East: Hardening of Egypt's attitude toward an acceptable settle- ment with the U.K. on the Sue z issue; strengthening of Turkish ties with Western nations; the series of tests of strength between Mossadeq and his opposition and dissuasion of Shah to abdicate; U.S. grant of wheat to Pakistan; filling of the post of Minister of the Interior in Afghanistan by an individual favorably disposed toward the U.S.; USSR denunciation of India's Korean resolution. E. Far East: Chinese Nationalist troops combined operations with Karen insurgent forces against Burmese military and civilian elements in the Shan States and the U,N, resolution looking toward the evacuation of the Nationalist's troops; military invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh; demands from the King of Cambodia for increased independence; pressure maintained by the Soviets to establish an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow; QPIrinols illness, Nagsaysay's nomination by the Nacionalista Party and Romulo's candidacy representing the newly formed Democratic Party in the Philippines; fs11 of the Japanese Liberal Party administration in March and elections for the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors in April; release of North Korean prisoners bf war by President Rhee, F. Western Hemiseh9re: Softening of Peron 'a bitterly anti-U.S. attitude; passage by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies of a bill excluding foreign EYES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 of 1;4 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EIFeS ON SECURITY INFORMATTON TOP SECRET ANNEX D PSB D47 JOU* 29, 1953 capital from its petroleum industry; failure of the Ibanez supporters to receive a majority in either the Chilean Senate or Chamber of Deputies; deterioration of Communist strength in Panama. President Eisenhower's proposals of 16 April for world peace. 6. SUBSTANTIVE ACTIONS CUTTING ACROSS AREA LINES A.. Soviet Peace Campaign: The new Soviet "peace offensive" may be interpreted as a significant move in the master plan designed to negate U. S. psychological warfare capabilities during the time of power transi- tion, secure internal support for the new regime, create dissension and confusion among the Western Mies by concessions designed to appeal to the neutralist sentiment on the European continent, wreak havoc on the EDC front and keep a rearmed Western Germany from being committed on the side of the West. It appears aimed at isolating the United States from its allies if, indeed, the U.S. is not captivated by the Soviet "new look". In the Scandinavian countries, the peace program had little effect, although the Danish Government made certain concessions to neutralists because of increased popular dissatisfaction with rearmament requirements. Reaction in the low countries was minimal, except for a softening of the non-Communist attitude in Belgium. The French Socialist Party is receptive to Communist peace proposals because of its conviction that a neutral position between the U.S. and Soviet extremes is best for the country. Soviet appeasement moves are profundly affecting French public opinion, which generally believes that the danger of war is receding. In Italy, in view of the election results, renewed emphasis on the peace propaganda line may be expected. The peace program in the U.K. is receiving greater attention from non-Bevan labor elements, as the result of the Prime Minister EYES 0N 30 SECURITY INF RNATION of 34 pages TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) EYES MY SiCUNTY INPOR44TIPN TOP SECRET ANNEX D PSB D-47 July 29,1953 strongly expressed desires for a Four-Pbwer conference. The 0p6ace offensive" in Eastern European areas, as the result of amnesties declared in the Soviet Union and the Satellites, isolated acts such as the release of William Gatis� and lifting of ration restrictions in several areas, have developed a strong psychological warfare weapon for the Soviets. Soviet overtures toward the unification of Germany on the basis of withdrawal of troops and free elections represent powerful appeals in support of communist objectives. Soviet gestures in the Near East alonE this line have not been without effect In other parts of the world the effect of the peace campaign was obscure, or as in the case of South Asia, accepted with Skepticism as the result of the invasion of Laos. B. ptsgn's Death and SlacquaLsaal_ The death of Stalin and transition in the party hierarchy overshadowed all other events during the reporting period Immediate world reaction to Stalin's illness and subseruent demise was one of intense speculation. Considerable disarray became manifest at once within the Saiellites. EYES OW SECURITY INFORMATIOV TOP SECRET (b)(1) (b)(3) 31 of 37bages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) r;YES ONLY SECURITY npormATION ELS,DM, Es/ES ON SECURITY IN?�ION TOP .SrCRET AMEX D PSB D-47 29, 1953 22. of 34 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) EYES ONLX SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 7. STEPS TAKEN TO PTTEMENT APPROVED PSB PLANS ANNEX D T1'13 10-47 Jay 29, 1953 A, PSB D-7 (Psychological Ojeration Plan Incident to Korean Cease- Fire Negotiations PSB 3.19 (Breakoff of Korean, Amiltioe aggotiationd: CIA produced a supporting plan to D-7 and 3-19 in the Fall of 1952. B. FSB D-18a (Illase A -Psychological OmEations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escanei71-- (Fhase B - A National Psychological Program with Respect to Escapees from the -oviet Orbit): FSB D6a8a calls for the reception, care and resettlement of escapees (Phase A) and stimulation EYES may SECURITY INFORMATION TOP ,TCRET (W(1) 2.2 (b)(3) of 34 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) EKES ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRPT ANNEX D PSB D-47 auly P9* 1953 of their flow and assurance of their maximum exploitation (Phase B). The Phase A program is the responsibility of the Department of StFte and requires no implementation by CIA. The Phase B program calls for increased attention to escapees, but does not require new Agency plans or operations. The major project advocated by D6.18a (Phase B) calls for the activation of a "freedom corps". This project has been developed under NSC 143 and is now awaiting implementation by the Department of State and Defense. CIA support, prinarily emigre relations and publicity build-up, awaits action by State and Defense. Appropriate CIA personnel have been alerted to the support acts on required The inducement effort, the increased utilization of Iron Curtain escapees and the propaganda value of inherent escapees are receiving close attention. EYES ONIX SECURITY INFORIIJION TOP SECRET of 34 Pages (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM - EXPENDITURES ANNEX E PSB D-47 July 29, 1953 The table below is a summary of the total costs of our national psychological programs, The figures are taken from expenditure figures contained in the appended progress reports of the Depart- ments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the tiutual Security Agency. Estimated Expenditures Carry-over Actual Actual Actual Funds,June Estimated Expenditures FY-'51 FY-'52 FY-'53 30, 1953 FY..154-Y-155 tY-I36 FY-I37 FY-T58 (the expenaTaFes shown are in millions of dol1ars-I-6-M nearest tenth, Foreign In- formation (State) 95,2 126.0 103.11 17.5 -2 109003 -4 Foreign In- formation (ILA) 18.8 203 20.5 none 7.65 - Ulitary - Unconventional Psywar (Defense) 27.1 38.6 43.2. .7 13.56 - Unconventional (CIA) 7 Escapee Program (State) Strategic Plans and Coordina- tion (FEB) 1.148 0,4 0.5 ea Oa ��� AO VW. ��� 4.1 9.2 8.5 6.9 4.5 9 flea. 006 0.6 0.6 0,6 0.6 IDENTIFIABLE ToTAL....1141#1 185.3 168.7 22.3 139.9 1. Estimated 2. For radio acquisition and construction 3. Total requested IIA Congressional Appropriation 4# In view of impending changes, including setting up of new information agency, no valid basis exists for projections beyond 154 5, This figure of 7.6 is scheduled for transfer to the new USIA under reorganiza- tion Plan No 8. It excludes 7.0 million already transferred to IIA by Buret., of Budget 6. Interim estimate 7. These figures are being supplied directly to the President by the Director of Central Intelligence 8. FY '52 & 153 shown together by reason of short period of operation in fiscal 152; included in FY-153 total 9. No basis for estimate SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 1 of 1 page Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 B Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 EYES ONLY 13ECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET (b)(1) ANNEX D (b)(3) PSE D-47 July 29, 1953 EYES OI .SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 42. of 34 Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 (b)(1) (b)(3) EYES OW SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SECURITT INFORMATION NI SECRET ANNEX D PSB D-47 Xuly 29, 1953 of Pages Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 Approved for Release: 2021/05/14 C03044095 iur 5t,"�.,Kt. ta ... SIGNATURE RECORD AND COMMENT SHEET � � FOR THE INTRA-OFFICE USE OF OSO & OPC ONLY AS A COVER ATTACHMENT TO room No. 38-13 NOTICE Detaching Form No. 38-13 for thepurpose of securing this form to Top Secret Documents is Prohibited. ATTENTION: ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES RELATE TO THE MATE- RIAL. EACH ALTERNATE OR ASSISTANT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER WHO RECEIVES AND/OR RELEASES THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN COLUMNS PROVIDED. EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO SEES THIS TOP SECRET DOCUMENT WILLENTER DATE OFHANDLING AND SIGNHIS FULL NAME IN THE PROPER COLUMNS. OFFICER DESIGNATIONS SHOULD BE USED IN THE "TO" COLUMN. UNDER EACH COMMENT A LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN ACROSS SHEET AND EACH COMMENT NUMBERED TO COR- RESPOND WITH THE NUMBER IN THE "TO" COLUMN. EACH OFFICER SHOULD SIGN FULL NAME BEFORE FURTHER ROUTING. FROM: P576' CONTROL NO. ,J ,) 8 '' r TO _ ROOM NO. DATE OFFICER'S FULL NAME COMMENTS #47) RECD. FWD'14- (b)(6) 1, V /41' ' e $3 ffed4-Astdoi-..--- ))1?-4-' 2. i i 17"i/ orA.,Vr: .1- 4. & ljeKtIle-- 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. THIS FORM MUST BE DETACHED PRIOR TO TRANSMITTING TOP SECRET MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF OSO OR OPC. FORM NO. 1S JUN 1949 S8. A "*0 8 3 � 3 348 0 PLEASE RETURN MIS Approved for R�el-e-ase7 IH1-/05/14 C03044095 _ FORM TO REGISTRY