MINUTES OF THE THREE MEETINGS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON VOA JAMMING, WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE APPENDICES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03151478
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01274
• Publication Date: May 15, 1950

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M 01 ES OF THE THREE MEETINGS OF
THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON VOL JAMMING.
WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE APPENDICES
Appendix 11 to the Report of the IA0 Ad Hoc Committee on VOL Jamming.
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SECRET
List of persons attending all or part of the meetings of the
TAO Ad Hoc Committee on VOL Jamming.
Dr. H. M. Ohadwell, OSI/CIA
Mr. R. L. Clark, OSI/CLA,
Mr. F. H. Gracely, 051/CIA
Mr. W. K. Harvey, 050/CIA
Mr. F, A. Voigt, CIA
Capt. K. M. Gentry, USN, ONO Comm. and EOM
Mr. W. E. W. Howe, ONI
Capt. J. H. Dennis, USN, APSA
Dr. L. W. Tordella, AFSA Navy Comm. Station
Lt. Col.* G. E. Branch, USAF Comm. and-ECM
Lt. Col. H. H. Towle'', USAF A.-2
Maj, W. S. Trites, USAF A-2
Mr. D. C. Trafton, USAF Comm.
Col. C. V. Bromley, USA, 0-2
Mr. M. D. Post, AC of S, 0-2
Maj, E. N. Jenkins, OCSigo. Comm. and ECM
Mr. R. P. Packard, State H/SFS
Mr. W. K. Scott, State, VOL
Mr. J. F. Thompson, State, VOL
Dr, M. Henderson, AEC, Int.
Mr. F. W. Reynolds, FB/
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IAC AD HOC COMMITTEE ON VOL JAMMING
CORRECTED MINUTES OF THIRD MEETING
Held 15 May. 1950 at 0930 Hours
Room 2519 NM" Building
Washington, D. C.
1. The minutes of the second meeting were considered and approved,
as corrected.
2. Col. Bromley's statement was discussed briefly, but no recom-
mendation was made or action taken.
3. The committee also discussed the Statement of the utility and
application of technical intelligence for the VOA problem which had been
prepared ,by the International Broadcasting Division, Department of State
as a supplement to their earlier Statement of VOL Intelligence Require-
ments. APPENDIX A.
4, Mt. Packard requested that the committee now proceed directly
to the task of preparing its report for the IAC; the conclusions and
recommendations of the committee should be addressed specifically to
the Recommendations contained in Mr. Armstrong's memorandum to the DOI.
At the suggestion of the committee, Mr. Clark appointed a subcommittee
composed of Capt. Gentry, USN, Mr. Packard, and Mr. Clark to draft such
a report. It was further suggested that the report incorporate the
statements made to the committee by Mr. Scott (APPENDIX B) with those
made by Mr. Clark and Mr. Packard,
5. The committee adjourned sine die after instructing the sub-
committee to prepare a final report of the Committee findings.
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OP Mel
SWUM Cr VII IIMINISCLNIZMUMPA
� Mere fellows an elucidation of the uses which Mb would make of
latelligenvet if available rogardlft various technical and oPera-
Usual factors of WU Jamming of the VOL the Departmentes momersadms
of 24 March 1956 to the Director of Control Intolligence and the tabs
thereto sot ontolearly the problem presontoi byVia Jangling and Om
liportanCo of penetrating to the listenors0 This gesorandmm also
pointed vat that some usoful data had 114414 rocolvod sad states in-oomo
the types of lifermatjon that mould be most'ussfulo,
Jamming is now spreading to language programs otitis than Sussing
sit Itcralslan as well as to the Morse cods Weiss linpagefeaws transpdosions of VOL. By technical nanimplatiOns sad selective aselosent
APPIONDIXA
of present VOI facilitios to the various pressen sorciseep spas in
psovemont in ponotration has been obtains& The small amount of
Intelligence received so far has been of great value� leweverb it
bas %eon insuffloient to meet the toohnioal planning end operational
roquiremonts of M. The mere fact that the Intolligesso laic-4801os
obtained has Veen so mief*1 *lowly indicates that more and comploto
istormati,on on a contimming basis would result is smkstaatial improve-
_
gent in penetration of handing.
The types of information on Soviet Jamming listed la fob D of
the biliatmostes MOSOVIMen of 24 'lush 1950.'0111C sivrasiall as
complete Information as possible, be seed 6160,2117 as t011011S0
8-3441-114
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(letters refer to Tab 3):
CO Tod recognises that the purpose* note& here are not
within its cognisance. Rowever, if the purpose of
jamming is purely political and is directed solely
ageinst freedom of information, TOL would be able
to produce strong political commentaries for
broadcast purposes, thus strengthening the line.
This assumes that the information could be die-
classified and its source protected.
(3) The importance of this information to the Whi is
obvious. /t is difficult or impossible to estimate
the techniques and/or effort to be applied or
expended in overcoming unknowns,, quantitative
factore are of vital concern in respect to
frequencies, facilities and hours, and they form
about the only basis for estimate of the valve
of proposed activities.
(0) Power repreeent* the primary limitation upon the
effectiveness of Jamming equipment. 'mission
types may be considered the second factor determining
effectiveness and are of interest not only in estimating
the capabilities of Jamming equipment but also in
evaluating the effectiveness to be expected from any
proposed 0ountermeseues. Details of equipment serve
to complete the information.
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(D) factors of location aad grouping are of great
importance because of the promotional factors
revealod. The 100 of certain trepan/01s, mar los
possible and effective or impossible and ineffoctiv*
in ilmot relation to the relative position of
tronsnitter and target, time of lay and the season.
Whir laformation being common, the location may
*noble TOL to fill ix a coaplete picture in respect
to general and specific trends and ourroat 'rag* of
Jamming facilities.
(1) Information as to mobility of the jammers is maired
is order to ovaliate the flioxiility of the Ja10146
opts** and the moulting *implication of outer-
'ration,
(1) Intonation oncoming antennas is required to complete
the plater* of jamming efficleney and for the intolligont
preparation of countermeasums on tie* most offectiv* ad
itessomical basis.
(G) Information oncoming *Alois of operation would provide
Wootton for counteractim in use of Teld tamilities and
torthsr such action, it approved by propsr authority, as
would provid* for enntormeseures including jamming of
roordinatioa all 'mitre& system and clrealts.
In order to most offoetively assign. VII facilitisl, both those now
ts 11$401.14 thole valor constriction or projected, to th* various ;roams-
services whil* at tho same tiro Intslligmtly allocating foollitlo to
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the Russian and Ukrainian programe, it is necessary that VOL have as much
of these types of information as possible. It is not possible to state
in a detailed manner the precise use that will be made of the requested'
intelligence until some further intelligence has been received and its
type and completeness determined. Any information would be usefpl. Very
little is now being received. However, the use to which intelligence
can be put is simply set out in the following example, assuming that
evaluated, intelligence indicated that the Russians could bring only one
jammer up on 9740 KO and that it was only strong in the Moscow area,
VOL could immediately put One of the higher powered transmitters on
9740 KO and keep it there with the knowledge that generally unjammed
coverage was being obtained.
Intelligence would. bring VOL up to a higher level of penetration
because of better strategic operation and Would provide for better
planning,
�
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APFAIDIX, 3
The following presentation of conclusions was 28144, by Mr. Scott,
and the cosimittee agreed that it might be used as a frame of reference
for the drafting group:
1. Smisting scientific knowledge and techniques do net offer a
technical solution to overcome Soviet janaing of VOL on a sustained
basis, if that jamming is carried to the ultimate extent in retaliation
to all degrees of increased VOL operations.
2. the effectiveness of the penetration effort can be increased
by knowledgeable manipulation of the transmittiag facilities, and tech-
nical intelligence of Soviet jamming would increase TOL ability to so do.
3. Intelligence on Soviet jamming would assist in policy consider-
*Um to deteraine the broakast facilities needed to carry ouVan
empaading foreign information program. for *mangle, the Secretary of
State should have knowledge regarding the following questions:
a. Does the USSR have the capability of offectiT4r Jamming
all United States broadcasts (1) to the Soviet Ilion, (2) to
satellite states, regardless of the power ea& location of VOL
transmitters?
b. If the *misting jamming capabilities of the USSR WV not
sufficient to effectively silence VOL signals in all parts of,
the Soviet 'Onion and satellite states, what is the present
'percentage of VOL penetration in each major target area?
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c.
What is the probable rate of increase in the effectiveness of
Soviet jamming; do we know how many new jamming transmitters
have been installed during the past 12 months; during the past
6 months? Have we sufficient intelligence to estimate the rate
of increase?
d. To what extent wouldlINSR capabilities be reduced by increas-
ing the number and power of transmitters beaming broadcasts
to the Soviet-Union and satellite areas
4. The possibility of receiving all intelligence which would be
useful is remote.
5. The possibility of an appreciable increase in technical intelli-
gence through existing intelligence agencies, even with diversion of all
available facilities, is not likely, due in part to equipment and location
problems.
6. Resources of the FCC, OIL, Army, Navy and Air Forces and
their present commitments preclude adequate diversion of existing facili-
ties to the VOL problem.
7.- Additional technical intelligence that would be of value could
be obtained by establishing a properly located and equipped monitoring
service.
8. In order to Obtain a maximum.degree of useful intelligence, it
will be necessary to establish a monitoring facility directed specifically
to this problem.
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IAC AD HOC COMMITTEE ON VOL JAMMING
CORRECTED MINUTES OF SECOND MEETING
Held 13 April 1950 at 1030 Hours
Room 1276 Iv Building
Washington, D. C.
1. Mr. Clark, presiding,- called for a discussion of the minutes of
the first meeting. Several changes were made, and the minutes incorporating
these changes were approved.
Capt. Dennis further requested from State a clarification of
Paragraph 341,_ concerning reports of eight megawatt stations.
2. Capt. Gentry questioned the usefulness of the informa ion Of�Tab B
to the VOL even if it were available. Mr Clark said he would like to go
through all the questions and examine each from the purely intelligence
standpoint. After some discussion it was decided to examine Tab B on the
basis of the intelligence effort involved in obtaining the answers. This was
done and the decisions reached are indicated on the Survey form, APPENDIX C.
A consolidated score card was promised for distribution before the nett
meeting.
3. Following the completion of the survey of Tab B, Col. Bromley
stated the Army's position and read the prepared statement, APPENDIX D.
A brief discussion of the Army's views followed. Capt. Gentry said he .
believed it was not the function of the Committee to discuss these views.
Mr. Scott requested that the Army's views be placed in the record and
that a study of the statement be placed on the Committee Agenda.
Dr. Chadwell suggested that further discussion of these subjects should
be a consideration of the next meeting.
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4. Mr. Clark suggested the possibility of declassifying the group
and inviting the POO to sit in with the Committee at its next meeting in
order to save time since the Security Council would have representatives
from the FCC anyway. It was decided that consideration of such action
would be placed on the agenda of the next meeting.
5. Mr. Clark stated, in reply to a question concerning the pur-
pose of the next meeting, that the purpose would be to find out which
technical operations are possible and what intelligence is needed.
6. Mr. Thompson stressed the idea that numerous receivers are in
the hands of expert listeners. W. Packard requested answers by the Com-
mittee to the following three questions:
a. What can the intelligence agencies reasonably do now
with available information?
b. Should we allocate any monitoring facilities now in
an effort to approach this problem?
c. Should we allocate any other additional facilities in
an effort to approach the problems?
In line with the above Mt. Scott was requested to prepare
for distribution, in advance of the next meeting, a written statement
which the Committee could consider in deciding what can be done, what
intelligence is required, etc. It was also requested that Mr. Thompson
be available again for a later analysis of technical operation.
7. The meeting was adjourned at 1325 with the date of the next
meeting to be determined by the date of availability of Mr. Scott's
written statement.
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CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX D
Statement for Ad Hoc Committee
by Colonel C. V. Bromley
1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 does not agree that sufficient
evidence has been produced before this ad hoc committee to show that present
intelligence effort in support of the VOL is insufficient to meet the re-
quirements of the Department of State. It is submittted that failure of
VOL to penetrate Soviet jamming is a technical matter and that no amount
of intelligence would change the existing physical factors under control
of the Soviets.
2. As for redirection of effort and reallocation of priorities dur-
ing the interim period the Army feels that existing military commitments
preclude placing VOL requirements on any priority that would curtail the
present program. VOL requirements form a specialized program not directly
linked to military requirements and should be considered apart.
3. Research and development are under study by the Signal Corps.
Here again we encounter the dissimilarity of the VOL problem with that
of the military. As pointed out in the technical discussion of the
first meeting, jamming of VOL and military communications are not com-
parable. It would appear that ultimate solution of VOL problems should
be sought through employment of competent research personnel outside
the Department of Defense.
CONFIDENTIAL
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IAC HOC" COMMITTEE ON VC.A,JI
CORRECTEDMpUTES OP rirsr mp4m141
Held 5 April 1950 at 0930 Heure
Room 1517 M Building
Washington, D. C.
1. Dr. Chadwell, presiding, stated the purpose of the committee
and suggested Mr. Clark as chairman and Mr, Gracely as technical sec-
retary. The Chairmanship was turned over to Mr. Clark, who suggested
the following agendas
ao General discussion of the technical problem; clarifica-
tion of the requests by State.
b. Technical possibilities of counteracting jamming.
c. Detailed appraisal of the intelligence required. ,
d. How needs can be satisfied by monitoring, covert opera-
tion, etc.
e. Who is best equipped to do each of the above.
2. Mr. Packard presented the case for State, pointing out thats
a. The CIA had been asked to coordinate the intelligence
effort.
b. Intelligence information has been sufficient.
c. No one group is particularly at fault.
d. A decision regarding technical poseibilities and pri-
orities is prerequisite to final establishment of intelligence
priorities.
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e. Preceding the final settlement of intelligence pri-
orities, an interim intelligence effort of six months duration
should be made to:
(1) .Conclude the study of existing facilities, and
(2) Reallocate monitoring, with emphasis on a joint
monitoring service.
3. Mr. Scott then gave for State a summary of the technical back-
ground:
.a. The VOL is rapidly becoming the only means of getting
information into the USSR.
b. *VOL has considerable support from the public and from
Congress, including in late 1949 a supplemental appropration of
$11,500,000.
0. Plant facilities include 38 high-frequency transmitters,
several high-power medium-wave transmitters and four relay bases.
d. A new technique of IF jamming, first observed four months
ago, has caused great alarm. New jammers up to eight megawatts have
been rumored.
4. Captain Gentry stated for the record that RIB practioe provides
only for the terms :lamina and antiJamming, not counterjamming. He also
stressed the advantage the jammers always have in the local areas and the
great cost of a solution in terms of time and money.
5. Mr. Packard commented upon:
a. Differences of opinion of technical success.
b. Insistence of VOA as a basis.
CONFIDENTli
kb)(3)
c. Withholding of intelligence for security reasons.
d. Decisions on certain policy matters by the NSC.
AMMOkag
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6. Mr. Clark summarized the technical information surrounding
The question was then raised by several members
whether any responsible engineer or body of engineers, either in or
outside of the intelligence agencies, would promise substantial relief
on the problem. On this question the military departments were essen-
tially in agreement that there is no adequate solution among orthodox
technical methods. The State Department, however, contends that:
a. The VOL has not been entirely blanked out and that the
pursuit of orthodox methods is still applicable to some degree.
b. The Department is unwilling to abandon the prospect
that further technical developments are possible.
7. Captain Gentry stated for the record: Barring the willingness
of State to introduce technical witnesses, it is suggested that the mili-
tary departments go on record as contending that a genuine technical
solution is not available with existing scientific knowledge and tech-
niques, and that outside consultants be employed. The Army and the Air
Force concurred.
There was general support for the possibility of increasing
effectiveness of penetration of jamming from an operational standpoint
by the use of all possible relevant intelligence.
(b)(3)
8. After consideration on limiting discussion
to the
(b)(3)
VOL, it appeared to be the
so limited.
sense of the committee
that
discussion
be
9. For the record,
was ruled not directly rele-
(b)(3)
vant to the VOL jamming, State dissenting.
10. It was decided that discussion of the remainder
was unanimously rejeM
e deferrekb)(3)
to the next meeting. Time of the next meeting was set at 10:30 a.m. on
Thursday, 13 April 1950.
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