WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03155958
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01252
• Publication Date: December 4, 1970

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Ittrat
cPti
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
USE
CriRDS
least
43
4 December 1970
No. 0399/70
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,
and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requir-
ing more comprehensive treatment and therefore published sep-
arately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information af-
fecting the national security of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excludod from automatic
downgrading and
daciastification
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 3 December 1970)
Page
FAR EAST
Cambodia: The Battle of the Roads 1
Laos: Beating the Communists to the Punch 3
Vietnam: Fallout from Son Tay 4
Malaysia-Singapore: Nettlesome Neighbors 6
Thailand: Praphat's Day Looms Nearer 7
EUROPE
German Problem Comes Up Again 8
Italy: Coalition Clears Major Hurdle 9
Developments in the European Communities 10
Hungary: Party Congress Advances Kadar's Reform Goals 11
USSR: Solzhenitsyn�A Prize and a Dilemma 12
-SECRET,-
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SEeRE-I.
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Guinea Repels Second Incursion 13
Jordan: Husayn Mending Fences Abroad 14
Israel-Egypt: Differing Views on Further Talks 14
India: New Efforts in Strategic Northeast 16
Zambia: Kaunda Seeks a New Order 17
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: One Month of Allende's Government
Mexico: Cabinet Appointments
Guatemala: Some Success in Anti-Communist
Nicaragua:
Campaign
18
19
20
20
Argentina: Political Developments 21
NOTES: USSR-Vietnam; Turkey: Uruguay
Political Negotiations Under Way
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brEtlt-EzIL-
FA R EAST
Cambodia: The Battle of the Roads
Communist harassing attacks and ambushes
along almost all of the country's main lines of com-
munication continue to keep sizable numbers of
government troops isolated and on the defensive.
Cambodian Army operations to reopen several key
roads have quickly bogged down, with heavy casual-
ties sustained. In Phnom Penh, the Communists de-
tonated a bomb in the US Embassy, their first
terrorist act against the American presence.
Steady enemy harassment in Kompong Cham
Province has prevented ten Cambodian battalions
from regaining control of Route 7, between Prey
Totung and Kompong Cham city; one government
paratroop battalion was badly mauled in an ambush.
Elements of the Viet Cong 275A Regiment, which is
operating just north of Prey Totung, evidently are
directing these attacks.
To the west, the Communists cut Route 6 at
Bateay just southwest of Skoun. Seven government
battalions, including five diverted from the
"Chenla" task force, are trying to retake Bateay, but
progress has been slow. Farther south on Route 6, a
Communist assault temporarily closed the river ferry
crossing at Prek Kdam, just 20 miles from Phnom
Penh.
Government efforts to ease Communist pres-
sure on Route 4 in the Kirirom area, southwest of
Phnom Penh, have been temporarily abandoned fol-
lowing a series of enemy ambushes. The continuing
presence of North Vietnamese main force units near
the Pich Nil pass overlooking Route 4 indicates the
importance the enemy attaches to keeping the high-
way closed. In the meantime, government officials
are concerned over possible oil shortages because it
is now impossible to reach the coastal refinery at
Kompong Som. Other sources of supply for Phnom
Penh are being investigated.
In the northwest, Cambodian Army forces have
been unable to regain control of the town of Puok
and to clear Route 6 between Puok and Siem Reap
city. They did succeed, however, in reopening the
road between Siem Reap and its airfield. Regional
government commanders reportedly were to plan
another push on Puok, using forces from Battann-
bang and Siem Reap cities.
Elsewhere in this region, the Communists am-
bushed another rice convoy near Pursat city on
Route 5 and reportedly hurnari all 11 of its vehicles.
enemy interfer-
ence with commercial traffic in Battambang Prov-
ince is also becoming more common, and the Com-
munists have been warning truck drivers they would
be killed if they haul rice. In addition, enemy propa-
gandists near Moung reportedly are telling rice farm-
ers to hold their crops for Communist buyers, and
Bottc mb p.13
Cambodia
Communist-controlled
0 100
MILES
550632 12-70 CIA
-Sreft-EZ_
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' SOUTH
VIETNAM
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sTEcC
implied that the Communists want to cut off the
flow of foodstuffs to Phnom Penh.
-s-EeKLEz_
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Laos: Beating the anj_ i,sts to the Punch
A large goveinnienfFt�ssfnalperation in forces trying to retake Mok Haw, a Laotian Army
northern Laos near the Ck_milik.thisS.1:99istic center outpost 25 miles north of Luang Prabang that fell
at Ban Ban has wet only 0-mit-e-iiiev�tance. By 1 into enemy hands on 20 November. The gov-
December, a _,f6rCCA, atirroI i,30 irregular ernment committed several additional companies
troops had "secujesnMCS,a ial.t�Dffstrip. In ad- of irregular and army troops to this operation,
dition, 850, government trpj5s_fro-m:Bouam Long,; 4_u_t, they have been unable to budge an unex-
moveckir(to_pottions about _foarTjniles north, of_ notedly large Communist force, estimated at
="7- --Ithree_ battalions.
r ,
rak Haw..
Luang ;
Prabag
_ n-
Bouarn -
Communist Troop Relocations in the South
plai.�0,74i4Baarin
-
Na Jurips- Tiau No significant fighting has occurred since 29
6;4� 4"
K fi
_ �
the Ban Ban valley-and were making sk?,,w1D:pgr_2ss
in their effort tdattabk,gorninunist\logistic assets
in the area. Presefrqpianscall for the withdrawal
of both forces Atte", they have harassed Route 7
and CommunisffilWistic troops and stockpiles in
the Ban Ban area.
The presence of government troops in this
sensitive area should help disrupt enemy supply
efforts into the Plaine des Jarres. The Commu-
nists can be counted on to react sharply, however,
and they apparently see the deployment of gov-
ernment forces required by the Ban Ban opera-
tion as a chance to make gains west of the Plaine.
In other action in the north, a sustained
Communist effort is pushing back government
November, but the Communists apparently are
isending more troops to the Bolovens Plateau area.
-
On the eastern rim of the plateau itself, the
_govern-meg irregular base at Site 38 has again
fallen Communist hands. Other irregular
trOpps, a0oulity suffering temporary setbacks
from ,vigorous enemy attacks, were able to set up
some defenstv;poSitions around Site 165 after
receivin4catt'suppqt. A government operation has
been mounted toidikkrt pnemy attention from the
Bol ovens Pateau.
RE
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Vietnam: Fallout from Son Tay
Hanoi appears to have taken a down-to-earth
"war is hell" attitude toward the Son Tay raid
and US air strikes a fortnight ago. A high-level
and knowledgeable North Vietnamese official re-
portedly said last week that Hanoi did not con-
sider Son Tay an escalation and will not make US
air attacks a major issue. He explained that the
Communists realistically expect the US to con-
tinue aerial reconnaissance over the North and to
retaliate when these flights are challenged. The
threat of reprisals, however, would not deter the
North Vietnamese from trying to shoot down the
planes, but, the official went on, Hanoi was not
of a mind to allow such matters to seriously
jeopardize the Paris talks.
This attitude has been reflected in the way
the Communists have played the affair: their
propaganda has been noisy, but it has not gone
beyond the position Hanoi has taken on recon-
naissance since the bombing halt two years ago�
that reconnaissance is a violation of North Viet-
namese sovereignty and that the Communists will
make every effort to stop it. Air strikes, however,
are termed in propaganda as a violation of the US
agreement to stop the bombing. In more than two
years Hanoi never has raised these as excuses to
either stall or break off the talks.
Despite its apparent relaxed attitude about
some aspects of the air and commando raids,
Hanoi is plainly embarrassed and wary that they
were brought off with such ease and it is trying
hard to plug the holes in North Vietnam's internal
defenses. A flood of domestic broadcasts has re-
flected new measures, under close party control
and high level military supervision, designed to
ensure faster and more effective reactions from
both militia and regular army units in the coun-
tryside. There has been mention of 24-hour
watches, better coordination, harder training, and
many more outposts, sentinels, and bunkers.
Aside from shoring up the North's defenses,
Hanoi probably is seeking to fire the collective
energies of the North Vietnamese populace to the
level prevalent earlier in the war, but which has
flagged since the US bombing halt in 1968. Hanoi
may also harbor some hope that by painting an
impressive picture of fortress North Vietnam, the
allies may be dissuaded from mounting new com-
mando assaults.
With so much attention riveted on POWs,
Hanoi also has taken some steps to dress up its
image on the prisoner question. The Foreign
Ministry last week broke with past practice and
provided information that
first had been requested more than 18 months
ago on the whereabouts of missing American pi-
lots. Radio Hanoi also has started to broadcast
brief taped holiday messages from US captives as
in past years.
The overriding considera-
tions for Hanoi are its image and its belief that
eventually it will be able to squeeze some conces-
sions from Washington in return for a general
prisoner release. Although neither a tougher pol-
icy toward captives nor any wholesale releases are
likely, some additional gestures such as providing
more information on missing American airmen,
may be made to lend weight to Hanoi's profes-
sions of leniency.
Action Picks Up in the South
In South Vietnam, Communist military ac-
tivity picked up this week, but still featured the
small actions that the enemy has been emphasiz-
ing for over a year and a half. The enemy shelled
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several province capitals and numerous smaller
towns and military bases throughout the country.
Casualties and damages were generally light.
The sporadic timing of the attacks reflects
the current Communist practice of letting local
field commanders set their own timetable for
action. This permits the enemy to take advantage
of local conditions and strike when ready�in con-
trast to previous so-called "highpoints," that were
generally well coordinated and often captured
headlines abroad.
Individually these attacks seldom inflict
heavy casualties or damage, but they are cumula-
tively substantial. For example, the Communists
have succeeded in overrunning some 65 govern-
ment outposts in the Mekong Delta so far this
year. Although scattered successes on this scale
have not rolled back pacification gains, they do
help create a significant amount of insecurity in
rural areas where the government is trying to
consolidate its control.
Despite Communist emphasis on guerrilla
tactics and other economy-of-force methods to
keep their losses down, South Vietnamese forces
have triggered clashes that were costly to the
enemy, especially in the Mekong Delta. Late last
week, for example, heavy ground battles de-
veloped in three delta provinces as the result of
aggressive ARVN operations. Stepped-up US and
South Vietnamese operations in the coastal low-
lands of the northernmost provinces comprising
MR 1 have also flushed out concentrations of
enemy forces and accounted for over 400 Com-
munists killed there each week.
Some South Vietnamese commanders are re-
organizing their forces to improve their perform-
ance in the many localized actions. For example,
Major General Dzu, who assumed command of
MR 2 last August, has directed his two divisions
to operate in small units rather than in the often
cumbersome multibattalion operations of the
past. He has given his territorial security forces�
Regional Forces and Popular Forces�a new sys-
tem of goals and quotas to encourage more ag-
gressiveness against the enemy. Already, Dzu
claims that the ratio of enemy-to-friendly cas-
ualties has risen markedly since last sum-
mer.
� � �
USSR-VIETNAM: In his speech in Armenia on
29 November, Soviet party leader Brezhnev gave
Moscow's most authoritative condemnation of
the recent US air attacks in North Vietnam and
reassured Hanoi of its continuing support. Brezh-
nev, who devoted considerably more attention to
Vietnam than in recent speeches, also used the
occasion to reject implicitly US contentions
about an "understanding" regarding reconnais-
sance flights over North Vietnam and to chide the
Chinese about the need for united action "to
sober up the much too adventurist hotheads in
the camp of imperialism." Brezhnev, however,
gave no indication that Moscow expects the raids
to disrupt seriously the Paris talks. I
� � �
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Malaysia-Singapore: Nettlesome Neighbors
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore appear com-
pelled to put their worst foot forward in their
relations with one another despite a host of trade
and family ties, a common diligence in containing
domestic Communist movements, and mutual
desire for security under the projected Five Power
Defense Arrangement. The Malay-dominated gov-
ernment in Kuala Lumpur suspects that Chinese
leaders in Singapore may covertly support opposi-
tion Chinese political parties and leaders in
Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur is also apprehensive that,
in the event of communal violence invoked by the
Malaysians, Singapore would send troops over the
causeway into southern Malaysia to protect the
local Chinese population and Singapore's water
supply.
Malaysia's basic dislike and distrust of Singa-
pore was enhanced this fall when Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the last minute can-
celed a state visit to Kuala Lumpur. He was ap-
parently irked because the Malaysian prime minis-
ter had not cleared with him the script of a
grandstand effort to improve relations between
neighbors. The scenario called for the presence of
Foreign Minister Malik of Indonesia at the same
time as Lee.
On Singapore's side, the island state is well
aware of its isolated position between two large
Malay neighbors. Although its economy is now
booming, the country's leaders fear possible col-
laborative moves between Malaysia and Indonesia
designed to hamper Singapore's predominantly
entrepot economy.
Aside from the basic antagonisms between
the two countries, a number of issues have
cropped up in recent months that have further
aggravated the situation. Both capitals read the
Page
possibility of offensive intent in the other's cur-
rent moves to build up its defense establishment
with the acquisition of late-model sophisticated
military hardware. Singapore is scheduled to
negotiate with the Soviets over the possible
limited commercial use of Singapore facilities by
Soviet naval craft. Malaysia, however, is bound to
be fearful of even a minuscule Soviet naval
presence in the area.
In another development creating friction be-
tween the two countries, Kuala Lumpur has so far
failed to approve an Asian Development Bank
project that would finance an expansion of Singa-
pore's water supplies from the Malaysian main-
land. The amount of increase is apparently well
within the volume of water provided by existing
agreements, but both governments have taken
umbrage at the manner in which the other has
handled the problem. Singapore's water needs are
currently expanding at the rate of seven percent a
year.
This prickly relationship is bound to in-
fluence, if not disrupt, plans for the projected
Five Power Defense Arrangement, which is sched-
uled to include Singapore, Malaysia, Australia,
New Zealand, and the UK. Already Malaysia has
announced its decision to restrict the use of its
Jungle Warfare School facilities, an establishment
that was slated to become a Five Power training
center next March. The move was directed
primarily at Singapore because its contingents
were largely Chinese. Although individual prob-
lems between Singapore and Malaysia can
probably be ironed out, the easily bruised sensi-
bilities and constant suspicions of both sides will
make it difficult for the Five Power arrangement
to get off the ground.
� * �
"SECRET--
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Thailand: Praphat's Day Looms Nearer
Recent cabinet changes strengthen the hand
of Deputy Prime Minister Praphat's supporters in
the government and lend further weight to the
possibility of Praphat's early succession. In re-
shuffling his cabinet, Prime Minister Thanom re-
tained all previous members, but made one im-
portant ministerial transfer and added a politi-
cally significant new face.
General Krit Siwara, who has been moving
toward closer political ties with Praphat, shifted
from the Education Ministry to a specially
created post in the Ministry of Defense. The shift
can be viewed as a personal triumph for Krit�he
has been impatient to move out of Education�
and should considerably enhance his standing
both within the cabinet and the army, where he is
�
mentioned more frequently as a successor to
Praphat as its commander in chief.
Of potentially greater significance for Pra-
phat forces, however, was Thanom's award of a
deputy slot in the Ministry of Economic Affairs
to Liberal Party chieftain Senator Prasit, who is
one of Praphat's closest supporters and who has
long coveted a cabinet post. The timing of his
appointment appears to be related to the consid-
erable support he is expected to be able to muster
on the government's behalf in Parliament when
the controversial budget bill is voted on later this
month.
The cabinet changes will strengthen the im-
pression that momentum is building for Praphat's
early replacement of Prime Minister
Thanonn.
� �
EUROPE
-SECRET�
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German Problem Comes Up Again
East German - West German negotiations,
the four power talks on Berlin, and the ratifica-
tion of the Soviet and Polish pacts with Bonn are
all at a crucial stage. Available evidence indicates
that this is attributable largely to East German
opposition to its allies' tendency toward com-
promise and the rapid pace of events favorable to
Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik.
Government and party leaders of the Warsaw
Pact states met in East Berlin on 2 December for
discussions with the East Germans. The Soviet
delegation, headed by Brezhnev, included Kosy-
gin and Konstantin Katushev, the secretary in
charge of relations with ruling Communist parties.
In the face of their arrival, East German
party boss Ulbricht appeared intransigent, and
East Germany kept up harassment of West Ger-
man autobahn traffic to and from West Berlin,
even after the ostensible reason for it no longer
existed. This harassment ceased shortly after the
Warsaw Pact leaders ended their one-day meeting.
The communique after the meeting avoided men-
tion of specific problems, but heading the list of
topics discussed was that of "strengthening secu-
rity and development of peaceful cooperation in
Europe." The document also stated that the
meeting took place in an atmosphere of "com-
plete unanimity."
The brevity of the meeting, the end of the
harassment, and the use of the words "peaceful
cooperation- in the communique indicate that
the pact leaders convinced the East Germans to
be less rigid toward the four power talks and in
their negotiations with Bonn. The end of the
harassment is particularly striking because on 2
December East German border guards had indi-
cated to travelers that it would continue for at
least four more days. The use of the woirds "com-
plete unanimity" in the communique may be
intended to convey the impression that Ulbricht
is now bound to a new policy.
Bonn is continuing its efforts to improve
relations with the rest of Eastern Europe.
-gErRET___
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Chancellor Brandt will be in Warsaw on 6-9 De-
cember to sign the treaty with Poland, and West
German officials have indicated that talks with
Prague may begin in January. Foreign Minister
Scheel has stated publicly, however, that ratifica-
tion of a treaty with any East European country,
as well as the ratification of the Soviet - West
German treaty, will depend on achievement of a
satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem.
� � �
Italy: Coalition Clears Major Hurdle
Prime Minister Colombo substantially ad-
vanced his government's program when he won
Chamber of Deputies approval on 30 November
for his key economic bill despite hazards posed
by Communists, ultraleftists, and neo-fascists. In
the same session, parliamentary action was com-
pleted on Italy's first divorce law, thus moving
one of the most divisive issues for the center-left
coalition off center stage. Chances for final par-
liamentary approval of the economic bill in Sen-
ate action before the Christmas deadline now
seem much improved.
A crucial vote of confidence on 28 Novem-
ber on tax aspects of the bill was a setback for the
Communists because it had the procedural effect
of killing all opposition amendments. The Com-
munists, whose legislative amendments the cen-
ter-left had, as a matter of principle until this
year, always refused, sought to avoid the confi-
dence vote and even persuaded the ultraleftist
Proletarian Socialists to abandon their obstruc-
tionism in order to protect the Communist contri-
bution to the final economic bill. The ultraright,
however, continued to insist on individual Cham-
ber consideration of the thousand-odd amend-
ments which had been presented. At this point,
Colombo estimated correctly that by a vote of
confidence he could safely force into line even his
left-leaning coalition colleagues who have favored
a closer working relationship with the Commu-
nists.
Movement on the economic bill has been
particularly important because it is a government
prerequisite for certain social reforms that were
demanded in protest strikes last spring. A recur-
rence of strike activity in late November raised
the threat of a new wave of protest strikes if the
social reforms seemed to be postponed in-
definitely. Other factors contributing to unrest in
recent weeks have included sporadic student out-
breaks, the threat of a Mafia scandal in Sicily, and
the problems of establishing regional govern-
ments, highlighted by recurring violence in the
southern city of Reggio Calabria.
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Developments in the European Communities
The momentum engendered last December
by the summit meeting of the Six at The Hague
continues to be evident in community activities a
year later. The talks with Britain are getting down
to the important issues, specific steps toward
closer economic and monetary union will be con-
sidered later this month, and "political consulta-
tions," intended as a step toward political unity,
have gotten off to a modest start.
With their third ministerial level meeting
scheduled next week. both London and the Six
are considering ways to deal with such tough
questions as the length of the transitional period
Britain should have and how much it will have to
contribute to the community budget. The com-
munity is likely to insist that London accept a
single period of transition for both industry and
agriculture, but the UK may get in return at least
a percentage ceiling on how much it will have to
pay during that time. Although there will be
significant differences of view on the terms of
such a compromise, coming to grips with this
problem will itself be progress.
London may in fact be persuaded that it is
necessary to speed up the negotiations�as sug-
gested in a recent Economist editorial�and most
of the EC members share this feeling. During
Chancellor Brandt's recent visit to Rome, both
the Italians and the Germans reaffirmed their
hope that the negotiations could be substantially
concluded by mid-1971. When British negotiator
Rippon was in Paris recently, however, French
Foreign Minister Schumann indicated this was
expecting too much. The Pompidou government
will be tough in bargaining about agriculture, and
it may also be sensitive that hard-core Gaullists
would be offended should Britain achieve an
entry accord during France's tenure as Council
chairman from January to July 1971.
Paris is clearly anxious, however, for early
implementation of the first stage of monetary
union. It desires to defer consideration of the
economic and political arrangements that would
accompany monetary measures. Germany and the
Netherlands, on the other hand, have criticized
the Commission's proposals for slighting these
aspects. The French preference for exploring in-
stitutional issues only after the community is
enlarged may rest on the hope that London will
be an ally against "supranationalist" solutions.
Despite these differences there is still moderate
optimism in Brussels that a compromise can be
worked out that would enable the first steps to be
taken early in 1971.
When the foreign ministers of the Six met in
Munich last month, explicitly to discuss political
matters, the agenda was concerned with discus-
sions on the Middle East and a conference on
European security. Most of the participants seem
to agree that the meeting marked the beginning of
an evolution toward a single European "voice,"
even though there were obvious disagreements,
especially between France and the others in
approaches to the Middle East and Mediterranean.
These topics will, nevertheless, continue to be
examined at the working level, and the foreign
ministers agreed on measures to strengthen con-
sultation among ambassadors of the Six in third
countries and in international organiza-
tions.
� 0
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Hungary:
Party Party Congress Advances Kadar Reform Goals
The party congress that ended on 28 Novem-
ber succeeded in raising Kadar's political reform
programs to regime policy without either incur-
ring Soviet displeasure or causing visible signs of
internal disagreement.
Soviet party boss Brezhnev warmly praised
party chief Kadar and gave a general endorsement
to his programs. During the deliberations, Hun-
garian party leaders, who will be responsible for
implementing changes in government structure,
secret police activities, and party work, presented
an unprecedented picture of unity and solidarity.
Their speeches conveyed a convincing degree of
political realism, setting limits on domestic re-
form and acknowledging obligations to the USSR
and the world Socialist movement. On the final
day of the congress, Kadar and his closest advisers
gave relaxed and confident summations, inasmuch
as they had succeeded in papering over, at least,
and perhaps even overcoming, domestic and for-
eign opposition to Kadar's reforms.
One of the more important practical de-
velopments at the congress was party secretary
Biszku's scheme for widening collective leadership
in order to eliminate potential disruptions caused
by any physical incapacitation of the leaders.
Although Biszku did not specifically mention
Kadar, it is well known that the latter's health is
not robust. Biszku did not detail his proposed
plan but indicated that more delegation of
authority to subordinates is in the cards. Another
important substantive development was the cen-
tral committee's decision to reject any loosening
of cultural controls�already the least restrictive
in the Soviet-oriented world.
Top personnel changes were limited as Kadar
apparently decided that stability and continuity
were more important than bringing younger peo-
ple into the leadership. The most important de-
motions were brought about by abolishing the
post of candidate politburo member; Defense
Minister Czinege, Culture Minister Ilku and
Deputy Premier Ajtai consequently lost their high
party posts through this stratagem. Key promo-
tions included party secretary Aczel's election to
the politburo, ex-candidate member Karoly
Nemeth's move to full politburo status and the
addition of Mrs. Valeria Benke, a capable ideo-
logist, to the politburo. The election of 45-year-
old Miklos Ovari to the party secretariat increased
the influence of liberals in Kadar's inner circle.
Three fourths of the central committee members
retained their seats.
The handling of economic questions also re-
flected a realistic approach. Kadar himself
emphasized satisfaction with economic progress
achieved during the current five-year plan period
(1966-70) and asserted that major plan targets
will be reached or overfulfilled. New goals for
1971-75 appear realistic and will permit concen-
tration on key tasks.
According to Kadar, the New Economic
Mechanism brought numerous economic prob-
lems into sharp focus, but progress is being made
in solving them and the system operates effi-
ciently. He stated that attention now will be
focused on key industries that need moderniza-
tion in order to increase their efficiency and to
improve Hungary's competitive position. The
Hungarians expect this to be accomplished in part
by procuring up-to-date technology from the
West, to be financed by boosting exports and by
greater reliance on medium-term credits.
Also, in January some less important in-
dustrial monopolies are to be reorganized into
multifirm trusts, with the expectation that decen-
tralization and more independent management of
enterprises will lead to more efficient operation.
In agriculture, the congress reiterated the need to
stimulate agricultural production, especially in
the livestock sector, in part through increased use
of chemicals and machinery.
Page 11
� � �
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Dec 70
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USSR : Solzhenitsyn-A Prize and a Dilemma
The award of the Nobel Prize for Literature
to novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has again con-
fronted the Soviet leadership with one of its most
thorny problems�how to handle Stalin's reputa-
tion.
Solzhenitsyn's identification with this issue
dates from 1962, and his difficulties with the
regime stem from the political�rather than the
literary�significance of his works. In that year,
over the opposition of some other members of
the leadership, Khrushchev personally authorized
publication of Solzhenitsyn's first novel to fur-
ther his own de-Stalinization campaign. This cam-
paign was intended to ease the passage of the
First Secretary's various schemes for reorganizing
the Soviet system. Since then Solzhenitsyn has
become a symbol for those opposed to the neo-
Stalinist tendencies of the present leadership.
The Politburo, which dismantled many of
Khrushchev's innovations, is slowly rehabilitating
Stalin and has barred any criticism of the major
periods of Stalin's rule. This trend has encouraged
those forces in Soviet society who are anxious to
maintain the status quo while alienating those
who advocate change and continuation of de-
Stalinization. Solzhenitsyn, however, has con-
tinued to criticize Stalin and the arbitrary use of
power that made his "achievements" possible,
and has openly spoken out against the regime's
repression of liberal intellectuals.
Primarily because of his significance as a
symbol of anti-Stalinism, the author and his
works have been a matter of special concern to
the Kremlin. The last-minute decision not to pub-
lish his novel, The Cancer Ward, was reportedly
made at "high political levels." Other reports sug-
gest that Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko was
behind the novelist's expulsion from the Writers'
Union in November 1969.
Since the announcement in early October of
the Nobel Prize award, there has been no con-
demnation of Solzhenitsyn or of the Nobel Com-
mittee by any Soviet political leader. Neverthe-
less, the Politburo itself was undoubtedly forced
to wrestle with the question of whether to permit
the novelist to accept the prize and howl the
USSR's public image could best be protected.
Solzhenitsyn initially announced that he wanted
to accept the prize personally in Stockholm. His
statement was ignored in the Soviet Union, but
the press and spokesmen for the Writers' Union
quickly branded the Nobel Committee's decision
as purely "political" and "provocative." The
rather mild tone of the criticism that has ap-
peared to date and the relative silence of the press
in the last few weeks are in sharp contrast to the
furor that surrounded Pasternak, who was forced
to refuse the award in 1958.
Citing his fear that he would not be allowed
to return to the Soviet Union from Stockholm,
Solzhenitsyn finally announced on 27 November
that he would prefer to receive the award at the
Swedish Embassy in Moscow. He also stated that
he is "ready to deliver the Nobel Lecture or hand
it over in written form" within six months. For
the regime, this decision eliminates unfavorable
publicity that would have been associated with
overt action to prevent the novelist from receiving
the prize. Moreover, inasmuch as the authorities
cannot easily threaten Solzhenitsyn with foreign
exile, they may find it difficult to influence the
content of his lecture. The most important aspect
of Solzhenitsyn's maneuvering, however, is that
the authorities may be faced with an outstanding
anti-Stalinist holding the Nobel Prize in the Soviet
Union.
-greKLE-T__
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SEU'1-144:_
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Guinea Repels Second Incursion
The abortive overland attack last week against
a small upcountry border town was almost certainly
an integral part of the Portuguese-directed operation
that began with the earlier seaborne commando as-
sault on Conakry. With African emotions further
inflamed, Lisbon and its NATO allies face rough
going when the UN Security Council considers the
episode again, probably sometime next week.
An armed group, probably consisting mainly of
exiled opponents of President Toure, crossed into
Guinea, almost certainly from Portuguese Guinea,
late last week and attacked Koundara, an inland
town some 200 miles north of Conakry. The
Guinean defenders repulsed the attackers, many of
whom were apparently captured.
The Koundara attack may have been under-
taken mainly to show increased activity by Guinean
dissidents in order to help mask extensive direct
participation by regular Portuguese troops in the
raid on Conakry. Members of the UN fact-finding
mission to Conakry, after interviewing captured par-
ticipants in the raid there, have stated that the
attack force numbered from 350 to 500 men and
consisted of two companies of regular Portuguese
African troops augmented by a commando group
and about 80 Guinean dissidents.
Portuguese spokesmen, who continue publicly
to deny Lisbon's involvement in either incident,
have by implication portrayed the Koundara ruckus
as a case of defecting Guinean soldiers fighting their
way to asylum in Portuguese Guinea. At the same
time, these spokesmen have reported the "escape"
to Portuguese Guinea of 25 Portuguese soldiers and
civilians previously held captive in Guinea. The
emphasis in the Portuguese press on the return of
these men, who probably were taken from Guinea
by the commandos on 22 November, supports the
conclusion that their liberation was Lisbon's pri-
mary objective in the entire operation.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Meanwhile, in battered Conakry conditions
have largely returned to normal, although army and
militia patrols and some roadblocks are still main-
tained. Military and medical assistance from other
countries has begun to arrive in response to Toure's
appeals. Moscow evidently airlifted some type of aid
last weekend, and Cairo apparently delivered the
medical aid it had promised. Algeria and Libya have
provided something characterized by Conakry as
"military assistance" and two Nigerian coastal patrol
craft are now reportedly operating off the Guinean
capital. Throughout Africa, the anti-Portuguese
furor and manifestations of support for Toure con-
tinue unabated as arrangements progress for a
special meeting of the Organization of African
Unity's ministerial council in Lagos beginning on 9
December.
When the Security Council returns to the
Guinea question, the Western powers may well be
confronted with difficult choices. The report of the
Council's fact-finding mission, due early next week,
will apparently stress the extent of Portuguese in-
volvement. These findings will likely be cited by the
Africans and their friends as sufficient reason to
declare Portugal guilty of aggression and to impose
mandatory sanctions.
Although the Council is not likely to adopt
such (3x t re m e measures, Portugal's NATO allies are
certain to be faced with renewed demands that all
countries refrain from giving Lisbon any assistance
that could be used against either independent Afri-
can states or indigenous groups fighting for freedom
from Portuguese control. A resolution along these(b)(3)
lines would probably attract the requisite nine affir-
mative votes, necessitating the use of a veto to block
it.
� � �
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Jordan: Husayn Mending Fences Abroad
King Husayn's tour this week points up a
shift in the nature of the problems facing Jordan
now that a period of relative calm has passed
since the application on 9 November of the truce
terms with the fedayeen. The focus of the King's
attention has moved temporarily beyond internal
events to external problems�the raising of funds
abroad, the purchase of new armaments, and the
reorientation of the Arab states following Nasir's
death.
Despite occasional skirmishes between the
fedayeen and the army, the situation generally
has remained quiet enough to allow the Arab
truce commission to start reducing its presence in
Jordan. The chairman, Tunisian Bahi Ladgham,
has left for home, although he will return as
necessary; the military observer team has been cut
to 30 men; and remaining difficulties are to be
ironed out at Permanent Military Subcommittee
meetings. These problems primarily center on
bringing undisciplined fedayeen and trigger-happy
troops under the control of their commands, but
also include getting the fedayeen out of the
northern towns and the army out of Zama.
Husayn obviously feels secure enough to
leave Jordan at this juncture, however, or at least
has decided that the immediate internal problems
must be subordinated to more pressing fiscal and
political demands. He left Amman on 1 December
to talk with King Faysal about money problems,
and planned to go on to Cairo to discuss his
growing fear that the Arab states have been con-
certing a policy inimical to Jordan.
Nasir had been a moderating influence in
Arab policy toward Jordan, but the Sadat regime
has played an equivocal role in its relations with
Husayn, especially since he appointed Wasfi Tal as
premier. The King is now seeking to restore a
solid base of bilateral understanding with Egypt
to counter the recent affirmations by Syria and
the fedayeen of their intention to associate them-
selves with the proposed tripartite federation of
Egypt, Sudan, and Libya.
Adding to Husayn's growing sense of isola-
tion is his suspicion that the other Arab countries
would like to get rid of the Palestinian question
by creating a "state" out of portions of not only
the Israeli-occupied West Bank but even of the
East Bank of his kingdom. The King's announced
plan is to call for an Arab summit meeting and
place the Palestinian burden on collective Arab
shoulders.
� * �
Israel-Egypt: Differing Views on Further Talks
As Israel this week appeared to be moving
closer to a decision on whether to return to the
Jarring talks, Egyptian President Sadat adopted a
harder public line regarding any further extension
of the cease-fire.
All major Israeli political groups, with the
exception of the right-wing Gahal, now generally
agree that rectification of the standstill violations
is no longer a precondition for a return to peace
talks under the auspices of UN mediator Jarring.
A public debate continues, however, over the
specific requirements for Israel's return.
Speaking to a Labor Party meeting on 29
November, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated
that Israel was prepared for talks without prior
conditions, but added that it had "certain
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S.EU-4-14-14;11._
guidelines" for negotiations. These were: a con-
tinued Israeli presence in the Golan Heights, the
Gaza Strip, and along the Strait of Tiran, and an
agreement that no Arab army would cross the
Jordan River westward toward Israel. These
guidelines were not preconditions, Dayan said,
because the Arabs would not have to sign their
agreement in advance. "We will sit together and
discuss these matters," the defense minister said.
Deputy Prime Minister AIIon pointed out,
however, that although Israel had not left the
talks for good, -a political and strategic solution"
must be found for the problem of the forward
missile deployment.
For its part, Cairo has continued to stress
the necessity of an early resumption of meaning-
ful contacts with Jarring, and to profess to believe
that a renewal of active hostilities will result if
such contacts fail to develop. Egyptians at various
levels have stated that Cairo could not accept
another renewal of the cease-fire unless substan-
tial progress were made toward implementing the
UN Security Council resolution. Moreover, on 30
November President Sadat defined the Egyptian
interpretation of "progress" in stronger terms
than previously. He told his front-line troops that
the cease-fire would be extended only if a time-
table were established for the withdrawal of Is-
raeli forces from Arab territory.
any kind of demonstrable movement
toward resolving the Middle East impasse would
be sufficient to permit Egypt to extend the
cease-fire beyond 5 February, at least on a de
facto basis. The publicity given Sadat's definition
of what would represent progress may make this
more difficult, however. Israeli Foreign Minister
Eban promptly responded to Sadat's statement
with a public affirmation that Israel would not
negoliate on the basis of
tions.
� � �
TURKEY: The tense political situation has eased
temporarily with the selection on the 36th ballot
of Sabit Avci, the former minister of power and
natural resources, as speaker of the National
Assembly. The month-long balloting was marked
by dissension and acrimony. Prime Minister
Demirel now faces the problem of getting par-
liamentary approval of such major legislation as
the annual budget, the opium licensing law, and a
controversial labor measure, as well as defeating
six censure motions that are pending against his
government.1
Meanwhile, student unrest, marked by increasing
violence, has reached a new zenith. Many schools
have been closed temporarily, but presumably
will reopen later this month followina the Islamic
holiday.
� � �
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India: New Efforts in Strategic Northeast
Since the 1950s, the diverse regional, ethnic,
and tribal groups inhabiting remote northeastern
India have aspired to greater autonomy or, in
some cases, complete independence. The geo-
graphic isolation of the area and the tendency of
the inhabitants to back their demands with armed
rebellion had caused New Delhi to try a dual
approach�a strong military presence combined
with large amounts of economic assistance. Re-
cently, however, New Delhi appears increasingly
willing to make concessions, provided the region's
security remains relatively assured.
Last April, New Delhi acceded to a 16-year-
old tribal demand for the creation of an autono-
mous, largely self-governing region, Meghalaya.
On 10 November, Mrs. Gandhi announced that
Meghalaya would be elevated to full statehood.
This surprise move follows a decision in Septem-
ber to grant statehood to the two union terri-
tories of Manipur and Tripura, where prolonged
agitation had been encouraged by New Delhi's
agreement to create the state of Nagaland in
1962.
New Delhi has shown considerable adroit-
ness in dealing with tribal dissidence. Its confi-
dence has been bolstered by relative calm in the
region throughout the past year, although it still
gives due recognition to the area's basic insta-
bility. In response to demands from the Nagaland
government, New Delhi has agreed to raise a Naga
regiment in the Indian Army, but has refused to
withdraw its armed forces from Nagaland or to
transfer responsibility for law and order from the
governor it appointed to the locally elected chief
minister.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that New Delhi
will continue to be harassed by separatist pres-
sures because of the competing tribal groups,
their resentment of New Delhi's pervasive role,
and their dissatisfactions with existing bounda-
ries. In the long-troubled Mizo Hills insurgents
have not abandoned their hope of establishing an
independent state of Mizoram. Although the Mizo
rebels have obtained some arms and training from
adjacent East Pakistan, they do not now consti-
tute a serious threat.
It has not yet been made clear, moreover,
how the government will handle the demands of
Naga tribesmen in northern Manipur who are agi-
tating for their own sub-state or for annexation to
Nagaland. In addition, the 4,000-man Naga under-
ground, split into extremist and moderate fac-
tions, remains a viable threat although it has been
somewhat demoralized by the hardship of con-
tinually evading security forces and by a continu-
ing drain of manpower because of surrenders and
captures. From his refuge in England, Naga ex-
tremist leader Angami Phizo continues to advo-
cate the revolutionary path to independence.
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�SreRLE�T--
Over-all, Assam appears to have withstood
the tremors of possible political instability. These
had been heightened by the recent resignation,
due to ill health, of Chief Minister Chaliha, who
had provided governmental continuity for the
past 13 years. A successor has been chosen with
New Delhi's blessing, and the central government
has further demonstrated its goodwill by deciding
to build a second, and probably uneconomic, oil
refinery in Assam. I
� � �
Zambia: Kaunda Seeks a New Order
The recent adoption of a new constitution
by Zambia's ruling United National Independence
Party (UN IP) and a reorganization of government
at the local level have contributed significantly to
strengthening President Kaunda's control over the
country. Armed with this new authority, Kaunda
has already moved ahead, announcing major eco-
nomic and social reforms.
The new constitution gives Kaunda wide-
ranging powers and is designed to combat party
factionalism, especially along tribal lines. The
local government reform increases the party's
control by giving government-appointed district-
level administrators powers to oversee lower level
officials.
Kaunda has also announced that the govern-
ment will acquire control of Zambia's five for-
eign-owned banks, eliminate private insurance
companies, and take over building-and-loan soci-
eties. Moreover, retail and wholesale trading
licenses will not be issued to foreigners after 1
January 1972, except in a few specifically exempt
categories. The government, therefore, will even-
tually assume control of virtually all enterprises
not nationalized in 1968 and 1969.
Page 17
In addition, Kaunda has disclosed a new
reform measure that vests control of all land in
the hands of the President. Rural tribal lands will
no longer be the sole responsibility of traditional
chiefs and village headmen, while private land will
come under government ownership but will then
be leased back on a long-term basis. Kaunda also
established a national service that eventually will
conscript educated citizens for civic and paramili-
tary training and for a tour of duty in the coun-
tryside.
Although these initiatives suggest radical
changes in the administration of the country,
Kaunda is likely to move slowly and stop short of
provoking widespread dissension. The land reform
is basically designed to spur the consolidation of
remote settlements into larger villages near gov-
ernment services and to prod small economic
enterprises to join cooperative ventures. Harsh
application of the reforms is likely to fall pri-
marily on unpopular minorities�especially on for-
eign residents and members of small religious
sects and the opposition political party�all of
whom carry little influence in Zambian af-
fairs,
� � �
WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 Dec 70
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chile: One Month of Allende's Government
Economic Measures
The government is moving to implement
some of Allende's campaign promises, but it is
realizing that financial constraints are causing a
problem in reconciling reality and ideology. Sev-
eral cabinet ministers, in particular those of agri-
culture and public works, already are complaining
that lack of funds will prevent them from under-
taking desired programs.
In a public statement on 27 November
Finance Minister Zorrilla said that the govern-
ment's priorities over the next year or so would
be aimed at establishing a socialist state and end-
ing the "dependent" nature of the economy. To
this end the government plans to increase the
state control of banking, nationalize the mining
sector, and expand the state's participation in
foreign trade. On 1 December it nationalized a
large "monopolistic" textile company.
Zorrilla added that direct foreign investment
would be encouraged only when it could make a
real technological contribution. He said that hous-
ing, public works, agrarian reform, export promo-
tion, and reduction of unemployment would be
stressed.
The Allende government now is considering
the most expeditious way to complete the nation-
alization of the US copper companies that was
begun during the Frei administration. Legislation
to this effect will be sent to Congress soon, and
may be accompanied by a proposal that would
change the constitutional guarantees now existing
for private property. If Congress fails to act
promptly and favorably Allende could carry
through on his "threat" to take the issue to the
public via a plebiscite.
The Christian Democrats
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is still
trying to decide whether to oppose or collaborate
with the government. Reports that the proposed
constitutional reform of private property rights
would be taken to a plebiscite if balked by "anti-
patriotic" elements in Congress drew sharp criti-
cism from PDC legislators. They have been quick
to state their approval of the principle of nation-
alization of the copper companies, however.
The UP, in particular the Communist Party,
is trying to drive a wedge between the wings of
the PDC supporting the position of defeated pres-
idential candidate Radomiro Tomic and that of
former president Eduardo Frei. The Communist-
directed UP tabloid went so far as to imply that
Frei was associated with the assassination of
Army Commander in Chief Schneider in October
and therefore with a plot to deny Allende the
presidency.
PDC Senator Renan Fuentealba on 30 No-
vember tried in turn to aggravate the divisions
within the UP, playing on the long-time rivalry
between the Communists and Socialists.
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Fuentealba emphasized the PDC's support for
changes in Chilean society but stressed that they
must be made within the present constitutional
system.
The Communists
At a plenum of the Chilean Communist
Party (PCCh) last week, Secretary General Luis
Corvalan gave a speech attesting to the major role
his party plays in the Allende government. He
emphasized measures already taken by the admin-
istration that parallel PCCh policies and asserted
that the ultimate goal of a "people's state" is
impeded by Chile's present constitution, legal
system, and entire institutional structure.
Corvalan's speech implies that PCCh leaders
are confident that anti-Communist opposition in
Chile now is weakened and that they no longer
need to be cautious in their exercise of political
power. Pravda's account of the speech portrays
the PCCh in a more militant and revolutionary
lighi than previous Soviet press commentary,
which had pictured the Chilean party as a reason-
able partner in a coalition having wide appeal.
This treatment suggests that the USSR is less
worried than before about possible US and in-
ternal Chilean reactions to greater Soviet atten-
tion to the PCCh.
The Military
Schneider's murder solidified military sup-
port for Allende's government as little else could
have.
� � �
Mexico: Cabinet Appointments
The cabinet appointed by newly installed
President Luis Echeverria reflects his own high
standards and further enhances the outlook for
good relations with the US. His choices for politi-
cally sensitive posts are strong, well-qualified
men. Those who will deal with Mexico's most
difficult problem�rural poverty�have intimate
and extensive knowledge in the field.
The agriculture secretary, Bernardo Aguirre,
has held office in his state of Chihuahua, one of
the most important agricultural regions, and
Aguirre himself is a rancher. The head of agrarian
affairs, Augusto Gomez Villaneuva, is a vigorous
lawyer in his late 30s who headed the powerful
national peasants confederation, the rural arm of
the official party. The new minister of education,
whose policies might affect the still explosive
student situation, is a highly respected educator,
Victor Bravo Ahuja. The labor and interior minis-
tries, both stepping stones to the presidency, are
headed by close friends of the president, Rafael
Hernandez Ochoa and Mario Moya Palencia.
� � �
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Dec 70
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b
(b
)(1)
)(3)
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Guatemala: Some Success in Anti-Communist Campaign
The terrorists are beginning to feel the
squeeze of the tough security operations launched
last month, and the chance of a retaliatory attack
on US or Guatemalan officials remains high.
Several terrorist leaders have been captured,
including the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) intel-
ligence chief "Antonio" and long-time Commu-
nist Party (PGT) central committee member,
Huberto Alvarado. Other active terrorists and col-
laborators are in custody, as well.
security is becoming a
serious problem for the terrorist organizations
because so many persons able to provide informa-
tion have been arrested.
the FAR leaders are convinced that
"Antonio" and Alvarado will be killed by the
police, and want to join with the PGT in an
assassination attempt against two US officials.
Even though the security forces seem to be
making some promising headway against the ter-
rorists, the less sophisticated aspects of the state
of siege operations continue to compound the
�
Nicaragua: Political Negotiations Under Way
Leaders of the two major parties have en-
tered into negotiations on constitutional reform
and presidential succession that may determine
the country's political direction for the next
decade.
According to an agreement reached last
week between President Somoza and the leader of
the opposition Conservative Party, Fernando
Aguero, the scheduled 1972 general elections
would not be held. Instead, at the end of Sarno-
government's political problems. Two leftist intel-
lectuals, both associated with the university ond
both frequently cited as "intellectual authors" of
subversion, were shot this week, apparently by
clandestine counterterrorist squads. In addition,
five unidentified bodies were found in Guatemala
City. These shootings and the government's un-
precedented search of the university have rased
the fury of the leftist opposition. The rector of
the National University of San Carlos declared
that a dialogue with the government is no longer
possible and that "the battle lines are drawn."
The leftist-oriented press association is similarly
outraged by strict censorship requirements and by
the "disappearance" of three of their colleagues�
one being, in fact, "Antonio." The general public
has been dismayed at the highly visible excesses
of the security forces, such as the shearing of
long-haired youths in public, the arrest of prom-
inent members of the opposition parties, and the
recent air force attack on a Salvadoran fishing
fleet mistaken for an -invasion force." In
response to widespread criticism, President Arana
addressed the nation with a plea for tolerance of
government errors in recognition that drastic
methofl neprieri to rid the country of vio-
lence.
*
za's term, a transitional government elected by a
constituent assembly would be installed for per-
haps two or three years. Somoza would remain as
head of the armed forces during this period and
would be able to run for the presidency after the
transitional government.
Both Somoza and Aguero would gain under
such a plan. Somoza, who is constitutionally
barred from seeking immediate re-election, would
be able to protect his political flank from the
SECRET
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SECRET,
sniping of opponents of continuismo and advance
his political ambitions without blatantly ignoring
the law. At the same time, however, he would be
spared the necessity of relinquishing the presi-
dency to a successor for a regular five-year term.
Moreover, during the term of the transitional gov-
ernment, Somoza's party would no doubt control
the congress, most of the cabinet posts, and, of
course, the military.
Aguero, for his part, would attain his major
short-term objective of ensuring that Somoza
stepped down in 1972 and also gain for his party
a more substantial role in the government. Aguero
is, moreover, interested in the Colombian Na-
tional Front system, which regularly alternated
power between the Conservative and Liberal par-
ties. He probably hopes that a transitional gov-
ernment could set the stage for such an arrange-
ment in Nicaragua.
Subsequent meetings between the governing
Liberal Party and the opposition Conservatives
will seek agreement on the precise composition of
a transitional government, specific changes in the
Aguero
Somoza
electoral and judicial systems, and a statement of
broad policy objectives. If Somoza allows Aguero
and his followers a significant degree of par-
ticipation in the transitional government, chances
for an agreement are quite good. Leaders of other
political factions, realizing that a Somoza-Aguero
accord could permanently condemn them to the
political periphery, would undoubtedly attack
any arrangement, but to little avail.
� � �
Argentina: Political Developments
The military government of President
Levingston will soon unveil a political plan and an
economic development program, designed to
move Argentina gradually toward a return to con-
stitutional government. Levingston has made it
clear, however, that before elections can be held
the proper conditions must be created and that
this process will take at least another four years.
the President appears to have put to rest the
growing sentiment for an accelerated return to
constitutional civilian government. Speaking be-
fore a group of nearly 2,000 military officers on
16 November, Levingston played on their concern
about a Marxist government in Chile by saying
that the armed forces must provide the continuity
of leadership that will enable Argentina to deal
with its neighbors�Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and
Uruguay�that are in danger of succumbing to
"socialist pressure." He stressed that Argentina
must now demonstrate that "democracy" is the
best system for meeting the problems common to
the area.
Levingston also appears to have calmed the
growing military frustration with the lack of
progress on the domestic scene since the armed
force; took over the government in 1966. The
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new economic team appointed last month has
reoriented economic policy toward rapid industri-
alization and the President has announced that a
comprehensive national development plan will be
made public later this month. At the same time, a
"political plan" is being devised that is intended
to move the country toward civilian government
in stages that will coincide with the development
plan.
Two of the immediate political tasks the
President has already set for the government are
the elimination of contacts between former presi-
dent Juan Peron in Spain and top Peronist leaders
in Argentina, and the extremely difficult problem
of limiting political activity by the labor unions.
URUGUAY: Montevideo experienced an up-
swing in urban terrorism this week with a flurry
of Tupamaro bombing attacks and the appearance
of a right-wing anti-Tupamaro terrorist group.
The targets of the Tupamaro raids included an
International Telephone and Telegraph commun-
ication center and several progovernment political
Page 22
President Levingston appears to be em-
barking on an ambitious course and he must
retain the support of the military if he is to
implement his wide-ranging political and eco-
nomic plans. To do this he must show early
progress in dealing with Argentina's economic
problems and find some way to deal effectively
with the growing problem of urban terrorism.
Terrorist groups, most claiming to be left-
wing Peronists, have become increasingly bold in
their ventures in recent weeks. US installations
and official personnel have been the frequent
targets of these groups, probably for publicity
reasons as much as out of fundamental anti-
Americanism. If it should become necessary to
call in the military to help solve this growing
problem, it would undoubtedly create a serious
irritant in President Levingston's relations with
the military.
clubs. On 26 and 27 November a new organi-
zation calling itself the "National Armed De-
fense" carried out minor attacks on the homes of
relatives of known Tupamaros. The group pledged
four Tupamaro deaths for every citizen killed by
the left-wing terrorist group.
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