COMBINED WATCH REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162374
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-00781
• Publication Date: February 8, 1968

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COMBINED WATCH REPORT
of the
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
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8 February 1968
Conclusions
We believe that the Communists intend to continue their major offensive in
South Vietnam.
We expect Communist pressure to continue in both northern Laos and the Pan-
handle. Communist forces in several areas apparently are preparing for further attacks
on government positions.
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I. Communist International Developments
We have noted no new developments of indications significance.
Soviet and Eastern European Military Developments
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Soviet naval patrols have been joined by air units in reconnaissance
of the US naval task group in the Sea of Japan. An additional Soviet naval force
consisting of six combatants in the southern Sea of Japan. These ships
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IIPEOP SECRET 111 February 1968
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probably are intended to auament the present surveillance arour) *
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Critical Areas
2. Vietnam (As of 0900 EST, 8 February): We believe that the Communists in-
tend to continue their major offensive in South Vietnam.
While elements of many Viet Cong main force units were employed in the
initial attacks, the bulk of the NVA forces were not committed. The movements and
preparations of major North Vietnamese and Viet Cona main force units suggest that further
operations are impending.
The expected Communist offensive against Khe Sanh and other targets in the
DMZ area could begin at any time and almost certainly will be timed to coincide with
further attacks in other areas. The extensive Communist activity in the Khe Sanh area,
including employment of tanks, indicates that Hanoi is preparing for a major battle which
could be an important aspect of its over-all strategy during the coming months.
*As of 8 February, Soviet surface forces in the southern Sea of Japan consist of:
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2 Kynda CLGMs - guided missile light cruisers (SAM/SSM)
1 Kashin DLG - guided missile frigate (SAM)
1 Krupnyy DDGS - guided missile destroyer (SSM)
1 Ki[din DDGS - guided missile destroyer (SSM)
3 Kotlin DDs - destroyers
1 Riga DE - destroyer escort
2 AGIs - intelligence col lectors
2 Oilers
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ICRET0 8 February 1968
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In the III Corps area, elements of all three Communist divisions now pose
a threat to major population centers and allied military facilities, particularly Saigon
and Bien Hoc airbase. In the central highlands, NVA regiments subordinate to the
B-3 Front are in position to operate against Dak To, Kontum, Pleiku and other cities,
while other NVA units have apparently been moved into position to rootinue attacks
on major targets in the coastal area, including Danang and Hue.
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3. Laos: Communist forces in several areas apparently are preparing for further
attacks on government positions. While we continue to have no firm signs of any general
Communist offensive, attacks in the near future could be timed to coincide with the (b)(1)
effort in South Vietnam to reinforce the appearance of Communist strength. The Com-
munists continue preparations for the attack on Phou Pha Thi (Site 85)
North Vietnamese AN-2s may again be employed against the site.
The Communists have also increased pressure against government positions west and
southwest of the Plaine des Jarres. In the Panhandle, a Communist attack on Saravane
Communist forces also pose a continuing threat to government positions
may occur soon.
along Route 9.
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