JMARC MEETING WITH DDP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03241934
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-02265
• Publication Date: November 16, 1960

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16 November 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: JMARC Meeting with DDP
PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Bissell, Barnes, King, Esterline, Eisemann,
Hawkins, Drain, Gaines, Beerli.
1. The meeting was held to bring the DDP up-to-date as to JMARC
operational planning on the eve of the DCl/DDP briefing of the President-Elect.
On the day previous, a JMA.RC staff meeting had crystallized a new concept,
as set forth in the attached memorandum.
2. At the outset of the meeting, C/WH/4 raised two related but separate
problems: the loan to Guatemala and the provision of military assistance to
quell the revolt.
3. The DDP heard out the JMARC presentation and raised the following
questions:
a. Would the effort now contemplated be enough? (JMARC personnel
put it that the success of this effort depended in large part on the internal
reaction thereto. That reaction should not be importantly different whether
our operation consisted of a 600-man mountain-top perimeter or a1500-3000
man beachhead with airstrip. A more meaningful contrast would be between
either of those actions on the one hand and a major joint CIA/DOD action on
the other.) The DDP requested that JMARC planning encompass an addi-
tional 600-man force, for possible use in a second mountain area.
b. What policy clearances were necessary? The following were
enumerated:
(1) Approval to use a ZI installation for up to 800 men. (JMARC
undertook to provide the DDP by Friday noon a specific recommendation
complete with installation blueprint and cost estimate.)
(2) Approval to use the Canal Zone facility for up to 200 trainees.
(3) Approval to launch strikes from Nicaragua.
(4) Approval to launch air resupply from U.S. bases.
(5) Approval for one LST, refitted for the purposes of this operation.
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4. It was understood that the general reaction of the President-Elect would
perhaps determine the further progress of the project. Subject to his indicated
general agreement, the DDP undertook to get answers to the above policy questions
next week. JMARC undertook to proceed at once to establish directives and
instructions to accomplish the revised plan, the date of launching to be 1 February,
5. In general discussion of JMARC problems, it was agreed that consider-
ation would be given to:
a. Gaining internal approval not to polygraph Army increments to the
training program.
b. Establishing an officer-in-charge, with full responsibility in the
field, in connection with any Nicaragua construction.
c. Reducing substantially the requirements for internal staff clearances.
6. At the close of the meeting the Chief, WH/4, having earlier made passing
reference to the possible requirement for U.S. and allied recognition of a provi-
sional government, also stressed the possible requirement that allied governments
jointly support the operation from its inception.
7. Very tentative budget figures (in the order of a $42, 000, 000 total) were
left for the DDP1s review.
Richard D -.--Drain
C /WH/4 /P&P
Attachment:
Pre -DDP Staff Meeting
WH/4 /P&P: R.D.Drain:jss (17 Nov 60)
Distribution:
1 - C/WH/4
1 - COPS/WH/4
1 - Mallard,
Barkley, File
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PRE-DDP STAFF MEETING
1. Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the
controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier
believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned.
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2. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with (4AV
airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD
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action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise
timely create the base and lift needed. /4/ lacti
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- 3. Our Our present concept:
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Land a force of 600 men by LST on beaches from which they would ,
at once move inland and create a safe area in a mountain fastness. These,
and those who joined them from within, to be resupplied by airdrop. To
launch in late January.
4. Needed to bring the above about:
a. One LST from Navy, to be outfitted by Navy at our direction,
b. 200 new recruits, in addition to the 70 in pipeline. Believed
that the recruiting would take 5 weeks, the training 4 more.
c. Use of the Nicaragua airstrip (with repairs thought to take 10 days).
d. Use of Panama for either training the 200 new recruits, or for
holding 200 from JMADD while the new recruits are trained there.
e. Use of or comparable area for final, Case Officer type (b)(1)
(b)(3)
training of up to 60 men going in as small groups.
f. Permission to resupply the 600-man lodgment from U.S. bases
(best: Opalocka).
g. Clear delineation of DPD-JMARC command lines so that the
latter can issue orders to the former.
h. An intimation to the State Department that part of the support
for the 600-man lodgment may have to be in the form of U.S. (and allied)
recognition of that force and its nominal leadership as a provisional
government.
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1 June 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell ID. Taylor
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On Friday, November 18, 1960, Mr. Bissell and I briefed the
President-elect at Palm Beach, Florida. This briefing included 'a
status report with respect to certain important covert operations
and in particular the Cuban Operation. The particular purpose of
the briefing was to bring the President�elect up to date with regard �
to the policy paper on Cuba which had been approved by the President
on March 16, 1960 and to outline the progress which had been made
towards accomplishing the aforementioned objectives set out in that
paper, all of which called for action in the covert field.
It seemed important to advise the President-elect of these
facts since he was receiving a large number of suggestions and was
under considerable pressure from certain Congressional leaders
who were not aware of the action programs which were being developed
in the Cuban situation.
The purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the President�
elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint
him of its existence.
AWD/ji
1 - DCI
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director
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(6j2,2,0 16 November 1960
1411,1011ANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director (Plan.s,
SUBJECT: Points re Cuba for Discussion at Special Croup
Meeting, Saturday, 19 NeveMbor 1960
1. The present piGn commies the possibility of continuing the
upe or the Ooata-aala baseu until some affiroative move ainst Cuba
Isrilainc.:nt. If this is not possible, there will of course be a
need for a(.1ditioml real estate. On, the asstunption of continued use
of Watem.-xlan bases, the following points arliPa:
a. The removal of about Co or 70 of the present trainee0
to form teams for dispatch to Cuba in the very near future.
Pros=a133.y these teams could be brouejlt up in small =hers
and sent from Minzal or Koy West. The infiltration will
all probability be by water.
b. The places occupied by the above Cro 6r 70 trainees can
be filled, by new individuals who will be recruited. for training.
c. An additional 200 trainees should be recruited in order
to raise the total number of tzminees to roughly 600 or battel ion
strength. Some place xuust be found to train these additional
200 mon. One possibility is the new base placed in the vicinity
of (..nmp Rondolph in Panama. If this is used, it will require
some expansion but this can be done without too much trouble.
Another possibility is rucrto'Cabezas in ITicus.-agua which the
Sora0Za3 would permit. At present this consists of a cr;ood pier
and it has a landing strip but money would have to be spent for
facilities and for all support assets. A third possibility,
though perhaps remote, is one of the tahamas. remission would
still have to be obtained for this from the icitish.
some U.S. real estate is possible if ai)proved by the Special
Croup. In the case of the U.S., obviously two further possibili-
ties exist: one is to use a military or at'nor official installa-
tion; and another is to obtain private property for the job. In
the latter ease, the situation would be essentially the some as
misted in the bases said to have been photocaphed in the recent
Life article.
d. Finding additional bases if Nero than 200 additional
trainees are to be recruited and prepared for action.. Ihe
reason for this is that it would seem impossible from the point -
of view of timing to start training these individuals as a -reserve
only after the departure of the initial battalion. The time cAp
under these circumstances would be too great to make the reserve
practical. Consequently training should overlap tt7;:ir".754 to some
extent. The only way that I can sco that this can be accomplished.
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is through U.S. real estate as mentioned above or Puerto Cabezas-
or conceivably a sizeable Bahama island if approved,
2. On the assumption that the present Guatemala bases must be
vacated, all the above points arise plus the need for real estate on
whiCh.to place- the present trainees in Guatemala.
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3. Although it is recognized that there are many practicalities
to Puerto Cabezas� Xy for one, would like to state- a very strong view
that the use of Nicaragua for training, i.e. over a reasonably extended
period of tine, 'would be highly undesirable. The news will get around.
and it will be a political disaster for the U.S. with respect to all
political elements in Latin America who have any association or
similarity of views with Betancourt. In the long run this would, I
think, mean that even if successful in Cuba) we *would lose an unacceptable
amount of face with these countries. Conceivably, if we carefully
prepared the ground with Betancourt, et al in advance, we could explain
our position. In view of the type of operation involved, however, such
an explanation is sUbstantinlly impossible and. probably undesirable.
Puerto Cabozas might be used on the other hand as a strike base
(faute de mieux provided the use. was for a very short period of
t me. Again, however, I would hope that for the same reasons mentioned
above, Nic,aralvaa would only be used as a last resort.'
4. Under any circumstances a strike base must be developed. It
will be remembered that t=t the original plan called for propaganda.
activities, training activities and than "invasion" activities of
some sort Cialfie propaganda is reasonably in hand, all the fore-
going discussion has to do with training activities while to date
nothing has been accomplished in finding a strike base. The present
sites in Guatemala are not adequate, nor is any other available real
estate. In addition, the present plan does not contemplate the
immediate acquisition after the first assault of a strike base � on
Cann soil. Of course the best possibility for such a base would
be U.S. territory. As iadicatod above, probably the next best �
from the purely military view point would be Nicaragua while other.
possibilities are pretty limited either for political reasons) e.g.
the Bahamas, or for the geograPhic reasons already indicated..
C. Tracy Barnes �
A/DDIYA
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SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS - C4(64 /1") 044
16 November 1960.
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I. Mr. Merchant said that Assistant Secretary Mann has come
to the firm conclusion that the continuance of our base in Guatemala
"places too much strain on the government of Guatemala" and that he
believes this operation must be moved to the U.S. On the other hand,
Mr. Merchant is unwilling to accept such a move under today's cir-
cumstances. He thus percieves two alternatives: (a) moving the
Guatemala installation to other countries outside the U.S., under
the same general type of cover, and expanding the scope as necessary,
(b) to change the entire basic policy of the U.S. toward Cuba, i.e., to
adopt an overt anti-Castro policy, leading probably to a break in
diplomatic relations and a series of appropriate acts of an overt
nature.
Z. Mr. Gray said that it was his understanding that the U.K.
would be willing to provide us with all the facilities necessary as an
alternative to Guatemala and other required expansion. All of the
others present, including myself, said that it was highly unlikely
that we could get enough concessions of this nature and magnitude.
I said further that, while I was not in a position to prejudge the situation
at the moment, there would probably be real difficulties in obtaining alternate
sites elsewhere outside the U.S., sufficient to meet all requirements.
3. Mr. Merchant then referred to a message,
which n
f the
rest of us had seen, from .Ambassador M id this dezc_r_i)aed
th re usal of a group of j uatemalan officers to go along with
orders of the real ent of Guatemala to commit elements ofthe
Guateinala air force and some of the Cuban trainees, against the
. rel5e s. Mr. Merchant appeared to view this development with extreme
&
gravity, commenting that it might well lead President Ydigoras to with-
draw permission for us to continue in Guatemala. I said I was unable
to comment intelligently, not having seen the message, but in view
of Ydigoras' past attitudes I would be surprised if this particular
incident would have such a far-reaching effect.
4. I also said that our poeple were at that moment engaged in a
searching re-evaluation of the entire situation, including the spectrum
of our capabilities and the possibilities of successful conclusion of
the Cuban o eration as originally conceived. All of the members of
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the Group seemed pleased with this. Mr. Merchant then said that
he considers it essential to have a meeting before next week, and
Saturday morning was finally decided upon.
5. I also took this opportunity to discuss the draft memo of
suggested guidance for the Department of Justice, which it had been
agreed would be prepared kir Mr. Yeagley. Mr. Gray concurred;
Messrs. Merchant and Irwin concurred subject to further checking
within their respective departments. I raised the question of the
proper channel through which Mr. Yeagley would receive this advice.
After some discussion, it was decided that the best method might be
for the members of the Group to initial the paper and send it directly
to Mr. Yeagley. It was agreed that I would discuss this matter
with him. (Note: I later talked to Yeagley telling him we would
ready with the final paper immediately after the Saturday meeting.
He thought that the proposed method of transmission would be
satisfactory, although he wanted to talk to the Attorney General
about it. He said the only possible objection he could perceive
is that the succeeding incumbents might find this procedure insuf-
ficient. He also said that he had just had a report from his repre-
sentative who had been investigating the situation of exile groups
in the Miami area. This individual reported that several sources
had suggested that legal action against a few people of the Masferrer
type would be beneficial to over-all U.S. interests; Yeagley was pleased
to hear that our guidance was along the same general lines.)
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SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS - CUBA
19 November 1960.
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1. Mr. Merchant began by stating that -in his opinion we are
putting More burden on the Guatemalan government with our
training base than that government can support for very long. He
noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training
activities to the U.S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get
away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated.
Therefore, the only solution would seem to be to move to another
base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden
on the other countries as now exists with respect to Guatemala.
Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter,
Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba rtitr
110-14)41fri
and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we G4A,W.
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should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve P,7,froye
a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a government in erve-J
exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training
in the U.S.
2. Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain
training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he dons think
we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said
that he believes everyone in ,Guatemala knows by now the true nature
of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized
before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. 1.04�". �
rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be
highly embarrassing for this country, but that for most Latin
American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending
OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support
would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S.
To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such'
activities on American soil would be acceptable, particularly inthe
U. N.
3. Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time
with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Gaaterbala. He said that
we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside _
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investigation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the
problem. He said that within about four weeks an alternate site
could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very
expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call
attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala.
4. Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities
for constructive change in the training operation, some for the
immediate future and some Over a period of longer range. They
include:
a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly
designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story
could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long
or how effectively.
b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This
could be handled more securely, but the existence of
an area where peculiar things are going on could not be
kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private
property such as the King Ranch, but this would take
longer to arrange than a military base.
C. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is
faitly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already
trying to get the U.S. Marines out.
d. Saipan. This would be very
secure but would require a large amount of airlift.
e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone.
At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would
almost certainly know where they were.
5. that a military base could be made
available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas.
He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort
of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees Committee on Cuban Refugees.
He felt also that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will
probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt
participation than has been contemplated to date. General Lansdale
said that he and General Bonesteel were of the same opinion.
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6. .Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that
when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that
country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have
received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organiz;ed a militia,
and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be.
Mr. Dulles acknowled ed that it would be necessary to have internal,. PAAAP41'
port 1 e asix.o_government were to be successfully overthrown;
he felt that there is reason to believe such support might develop,
perhaps within the militia itself.
7. Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is
to seal Cuba off.from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for /10A444t
a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not ikr,a4i-e-c.
turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate
small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone
a decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general
connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that avev-a'
overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of Corktv;14W-y
trained Cubans available. Theraore, our present activities should 44:74e
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muecify case.
8. Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of
splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should
be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate
that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks).
Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB
and Fort Randolph. The latter location should absorb no more
than 200. cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should
at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a
continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities
of establishing a kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be
examined.
9. Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice to Mr.
_M1
Mi./Sv � 14
Yeagley in connection with Cuban exiles. it wap
not desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece at paper. He suggested
that Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the beta
method of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer,
but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question,
Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would
satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who
had by that time left the Meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley,
who appeared satisfied with the oral guidance.)
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10. Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2,
flight over Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two
additional sorties to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The
Group agreed, subject to Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was,
obtained later.)
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
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FROM:
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
NO.
DATE
17 Nov 60
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across c lumn after each comment.)
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SEMI'
SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS - CUBA
23 November 1960
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1. Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following
the meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that
Saipan would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the
Cuban trainees. He emphasized the security advantages of the 1-414".��
location, and said that it is believed the move can be accomplished
with our own transportation plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These
we would request the Department of Defense to provide. We would
probably move some small commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort
Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell also stressed the fact that additional
construction costs would be significantly less at Saipan than any-
where else.
2. The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. \
He urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be
borne constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished
all at once. General Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked tha
President Ydigoras be informed.
3. Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until
receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.
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4. Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by
Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that -
we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to /A4 - -
give much support to it. He said that it is highly questionable
whether this attempt will take place on the reported time schedule,
or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initia tive
might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with dr_a.atic
requestITior assistance on very short notice- Mr. Bissell also
mention-6-Z the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out /
in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six I
B-26's, plusi.yen crews� available for combat, with other aircraft colana
for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in
the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objectivealdJAa
be\ to obtain _strips on the Isle of Pines. 1 r. Dulles remarked that 4qtit4.4i:
this would course require an active revolt. .rvt4A.44.41)
5. Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to -----
encourage Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy
Graham) to carry out activities in Cuba.
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