SAIGON STATION ASSESSMENT: VIET CONG REACTION TO THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05015421
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-01120
• Publication Date: April 23, 1969

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NillelilrY OF STATION, SAIGON
S .11,e2-11 T
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS STAF_E
C FOREIGN DIMSEM (b)(3)
RAS M 39/6,
n3 Aran, 1969
VI I
VIET CON REACTION TO- THE ACCELERATED
PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM
Summary; Documantary avidence as wall as specific
actions undartakan by tha Viat Cong (VC) during tha
late Novambar 1933 - lata March 1939 pariod indicata that
the stappad-up Pacification and PHOENIX Programs have
bawl major Communist targats. While tha Post-Tat Offan-
siva has sat bac!.. tha pacification effort in cartain
provincas, its ovarall affact on such afforts in the
country as a whola has bean slight. This, and the fail-
ure of other VC actions to make much of a dent in 'the
Pacification and PHOENIX Programs then, would appear
to constitute yet another example of currant Vietnamese
Communist waanass and their inability to match actions
with plans even against a relatively vulnerable target.
I. PLANS
1. The Viet Cong (VC) reaction to the Accelerated
Pacification Program and its component PHUNG HCANG DONG
TIEN (Stepped-up PHOENIX Program) has been characterized
by a relatively wide gap between calls for counteraction
And actual measures taken against the programs. Almost
immediately following the inauguration of the Accelera-
ted Pacification Campaign,* rafarancas to it began to
appear in captured VC documents, and during the November
1938- January 1030 period-, several comprehensive VC
directives were promulgated setting out in broad terms
the measures to be taken to counter these new Allied
programs. An order of tha Peoples Liberation Armed
Forces, dated 2$ November, was unique in that it was
overt, being broadcast over the VC Liberation Radio
three days latar. A circular, apparently issued by VC
Sub-Ragion 3 (3R-3) on 26 November and by SR-5 on 10 De-
cember, was noteworthy for its detailed treatment of the
structure and activities of the PHOENIX organization. A
*Initially inaugurated on 1 November 1963 under the
rubric "Accelerated Pacification Campaign," the Accel-
erated Pacification Program is now the preferred term.
Although kicked off on 20 October 1968, the PHUNG HOANG
DCNG TIEN was incorporated as an integral part of the
increased pacification effort.
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document published by 3R-5 on 12 December gave a
similarly extensive description of the Accelerated
Pacification Program. Finally, documents picLKed up in
VC Military Region 2 (MR-2) and apparently published
throughout this November-January period mentioned a VC
anti-pacification program which apparently had two
stages labeled "Rang Deng 1 snd 2." This VC effort
placed spacial emphasis on the use of tactical military
end psychological warfare factors.
2. The countermeasures generally called for by
the VC in these documents can be grouped into the follow-
ing categories:
a. Military attacks .(with an emphasis on
guerrilla warfare, technicrlas) on Allied units conduct- .
ing sweep operations, Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF)
involved in pacification tass, and on the pacification
teams themselves.
b. Terrorist activity stressing the assassin-
ation of "anamy" adminfStrative personnel and returnees,
plus the destruction of facilities associated with the
pacification effort.
c. Counterintelligence efforts directed at
uncovering "ena:Jiy-"' cespacir TEZEnX) intelligence
networks and eliminating their members, inserting "friend-
ly" agents into tha networks as a means to this and, and
increasing other defensive security measures.
d. Propaganda efforts directed at improving
tha mftrale of "friendly" elements; re-educating captives
released by the Govarnmant of Vietnam (GVN); Motivating
the MS.SS3S in general to conduct "political struggle";
encouraging Southern refugees to return to their native
villages; and converting "enemy" military personnel,
pacification cadre, and local government officials.
3. The objectives of the VC effort were said to
be the defense, consolidation, and expansion of tha
"liberated areas." And 'though the aferamentionad docu-
ments certainly take note of the damage done by the
stopped-up PHOENIX -and Pacification Programs, the latter
are presented as a frenzied "last gasp" of the "Free
World" agencies involved, an effort that is doomed to
failure.
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4. Lass comprehensive, but more specific, VC
provincial and district plans provide further insights
into the anti-pacification program. As for military/
tarrcrist activity, VC guerrillas in the qua Son District
of Quang N-m i'rovince reportedly were ordared in January
1939 to concentrate on sniping and the Use of mines in
thwarting the pacification program. In the terrorist/
countarintelligance sphere, it was reported that the VC
in Xhanh Hea Province had been directed in early Febru-
ary to make lists of GVN village and hamlet cadre,
Provincial Raconnaissance Unit members, and Revolution-
ary Develop-aant (AD) personnel for the purposes of assass-
ination. And AP extension of the propaganda/convarsion
effort might he .een the report that the VC in Tran
Cm District, Vin'l Loa, ware making arrange-
ments to buy off ham. Id outpost chiefs and low-
level GVN security personnel as of December 1933.
II. ACT/CNS
There are indications that prior to the inaugura-
tion of the Post-Tat Cffensiva on 22 February 1039, the
VC had begun to implement some of their anti-pacification
plans. The P"c70EITIX year-end report of 1930 noted a
general stepping-up of VC counterintelligence activities,
and the numbar of VC assassinations and overall incidents
directed against the civilian population both showed a
steady Increase between late November 1933 and late
February 1939. ril3s3 activities developed unevenly,
however, and appear not to have been conducted on the
scale planned for -- P presumed result of VC weakness.
There was, however, a notable increase of terrorism in
-luang Nam Province, especially directed against low-
laved GVN officials, during December and January.*
Further, a sharp increase in terrorism occurred in II
Corps in early Fabruary, noted as being specifically
targeted against the pacification program in Phuoc Tuy
Province. In addition, there was an increase in attacks
on RD teams in Thua Thin, Vinh Long, and Ba Kuyan
Provinces just prior to tha onset of the Post-Tat Offen-
siva, and an apparently stepped-up use of the threat of
*Liberation Radio, incidentally, concurrently noted that
the fiercest struggle against the pacification program
was being conducted in oxang Nam Province.
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assadsihetion in propaganda/indoctrination activities
diractad against Civil Salf-Dafensa cadres, GVN
Officials, and RF/PF membars throughout the counlirY
during tha Dacembar-February paricd. It is not /mown
to what extant tha iac1 of furthar information on VC
counterintelliganca activities targeted against the
pacification program rosults from a lac1". of activity
in this fiald and to what axtant it results from a
succassful implanantation of such policies. One of the
more novel VC innovations, and ona which does not appear
to have "seen duplicated elsewhere, was the activation
in January 1939 of D "Countar-Pacification Committee"
in Cha.0 Thanh D trct in VC SR-5. Tha committea in-
cluded p3rsonn31 vagular Communist Party
app g,, -Ap TAA-2*1, Financa-Economy, Supply
21.1.tary Prosalyting, Train-
ing and rropazanea, aii curity Sections.
3. Following tha onsat of tha Post-Tat Offensive,
Libaration Radio broadcasts strassad what thy claim
was the high degr3e. of damaga to the Program inflicted
by the effansiva winout, llowav3r, claiming that such
was tha latLar's main 07,3j3eiv3. Co-rar .k3nortIng from
Binh Dirh Previnc'e, 7,cr3cvr, indicatas '`Ilat Pt least
in that province VC orders from the Caltral Cfff.c.. of
Ocuth Vi3tnam 5tat3d that th3 sp3cific nurpcs3 of tha
Clfansiva was to attacr tha Program, n-ad s IToth 7iatna-
masa diplomat in Vientiana WPS said to '1F173 raw?alad in
early March that tha chief mission of his country's
troops in south Viatnam was to help tha vC destroy the
Accelaratad pacifIcatIon Program. In 7!,DW of the tar-
gats actually hit during the opening CVE1?,-3.0 of the
Cffansive and the considarabla docu=tary -i7Adanca now
availabla, however, it appears tht th off.ication
affort was not th3 immadiata or major tt of tha
Cffansiva.
7. Nonathalass, it saams claar that harming t.ha
Accalaratad Pacification Program ramao a nr,j6.4.� VC
objactiva and, it also appaars that tha Offen."
51173 servad to coma axtant to tbs .aa,7L 2.7it th3 overall
affact of th3 cfuiva on tha IyAcficaUon af2ort was
not graat, pnd tha damaga that occut--zad as localizad.
In Mnrcht dun,-?; tha ::mccoo-.)eing phacon cf: tha Offensive,
thare waci o,:irL!idarL7613 sci on attfing tha pacifi-
cation program and tha various alamants involved in it.
Thus, thor3 was an incraasa in terrorist incidents
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diractad at personnal involvad in varicus aspacts of
tha ovarall pacification affort.
B. As of 1 March 1939, CORDS reporting noted
that as a result of tha Cffansive, tha momantum of
tha pacification affort had baan slowed in Quang Nam,
Thua Thian, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Twang Provincas and
that its momantum had baan haltad with s scmawhat lowarad
sacurity Laval in tha rural areas in Quang Tin, Kantum,
and Eau Fghia Provincas. Furthar, it was raportad that
pacification had been "sat bacla" (i.e., that tha GVN
had suffirad more than a fiva percent loss in population
central) in Phuoc Long Provinca. In tha latter province,
the GVN dafansa :effort appeared to have collapsed in
the face of a VC onslaught, a situation at least partially
attributable to tha lower caliber of governmental leader-
shin there. Ac a result, the PHOENIX Program was largely
suspended and the RD effort reduced to a security role.
G. By mid-March, Kontum Province had movad into
the "pacification setback" category. Moreover, there
were indications that the situation in Quang Ngai
Province had deteriorated. Reporting on the provinca
agrees that the pacification momantuaf, has been slowed
down there, and one source says that tha Program. has
suffered a sat-bac:a. CCIUS in its early March tabula-
tion noted that Quang iTwai Province had more RD tams
withdrawn for socury reasons than any other pravinca.
As the month pragrassa, it lachaad as if the pacification
effort might have received significant damage in Long
KhanNProainca as well, since the Accelerated Pacifica-
tion Prtgram hamlets were reported to have been hit
especially hard by the VC.
10. The "a'llat Evaluation System (HES) statistics
for 31 March indicated that the following provinces had
suffered over a cue percent decrease in "relatively
secure," "GVN controlled" population over the course
of the month: Quang Ngai (from 32.2% to 59.3%), Phu
Yen (from 30.110 to 37.0%), Tontum (from 92.4% to 90.4%),
Phuoc Long (from 00.1% tc 83.3%), and Quang Nam (from
35.6% to 34.2%). Thus, the two provinces apparently
hardest hit at the onset of the late February Offensive,
Phuoc Long and Kontum, seem to have continued to decline
from a security standpoint, albeit at a lower rate.
Similarly, in Quang Nam Province, where the pacification
program has been noted as encountering trouble since
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D3camb3r 130 (aboval paragraph 5), and in Quang Ngai
Frovincal whar.? such difficultias Nava baan notad from
lata Fabruary onward, tha situation apparantly continuas
to go downhill. Finally, howavar, according to tha
31 March stattEtIcs, tha situation has bon stabilizad
in Cluang Tin, _-.au Nghia, Thua Thin, Gia Dinh, and Dinh
Tuong Provincii, initially raportad to hava baan affactad
by tha Pcst-TaL Cffansiva (abova, paragraph 3), ad in
Long IThanh rrovinca yhara stnilar difficultias had baan
ralocrtad durin: March. It should ba notad that this
sat of 730 statistics shows an ovarall iricraapa for tha
cou-itr; as a wcla in tha parcantaga of lociralTb-n in
tha sacura," "G"/N controllad" catagcry on
31 March as cor:parad to tha situation on 20 Fabruary.
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