THE IRAN ESTIMATE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
05850269
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date:
April 5, 2021
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2014-00454
Publication Date:
May 19, 1961
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
rs
Approved for Release 2021/04/05 C05850269
It 1.
gEt4ORANDUM FOR: THE 1R.ECTOR
ACT:
The Iran Estimate
The agency representatives are still
struggling with the new Iran estimate.
Attached is my own rendition of the main
conclusions, which I understand are sub-
stantially agreed to by all. We think that
the estimate will be consistent with the
intelligence portion of the Iran Task Force
Report. To a considerable degree, however, �
it covers different ground. (b)(3)
19 May 19 61
(DATE)
,NO. i A REPLACES FORM 10-101
1V $041 Azproved for Release 2021/04/05 C05850269
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Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 005850269
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Noted by MCI
a
19 May 1961
IRAN
Noted by DCI
1. Basic estimates of fundamental forces and trends operating
in Iran remain valid. We have long said that the situation could not
last indefinitely, but last February we judged that a coup or break-
down was unlikely "in the next year or so."
2. Now the pace of political change seems to be accelerating.
The Amini government represents a step toward liberalization and
reform. It might succeed in stabilizing the situation.
3. But there will almost inevitably be a tug-of-war between
Amini and the Shah. The Shah, if driven too far, may abdicate.
The military have lost some of their perquisites, and are being
purged. The moderate Nationalists may cooperate with Amini for
a time; the more radical ones will oppose him.
4. We do not expect the Tudeh Party to exert much influence
in the immediate future.
5. We think that a military coup, or a nationalist demonstration,
or an abdication of the Shah, are continuing possibilities. The
chances of some of these things occurring in the near future are
greater than they appeared when our estimate was written in February.
But we think that the situation, as of today, is too fluid to justify
a confident prediction of what will actually happen.
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 005850269