20150213 INITIAL COMPLAINT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06318124
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 149
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2021
• Case Number: F-2015-01336
• Publication Date: February 13, 2015

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GRANT F. SMITH, PRO SE
Cle_rk,FPUE.als.11:3:2Dtand
aankrupto,
Courts
(b)(6
202-342-7325
Plaintiff, Case: 1:15�cv-00224
Assigned To: Chutkan, Tanya S.
v. Assign. Date : 2/13/2015
Description: FOR/Privacy Act
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20505
703-613-1287
Defendant.
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1. This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 552, to order
the production of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) files about the unlawful diversion of
U.S. government-owned weapons-grade uranium from the Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) into the clandestine Israeli nuclear weapons program
which the Defendant Central Intelligence Agency has improperly withheld from the Plaintiff.
2. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 5 552(a)(4)(B).
3. The Plaintiff has a legal right under FOIA to obtain the information he seeks, and
there is no legal basis for the denial by Defendant CIA of said right.
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4. Plaintiff, Grant F. Smith, is an author and public interest researcher and founder of
the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy, Inc (IRmep) and is the requester of the
records which Defendant is now withholding. Smith's FOIA, mandatory declassification
review (MDR) and Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) generated
releases, research and analysis have been published in The Washington Report on Middle East
Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, Antiwarcom, The Washington Examiner, Mint Press News, LobeLog,
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,' Militag.com, The Jewish Daily Fonvard, Business Insider, and
Courthouse News Service. They have been carried on broadcast outlets such as C-SPAN, public
and commercial U.S. radio stations as well as foreign outlets like the BBC and RT. Plaintiff
originally requested this information for use in vital public interest research into how nuclear
weapons related know-how, material and technology have been unlawfully diverted into
Israeli entities conducting clandestine nuclear weapons-related research and development
while undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Symington and Glenn
Amendments to the 1961 US Foreign Assistance Act. He is the author of the 2012 book
Divert! NUMEC, Zalman Shapiro and the Diversion of US. Weapons-Grade Uranium into the Israeli
Nuclear Weapons Program.
5. According to a U.S. Department of Energy year 2000 report, the Nuclear Materials
and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC), though defunct, retains the highest pre-1986
"materials unaccounted for" losses of any government-contractor nuclear processing facility
I "Did Israel steal bomb-grade uranium from the United States?" Victor Gilinsky and Roger J. Mattson, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, April 17, 2014 http://thebulletin.org/did-israel-steal-bomb-grade-uranium-united-
states7056
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in the United States.2 According to a declassified GAO report, Apollo, Pennsylvania based
NUMEC processed scarce government-supplied, unique, highly enriched uranium into fuel
for the U.S. Navy, receiving over 22 tons of weapons-grade U-235. Through 1968 more
than 330 kilograms of highly enriched uranium disappeared from NUMEC.3 In 1968,
Israel's top spy Rafael Eitan visited the plant with his team of Israeli intelligence operatives
under false pretenses at the invitation of the plant's president, Zalman Shapiro. Information
about this visit became part of the FBI investigative file on NUMEC. (Exhibit 1) 1968 was
the year of highest NUMEC losses.4 The plant only returned to normal industry-level
losses soon after the Atomic Energy Agency engineered a buyout, termination of Israel joint-
ventures, and transfer of top executives.3
6. According to lengthy investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
earliest demanded by the CIA, NUMEC was unique among U.S. government nuclear
contractors in its formal and informal ties to Israel and Israel's clandestine nuclear weapons
operatives and front organizations. Many FBI files are now in the public domain.�
NUMEC President Zalman Shapiro knew Benyamin Blumberg, who formed Israel's
LATC-kM (Bureau of Scientific Relations) intelligence and covert operations agency that
collected scientific and technical intelligence abroad. Avraham Hermoni, technical director
2 "Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance" U.S. Department of Energy, 2001 released to the Federation of
American Scientists on February 2, 2006 http://www.fas.orgisgp/othergovidoe/heu/striking.pdf
3 "Did Israel Steal Bomb-Grade Uranium from the United states?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 7, 2014
http://thebulletin.org/did-israel-steal-bomb-grade-uranium-united-states7056
4 "Revisiting the NUMEC Affair" Victor Gilinsky and Roger Mattson, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 30, 2013
s "Divert! NUMEC, Zalman Shapiro, and the Diversion of US Weapons Grade Uranium into the Israeli Nuclear
Weapons Program" Grant F. Smith, IRmep, 2012
s Archived at http://1Rmep.org/ilainumec
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of Israel's nuclear bomb project at RAFAEL was Shapiro's frequent guest both at his home
in Pittsburgh and at NUMEC. Shapiro held rushed clandestine meetings with Israeli
intelligence operatives such as Jeruhem Kafkafi which took place under FBI surveillance7.
NUMEC formed a joint venture, ISORAD, with the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission,
later determined to be a front for nuclear weapons development. This "joint venture"
required shipping hollow, sealed "irradiators" under non-standard logistical arrangements
prioritized to leave the United States as quickly as possible.
7. According to a 1980 NUMEC employee eyewitness (Exhibit 2) account to the FBI,
Shapiro and unknown accomplices stuffed irradiators with highly enriched uranium (HEU)
canisters before sealing for rush shipment to Israel.
8. High officials at the CIA went on the record claiming that Israel diverted HEU
from NUMEC for use in its clandestine nuclear weapons program. The head of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) invited CIA Deputy Director for Science and
Technology Carl Duckett to brief the NRC about safeguards issues. Duckett told a stunned
NRC executive audience not only that CIA believed Israel had illegally obtained HEU from
NUMEC, but that the stolen material was used to produce Israel's first atomic bombs.
Duckett confirmed the CIA's finding that Israel had already assembled nuclear weapons by
the mid-1960s. Israel began to practice A-4 jet bombing run maneuvers that were only
warranted if the explosives being delivered were atomic rather than conventional. Such
practice runs to guarantee aircraft and pilot survival "would not have made sense unless it
"Revisiting the NUMEC Affair" Victor Gilinsky and Roger Mattson, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 30, 2013
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was to deliver a nuclear bomb."8 A summary of the CIA briefing was released under POD\
to the Natural Resources Defense Council. (Exhibit 3)
9. John Hadden was CIA station chief in Tel Aviv from 1963 to 1967 and was tasked
with collecting environmental samples outside Dimona for radiation testing. Hadden told
congressional investigators, "NUMEC had been an Israeli operation from the beginning but
the CIA had not been able to follow the money trail. The agency thought NUMEC had been
financed by the owner of Apollo steel mill, Israeli War of Independence veteran David
Lowenthal." Hadden said that any suggestion that Angleton Qohn Jesus Angleton, the top
CIA counterintelligence official and Israel liaison) had actually helped the Israelis with the
NUMEC operation was "totally without foundation."'
10. In a 1978 BBC interview Hadden revealed that Israeli spy Rafi Eitan, who had
visited the NUMEC plant at the invitation of Zalman Shapiro, was complicit in the removal
of material. "The Israelis, and they are gentlemen. Just imagine to yourself how much easier
it would be to remove a pound or two of this or that at any one time, as opposed to�which
is inert material�as opposed to removing all at one blow. 150 pounds of shouting and
kicking Eichmann.10 You see, they are pretty good at removing things." (Exhibit 4) In the
mid-1980s Eitan became publicly known in the United States as the Israeli handler of
convicted spy Jonathan Pollard, who is currently serving out a life sentence.
8 "The American Connection: How Israel Got the Bomb," Jon J. Fialka, The Washington Monthly, January, 1979 p
51
9 "Dangerous Liaison, The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship," Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, p. 78-
80, Harper-Collins, 1991
10 Eitan and a team renditioned Nazi war criminal Eichmann from Argentina to Israel in 1960.
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11. The CIA discovered traces of enriched uranium in Israel in the mid-1960s,
touching off an investigation to determine which handful of countries then in possession of
multi-billion dollar gaseous diffusion plants was the source." Energy Department officials
visiting retired former Atomic Energy Commission head Glenn Seaborg in 1978 told him
the signature of the uranium picked up outside Dimona in Israel was of that of a specialized
signature provided to NUMEC. (Exhibit 5)
12. The CIA was initially compelled by President Lyndon B. Johnson to suppress its
findings about NUMEC and Israel's possession of nuclear weapons built with material
diverted from NUMEC. When CIA Director Richard Helms advised LBJ of CIA findings,
he was ordered by LBJ to not further discuss it. (Exhibit 3)
13. In July of 1969, according to declassified files,12 National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger noted "There is circumstantial evidence that some fissionable material available for
Israel's weapons development was illegally obtained from the United States about 1965...
This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us," Mr. Kissinger said,
"and may even have stolen from us."13
14. Concerns in Congress that illegal activity had occurred and was simply covered up
triggered new interest in finally determining what had happened at NUMEC during the Ford
administration. Attorney General Edward Levi ordered the FBI to investigate whether
criminal statutes had been violated in the diversion and whether a government cover-up had
Transcript of the BBC News program "Panorama", June 26 1978, included as Exhibit 4
12 Archived at http://www.irmep.orgfilakumec/07191969_Kissinger_lsraeli_Nuclear_Program%20.pdf
13 "Israel's Nuclear Arsenal Vexed Nixon," David Sout, The New York Times, November 29, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/world/middleeast/29nixon.html? _r=0
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ensued.14 Another FBI investigation, with additional input by the CIA and General
Accounting Office (GAO) commenced and continued until the end of the Carter
administration.
15. The CIA has long taken the position that none of its "source" files about
NUMEC or derivative equity content can ever be made public. It has issued blanket denials
of Freedom of Information Act requests from the late 1970's onward filed by such
investigative reporters as John Fialka of the Washington Star.I5
16. On May 13, 2010 the Plaintiff requested "declassification and release of all cross
referenced CIA files related to uranium diversion from the Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) to Israel. This request includes, but is not limited to CIA
content provided for publication in the now declassified 1978 GAO report titled 'Nuclear
Diversion in the U.S.? 13 Years of Contradiction and Confusion." The request was broad.
(See Exhibit 6) It is known in the public domain that the CIA possesses thousands of
NUMEC files.
17. On September 10, 2010, months in excess of the twenty day FOIA response limit,
the CIA confirmed receipt of the Plaintiff's request and assigned it number F-2010-01210.
(See Exhibit 7)
18. On August 28, 2013, over three years after the Plaintiff's filing of the request, the
CIA issued a "final response to your 13 May 2010 Freedom of Information Act FOIA
14 FBI Airtel, special agent in charge, Washington Field Office to FBI director, [subject redacted), June 15, 1976,
Benjamin Loeb papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division
15 Reviewed by the Plaintiff at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, Benjamin Loeb Papers
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request." The CIA segregated and released nothing it had generated about the diversion,16
stating 'We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located
material that we determined is currently and properly classified and must be denied in its
entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions(b)(I)and (b)(3)." (See Exhibit 8)
19. On September 19, 2013 the Plaintiff administratively appealed the CIA denial and
also challenged the CIA on whether it was conducting the required periodic reviews of
operational and related files for release. (See Exhibit 9).
20. On March 28, 2014, nearly four years after the initial FOIA, the CIA denied the
plaintiffs administrative appeal, segregated and released nothing. (See Exhibit 10). Although
the Plaintiff had legal standing much earlier to seek a de nom judicial review of the adequacy
of the Defendant's search and whether it was conducting reviews of classified material that
should be automatically released after fixed durations and other applications of FOIA and
declassification directives, the Plaintiff instead chose to allow the Defendant as much time as
it required to fully exhaust its administrative process.
21. The Defendant now bears the burden of justifying to the court its longtime
blanket nondisclosure of NUMEC files under FOIA exceptions, of demonstrating that it
conducted a bona fide search and that the agency has adequately segregated exempt from
non-exempt information. See 5 U.S.C. � 552(a) Part of this burden to the court may involve
the production of detailed Vaughn indexes or even in camera review of the documents in
16 The CIA did re-release internal memorandums about why it would not allow release of CIA equity in the 1978
GAO report titled "13 Years of Conflict and Confusion" due to the need for a "coordinated Executive Branch
position and our desire to protect a sensitive and valuable liaison equity."
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question.
22. As it conducts a dc novo review of the adequacy of the Defendant's search for
files, the Defendant's prior assertions that operational files and derivative products about
NUMEC should not be released, and the Defendant's determinations that nothing was
segregable or releasable, the court should consider that the CIA's previous release
determinations on NUMEC files have already been overruled.
23. On December 18, 1978 the Government Accounting Office� (GAO) issued the
report "Nuclear Diversion in the U.S.? 13 Years of Contradiction and Confusion." Because
it contained CIA equity, in 1978 the CIA was opposed to public release of a report originally
chartered to quell concerns in Congress and the American public that uranium was illegally
diverted from NUMEC, and that nothing was ever done about it. The four allegations
investigated by GAO were as follows. "A. The material was illegally diverted to Israel by
NUMEC management for use in nuclear weapons. B. The material was diverted to Israel by
NUMEC management with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). C. The
material was diverted to Israel with the acquiescence of the United States Government. D.
There has been a cover-up of the NUMEC incident by the United States Government."
24. At the CIA's insistence in 1978, and in opposition to the will of the Congress, the
entirety of the GAO report was originally classified as "secret" and not publically released.
25. In May of 2009, the GAO asked the CIA and FBI to engage in a mandatory
declassification review of the secret GAO report "Nuclear Diversion in the U.S.? 13 Years
" since renamed the "Government Accountability Office"
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of Contradiction and Confusion" for public release. The CIA redacted all of its equity
content. The FBI did not. The GAO released a CIA-redacted copy of the report to the
public on May 6, 2010.
26. On March 18, 2014 the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a
review board that issues rulings "on appeals by authorized persons who have filed
classification challenges under Section 1.8 of E.O. 13526" overturned the CIA's
determinations and released most of the equity the CIA had redacted from the GAO report
before the 2010 release. (A page by page comparison of CIA redactions vs ISCAP reversals
of CIA may be found in Exhibit 11)
27. On March 18, 2014 the ISCAP also overruled CIA's blanket of secrecy over
NUMEC and released the April 2, 1968 appeal from then-CIA Director Richard Helms to
Attorney General Ramsey Clark urging the FBI "initiate a discreet intelligence investigation
of an all source nature of [NUMEC president] Dr. Shapiro in order to establish the nature
and extent of his relationship with the Government of Israel" in the name of counter-
proliferation. (Exhibit 12).
28. The ISCAP also compelled partial release on March 18, 2014 of CIA Deputy
Director of Covert Operations Theodore Shackley's July 28, 1977 phone briefing on the
NUMEC diversion, including content about how then-CIA director George H.W. Bush had
briefed President-elect Jimmy Carter on the matter. Recipient of the Shackley briefing
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, a national-security official in the Carter administration, stated "I
do not think the President has plausible deniability. The CIA case is persuasive..." (Exhibit
13).
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29. The Plaintiff therefore asserts on the basis of evidence that the Defendant has
neither properly reviewed files in its possession nor equity held by other parties for release.
The CIA has never denied that CIA files on the NUMEC matter exist. Records in the
public domain confirm that "thousands" of CIA files have been generated on the matter.
30. For example, in 2013 the National Archives released an April 25, 1979 Carter
Administration Attorney General memo that their Internal Security Section "completed a
detailed review of thousands of CIA documents..." on NUMEC which necessitated further
FBI investigations. (Exhibit 14) The name of the National Security Council file folder
containing these documents is revealing, "NSA Staff Material: Global Issues Box 41, Folder:
Proliferation: Apollo, PA 5/77-11/79"
31. Some of CIA's improperly retained records are almost certainly about internal
investigations, particularly whether the agency or any of its operatives abetted the diversion
of uranium from NUMEC. This is documented in an August 2, 1977 memo to President
Jimmy Carter from his national Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. "So far as we know
however, (and we have made serious effort to discover it) there is nothing to indicate active
CIA participation in the alleged theft." (Exhibit 15).
32. A number of historical records produced by the FBI and Naval Intelligence about
such conventional weapons smuggling fronts for Israel as Foundry Associates, the
Sonneborn Institute, Materials and Manpower for Palestine, Mar Tech, Service Airways and
other fronts that endangered Americans by shipping mislabeled explosive cargo, stealing U.S.
government military property, stealing veterans lists from the U.S. chaplains, undermining
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the Neutrality and Arms Export Control Act and other laws through illegal actividesla are
now available as public records." Also in the public domain are records about why the U.S.
Department of Justice only prosecuted a handful of lower-level operatives but not the
identified kingpins of the smuggling operations due to their ability to use"war chests" to
"quash" warranted prosecutions.20
33. However NUMEC records about similar Atomic Energy Act violations that were
covered up and never prosecuted could now soon be lost to posterity under mandatory
document destruction guidelines, burying a vital chapter of history forever.
34. There is a strong and growing public interest in the immediate disclosure of the
requested CIA documents concerning NUMEC. Currendy U.S. taxpayers are being
maneuvered into position to pay for a massive clean-up of the contaminated environs caused
by the severely undercapitalized, safety-scoffing NUMEC smuggling front operations in
Apollo, and neighboring Parks Township in Pennsylvania.21 In January of 2015 the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers estimated the NUMEC cleanup will cost just under half a billion
dollars over the next decade.22
35. Further confirming that NUMEC really was as CIA officer John Hadden asserts,
"an Israeli operation from the beginning," will allow concerned U.S. citizens, anti-corruption
18 "Arming David: The Haganah's Illegal Arms Procurement Network in the United States, 1945-49," Ricky Dale
Calhoun, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 36 No 4, Summer 2007
19 FBI File regarding Foundry Associates Incorporated-Neutrality Act; file number 2-1-10-875, 4,000 plus pages of
FBI files available at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD.
20 File archive at http://www.irmep.orela/feinberg/
21 "Americans Pay Dearly to Maintain Israel's Nuclear Secrets: CIA endangers NUMEC toxic waste cleanup," Grant
F. Smith, October 20, 2011 http://original.antiwar.com/smith-grant/2011/10/19/americans-pay-dearly-to-
maintain-israels-nuclear-secrets/
22 "Nuclear-Dump Cleanup Gets Complicated," John R Emshwiller,., Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pennsylvania-nuclear-dump-cleanup-gets-more-complicated-1422558579
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and taxpayer watchdog organizations to use withheld CIA and other available government
files verifying these facts in litigation against the Israeli government for cleanup, health, and
other NUMEC-related damages.
36. Failing that, citizens could lobby members of Congress to deduct costs of the
NUMEC cleanup from the massive annual taxpayer-funded foreign aid packages delivered
to Israel in the same way that U.S. loan guarantees arc occasionally withdrawn when there is
evidence of improper use in Israeli settlement activity.
37. It is important to note under Executive Order 13526 53.1(a) that documents may
not be classified in order to "(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative
error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; (3) restrain
competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require
protection in the interest of national security."
38. The U.S. government continually misuses its classification authority on matters
concerning the Israeli nuclear weapons program, of which NUMEC is only one component.
Adding insult to the original injury, FOIA exemptions are misused to delay release
indefinitely.
39. It is also important to note that although most government agencies do not
discuss issues touching on the Israeli nuclear arsenal under various gag regulations,23
23 "Lawsuit Challenges U.S. Ambiguity Toward Israel's Nuclear Arsenal," Grant F. Smith, Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs, January/February 2015 http://www.wrmea.org/2015-january-february/lawsuit-challenges-
u.s.-ambiguity-toward-israels-nuclear-arsenal.html
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Americans are not fooled. A September 2014 Google Consumer Survey revealed that 63.9
percent of American adults believe Israel has nuclear weapons.24
40. As noted, Lyndon Baines Johnson's immediate response to news of NUMEC was
to order the CIA director's silence. Evidence suggests it was domestic special interest group
politics rather than national security that triggered LBJ's response. One of LBJ's longtime
campaign contribution bundlers was Abraham Feinberg. At times LBJ was in possession of
hundreds of thousands of dollars of Feinberg-raised cash in White House safes,25
According to "Israel and the Bomb" author Avner Cohen (1998), Israeli Prime Minister
David Ben-Gurion secretly named Feinberg his chief nuclear weapons fundraising
coordinator in 1958. According to Michael Karpin's "The Bomb in the Basement" (2007)
Feinberg and 25 others contributed $40 million to the Israeli nuclear weapons program in
opposition to presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy non-proliferation efforts.
41. Recently declassified Nixon administration files reveal the president agreed to
comply with Israel's policy of not confirming or denying the existence of its arsenal under
special interest pressure to avoid a "Zionist campaign to try to undermine" him rather than
any legitimate national interest.26
42. The GAO was right to investigate the NUMEC matter in 1978 as a government
cover-up. When problems with materials diversion became overwhelming, at great taxpayer
expense AEC chairman Glenn Seaborg engineered NUMEC's buyout and a management
24 Google Consumer Survey, "Do you believe Israel Has Nuclear Weapons?"
http://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys/view?survey=?gfftskexobf4&question=1&filter.=&rw=1
25 "The Samson Option" Seymour M. Hersh, Chapter 14, Random House, 1991
26 Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program, ISCAP declassification, March 18, 2014,
http://www.archivestovideclassification/iscap/pdf/2009-076-docl.pcif
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transition by an oilfield services company Atlantic Richfield in 1967 by dangling a $30
million per year Hanford facilities management contract.27
43. Zbigniew Brzezinski was eager n 1977 to divert public attention away from
NUMEC diversion questions raised by CIA information and toward general "safeguards"
findings by one of the AEC's successor organizations, the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA). "There is a tremendous amount of interest in this
issue in Congress...We face tough sledding in the next few weeks in trying to keep attention
focused on ERDA's technical foverall U.S. nuclear material loss and safeguard remedy]
arguments On the FBI investigations, and away from the CIA's information." (Exhibit 15)
In 2014 Brzezinski told the Wall Street Journal the evidence suggested that "something did
transpire" but that if theft was proven, "What are we going to say to the Israelis, 'give it
back?"28
44. Most Americans, if asked such a simple question, would probably say, "yes," be
appalled by the real reasons for the wall of secrecy, and wonder whether such deference to
domestic special interests�not national security�continues to generate similar abuses.
45. There currently is no FOIA exemption enabling "deference to special interests."
Existing FOIA exemptions cannot lawfully be used for such purposes.
46. Quashing warranted public disclosure and informed debate through spurious
claims of secrecy undermines governance in the United States and the spirit of FOIA as
27 AEC Operating Contract No. AT (45-1)-2130 between USA and Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company.
http://www.irmep.org/ilainumec/contract.pdf
28 "The U.S. Suspected Israeli Involvement in 1960s Missing Uranium" John R Emshwiller, The Wall Street Journal,
August 5, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-suspected-israeli-involvement-in-1960s-uranium-theft-
1407352852
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reiterated by President Obama upon entering office, The Freedom of Information Act
should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails.
The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or
because of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based on an effort to
protect the personal interests of Government officials at the expense of those they are
supposed to serve. In responding to requests under the FOIA, executive branch agencies
(agencies) should act promptly and in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that such agencies
are servants of the public."29
47. Defendant CIA is an agency of the United States and has possession of and
authority to release the document that Plaintiff seeks.
48. Plaintiff believes he and the public have a compelling right of access to CIA's
NUMEC files. The Plaintiff believes their publication will reveal important insights into the
functions of government. Enabling these insights to produce oversight and better
governance is the reason FOIA exists.
49. The basic question is, as former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor
Gilinsky formulated it in a 2014 Wall Street Journal article, "We know the CIA thought the
material was stolen. We want to know why they thought that."30
50. The D.C. Circuit applied the general federal statute of limitations, which is found
29 White House Memorandum on FOIA, January 21, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.govithe_press_office/Freedom_ofinformation_Act
3� "The U.S. Suspected Israeli Involvement in 1960s Missing Uranium" John II Emshwiller, The Wall Street Journal,
August 5, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-suspected-israeli-involvement-in-1960s-uranium-theft-
1407352852
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at 28 U.S.C. � 2401(a), to FOIA actions in Spannaus v. Department of Justice.
In the relevant portion Section 2401(a) states, that "every action commenced against the
United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of
action first accrues." It was held that the FOIA cause of action accrued� and, therefore,
that the statute of limitations began to run� once the plaintiff had "constructively"
exhausted administrative remedies in Spannaus.
51. The Plaintiffs administrative remedies were exhausted by the CIA's March 28,
2014 denial of his appeal.
52. This complaint is filed well within the six year limit.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Court:
(1) Declare the Defendant's failure to comply with FOIA to be unlawful;
(2) Order the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose the requested records in their
entirety and make copies promptly available to him;
(3) Award Plaintiff costs in this action, as provided in 5 U.S.C. � 552(a)(4)(E);
(4) Award attorney's fees if such assistance is later engaged in this action as provided
in 5 U.S.C. �552(a)(4)(E) and
(5) Grant such other and further relief as may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
(b)(6
Grant F. Smith, Pro Sc
(b)(6
Dated: February 13, 2015
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Exhibit List
Exhibit 1: NUMEC letter advising of Israeli spy Rafi Eitan's team plant visit�September 27,
1968, FBI memo about visit�October 17, 1968
Exhibit 2: FBI FD-302 Report � Eyewitness to nuclear diversion at NUMEC�September
21, 1980
Exhibit 3: Inquiry into the Testimony of the Executive Director for Operations,
Unclassified, Office of the General Counsel, Office of Inspector & Auditor, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission�February 1978
Exhibit 4: Transcript of the BBC News program "Panorama" excerpt 6 pages of 17 � June
26 1978
Exhibit 5: Glenn T. Seaborg Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division - Glenn
Seaborg office diary: DOE claims Shippingport U-235 picked up in Israel�June 21, 1987
Exhibit 6: Freedom of Information Act Request to CIA for NUMEC files � May 13, 2010
Exhibit 7: Freedom of Information Act confirmation from CIA � September 10, 2010
Exhibit 8: Freedom of Information Act final response from CIA � August 28, 2013
Exhibit 9: Freedom of Information Act administrative Appeal to CIA � September 19,
2013
Exhibit 10: Freedom of Information Act appeal denial from CIA�March 28, 2014
Exhibit 11: Nuclear Diversion in the U.S.? 13 Years of Contradiction and Confusion. Report
by the Comptroller General of the United States, December 18, 1978. �May 6, 2010 release
with CIA redactions (Right side) March 18, 2014 release with ISCAP overrulings of CIA
redactions (Left side).
Exhibit 12: Director of Central Intelligence Agency memo to Attorney General Ramsey
Clark�April 2, 1968
Exhibit 13: Memorandum for Jessica Tuchman from John Marcum on Israel and MUF�
July 28, 1977
Exhibit 14: Memorandum to the Attorney General from Frederick D. Baron RE: NUMEC
Investigation�April 25, 1979
Exhibit 15: Memorandum to the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject Nuclear MUF
Frederick D. Baron RE: NUMEC Investigation�August 2, 1977
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Exhibit 1
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:
4 'ray --:**11,1VD1614+""
41-04#4. $:Property:meliikgeeerit Division
19*:08szatiOns Office
c Energy 'Commission
Street
ew York 10014
_
Dear mr. Walsh:
; y
� ApaPtmnsykaos Tesphon. OVNIMit
September 27, 1968 11-0.4.4
k
at
kik./ I.
Reference Your telephone call concerning the September IP visit of Messrs.
Bandar, Eitan and BiOVA. Israeli citizens. Please be advised of
the fo�cwing.
The above mentioned gentlemen met with Dr. Shapiro, D. Purdy, T. Hur1Q7..
J.: Williams, and S. Kolenik. With the exception of Dr. Shapiro, all of
the WIZ= personnel are in our Energy Conversion Department and Are Ller
electric generator specialists.
Discussion with the Israeli nationals concerned the possibility of
plutonium fueled thermo-electric generator systems in the $ and 50 m
Lei power level. Specifically, they were interested in 10 generators in the
5 milliwett range. Each of which would be fueled with About 2 greM$ of
� plutonium. The 50 milliwatt generator is considered a remote possibility,
but would use approximately 20 grams of plutonium. The generators are of
tr the terrestrial type.
im w ties are proceeding to Sake a proposal to throe gentlemen for this work 44in.
Tt; - of course, only uncieseified information which is already in the public
domain. It is alweiii'tinderstanding that these Same gentlemen have 'ant
several of the major nuclear organiketions in the 'United States ie. cortv.i:
in proposals from them on this. items.
teuIt thie satisfies your needs:
Ve truly yo $
4 "
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�ic
gl_!t.; 4
SP " IrriS "'as We
"SW
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Case 1:15-cv-00224-TSC Document 1 Filed 02/13/15
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM;
Fe: AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
IMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
09-26-ZOOS
UNITED STATES DEP
In Reply, Plow Raft io
Rh No.
FEDERAL BUREAX! holy!fyD.STIGATION
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
tober 17. 1968
frosks
SIt RET
RTMENT OF JUSTICE
Page 22 of 147
1 4
Investigat- n was instituted at the rogue
1:
the Attorney General establish the nature and ex
(In Government of Israel. 7his could be connected with l
addition to, or as a result of, his association wit
Israeli officials nd sympathizers in the United St
On September 6, 1968, Clem Palazzolo, Sec
of Zalman Mordecai S apiro's relationship with the
:
Office. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Germantown,
Maryland. advised that AEC. New York City, had race
been requested by the following individuals to visi
a
Nuclear Materials Equipment Corporation (NUMEC). A..
v e
, Avrahas4ermoni, Scientific Counselor.
Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C.;
Dr. EphrairRiegun, Department of Fllymon
Israel, borni
avrahanieRem.c"or. Oetnrtmcpt of Flov-trinics.
l; Israe born,
Raphatl...Fit3n,
Israel, born'
DR. ZALKAN MORDECAI SHAPIRO
Chemist. Minictry of Defens
L in
On September 26, 1968, Clem Palazzolo, sup
made available a CODY of a letter dated September 12
1968, from Manager, Security, NUMEC,
Apollo, Pa., to Barry R. Walsh, Director, Security 4
This document contains neither recommendations
nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property
of the FBI And is loaned to your agency; it and
its contents are not to be distributed outside
your agency.
IIIIIITORNMTIONCORTADAM . SirE7
mumninumNassummAy. :
UcznWHERESHOS11,-/ I: Excluded
�ODIEBNIML4.1-4-- downgrad
lassi
ason
Review
on_ nal
54)
P1 - rr
rom automatic::
and 4
t ion
IPP ---71/611
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Exhibit 2
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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TESTI
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
March 25, 1980
FORMER EMPLOYEE OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT CORPO
APOLLO, PENNSYLVANIA;
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
On March 21, 1980,1
at his residence and providda the following in
c,(211TATI:=1
,.:21.61Fa)
This document contains neither recomm
tions nor conclusions of the FBI. It
the property of the FBI and is loaned
agency; it and its contents are not to
distributed outside your agency.
ION,
s interviewed
ation:
ory203 o7St
d*-
S
o your
be
b6
b7C
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FD.302 (REV. 3-8-77)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ti I tflt,
Date Of transcription
3/24/80
I 1
I I telephone! I
was interviewed at his residence. After being advised of
the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature
of the interview, 'provided the following informa-
tion:
'advised that he was employed by Nuclear
Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) in February, 1965,
(exact date unknown) and was continuously employed
at the Apollo, Pa., facility through two ownership changes
until October, 1978. I ladvised that he was fired
in October, 1978, by the present owner, Babcock and Wilcox,
Inc., for job abandonment following an alleged job related
illness.
he was given three days of schooling on the equipment he
advised that upon being hired at NUMEC,
was to operate and briefed by the Personnel Manager and
Low Enrichment Facility Foreman concerning the security
measures at the Apollo facility nuclear plant. He then
commenced his production line job upon completion of this
brief schooling. I 'related that his exact position
was Senior Ammonator Operator in the Low Enriched Operations
area, which was immediately adjacent to the loading dock .
area of the Apollo nuclear facility. I 'further
described the NUMEC Apollo plant as being broken down into
four areas: the Low Enriched area, the High Enriched area,
the Sphere area, and the Peletizer area. He advised that
although his full-time job was on the Low Enriched Area
Ammonator, he worked overtime in the High Enriched area
on several occasions.
1 'advised in late march or early April,
1965 (exact date unknown) while working on a swing shift
from 3:30 p.m. until 12:00 a.m., his Ammonator was shut
down between approximately 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. in the evening.
He stated that because of the negative air pressure within
the plant area, conditions were usually very warm so he
walked out to the loading dock for a breath of air. The
loading dock was located approximately 20 feet from his
equipment through a single door. I advised that
3/21/80
Investigation On
by
Apollo, Pa. Pittsburgh 117-108
al File*
SA4
1
3/24/80
Oatedctated
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. it, the (SroBWISt Otlivivirrif !bead to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be cliStrIbuted outside your agency.
2
b6
b7c
b6
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PG 117-108 2
employees often went to the loading dock to get a r
of air and further said he thought he remembered an employees'
eating area on the dock.
b6
1 Irelated that when he entered the loading b7C dock area on this particular evening, he noticed a flatbed
truck backed up to the loading dock with some strange equip-
ment on it. He described the equipment as several steel
cabinets with some kind of gauges on the front of them and
other equipment which looked like a lathes. 1 I
opined the equipment may have come from the Peletiser area
of which he was not familiar.
noticed the NUmEC owner, pr. zalman Shapiro, pacing around
1
the loading pork whilel kShipping and Receiving
Foreman) andl Itruckdriver for NUMEC) were
loading "stove pipes" into the steel cabinet type equip-
ment that he observed on the truck, recalled
that there were four or five of the steel cabinetq on the
flatbed truck. 1 'stated that and
never loaded trucks themselves, always employing other workers.
stated that the "stove pipes" are cylindrical
storage containers used to store canisters of high enriched
materials in the vaults located at the Apollo nuclear facility.
stated that the "stove pipes" contained three
or four canisters which were described as highly polished
aluminum with standard printed square yellow labels, approxi-
mately three inches in diameter by six inches tall, that
normally were used to store high enriched uranium products
which' 'defined as 95 percent uranium.
stated that he observed two workmen,
whose names he could not recall, bringing the "stove pipes"
from the High Enriched vault area located approximatel
150 feet from the docks to the dock area where and
1 'opened the "stove pipes" and with canisters
located in the "stove pipes". He then said checked
the label on each canister for information and checked it
off on a shipping order he had attached to a clipboard.
'advised that the canisters were then replaced
in the "stove pipe" and then the "stove pipe" itself was
loaded into the cabinet type equipment after being wrapped
with a brown paper type insulation. 'advised that
he observed one cabinet being loaded and that the "stove
pipes" were placed one in each back corner of the cabinet
and one in the front center of the cabinet directly behind
the door.
'described the canisters found in the
"stove pipes" as approximately three inches by six inches,
bright polished aluminum canisters with yellow labels con-
taining typewritten information and nuclear "fdn" symbols
in the upper corners of the label, said he had
3
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(U)
PG 117-108 3
never observed typewritten information on the labels that
A.Ltiric)rik.... ...
4-r44AL..
oio 0 - I._
advised he was sure this was MgI En- bs
riched uranium products due to the size and shape of the b7c
container and the labeling. He stated that the containers
he used in the Low Enriched area .4ere much larger than the
canisters he observed and used a difterent label
he had previously seen on the dock.
stated he had never seen "stove pipes"
used as shipping containers but whenever High Enriched
uranium products were shipped, the canisters were unloaded
from the "stovepipes" and loaded into cement lined steel
drums. further advised that the route the workmen
transporting the "stove pipes" used took them away from
the Low Enriched area and orought them onto the dock through
a different door. The Low Enriched materials vaults were
angled corridor. said the normal route for High
located approxima 5 feet from the dock area down an
Enriched materials from the High Enriched vaults was down
the same corridor where the Low EnricheA vaults were lo-
cated.
1 citing his natural curiosity, stated
he observed I
d
1lay his clipboard down on an empty
rum located on the dock, whereupon proceeded
to read the information contained on t e shipping order.
He said he noticed that the destination for the equipment
on the truck was Israel, and that it was to be transported
by ship. He recalled that the ship had a long foreign name
which he believed to be Greek, and its location at the time
was in New York City.
advised that ho believed the ship's
name was Greek because when he was in the U.S. Navy (1956-60),
he was a radio man third class stationed at the Naval Radio
Facility, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, and had handled
messages from Greek shipping among others
stated that after he had quifklv naafi
the information contained on the shipping order,
grabbed the clipboard away from him, telling him in words
to the effect that the material contained in the shipping
order was confidential and not for his eyes. 1 1
advised that shortly thereafter, an armed guard ordered
him off the loading dock. stated he d� 1 not ob-
serve anybody call the arm�guard nor did he see the guard
on the dock, out that ne believed the guard came from on,:
of the hallways adjoining the dock. stated that
he was on the loading dock for approxima e y 15 minutes
and that at no time did Dr. Shapira% or
lor anybody else ask him to leave.
4
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PG 117-108
m
4
further advised that it was highly unusual
to see Dr. Shapiro in the manufacturing section of the Apollo
nuclear facility; it was unusual tp,Alie,Dr� Shapiro there
at night; and very unusual to ses-70g,.$0*.piro so nervous
as to pace around. described Dr. Shapiro as a
very calm, cool and collected man who never got upset.
docu-
mentation IZ.:;;;aess to were the shift productions records
advised that the only records and for the bow Enrichment Area and then only during the specific
shift on which he was working. He stated that at the comple-
tion of each shift, the records were removed from the manu-
facturing area and taken across the street to the administrative
offices.
!advised at most of the shipping was
normally cl that
one at daytime but did state that occasionally
there was some shipping activity in the early evenings.
He stated it was highly unusual though that any equipment
would be shipped at night.
advised that he had not seen previously
the equipment e noted on the loading dock and flathed trailer
and that he had not seen the equipment subsequent to that
incident or any equipment like it in the NUMEC Apollo nuclear
facility.
stated he became aware of the alleged
diversion of nuclear materials through newspaper acticles
which caused him to think. He said that "everyone" at the
plant knew there were losses of materials from the High
Enriched area but nobody seemed to care during the time
the facility was owned by NUMEC. He stated when Atlantic
Richfie Company purchased NUMEC, the losses stopped.
further stated that newspaper accounts of the
alleged diversion mentioned Doctor Shapiro, and he recalled
that just prior to the previously mentioned incident, it
was an open plant rumor that Doctor Shapiro had just re-
turned from an extensive vacation in Israel.
advised he had not come forward before
because he had a large family to support and the day following
the incident, the plant Persne ger (name unrecalled)
of NUMEC threatened to fire it he "did not keep
his mouth shut" concerning what he had seen on the loading
r.
1)6
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�
PG 117-108
5
iftit*I"OlisSiesels.
dock the night ',efore. further advised he men-
tioned the threat he received frml Ph. pnrsonnel Manager
to his union steward, whereupon claims he was
visited by "sone union goons" from xSttanning, Pa., and
again told to keep his mouth :shut.
es.
stated the *evening attitude at the
plant in 1965 by management, union and the employees was
that the Atomic Energy Commission was the enemy looking
for a reason to shut the facility down with the resultant
job losses. In addition, he stated he did not know how
or who to contact in authority who would take action.
1 'advised that he could sAcall no other
information concerning this incident which occurred in late
March or early April, 1965.
�
ivri4
6*
) 1-44'
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Exhibit 3
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COCCIrtv�+--
\.)
INQUIRY INTO
THE TESTIMONY OF
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
FOR OPERATIONS
VOLUME III
INTERVIEWS
UNCLASSIFIED
FEBRUARY 1978
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR Et AUDITOR
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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UNCLASSIFIED
INQUIRY INTO THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
VOLUME III - INTERVIEWS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Name Page
Clifford V. Smith, Jr.
Robert F. Burnett
Gerald Page
Roger J. Mattson
John G. Davis
William A. Anders, former Chairman
Kenneth R. Chapman
Peter L. Strauss
Bryan Eagle
C. W. Reamer
Marcus A. Rowden, former Chairman
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.
George W. McCorkle
Robert A. Erickson
Paul F. Goldberg
Ben Huberman
L. D. Y. Ong
Kenneth S. Pedersen
Bernard J. Snyder
Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman
Frederick L. Crane
Thomas F. Carter, Jr./Thomas C. Thayer
Joseph J. Fouchard
William J. Dircks
Richard T. Kennedy, Commissioner
Lee V. Gossick
Carl Builder
Edward Mason, former Commissioner
*
Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner
James H. Conran
UNCLASSIFIED
1
7
11
17
27
29
40
43
48
53
60
65
70
72
75
78
82
106
109
113
117
121
122
135
137
145
159
164
176
180
199
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3
informaticn. They had other information such as a type of bombing
practice cone with A-4 aircraft that would not have made sense unless it
was to deliver a nuclear bomb.
By the time of the NRC briefing the question of whether L-235 had been
dverted from NUMEC was academic for the CIA because plutonium from the
Dimona reactor was believed to be available. Therefore, from the CIA's
intelligence point of view the diversion did not matter. The last
inspection of Dimona was in 1969. In his view it was less than an
adequate investigation to determine whether plutonium was there. After-
wards Israel refused to permit inspections. Furthermore, a shipment of
200 tons of non-enriched uranium from Argentina had been diverted to
Israel through a West German cut out.
Mr. Duckett raised the question of whether the U.S. had intentionally
alloweo material to go to Israel. He said that if any such scheme was
under consideration, he would have known about it and he never heard so
much as a rumor about this. He, therefore, does not believe there is
any substance to this allegation. In support of this view, he related
that CIA had drafted a National Intelligence Estimate on Israel's
nuclear capability in 1968. In it was the conclusion that the Israelis
had nuclear weapons. He showed it to Mr. Helms. Helms told him not to
publish it and he would take it up with President Johnson. Mr. Helms
later related that he had spoken to the President, that the President
was concerned, and that he had said "Don't tell anyone else, even
Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara."
Mr. Duckett was asked about the reactions of NRC officials who were
present at his briefing. He said that Mr. Anders was very concerned and
felt that already too many people had been exposed to the information.
After the briefing Mr. Duckett went to Mr. Kennedy's office. Mr. Kennedy
wanted to talk about more frequent interchange of information between
the NRC and the CIA. Mr. Anders came in and wanted to apologize for
having so many people present. He said he did not realize how sensitive
tne information was and if he had he would have restricted the attendance
even more. Mr. Anders said that, in the future, he should deal only
with Mr. Kennedy and him, and that in light of the sensitive nature of
the information he was going to go to the White House. During this
session, Mr. Duckett recalls that one Commissioner, Probably Mr. Mason,
commented with mock jocularity "My God, I almost went to work for �
Zal Shapiro. I came close to taking a job with him." By tne end of the
meeting it was a pretty somber group. Mr. Duckett does not recall that
tne staff actively participated in the briefing, He pointed out that it
was not a formal briefing. It was more of a discussion for the whole
session.
1
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Exhibit 4
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VOTE: THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS 1111.24 TYPED FHOM A TEE3DIEIGNE RECORDING
AND NOT COPIED FOX AU ORIGMAL SCRIPT, BECAUn: OF THE RISK OF
MISIIIIIRING AND THE DIFFICULTY, ID SOI�11 CASES, IN IDli:TIEYINC..
INDIVIDUAL MAKERS, THE EBC CiagOT VOUCH IOR ITS ACCURACY,
PANORAMA
Recorded from transmission 2010 (BBC-1) 26th June, 1978
CHARLES WHEELER: � Good evening. It is now seven
months since President Sadat of Egypt went to Israel in search of
peace. His journey split the Arab world and threatened his own
position as an Arab leader. As for peace, it seems no nearer,
if anything the reverse. So why did Sadat launch such a mission
without the preparation. that might have told him it would fail ?
Various reasons have been put forward, ranging from Egypt's dire
economic need for a settlement, to Sadat's belief that a touah
of drama would create the climate for a breakthrough.
One other factor has been si-pested: there is speculation that
Sadat was at least partly mo,ed by the belief that Israel possesses
the ultimate deterrent, the atom bomb. The rumour that she has it
has been around for years, but recently informat%on has come to
light that shows how Israel may have acquired the means to neke the
bomb. In a parallel investigation-with the Insidhtteem of the
SUNDAY TINES, whose book "The Plumbat Affair" came out today,
PIXORAPIA now traces two of the ways by which Nossad, the Israeli
Secret Service, apparently obtained the ingredients for the atom tomb.
Tom Bower reports.
TO:.: BOWER; In 1958, this part of the Negev Desert
in Israel was declared a restricted area and closed to all traffic.
It was the baginning of Israel's worldwide strategy to gefthe material
and technology to build an atomic bomb. Dimona was accessible only
to the holders of special permits. Covered lorries passed through the
security checks bringing the materials and equipment for what is
simultaneously one of Israel's most closely guarded secrets,,and a
deliberately cultiVated ambiguity.
It is the strength of the security sorean that has created the firm
belief that Israel has introduced the aomic bomb into tao Middle East.
Israel has answered all requests for informetion with the bland reply
that the area was scheduled as the centre for Israel's textile industry,
The co/our of the Israeli textilos, a spokesmen said, would be cobalt
blue. In fact under a secret agreement sig! ' in 1958, France had
provided Israel with the technical details for 1.%li1(linz2 a nuclear
reactor. Still protected by complete security elackcat, it is believed
to be able to produce enouPh plutonium for ju::: over one Hiroshima type
atomic bomb per year. It was completed around .L960, and in operation
four years later. Since than Israel has refuacd to share its nvolear
secrets, even with the United States,
Am
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PANORANA
Throughout Israel has insisted tIm.t it would never be the first to
introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and that Dimona would
only be used for peaceful purposes.
When Dimona's secret was discovered by the Americans in 1960, the CIA
in Tel Aviv was ordered to investigate the extent of Israel's programme.
A sensitive intelligence operation in an allied country. Officially
listed as the Political Officer, John Haddon claims there are eight
main factors that convinced him that Israel had =barked on an atomic
bomb programme.
Firstly, the construction of facilities to produce and handle nuclear
materials like Dimona.
Secondly, the development of weapons technology, especially the type
which can carry tactical nuclear warheads for use in conventional
wars.
Thirdly, the flow of key persOnne/, the numbers specialising in
nuclear physics and who were being trained in the many areas neoessary
for a nuclear programme.
Fourthly, the attitude of the leadership to the nuclear question.
General Dayan had hinted that Israel should declare it has the bomb.
Fifth, the armed forces had bought and developed a vehicle, he Jericho
missle, which can deliver an atomic bomb.
Sixth, existing planes had been specially adapted to carry atomic bombs.
Seventh, the delivery pattern of bombers on trainins runs. The plane's
ight on a nuclear attack is different from a conventional attack.
(I
Eighth, analysis of the aerial water near nuclear installations for
traces of comb grade uranium. Few doubtod that Israeli scientists
had the knowledge to deeign and build an atomic bomb.
What remained unknown was whether the political decision had be-en---
.
taken to use that expertise and build one.
Combining his intelligence discoveries with tha earlier public
resignation of all but one of Israel's Atomic .nergy Commission,
Haddon was oonvinced that the pro-bomb lobby had won the argument.
JOHN HADDON: My judment would be that the pros
have probably won most of the arguments. That would be my feeling.
BOWER: The pros.- you moan the Israeli pros
for having the bomb ?
BADDOM Yes, I think that, because if I were an
Israeli I would want the bomb. I think the Israelis would want to take
out an insurance policy, so that if the Arabs got it and if the Arabs
used it, they would have something in their nliog.Y
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BOWER: But they have also stated that
although they can't go in for a limitless armo_race, that they also
would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.
How do you sec these two statements as compatible ?
HADDON: Well I think that the second one is
very easily handled in that in that area you have the Soviet Fleet
and the U.S.Sixth Fleet, both of which as I understand it, have
introduced atomic weapons into the area.
HADDON: So you mean that if Israel get the
bomb they will be the third ? (Yes) Which therefore is consistent
with not being the first ?
HADDON: Yes. And you can go on, you can
� I think the Americans use this term 'scenario' , there's another
one. Let us suppose that you have a weapon and that it Is in a
vehicle, that everything is all set to go, and only the last screw
remains to be in place, to complete it. Well you haven't introduced
then have you, until you put that last screw in.
BOWER:� It was another agent that supplied the
CIA in Washington with what was considered to be conclusive eviidemD0
that Israel had built the bomb. The agent reported the discovery of
traces of bomb grade enriched uranium near a security zone. The CIA's
conclusions were taken straight to President Johnson, by the ten director
Richard albs. . Their conversation was reported Ln 1977 by James
Duckett, No. 3 in the Agency. It was Duckett who lad told Helms of the
discovery. Duckett's report of that conversation was mistakenly
released under the Freedom, f Information Act.
VOICE OVER: In it was the conclusion that the Israelis
had nuclear weapons. He showed it to 1.1r. Helms. Helms told hin not to
publish it, that he would take it up with President Johnson. Mr. Helms
later related that he had spoken to the President,that the President was
concerned, and that he had said 'Don't ell anyone else, even Dean Rusk
and Robert Macnamaral.
BOWER: In another CIA Secret Report on
Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, written in 1974, and again
mistakenly released, the Agency drew on more intelligence reports to
conclude that Israel had the bomb.
VOICE OVER: We believe that Israel has already
produced nuclear weapons. Our judDcant is based on Israeli acquisition
of large quantities of uranium, partly by clandestine means, the
ambiguous .1:vitt:re of Israeli efforts in the field of uranium enrichment,
and Istael's large investment in a costly missile system designed to
accommodate nuclear warheads.
HADDOIT: I think that the publication of highly
classified documents was a mistake.
AN
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PANOiGUCA U.
. . .
BOWER: There is absolutely no doubt that this
is a highly classified document ?
HADDON: I was told that it was.
BOWER: There are two sources of material to
make an atomic bomb; enriched uranium and plutonium processed from
uranium ore. It is now believed that during the 160s, Israel
launched at least two clandestine ocerat' s to obtain both materials.
resuta e
In both operations Israel relied on 7 usinessmen� on inadequate
controls, and on a series of coverups.
The NDMEC diversion is, suspected to be the first of Israel's succesful
operations. Ntiri:C, the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation,
was founded in 1957 to build enriched uranium units for America's
growing nuclear fleet. Security was the managemerres responsibility,
althsugh allegedly supervised.by the N.S.Atonic Energy Commission.
The management was accountable for each gram of enriched uranium
delivered, not only because of its monetary value - it's worth two
thousand five hundred pounds a pound, but more importantly its strategic
potential. Just twenty pounds-of-enriched uranium is sufficient for a
Hiroshima type A-bomb. X,9_in 1960, AEC inspectors discovered that at
least two hundred pounds of eiliaZhailianium delivered to NIMEO was .
missing.
In the investigation which followed, the AEC discovered that in contrast
to surveyed security, NUMC had delegated the task wa a receptionist at
the front door. Worse still, cony of the vital lecords which
accounted for each gran of the uranium's unit was either lost or had been
accidentally destroyed in a fire.
NDMEC Management's explanations for the loss all proved .to be bogus or
misleading. The missing two hundred pounds 1..?re never found.
Frustrated, the LEO decided nevertheless to drop their investigations
and cover up the lose.
Only in the mid-160s when the CIA discovered the traces of enriched
uranium in Israel were the investigations reopened. A massive
three-pronged investigation revealed that NUYS:Vs management with
access to top secret nuclear information had very close links with
Israeli nuclear scientists and had allowed them to visit the plant.
In particular NUMEG's founder and president, Zalrinn Shapiro, an ardent
Zionist, but a frequent and privileged visitor to Israel, jointly owned
a company with an Israeli Group which dealt in nuclear Inaterials, and
had a scrambler telephone direct from the factory to an Israeli
Governr:ant office in New York.
Yet eighteen months of CIA and FBI telephone taps and round the clock
surveillance, failed to prove that Shapiro was either a foreign agent
or that he knew of a deliberate plan to divert the two hundred pounds
to Israel.
AM
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RINORIM 26.6.70.
Shapiro refused to be interviewed on film, but during a three hour
conversation he insisted that the two hundred pounds worth over one
million dollars, was simply lost during the industrial process. An
excuse dismissed by one expert saying that NUMEC would haVe had to
have been in operation since the American revolution in 1776 to have
lost that amount.
The Government, sensitive to the implications of stability in the
Middle East, ordered the AEC to keep the loss and the investigation
secret. The covet-up lasted until 1974, when an Inquiry was ordered
into the security of nuclear materials.
The investigator' Janes Conran, discovered the coverup,that the NUNEC
uranium had probanly gone to Israel. He insisted that the Commission
take action.
JAMES COIrat.N: I told the Commission that I had
discovered information, that there likely had been a theft of nuclear
material, from at least one facility, for the purposes of a foreign
Power.
BOWER: And s�hat was their reaction to your
Information ?
COHRAN:
Pear, panic, an attempt to scramble
and cover up, ignore this information.
BOWER: When the Commission refused to act,
Conran reported his discovery to the U.S.Congress. Now three
different committees are investigating the NUNEC loss. All three have
been warned that a public statement that the uranium did go to Israel
inevitably means Israel has the atomic bomb.
OHN STOCKTON: -� I think the argument would go that it
wouldThrsI6�sly distabilising if indeed a United States official,
someone in the Congress, stated positively that the Israelis had a
bomb, because of the potential impact on the Arabs. And their
potential reaction to that, of course that whole issue has been mooted
now, we have been seriously worried about this, that however the CIA
by mistake released the documents saying just that.
BOWia: Had the CIA warnadyou as well, that
it would be a mistake,
STOCKT01.:
BOWE2:
warnings ?
Yes, they had.
What's your reaction been to those
STOCKTON: We've been very careful not to say
anything, and of course as soon as they released their document, the
National Intelligence esatimate which made it very clear that in their
estimation Israel had a bomb, and that potentially their material
for that bomb had been obtained clandestinely, I don't see any
particular need to keep that secret any longer, the fact that they
warned Ds on numerous occasions not to make it explicit.
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BOWER: At what level had they warned you ?
STOCKTON; At very high'levels.
BOW-11: Ropiesentative Morris Udall chaired'
one of the Inquiries into the NUMEC loss.
REP. MORRIS UDALL: It seems generally conceded in the
Intelligence community that - and generally accepted in the Mid-Eaat
that the Israelis have the bomb, and had it for a number of years.
It appears that they achieved this capability at about the time
that some od the uranium was missing in the United States, so there's
a temptation to draw conclusions from this. There always seemed
to be a feeling among the investigators that I hope we don't find
something and maybe this will all go away, and it was pursued in the
days When the trail was a little more warm, with the kind of vigour
that I would liked to have seen.
BOWER: What do you think happened ?
UDALL: If someone had to have me write in an
envelope whether a diversion occurred or didn't occur, and I were
going to be put to death if I answered wrong, I suspect I'd have to
put in the envelope that I believe there is a diversion.
HADDON: These gentlemen have been extraordinarily
adept at removing things at long distance.
BOWER: Which gentlemen are we talking about ?
HADDON: The Israelis, and they are gentle:ma.
Just imagine to yourself how much easier it would be to remove a pound
or two of this or that at any one time, as opposed to - which is inert
material - as opposed to removing all at one blow 150 lbs of shouting
and kicking Eichmann. You see, they are pretty good at removing
things, So I would have no argument with that kind of alndgment '
without knowing anything about it.
BOWER: You mean it would be wilfe consistent
with Israeli practice to clandestinely go about getting any materials
they needed?
HADDON: Well, there wore those ships out of
Cherbourg, and there was that - there was that garage full of Mirage
plans, I don't think it's unusual for them to have remove.. things or
acquired things.
BUhhtE: The other operation by which Israel
is now known to have clandestinely obtained uraniun ore suitable to
convert into bomb grade plutonium, is the so-called Plumbat Affair.
At 2 p.m. on November 16th, 1968, a special train carrying two hundred
tons of uranium ore was shunted onto Berth No. 42 in the Antwerp Docks.
AM
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Exhibit 5
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the inputs:10%1mb.
rt.:9A..: to ttan
tng du* ''irtaarai
id that tkisr
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Transcription
I met from 2:15 to 3:15 p.m. with Bill Knauf and Jim Anderson of the Division of Inspection of the
Department of Energy. Their purpose was to interview me on the allegation that Zalman Shapiro of the
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation of Apollo, Pennsylvania diverted large amounts of highly
enriched Uranium-235 to Israel in the 1960s.
They questioned me about the degree of surveillance [surveillance) of the Atomic Energy Commission
commissioners on the NUMEC and the actions of the Commission when the loss of material was
reported. I described the manner in which the commission operated and the responsibility of the staff in
this connection. ,
They focused a good deal on the dispute which the commissioners had with John Mitchell in 1970 when
he wanted to deny the upgrading of Shapiro's clearance without granting him due process.
In response to this questioning I said that the commissioners were motivated by the desire to give
Shapiro a proper hearing as well as by their concern that the scientific and legal community would
disapprove of any denial of due process.
They were interested in how the matter was finally settled. They told me that they had already
discussed this with Ramey and I agreed with them that Ramey served as the means by which a position
was found for Shapiro with the Westinghouse Corporation, hence rendering the question of clearance
upgrading as moot. They told me that as late as 1971 the CIA wanted to pursue this further but Mitchell
declined to do so.
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They asked about any discussions I have had with Helms about this matter and I described the luncheon
meeting I had with him in 1967 or 1968 during which I asked Helms if he had any evidence beyond that
which I had and Helms replied that he did not. They are going to interview Helms. They are probably
going to interview Mardian but not John Mitchell.
They have interviewed Howard Brown and the BBC has also interviewed Howard Brown, giving him a
hard time. They indicated that BBC may try to interview me. They said that Shapiro has now engaged
the law firm of Arnold and Porter and this law firm may get in touch with me.
I asked them if any responsible persons feel that Shapiro actually diverted material to Israel. They
replied that nobody with a scientific background believes this but that it is difficult to convince some
members of Congress. They said that some enriched Uranium-235 which can be identified as coming
from the Portsmouth, Ohio plant has been picked up in Israel which, of course, has exited some
members of Congress. However, such enriched material has been sold on an official basis to Israel and
this could be the source of the clandestine sample.
They indicated that they would let me read the draft of their summary of our conversation today in
order that I might make any necessary corrections.
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Exhibit 6
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IRmep kftp://wentInuetem
Calvert Stolen infe@ltmetem
P.O. lox 32041 Phut 202442-1325
Wearfingten.11C 20007 Fax: [phone]
Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Fax: [phone]
RE: FOIA Request
Dear Coordinator,
PInstitute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy
�
time
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. subsection 552, I am requesting declassification and
release of all cross referenced CIA files related to uranium diversion from the Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) to Israel. This request includes, but is not limited to CIA content
provided for publication in the now declassified 1978 GAO report titled "Nuclear Diversion in the U.S.?
13 Years of Contradiction and Confusion."
We request a waiver of all fees for this request as a nonprofit, tax exempt research organization.
Disclosure of the requested information to IRmep is in the public interest because it is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is
not primarily in our commercial interest.
If you have any questions about handling this request, please call me at 202-342-7325.
Sincerely,
Grant F. Smith
Director of Research
(b)(6
Cc: Cover "Nuclear Diversion in the U.S.? 13 Years of Contradiction and Confusion."
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Exhibit 7
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P.O. Box 32041
Reference: F-2010-01210
Mr. Grant F. Smith
Director of Research
Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy
Calvert Station
Washington, D.C. 20007
Dear Mr. Smith:
your 13 May 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records "relating to uranium
diversion from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) to Israel." We have
assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding
so that we can identify it easily.
from the search, review, publication, and disclosure requirements of the FOIA. To the extent
your request seeks information that is subject to the FOIA, we accept your request and will
process it in accordance with the EOM, 5 U.S.C. � 552, as amended, and the CIA Information
Act. Unless you object, we will limit our search to CIA-originated records existing through the
date of this acceptance letter. As a matter of administrative discretion, and in accordance with
to consider our honest appraisal as a denial of your request and you may appeal to the Agency
our regulations, the Agency has waived the fees for this request.
Release Panel. A more practical approach would permit us to continue processing your request
and respond to you as soon as we can. You will retain your appeal rights and, once you receive
the results of our search, can appeal at that time if you wish. We will proceed on that basis unless
you object.
it unlikely that we can respond within the 20 working days the FOIA requires. You have the right
On 18 May 2010, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received
The CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. � 431, as amended, exempts CIA operational files
The large number of FOIA requests CIA receives has created unavoidable delays making
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Central Intelligence Agency
Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator
washington, D.C. 205C6
Sincerely,
Scott Koch 10 September 2010
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Exhibit 8
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Cetaialivellipaice Agos.v,
)1 as Iffilltton 1)1 21114 is
2g August 2013
X Ir. Grant F. Smith
Director of Research
Institute for Research Middle Eastern Policy
Cal \ ert Station
P O. Box 32041
Washington. DC 20007
Reference: F-2010-01210
Dear Xlr Smith:
This is a final response to vow 13 May 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
or records "relating to uranium di \ ersion from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation
Nt.MEC) to Israel.- We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. � 552, as
amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 �: 431, as amended. Our processing included a
search ftir records as described in our 0 September 2010 acceptance letter.
We completed a thorough sew ch for records responske to your request and located
material that we determined is currently arid properly' elassined and must be denied in its entirety
on the basis of FOLA exemptions (bit 1) and (b)(3). An explanation of exemptions is enclosed.
Vemption (001 pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statute
is the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.50 U.S.C. * 403g. as amended. Section 6, which
exempts from the disclosure requirement inthrmation pertaining to the organization and functions.
including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. As the CIA
Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination.
Von lune the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care. within 45 days
from the date of this letter. Please inc ude the basis of your appeal.
We conducted a search of our previously released database and located the enclosed tour
documents, totaling II pages. which we belie \e may be responsive to your request. Please be
ad h isecl that these documents were released as part of another release program.
Sincerely.
Michele Meeks
In and Pri \ acv Coordinate]
Enclosures
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Explanation of Exemptions
Freedom of Information Act
(b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an
Executive Order,
(b)(2) exempts from disclosure information, which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of the Agency;
(b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the
other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld_ The (b)(3)
statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
(b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is
obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
(b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(b)(6) exempts from di.stiosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
(b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law Enforcement purposes to the extent
that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source or, in the en ot of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful
national security intelligence investigation, information famished by a confidential source;
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the
law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical
safety-,
(b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on beJvdfo or for use of an agency
responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
(b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
April 2012.
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� �
SECRET
S OCI
a ;0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : GAO Report on Alleged Nuclear Diversion
REFERENCE Our memorandum on the same subject,
dated 30 August 7978
1. Action Requested. Review options outlined
in paragraph 3 and note recommendations.
2. Background. Since forwarding Reference to
GAO, there has been no response to our letter. we
assume the report, as previously drafted, will stand.
GAO has asked us to declassify our contributions to
this report. We have worked on sanitization of the
report, and this version is attached. The FBI also
has been asked to sanitize their contribution and is
taking the position that they will not declassify.
The Department of Energy's position also is that
they do not want to declassify their portion.
3. Staff Position. This leaves us with two
options:
a. Clear the sanitized report for passage
to GAO:
(1) Pro - This is responsive to GAO's
request.
SECRET
1
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CO3250307
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-2-
(2) Con - In our sanitized report,
every effort was made to orotect"intellieRce
sources and methods
(however, the
sanitized report still would reveal sensitive
information when considered together the
unclassified collateral material which
has appeared in the press and which the House
Committee on Interior awl Insular Affairs has
uublished in a booklet. I
b. Advise GAO that we cannot declassify our
report because of the need to have a coordinated
Executive Branch position and our desire to protect
a sensitive and valuable liaison equity.
(1) Pro - (Our reasons are identical
to those stated in paragraph 3a(2) above.)
(2)
desires.
Con - This is unresponsive to GAO's
4. Coordination. This has been coordinated with
OLC, OGC, NE Division and CTS.
5. Recommendation. Option B. If you concur,
GAO will be advised orally by OLC.
Attachments:
A. GAO repori
B. Booklet,
John H. Stein
John H. Stein
SECRET
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SLCRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
43
VIA : Deputy Director of Central IntelliviAC rett (_7
FROM : John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : GAO Report on Alleged Nuclear Diversion
REFERENCE : Our memorandum on the same subject,
dated 30 August 1978
1. Action Requested. Review options outlined
in paragraph 3 and note recommendations.
2. Back round. Since forwarding Reference to
GAO, there as cen no response to our letter. We
assume the report, as previously drafted, will stand.
GAO has asked us to declassify our contributions to
this report. We have worked on sanitization of the
report, and this version is attached. The FBI also
has been asked to sanitize their contribution and is
taking the position that they will not declassify.
The Department of Energy's position also is that
they do not want to declassify their portion.
3. Staff Position. This leaves us with two
options:
a. Clear the sanitized report for passage
to GAO:
(1) Pro - This is responsive to GAO's
request.
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SECRET
-2-
(2) Con - In our sanitized report,
every effort was made to protect intelligence
sources and methods
inowever,
sanitized report still would reveal sensitive
information when considered together with the
unclassified collateral materiall which
has appeared in the press and which the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has
published in a booklet,
..eanoiL
40 b. Advise GAO that we cannot declassify our
report because of the need to have a coordinated
' Executive Branch position and cur desire to protect
a sensitive and valuable liaison equity.
(1) Pro - (Our reasons are identical
to those stated in paragraph 3a(2) above.)
(2) Con - This is unresponsive to GAO's
desires.
4. Coordination. This has been coordinated with
OLC, OGC, NE Division and CTS.
S. Recommendation. Option B. If you concur,
GAO will 151-1-0-ised orally by OLC.
e,
I A-
-03- tag
na Attachments:
A. GAO report
B. Booklet,
)
SECRET
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25
25
25
25
25
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t" ,..;/3147/11
C�t;1 1.1AI
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
-
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : GAO Report on Alleged Nuclear Diversion
REFERENCE : Our memorandum on the same subject,
dated 30 August 1978
1. Action Requested. Review options outlined
in paragraph 3 and note recommendations.
2. Background. Since forwarding Reference to
GAO, there has been no response to our letter. We
assume the report, as previously drafted, will stand.
GAO has asked us to declassify our contributions to
this report. We have worked on sanitization of the
report, and this version is attached. The FBI also
has been asked to sanitize their contribution and is
taking the position that they will not declassify.
The Department of Energy's position also is that
they do not want to declassify their portion.
3. Staff Position. This leaves us with two
options:
a. Clear the sanitized report for passage
to GAO:
(1) Pro - This is responsive to GAO's
request.
ILLEGIB
SECRET
pprove or Kelease 2004/07116 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000800090051-9
25X1
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CO3242743
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SECRET
-2-
25X1
b. Advise GAO that we cannot declassify our
report because of the need to have a coordinated
Executive Branch position and our desire to protect
a sensitive and valuable liaison equity.
(1) Pro - (Our reasons are identical
to those stated in paragraph 3a(2) above.)
(2) Con - This is unresponsive to GAO's
desires.
4. Coordination. This has been coordinated with
OLC, OGC, NE Division and CTS.
5. Recommendation. Option B. If you concur,
GAO will be advised orally by OLC.
John H. stain
John H. Stein
Attachments:
A. re report
25X1 8.
SECRET
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C 0 3 2 4 2 7 4 3
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Distribution:
Orig - Addressee Watts
1
- DDCI w/atts
2
- Executive Registry w/o atts
- ADDO w/atts
2
- ODD Registry w/o atts
1
- C/NE go atts
1
C/NE hold w/o atts
1
OLC w/o atts
1
- OGC gatts
1
CTS w/o atts
1
NE/ISR gatts
1 -
1 -
NE/ISR w/o atts
NF/ISR hold w
o atti
51
Orig:
C/NE :rmw:6C18
3 Oct
78
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:
FROM
:
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
:
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' Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP81M00980R001800060C124D1'071."15-- �:j1-40
SECRET
, �
18-/a7
7AW
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
GAO Report on Alleged Nuclear Diversion
Our memorandum on the same subject,
dated 30 August 1978
1. Action Requested. Review options outlined
in paragraph 3 and note recommendations.
2. Back round. Since forwarding Reference to
GAO, there as een no response to our letter. We
assume the report, as previously drafted, will stand.
GAO has asked us to declassify our contributions to
this report. We have worked on sanitization of the
report, and this version is attached. The FBI also
has been asked to sanitize their contribution and is
taking the position that they will not declassify.
The Department of Energy's position also is that
they do not want to declassify their portion.
3. Staff Position. This leaves us with two
options:
a. Clear the sanitized report for passage
to GAO:
(1) Pro - This is responsive to GAO's
request.
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/11/27 . CIA-RDP81M00980R001800060024-1
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:03240476
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Si
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SECRET
-2-
(2) Con - In our sanitized report,
every effort was made to protect intelligence
sources and methods 1
Ihowever, I
sanitized report still would reveal sensitive
information when considered together the
unclassified collateral materialj lwhich
has appeared in the press and winch the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has
Published in a booklet 1
b. Advise GAO that we cannot declassify our
report because of the need to have a coordinated
Executive Branch position and our desire to protect
a sensitive and valuable liaison equity.
(1) Pro - (Our reasons are identical
to those stated in paragraph 3a(2) above.)
(2) Con - This is unresponsive to GAO's
desires.
4. Coordination. This has been coordinated with
OLC, OGC, NE Division and CTS.
S. Recommendation. Option B. If you concur,
GAO will be advised orally by OLC.
Attachments:
A. GAO repoIt
B. Booklet,
John S. Stein
John H. Stein
SECRET
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CO3240476
. a Approved For Release 2006/11/27 CIA-R DP81 M00980R001800060024- 1
S E C T
-3-
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/atts
1
- DDCI Watts
2
- Executive Registry w/o atts
- ADDO w/atts
2
- BOO Registry w/o atts
1
- C/NE w/o atts
1
- C/NE hold w/0 atts
1
- OLC w/o atts
1
- OGC w/atts
1
- CTS w/o atts
1
- NE/ISR w/atts
1
- NE/ISR w/0 atts
25)0
1
- NE/ISR hold w/o attf-1
Oct
78
Orig:
:C/NE/I Irmw:6C18
25X1
SEcRI T
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25X1
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Exhibit 9
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lilmep kno://www.inoop.ors
Calvin Station ido@irmotorg
P.O. Box 32041 Moo: 292-342-7325
Washington, DC 20001 Fax: [phone]
Thursday, September 19, 2013
Agency Release Panel
Michele Meeks, Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
PInstitute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy
tine
Reference: F-2010-01210 CIA records "relating to uranium diversion from the Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) to Israel."
Dear Michele Meeks,
On August 28, 2013 the CIA denied in entirety the release of material on the above-referenced FOIA request of
May 13, 2010. (Attached) We appeal to the Agency Release Panel to reconsider this denial and release in full
all requested records, including the Carter administration Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation
(NUMEC) files
The CIA Information Act of 1984, cited in the Agency's September 10, 2010 FOIA confirmation letter
(Attached), provided guidance over the review for release of relevant CIA files. As an outside public-interest
nonprofit, it is impossible for us to know whether the majority of the CIA's thousands of files about NUMEC are
considered to be "operational" or not. We believe they probably should not be since the diversion was not a
CIA operation, according to officials who spoke publicly about the matter.
Carl Duckett, the executive director for CIA operations, revealed that CIA Director Richard Helms wrote a
classified letter to Attorney General Ramsey Clark telling him that highly enriched uranium "processed at
Apollo might have ended up at Dimona" and requested that the FBI investigate NUMEC and its officials, many
who had strong ties to Israel. Helms also informed President Lyndon Johnson about Israel's nuclear weapons
program, to which LBJ famously responded, "Don't tell anyone else, even [Secretary of State] Dean Rusk and
[Defense Secretary] Robert McNamara."' CIA Tel Aviv Station Chief John Hadden called the NUMEC incident
an "Israeli operation from the beginning." These and other comments by CIA officials imply that while the
diversion of weapons-grade uranium from Apollo to Dimona was indeed an operation, it was not a clandestine
CIA operation authorized by a presidential finding, and is therefore probably unworthy of the decades of
agency refusals to researchers seeking file release.
However, even if CIA considers NUMEC files to be "operational files," under Sec. 702 "Decennial review of
exempted operational files" the CIA would have had to have conducted ten-year reviews for removal of
exemptions for release of NUMEC files. In particular, under subsection (b) CIA would have had to consider the
historical value and ongoing heavy public interest in the subject matter.
The NUMEC affair has been of intense public interest since the first press accounts of massive NUMEC
uranium losses were reported by the New York Times on September 17, 1966. A lingering question is whether
the ramshackle NUMEC facilities and operations that polluted the Kiski Valley, currently requiring a U.S. Army
McTiennan. Toni "Inquiry into the Testimony of the Executive Director for Operations" Volume 111, Interviews, February 1978. The CIA's Carl Duckett briefed NRC
commissioners in 1976 In 1978, Tom McTieman of NRC investigated the 1977 Congressional testimony of NRC's Executive Director for Operations Lee Gossick to
see ilGossick lied to Congress about whether officials thought there was evidence of a diversion. The 1978 report of McTieman's investigation contains recollections
by NRC people who attended the Duckett briefing in 1976, There is also a four page summary of an interview with Duckett. Nearly all of what Duckett said or what
others recalled he said was redacted from the public version of McTieman's report that was eventually released to the public. However, one page (number)) of the four
pages summarizing Ducken's interview summary was inadvertently released to the Natural Resources Defense Council when the report was first made public.
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Corps of Engineers cleanup costing up to half a billion taxpayer dollars, were the result of its core mission as a
budget smuggling operation. Many such operations were established across the United States in the 1940s to
illegally obtain and smuggle conventional weapons. One key figure in the NUMEC scheme, David Lowenthal,
was just such a smuggler for Israel. Even in 2013, civil suits over accidental death and injury compensation
continue to be filed in Pennsylvania district courts by victims of NUMEC. However, aside from the public
remarks of Carl Duckett and John Hadden affirming an illegal diversion, the CIA has never fully divulged its
findings about NUMEC to the American public.
It is now known that the CIA generated a vast amount of data about NUMEC which could reveal a great deal
about the functions of government and till important gaps in the historical record�which is the primary purpose
of the Freedom of Information Act. According to a Carter Administration memo obtained from the National
Archives this year dated April 25, 1979, the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department completed a
review of "thousands of CIA documents" about the NUMEC diversion. (Attached). Although Congress was to
have received the review to take warranted action, apparently such an accountability moment never occurred.
According to a previously released October 6, 1978 memo from John H. Stein, Acting Deputy Director for
Operations which accompanied the August 28, 2013 FOIA denial to us, the CIA believed intelligence sources
and methods might have been compromised if CIA material submitted for a 1978 GAO report2 were combined
with information already in the public domain. Further, the CIA felt it could not declassify their report "because
of the need to have a coordinated Executive Branch position and our desire to protect a sensitive and valuable
liaison equity."
The Executive branch is demonstrably reticent to release classified files about Israel's nuclear weapons
arsenal in observance of the Nixon-Kissinger Meir policy of "strategic ambiguity." However, no educated
person inside or outside the Middle East any longer believes Israel doesn't have a nuclear arsenal. There is
an abundance of public domain information about clandestine nuclear weapons funding through nonprofit
corporations, yellowcake and technology transfers that helped build the arsenal�often against the wishes of
the countries from which such resources were extracted. Perhaps the Stein memo is saying that the U.S. was
once so reliant on Israel as an intelligence liaison it would have been counter-productive to let the public know
that Israel's agents stole sensitive military material. However, the Cold War is now over. Furthermore, the
Obama administration's 2009 executive order on Freedom of Information calls for a new "presumption" of
openness, and prohibits retaining material for decades that is "embarrassing" or casts a harsh light on
decisions made under such circumstances. Excempting 30+ year-old records under (b)(1) contradicts Obama
guidelines that "nothing should remain classified forever" and new automatic 25-year declassification targets.
As you may know, the ISCAP panel, which has an established record declassifying tightly held intelligence
files, is currently reviewing a number of NUMEC-related files for release, including the 1978 GAO report. CIA
is no longer the sole decision point for release of sensitive records about NUMEC. We believe it would be best
for compliance with the spirit of FOIA, the reputation of the CIA, and the benefit of the American public, if all of
the CIA's NUMEC-related material were released immediately.
Sincerely
(b)(6
Grant bman
Director of Research
Attachments.
2 Nuclear Diversion in the US? 13 Years of Contradiction and Confusion, GAO, partially declassified and released in 2010
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Exhibit 10
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Ceniral Intellid?NiLL
�1,.nIIIIupl!o. liiMP,
28 March 21)1.
Mr. Grant F. Smith
Director of Research
Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy
Calvert Station
P.O. Box 32041
Washington. DC 20007
Reference: F-2010-01210
Dear ivIr. Smith.
This responds to your 19 September 2013 letter appealing our 28 August 2013 final
response to your Freedom of Information Act request for records relating to uranium dnersion
from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation INUMEC) to Israel.
'The Agency Release Panel (ARPi considered your appeal and determined the material
dcmcd in its entirety is currently and properly classified and must continue to he protected froin
release on the basis of FO1A exemptions (hit I) and 010 Exemption (h:(3) pertains to
information exempt from disclosure by statute. The nelex ant statute is thefentral I nelligencc
Agency Act of 1949..50 U.S.C. � 403g. as amended. Section 6. which exempts from the
disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organization and functions, including those
related to the protection ol intelligence sources and methods.
Therefore. in accordance with Agency regulations set forth in pail 1900 of tale 32 ol the
Code of Federal Regulations. the ARP denied your appeal on the basis oi FOIA exemptions
ir9111 and hil 3). In accordance with thz provisions of the FOIA, you lime the right to seek
Judicial review of this determination in a United States district court. Alternatively. the Office ot
Government Information Services (OGIS1 offers mediation services to ie,ol�c disputes between
FOIA requesters and federal agencies. ()sin!: sery ices offered by OGIS does not affect your right
to pursue litigation. For more in format on. including how to contact (Xi IS. please consult its
website. Imp://ogisiarchives.gm
Sincerely.
g
Michele 'cleek,
Executive Secretary
Agene) KJease Panel
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Exhibit 11
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CO1162251
REPORT BY THE
de.
Comptroller General
OF THE UNITED STATES SmutEr
Nuclear Diversion In The U.S.?
13 Years Of Contradiction
And Confusion
"NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION-
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SUBJECT
TO CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
MY SEE INSIDE COON]. Dos Esp.
OF EXECUTIVE 0 -652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
EXEmETF ERAL OECLA5SISICATION SCIEISOULE
ti WARNING NOTICE�SensitIve
Intelligence Sources and
Methods Involved
DECLASSIFIED ENDER AUTHOR- ITY OF THE
I iNusitmaNCYSEculu ry CLASSIFICATIOV APPEA1S PANEL
� 1K.O. 15526.. SECTION 5:1(bX31
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-078. dOturneal sa. 1
1.0 DECLASSIFICATION OAT": March IS, 2014
.41E-RkT
c
C.
13104114
DeCtMeeR is. '1971
REPORT BY THE
EO 12958 3 3(b)I1 )>25Yrs
el" EO 12958 3 5(b)(6)>25Yrs
Comptroller General INCUSSIFiEil o
OF THE UNITED STATES IsratitEr- criLi
Nuclear Diversion In The U.S.?
13 Years Of Contradiction
And Confusion
"NATIONAL SECU INFORMATION"
UNAumoRIzffieiscLosURE SUBJECT
TO CRIMIN nIcTIONS
CEAssIFIED Sr NS UM FRONT COVER).
[KEENE FROM (PAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUT1 OER 11652.
OXEMPTI TEGORT 2.
WARNING ROT Sensitive
In-Lento Sources and
Method nvolyed
ONCEASSIFE0
6'screniticr
'B-157767
FAD-714
DECEPAIEM ilL10711
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Ul
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C01162251
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001162251
S-15,7i1
1..ffmlAZZ
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Energy and Power
Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
ormarzs
On AOgust 12. 1977, you requested that we initiate an
investisation to determine the extent and contents of intel-
ligence and related nuclear safeguards information regarding
a possible diversion of nuclear material Eros a U.S. facility
and the extent to which this information was disseminated
among those agencies having responsibilitLes in this area.
In response to your request, this report primarily
discusses two questions
--what information has been developed about the alleged
diversion? and
--were the Investigations done by the Federal Government
adequate?
AS agreed with your office we plan to distribute the
report to certain other parties having an interest in it.
Specifically, we plan to provide the report to the Chairman
of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and
the criairman of the Subcommittee on Enetgy. Nuclear prolifer-
ation and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental
C SD ST (see inside front cover).
sAEMPT F RAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXEC EDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
(This page Is UNCLASSIFIED.)
CC
S-15776?
A is. ran. C
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Energy and Power
Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman'
CD STA TCS
On AUgust 12, 1677, you requested tnat we initiate an
investigation to determine the extent and contents of intel-
ligence and related nuclear safeguards information regarding
a possible diversion of nuclear material from a U.S. facility
and the extent to which this information was disseminated
among those agencies having responsibilities in this area.
In response to your request, this report primarily
discusses two questions
--what information has been developed about the alleged
diversion? and
--were the investigations done by the Federal Government
adequate?
As agreed with your office we plan to distribute the
report to certain other parties having an interest in it.
Specifically, we plan to provide the report to the Chairman
of the House Committee on interior and insular Affairs and
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy. Nuclear Prolifer-
ation and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental
CLASSIFIED BY (Sc inside front cover).
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E ECU IVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGOR 2
Apra
(This pa e is 011CL S I IED.)
ONCLASSIFIED
I.
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Co1162251
CO1162251
0-1577,57
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-1.2e..� -ea
B-15776".
OUCLASSIFZES
Affairs. runner, we will also be providing the report to
the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees anti the
Federal agencies included in our review.
The report has teen classified as SECRET/National Secu-
rity information by the federal aUrGall of investigation and
the Central Intelligence Agency. we made every attempt to
issue an unclassified report on this matter. However, neither
the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the Central Inteili-
geocY Agency was able to provide us with a declassified version
of the report.
YOU:4
Comptroller General
of the United States
2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Affairs. Further, we will also be Providing the report to
the House and Senate Select intelligence Committees and the
Federal agencies included in our review.
The report has teen classified as SECRET/National Secu-
rity Information by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Central Intelliaence Agency. We made every attempt to
issue an unclassified report on this matter. However, neither
the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the Central Intelli-
gency Agency was able to provide us with a declassified version
of the report.
your
-44c. 44
Comptroller General
of the United States
2
UNCLASSIFIED
ZOO-A0-9-1:1 asea
anucl ST/ET)
elease: 2021/10/21 C06318124
CO 1162251
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"stsfrizr�
REPORT OF THE -.:CVP'rPOII_T. NUCU'R DIVERSION
GENERAL OF TN E INITCE g UNITE, TATES? 12 '2EAli3 0'
CONTE:WIC:1G:: krC CCEFDSIOE
DIGEST
??!ELLS!
It is not GAO's function to conduct Criminal
investigations and this review should not be
construed as one. This report is Simply a
presentation of facts as we have examined
then regarding the alleged diversion and its
accompanying 13 years of contradiction and
confusion, GAO's efforts focused on the im-
plications such an alleged incident would
nave for improving the effectiveness of the
Nation's current nuclear safeguards program.
InYestigations of the alleged incj,dent by
the FBI and the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Office of Inspector General are still under-
way.
WHY GAO'S REVIEW WAS MADE
Chairman Jahr Dingell of the Rouse Subcom-
mittee on Energy and Power requested GAO
to examine an alleged incident involving
over 200 pounds of unaccounted for uranium-
235, the material used in the fabrication
of nuclear weapons, from a nuclear plant in
western Pennsylvania. Also, Chairman John
Glenn of the Subcommittee on energy, Nuclear
Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and Chair-
man Morris K. Udall of the Subcommittee on
Energy and Environment, House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, expressed in-
terest in the review.
Chairman Dingell specifically asked GAO to
examine the extent and content of intelli-
gence and safeguards information regarding
the alleged incident, and the extent to
which this information was PCOVLded to DOE
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
for their use in assuring that nuclear ma-
terials were being adequately protected in
this country. Chairman Dingell requested
that GAO review " * � � all necessary files
END -29 -2
C01162251
REPORT OF THE COPTROLLF1.
GENERAL OF THE UNITEE ST,.Tee
DIGEST
PREFACE
;--farr17.1
NUCLEAR DIVERS/ON .19?:
UNITED STATES? 13 YEARS OF
CONTRADICTION AID cONFUSIOE
ft is not GAO's function to conduct criminal
investigations and this review should not be
construed as one. This report is simply a
presentation of facts as we have examined
them regaedin9 the alleged diversion and its
accompanying 13 years of contradiction and
confusion. GAO's efforts focused on the im-
plications such an alleged incident would
have for improving the effectiveness of the
Nation's current nuclear safeguards program.
Irirestigations of the alleged inci,dent by
the FBI and the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Office of Inspector General are still under-
way.
WRY GAO'S REVIEW WAS MADE
Chairman John Dingell of the House Subcom-
mittee on Energy and Power requested GAO
to examine an alleged incident involving
over 200 pounds of unaccounted for Uranium-
235, the material used in the fabrication
of nuclear weapons, from a nuclear plant in
western Pennsylvania. Also, Chairman John
Glenn of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear
Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and Chair-
man Morris K. Udall of the Subcommittee On
Energy and Environment, House Committee on
interior and Insular Affairs, expressed in-
terest in the review.
Chairman Dingell specifically asked GAO to
examine the extent and content of intelli-
gence and safeguards information regarding
the alleged incident, and the extent to
which this information MPS provided to DOE
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
for their use in assuring that nuclear ma-
terials were being adequately protected in
this country. Chairman Dingell requested
that GAO review � � * * all necessary files
MD- 79-8
SF:Miff !1yr,3
Wilt; At
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and reports incluoino those of ER, NRC,
CIA, and the tEl � I."
CONSTRAINTS Cm GAC's REVIEW
GAO attempted to satisfy the Chairman's re-
quest by interviewing responsible Federal
and private individuals and by examining
pertinent reports and documentation. While
ODE 1/ and NBC provided full access to all
their records and documentation. GAO was con-
tinually denied necessary reports and docu-
mentation on the alleged incident by the
Central. Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
CIA provided GAO a written chronology of
contacts with other Federal agencies, how-
evbr, , the CIA denied GAD access to, any
source documents on the case. According to
agency officials, this was a decision made
by the Director of the CIA I
1 The CIA dad subsequently
allow selected staff of Chairman Dingell's
Subcommittee access to CIA documents, how-
ever, access to the documents was not ex-
tended to include GAD.
n
Withheld onder statutory authority crib.
Central Intelligence Agency Art or 1949 (50
LAC. 'in line 400
1/The Atomic Energy commission (ARC) was for-
merly responsible for both regulating and
promoting all nuclear activities in the
United States. In January 19, 1975. lr
was split into the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and the Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration (ERDA). SRC became
responsible for nuclear regulation and
ERDA became responsible for nuclear devel-
opment and promotion. under Public Law
95-91, ERDA's functions were placed in the
Department of Energy effective October 1 �
1977. NRC remained intact. Throughout
the report, DOE is used to refer to the
Department of Energy, ERDA, and AEC.
001162251
ea.:4�11-
and reports including those of ERDA, NRC,
CIA, and the FRI �
CONSTRAINTS ON GAO'S REVIEW
GAO attempted to satisfy the Chairman's re-
quest by interviewing responsible Federal
and private individuals and by examining
pertinent reports and documentation. While
DOE Al and NRC provided full access to all
their records and documentation, GAO was con-
tinually denied necessary reports and docu-
mentation on the alleged incident by the
Central. Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Federal Eureau of Investigation (FBI).
CIA provided GAO a written chronology of
contacts with other Federal agencies, how-
evbr theSSILdenied GAO accese,S_g_amy
on the case.
The CIA did subsequently
-511-6w selected staff of Chairman Dingell's
Subcommittee access to CIA documents, how-
ever, access to the documents was not ex-
tended to include GAO.
1/The Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was for-
merly responsible for both regulating and
promoting all nuclear activities in the
United States. In January 19, 1975, it
was split into the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and the Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration (ERDA). NRC became
responsible for nuclear regulation and
ERDA became responsible for nuclear devel-
opment and promotion. Under Public Law
95-91, ERDA's functions were placed in the
Department of Energy effective October 1,
1977. NRC remained intact. Throughout
the report, DOE is used to refer to the
Department of Energy. ERDA, and AEC.
dsieftrr 0 pow !rn
b
C)
so
CD
Fs'
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:131-7szz,
The FBI's rationale for :Tr-lying access was
that it did not want to :oon9rArze an on-
going investigation of :re �Ileged diver-
sion incident.
Because GAO was denied access to documenta-
tion, it had to rely, for the most part, on
oral evidence obtained Sr interviews with
knowledgeable individuals and staff. The
lack of access to clA and FBI documents
made it impossible for GAO to corroborate
or check all information In obtained. When-
ever possible, GAO attempted to corroborate
the information with other knowledgeable in-
dividuals. One must keep in mind, however,
that the alleged incident occurred more than
13 years ago. These limitations impeded
GAO's efforts to fully collect and evaluate
all facts of possible relevance to the al-
leged diversion incident.
While GAO normally would not continue work
where it was continually denied access to
pertinent and important documentation, it
did continue in this case necause of the
significant nuclear safeguards ,mpircations
and the congressional interest. This re-
report is focused on the implications the
alleged incident has for improving the ef-
fectiveness of the Nation's current nuclear
safeguards program.
BACKGROUND
The alleged incident surfaced in 1965 at
the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corpo-
ration (NUMEC). Since that time, many
allegations concerning the incident have
been made in newspaper and magazine arti-
cles and at congressional hearings. These
allegations include:
--The material was illegally diverted to
Israel by NUNEC's management tor use in
nuclear weapons.
--The material was diverted to Israel by
NUmEc's management with the assistance
of the CIA.
Sant.
1C01162251
The FBI's rationale for denying access was
that it did not want to ,aonardize an on-
going investigation of :re elleae3 diver-
sion incident.
Because GAO Was denied access to documenta-
tion, it had to rely, for the most part, on
oral evidence obtained in Interviews with
knowledgeable individuals and staff. The
lack of access to CIA and FBI documents
made it impossible for GAO to corroborate
Or check all information it obtained. When-
ever possible, GAO attempted to corroborate
the information with other knowledgeable in-
dividuals. One must keep in mind, however,
that the alleged incident occurred more than
13 years ago. These limitations impeded
GAO's efforts to fully collect and evaluate
al g facts of possible relevance t9. the al-
leged diversion incident.
While GAO normally would not continue work
where It was continually denied access to
Pertinent and important documentation, It
did continue in this case because of the
significant nuclear safeguards implications
and the congressional interest. This re-
report is focused on the implications the
alleged incident has for improving the ef-
fectiveness of the Nation's current nuclear
safeguards program.
BACKGROUND
The alleged incident surfaced in 1965 at
the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corpo-
ration INUMEC). Since that time, many
allegations concerning the incident have
been made in newspaper and magazine arti-
cles and at congressional hearings. These
allegations include:
--The material was illegally diverted to
Israel by NUMEC's management for use in
nuclear weapons.
--The material was diverted to Israel by
NUMEC's management with the assistance
Of the CIA.
iii
.Sitagnr.
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--The material was diverted to Israel with
the acquiescence of the United states
Government.
--There has been a cover-up of the NUMFC
incident by the united States Government.
CIA officials provided us with their views
on the first allegation and stated that they
had no information to substantiate any of
the others. Based on the totality of GAO's
inquiry, we believe that the allegations
have not been fully or adequately answered.
Investigations of the incident were con-
ducted by DOE and the FBI. The CIA, NRC,
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
also have some knowledge of the facts sur-
roisndina the incident. All investigations 1/
of the alleged incident ended with no defini-
tive answer and GAO found no evidence that
the 200 pounds of nuclear naterial has been
located, however, as a result of the NUMEC
incident the safeguards programs in the
United States have undergone substantial
changes and have improved significantly.
This report addresses the two major ques-
tions still surrounding the incident and
their implications for tnis country's con-
tinuing responsibilities for safeguarding
strategic nuclear materials. These are:
--What information has been developed about
the alleged NUMEC diversion?
--Were the investigations conducted by the
Federal Government into the alleged inci-
dent adequate?
1/CIA officials informed GAO that they have
no authority to conduct 'investigations"
of unaccounted for nuclear materials in
the United States. As used in this report
the term "investigation(S)5 is used in the
context of the entire Federal effort to re-
solve the incident.
SgCRET
CO1162251
--The material was diverted to Israel with
the acquiescence of the United States
Government.
--There has been a cover-up of the NUMEC
incident by the United States Government.
�II
L-BUised On the totality of GAO
inquiry, we believe that the allegations
have not been fully or adequately answered.
Investigations of the incident were con-
ducted by DOE and the FBI. The CIA, NRC,
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
also have some knowledge of the facts sur-
roUnding the incident. All investigations 1/
of the alleged incident ended with no defini-
tive answer and GAO found no evidence that
the 200 pounds of nuclear material has been
located. However, as a result of the NOMEC
incident the safeguards programs in the
United StateS have undergone substantial
changes and have improved significantly.
This report addresses the two major ques-
tions still surrounding the incident and
their implications for this country's con-
tinuing responsibilities for Safeguarding
strategic nuclear materials. These are:
--What information has been developed about
the alleged NUMEC diversion?
--Were the investigations conducted by the
Federal Government into the alleged inci-
dent adequate?
1/CIA officials informed GAO that they have
no authority to conduct 'inveStigations"
of unaccounted for nuclear materials in
the united States. As used in this report
the term sinvestigationfs)" is used in the
context of the entire Federal effort to re-
solve the incident.
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00 1 1 6 2 5 1
L21p, EAD.13526 I
-rpetIchz.
WHAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED-XBOUT-TffraLedED
NUMEC DIVERSION!
Based on its review of available docurents
held by DOE and discussions witn those in-
volved in and knowledgeable about the NONEC
incident, GAO cannot say Whether ar not
there was a diversion of material from the
NUMEC facility. DOE has taken the position
that it is aware of no conclusive evidence
that a diversion of nuclear material ever
occurred at the NUMEC facility, although it
recognises that the possibility cannot be
eliminated. Agents from the FBI involved
in the current investigation told GAO that
while there exists circumstanial information
which could lead an individual to conclude
alit a diversion occurred, there no
substantive proof of a diversion.
Currently the FBI is continuing its in-
vestigation into the alleged "NEC inci-
dent.
In an August 1977 meeting a farmer high
ranking CIA official informed GAO, in the
presence Of Several current CIA officials,
that information was developed by the CIA
that made it appear that the NUMEC facility
was the 'Most likelY source of the material
1 GAO's
understanding of the information that was
presented at this meeting was subsequently
provided to CIA in a memorandum of conver-
sation. A knowledgeable CIA official who
reviewed the memorandum expressed no oppo-
sition to GAO', use of the term 'most
likely.'
Later. in a November 1977 meeting with CIA
officials, GAO was informed that there was
no data to specifically support such a con-
clusion. Further, GAO was informed by CIA
officials that characterizing NUMEC as the
"most likely" source of the uranium-235 held
by Israel was not the official position of
the Agency but of perhaps one or two former
Agency officials. The CIA officials GAO
contacted informed us that the position ex-
pressed in the August 1977 briefing should
.031162251
;ffkittrl
WHAT /NFORMATION HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED ABOUT THE ALLEGED
Based on its review of available documents
held by DOE and discussions with those in-
volved in and knowledgeable about the NUMEC
incident, GAO cannot say whether or not
there was a diversion of material from the
NUMEC facility. DOE has taken the position
that it is aware of no conclusive evidence
that a diversion of nuclear material ever
occurred at the NUMEC facility, although it
recognises that the possibility cannot be
eliminated. Agents from the FBI involved
in the current investigation told GAO that
while there exists circumstanial information
which could lead an individual to conclude
thqt a diversion Occurred, there is no
substantive proof of a diversion.
Currently the FBI is continuing its in-
vestigation into the alleged NUMEC inci-
dent.
OSI-VZZOO-AD-s-r:T aspo
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nave been changed to reflect a less conclusive
position. The CIA officials suggested that
uuflEC be recognized as only one of many pos-
sible sources of enriched uranium going to
Israel. Subsequently, however, two former
senior C/A officials responsible for collect-
ing and analyzing such data told GAO that
Information does exist within the CIA link-
ing the unaccounted for NUMEC material to
ISrael. One of these former officials was
one of the five highest ranking employees
of the CIA and reported directly to the
Director of the CIA on this matter.
Current CIA officials told GAO that these
two former officials were drawing on memory
as they recalled past events. The CIA of-
ficials having current access to the files
adliised GAO that a search of the ayailable
data reveals a 'semantic' problem concerning
the use of the term 'evidence.' In short,
CIA states there is no hard evidence on a
diversion from NUNEC to Israel. At the same
time. current CIA officials recognize that
the available data, when coupled with past
recollections of events, could lead former
officials to speak in terms of 'linking' the
unaccounted material from NUMEC to nuclear
developments in Israel. GAO was unable to
determine whether the CIA changed its opin-
ions about any NUMEC/Israel link or whether
the CIA inadvertently failed to comment on
the inaccuracy of the 'most likely' position
conveyed to GAO in the August 1977 briefing.
The FBI agent currently in charge of the in-
vestigation told GAO that the FM also re-
ceived conflicting stories from the CIA.
Initially, the CIA told the FBI investiga-
tors they had information supporting the
possibility that the material missing from
the NUMEC facility went to Israel. The CIA
later reversed itself and told the FBI it
did not have this type of Information.
In 1975, the entire regulatory function of
DOE was taken over by the newly created NRC,
which was made responsible for the regula-
tory oversight of commercial nuclear facili-
ties like NUMEC, and consequently has become
involved in the incident. In A February
1978 report related to the NUMEC incident.
vi
-snag.
CO1162251
In 1975, the entire regulatory function of
DOE was taken over by the newly created WPC,
which was made responsible for the regula-
tory oversight of commercial nuclear facili-
ties like NUMEC, and consequently has become
involved in the incident. In a February
19713 report related .to the NUMEC incident,
,
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NAC concluded that their previous official
position of "n0 evidence' to support a di-
version may need to be reconsidered in ligh:
of the many uncertainties surrounding the
incident.
WERE THE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED
BY THE VEDERAL GrinTIIERtniT
THE ALLEGED INCIDENT ADEOUAfia
It a diversion or theft of nuclear material
is suspected or actually occurs in this
country, the Federal Government must be able
to quickly and definitively determine how
and why it happened so that the public can
be protected against the potential hazards
from such an occurrence. To do this, agen-
cies of the Government with capabilities
to; investigating and responding to such
incidents must work together to allure that
all relevant information AS obtained and is
timely. This did not happen with the al-
leged NUMEC incident. Federal investigations
of the alleged NUMEC incident were uncoordi-
nated, limited in scope and timeliness, and,
in GAO's opinion, less than adequate. There
was not a unified and coordinated investiga-
tion of the incident by those agencies having
the capabilities to fully resolve the matter
--DOE, the FBI, and the CIA.
During 1965 and 1966 DOE investigated NUMECis
accountability and safeguards system focus-
ing on the diversion possibility. Prior to
the alleged 1965 incident, DOE conducted six
accountability inspections at NEMEC in order
to assure that nuclear materials were being
adequately protected. The inspections were
directed solely at the material accounting
requirements of the time which were such
less vigorous than those in existence at
nuclear facilities today. Each inspection
revealed significant deficiencies, but DOE
allowed the facility to continue nuclear
operations even though a key field investi-
gator at one point recommended that DOS stop
providing nuclear material to the facility.
The FBI, which had the responsibility and
authority to investigate the alleged inci-
dent, did not focus on the question of a
001162251
ARC concluded that their previous official
Position of 'no evidence" to support a di-
version may need to be reconsidered in light
of the many uncertainties surrounding the
incident.
WERE THE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED
BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTO
THE ALLEGED INC/DENT ADEQUATE?
If a diversion or theft of nuclear material
is suspected or actually occurs in this
country, the Federal Government must be able
to quickly and definitively determine how
and why it happened so that the public can
be protected against the potential hazards
from such an occurrence. To do this, agen-
cies of the Government with capabilities
Ec$ investigating and responding to Such
incidents must work together to assure that
all relevant information is obtained and is
timely. This did not happen with the al-
leged NUMEC incident. Federal investigations
Of the alleged NUMEC incident were uncoordi-
nated, limited in scope and timeliness, and,
in GAO's opinion, less than adequate. There
was not a unified and coordinated investiga-
tion of the incident by those agencies having
the capabilities to fully resolve the matter
--DOE, the FBI, and the CIA.
During 1965 and 1966 DOE investigated NUMEC's
accountability and safeguards system focus-
ing on the diversion possibility. Prior to
the alleged 1965 incident, DOE conducted six
accountability inspections at NUMEC in order
to assure that nuclear materials were being
adequately protected. The inspections were
directed solely at the material accounting
requirements of the time which were much
less vigorous than those in existence at
nuclear facilities today. Each inspection
revealed significant deficiencies, but DOE
allowed the facility to continue nuclear
operations even though a key field investi-
gator at one point recommended that DOE stop
Providing nuclear material to the facility.
The FBI, which had the responsibility and
authority to investigate the alleged inci-
dent, did not focus on the question of a
v ki
AO-ST :T aSep
CD
Es
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possible nuclear diversion un 11 May 1976
--nearly 11 years later. Initially, the
FET declined DOE's request to conduct an
investigation of the diversion possibility
even though they are required to conduct
such investigations under the Atomic Energy
Act. Two Sources familiar with the matter
gave GAO differing views on why the FBI de-
clined to undertake the investigation. Be-
tween 1965 and 1976 the FBI's efforts were
directed at investigating the actions and
associations-of NUMEC'S president. PEI and
Department of Justice staff told GAO that
after a request by President Ford in April
1976 the FBI did begin to address the diver-
sion aspect. GAO was not furnished any
documents regaroing President Ford's re-
quest and thus could not specifically
determine its nature and scope. This
invystlgation, which is currently ongoing,
is Obviously hampered by the 11-year gap
since the alleged incident occurred. Also,
although it may not affect the investigative
outcome, GAO found that certain key indivi-
duals had not been contacted by the FBI
zaniest 2 years into the FBI's current
investigation.
According to the CIA, it did not conduct a
domestic investigation. of the incident be-
cause It had no authority to do so.
Several current and former FBI and DOE
officials indicated that the CIA withheld
this Information from them, at a time when
it could have affected the scope and direc-
tion Of their investigations. However, Cur-
rent CIA Officials we contacted stated that
the full range of information)
was not available during the FBI investiga-
tion in 1968. Current CIA officials told
us that during the FBI's investigation be-
ginning in 1976 the FBI was briefed by CIA
in full and the FRI agent-in-charge told
viii
'2510,6.0.13526
CD 1162251
4
possible nuclear dive ion until May 1976
--nearly 11 years later. Initially, the
FBI declined DOE'S request to conduct an
investigation of the diversion possibility
even though they are required to conduct
such investigations under the Atomic Energy
Act. Two sources familiar with the matter
gave GAO differing views on why the FBI de-
clined to undertake the investigation. Be-
tween 1965 and 1976 the FBI's efforts Were
directed at investigating the actiOnS and
associations of NUMEC's president. FBI and
Department of Justice staff told GAO that
after a request by President Ford in April.
1976 the FBI did begin to address the diver-
sion aspect. GAO was not furnished any
documents regarding President Ford's re-
quest and thus could not specifically
determine its nature and scope. This
inVgstigation, which is currently ongoing,
is Obviously hampered by the 11-year gap
since the alleged incident Occurred. Also,
although it may not affect the investigative
outcome, GAO found that certain key indivi-
duals had not been contacted by the FBI
almost 2 years into the FBI's current
Investigation.
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001162251
the CIA that he did not see any new informa-
tion in the presentation which was germane
to tne Eel investigation. CIA officials
also told us that at about the same Use
DOE officials, also briefed ty CIA, said
that the information was consistent with
what had been known previously. GAO does
not know the extent to which the CIA re-
vealed to the FBI or DOE the information
it possessed. While the CIA may have
alerted these agencies, it does not appear
to us that it provided them with all the in-
formation it had on this suh2ect in an ade-
quate or timely manner. It appears tO GAO
that the CIA may have been reluctant to aid
[hairier:Lento investigation of the alleged
diversion because of its concern about pro-
tecting its own 'sources and methods' of
obtaining information.
The failure of DOE, the FBI, and the CIA to
coordinate their efforts on the suspected
diversion when It occurred and an new infor-
mation developed and the limitat:on in the
scope and timeliness of the FBI efforts,
lead GAO to conclude that the Federal efforts
to resolve the natter were less than adequate.
Currently, there exists no coordinated inter-
agency agreed upon plan which focuses an 41/
an adequate detection and investigative sys-
tem and (21 4 reporting System to the appro-
priate congressional committees and to the
President. As a result, if a similar inci-
dent were to occur today, this country may
not be assured of any better investigation.
The United States needs to improve its ef-
forts for effectively responding to and in-
vestigating incidents of missing or unac-
counted for weapons-grade nuclear materials.
In view of increasing terrorist activities
throughout the world, the ability to respond
and investigate such incidents should be of
concern to national security and the public
health and safety.
001162251
The failure of DOE, the FBI, and the CIA to
coordinate their efforts on the suspected
diversion when it occurred and as new infor-
mation developed and the limitation in the
scope and timeliness of the FBI efforts,
lead GAO to conclude that the Federal efforts
to resolve the matter were less than adequate.
Currently, there exists no coordinated inter-
agency agreed upon plan which focuses on (1)
an adequate detection and investigative sys-
tem and (2) a reporting system to the appro-
priate congressional committees and to the
President. As a result, it a similar inci-
dent were to occur today, this country may
not be assured of any better investigation.
The United States needs to improve its ef-
forts for effectively responding to and in-
vestigating incidents of missing or unac-
counted for weapons-grade nuclear materials.
In view of increasing terrorist activities
throughout the world, the ability to respond
and investigate such incidents should be of
concern to national security and the public
health and safety.
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RECOqmE:Df.TIONS TO THE
MEADS OF AGE�CIES
GAO recommends that the heads of DOE, NRC.
the Department of Justice, and the CIA, as
part of their responsibilities for the na-
tional security of the country, establish
a plan for coordinated interagency action
which focuses On a nuclear safeguards
system that adequately detects, investigates,
and reports to the Congress and the President
on thefts Or diversions of nuclear materials.
The plan � which should be submitted CO the
Congress within 90 days or less of the issu-
ance of this report, should include
--a formal means for a timely determination
eA whether a loss has occurred! ,
--a clear and direct channel of communica-
tions between the agencies;
--a formal means for rapidly focusing the
abilities of these agencies on the resolu-
tion of a diversion incident; and
--a means for allowing any incident involving
the theft or diversion of nuclear material
to be definitely resolved to the satisfac-
tion of the Congress and the President.
GAO also recommends that the Attorney
General, working with the FBI, take the lead
in establishing the interagency plan since
the FBI, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
is responsible for invest/gating incidents
involving the diversion or theft of nuclear
materials.
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS
The committees of Congress naving jurisdic-
tion for domestic nuclear safeguards should
--review the nuclear safeguards plan to be
submitted by the executive Branch to assure
that an adequate system is developed which
asters and investigates thefts or diver-
sions of nuclear materials.
Siatrtr.
RECOM1E::DATIONS TO THE
HEADS OF AGfuCIES
GAO recommends that the heads of DOE, NRC,
the Department Of Justice, and the CIA, as
part of their responsibilities for the na-
tional security of the Country, establish
a plan for coordinated interagency action
which focuses on a nuclear safeguards
System that adequately detects, investigates,
and reports to the Congress and the President
on thefts or diversions of nuclear materials.
The plan which should be submitted to the
Congress within 90 days or less of the issu-
ance of this report, should include
--a formal means for a timely determination
cV whether a loss has occurred;
--a clear and direct channel of communica-
tions between the agencies;
--a formal means for rapidly focusing the
abilities of these agencies on the resolu-
tion of a diversion incident; and
--a means for allowing any incident involving
the theft or diversion of nuclear material
to be definitely resolved to the satisfac-
tion of the Congress and the President.
GAO also recommends that the Attorney
General, working with the FBI, take the lead
In establishing the ietersgentY Plan since
the FBI, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
is responsible for investigating incidents
involving the diversion Or theft of nuclear
materials.
RECOMMENDATION TO TEE CONGRESS
The committees of Congress having jurisdic-
tion for domestic nuclear safeguards should
--review the nuclear safeguards plan to be
submitted by the Executive Branch to assure
that an adequate system is developed which
deters and investigates thefts or diver-
sions of nuclear materials.
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001162251
--recuest thvt the ?al arc DOE's Office of
crc nector cc-olote tneir investi-
gations of toe 11:C incident as sobn as
ocssicle and suonit their reports to the
committees.
These reports sould be reviewed to determine
the adequacy of the investigations and their
imolicacions for developing a More effective
future system.
Even with complete information on all Govern-
ment investigations, given the Peeeage of
time, at may be difficult to conclusively
determine what specifically happened at MIMEO.
GAO believes the important thing is to use
the lessons learned from the NUMEC experience
to vette certain that the Nation develops an
ade4uate detection and follow-up system to
deter future nuclear thefts or diversions.
AGENCY CommENTS
DOES comments on the report are contained
in a letter dated July 25, 1978. (See ap-
pendix III. DOE agreed with the thrust of
the report. However, it disagreed with our
recommendation concerning the need to enter
into a formal interagency agreement with NRC,
the FBI, and the CTA for more timely and ef-
fective action in investigating incidents of
suspected or real diversions of nuclear ma-
terial. DOE stated in its letter that a
comprehensive plan and a memorandum of under-
standing with the FBI already existed for
joint responses to nuclear threat situations.
Further, DOE stated that it had open channels
of communication to other agencies, including
the CIA, for the exchange of information
Pertinent to nuclear threat situations.
These factors were known to GAO and are com-
mendable. The current memorandum of under-
standing between DOE and the FBI is the be-
ginning of an effective response Plan to
incidents of nuclear diversion, but is in-
adequate since it does not include CIA par-
ticipation and cooperation. Without a for-
mal interagency agreement plating Positive
reporting and investigative responsibilities
an DoE, NEC, the FBI, and the CIA along the
lines recommended by GAO, we believe tie
001162251
--recuest that the FBI ana DOE's Office of
lbsoector Glrera_ corplete their investi-
gations of ine Incident as soon as
oossible and suonit their reports to the
committees.
These reports should be reviewed to determine
the adequacy of the investigations and their
implications for developing a more effective
future system.
Ever, with complete information on all Govern-
ment investigations, given the passage of
time, it. may be difficult to conclusively
determine what specifically happened at NUMEC.
GAO believes the important thing is to use
the lessons learned from the NUMEC eXperience
to make certain that the Nation develops an
ade4ua re detection and follow-up srsteM to
deter future nuclear thefts or diversions.
AGENCY COMMENTS
DOE 's comments on the report are contained
in a letter dated July 25, 1908. (See ap-
pendix II). DOE agreed with the thrust of
the report. However, it disagreed with our
recommendation concerning the need to enter
into a formal interagency agreement with NRC,
the FBI, and the CIA for more timely and ef-
fective action in investigating incidents of
suspected or real diversions of nuclear ma-
terial. DOE stated in its letter that a
comprehensive plan and a memorandum of under-
standing with the FBI already existed for
joint responses to nuclear threat situations.
Further, DOE stated that it had open channels
of communication to other agencies, including
the CIA, for the exchange of information
pertinent to nuclear threat situations.
These factors were known to GAO and are com-
mendable. The current memorandum of under-
standing between DOE and the FBI is the be-
ginning of an effective response plan to
incidents of nuclear diversion, but is in-
adequate since it does not include CIA par-
ticipation and cooperation. Without a for-
mal interagency agreement placing positive
reporting and investigative responsibilities
on DOE, NRC, the FBI, and the CIA along the
lines recommended by GAO, we believe the
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nc: .... e-Ifte L-i.esetition of the
I3-vear tr.ve=-tiuntion.
Inc comments received free the CIA are con-
tained in a letter gated Septemter 1, 1978.
ISee appendix It; The letter takes no
lcsue with the facts or recommendations in-
cloned in the report. It does, however,
point out some concerns about certain in-
formation in the report.
GAO believes that the corcerns expressed by
the CIA have been adequately addressed in
the text of the report. However, we did not
specifically address the CIA's concerns re-
garding its degree of cooperation with DOE
and the FBI on the alleged NIMEC incident.
In its letter the CIA disagreed with the
staiement in tne report indiceting_that
they failed to cooperate with DOE and the
FAI. The CIA Oases the disagreement on the
fart that its officials briefed a large num-
ber of officials in the executive and legis-
lative branches of Government on the NUMEC
matter in 1976 and 1977.
GAO was aware that such briefings were pro-
vided. However, GAO believes that since the
briefings were provided 4 to 6 years after
some of the key information was developed
their utility in helping to resolve the
NUMEC matter was greatly diminished. Fur-
ther, according to two former CIA officials
familiar with the case, documents were
prepared within the CIA linking the unac-
counted for NUMEC material to Israel. This
information was not passed on to DOE or the
FBI according to the officials we contacted
in those agencies. However, we believe it
must be pointed out that the current CIA
officials GAO interviewed said that such
documents were not known to exist within
the CIA.
The Department of Justice and the FBI did
not furnish formal written comments. GAO
provided them more than 3 months to do so,
a time period Longer than that provided
DOE. the CIA, and NRC. While GAO did not
have the benefit of official written com-
ments from the Department of Justice and
-00:162251
d s 5 i6tyarpetition of the
1i
The comments received from the CIA are c00-
t4ined in a letter dated September 1. 1973.
!See appendix III.) The letter takes no
issue with the facts or recommendations in-
cluded in the report. It does, however,
point out some concerns about certain in-
formation in the report.
GAO believes that the concerns expressed by
the C/A have been adequately addressed in
the text of the report. However, we did not
specifically address the CIA's concerns re-
garding its degree of cooperation with DOE
and toe FBI on the alleged MIMEO incident.
In its letter the CIA disagreed with the
statement in toe report indicating...that
they failed to cooperate with DoE and the
POI. The C/A bases the disagreement on the
fact that Its officials briefed a large num-
ber of officials in the executive and legis-
lative branches Of Government on the NUMEC
matter in 1976 and 1977.
GAO was aware that such briefings were pro-
vided. However. GAO believes that since the
briefings were provided 4 to E years after
some of the key information was developed
their utility in helping to resolve the
NUMEC matter was greatly diminished 1 I
The Department of Justice and the FBI did
not furnish formal written comments. GAO
provided them more than 3 months to do so,
a time period longer than that provided
DOE, the CIA, and NRC. while GAO did not
have the benefit of official written com-
ments from the Department of Justice and
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u�
th? FBI in preparinot.. t!:e :Ina' report, GAO
did consider the vi&- cc:toents of tne
FBI staff ramiliar with tne aileged NUNES
Incident during the course of tre review.
NRC had no coliment on toe content of the
report. However, NRC did stare that the
recommendations to the Heads of Agencies
aOPears reasonable. (See appendix IV.)
5
C01162251
the FBI in preparing ine�?Iral report, GAO
did cons 'let the Vie; rr,S comments of tne
FBI staff familiar with tne alleged NUY.fc
incident during the course of the review.
NRC had no comment on the content of the
report. However, NRC did state that the
recommendations to the Reads of Agencies
appears reasonable. (See appendix IV.)
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Con tents
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DIGEST
CHAPTER
E29�
DIGEST
CHAPTER
1
INTRODUCTION
'2ns
1
1
INTRODUCTION
1
Agencies involved in investigating NUMEC
3
Agencies involved in investigating NUMEC
3
Access GO records difficulties
Access to records difficulties
3
2
WHAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED ABOUT
2
WHAT INFORMATION HAS SEEN DEVELOPED ABOUT
THE. ALLEGED NUMEC DIVERSION?
5
THE ALLEGED NUMEC DIVERSION?
Department of Energy's involvement with
Department of Energy's involvement with
NUMEC incident
Federal Bureau of InvestigatiOn'S
5
NUMEC incident
Federal Bureau of investigation's
$
involvement with NUKED incident
10
involvement with NUMEC incident
10
5 Central Intelligence Agency%s involvement
5 Central Intelligence Agency:" involvement
with NEMEC incident
15
with NUMEC incident
1$
WERE THE INVESTIGATIONS BY THE FEDERAL
3
WERE THE INVESTIGATIONS BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT INTO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT
GOVERNMENT INTO THE ALLEGED INCIDENT
ADEQUATE?
19
ADEQUATE?
19
Department Of Energy
19
Department of Energy
19
Federal Bureau of Investigation
22
Federal Bureau of Investigation
22
Central Intelligence Agency
23
Central Intelligence Agency
23
4
OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
4
OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
25
RECOMMENDATIONS
25
Whether a diversion occurred at MONET
Whether a diversion occurred at NUMEC
remains to be answered
25
remains to be answered
25
Federal mechanisms to coordinate in-
vestigations of Trissite nuclear
Federal mechanisms to coordinate in-
vestigations of missing nuclear
material are lacking
26
material are lacking
28
Recommendations to the heads of agencies
27
Recommendations to the heads of agencies
27
Recommendation to the Congress
28
Recommendation to the Congress
28
Agency comments
28
Agency comments
28
5
SCOPE OF REVIEW .
31
5
SCOPE OF REVIEW
31
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
I
Summary last or individuals contacted in
preparing report
32
1
Summary last of individuals contacted in
preparing report
32
II
Letter dated July 25, 1978, containing DOE
comments on this report
34
II
Letter dated July 25, 1978, Containing DOE
comments On this report
34
III
Letter dated Septemoer 1, 1978. containing
CIA comments on this repott
36
III
Letter dated September 1, 1978, containing
CIA comments on this report
36
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APPENDIX
IV Letter dated July 13, 1978, containing RC
comments on this report
V Letter dated February 8, 1978, from
Attorney General to GAO denying access
to Department of Justice records
AEC
CIA
DOE
ERDA
FBI
GAO
JCAE
NRC
NEMEC
ABBREVEATIONS
Atomic Energy Commission
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Energy
Energy Research and Development Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
General Accounting Office
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Commission
40
41
APPENDIX
It,
V
AEC
CIA
DOE
ERDA
FBI
GAO
JCAE
NRC
NUMEC
Letter dated July 13, 1978, containing NRC
comments on this report 40
Letter dated February 8, 1978, from
Attorney General to GAO denying access
to Department of Justice records 41
ABBREVIATIONS
Atomic Energy Commission
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Energy
Energy Research and Development Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
General Accounting Office
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Commission
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CHARM'? 1
INTRODUCTIO!'
In 1965 the Department of Energy (DOE) 1/ found during
an inspection that about 206 pounds of urania-235 could not
be accounted for at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Cor-
poration eNUMEC), a nuclear facility located in Apollo, Penn-
sylvania. DOE estimated that this much uranium could make at
least four or five nuclear weapons. Although investigations
were conducted, the uranium was never accounted for.
The Federal Government has generally remained silent
about the incident. Information that has become known over
the years has been vague and inconsistent. with the current
high interest in assuring adequate safeguards over nuclear
materials, speculation about the Incident has surfaced again.
Many allegations concerning the unaccounted for material and
the NUMEC' facility have been made in newspaper and magazine
articles and at congressional hearings. -These allegations
include:
--The material was illegally diverted to Israel by NUMEC
management for use in nuclear weapons.
--The material was diverted to Israel by NEMEC management
with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).
--The material was diverted to Israel with the acquies-
cence of the United states Government.
--There has been a cover-up of the NEMEC incident by
the United States Government.
1/The Atomic Energy commission (AEC) was formerly responsible
for both regulating and promoting all nuclear activities in
the United States. On January 19, 1975, it was split into
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (PRE) and the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration (ERDA). NRC became
responsible for nuclear regulation and ERDA became respon-
sible for nuclear development and promotion. Under Public
Law 95-91, ERDA's functions were placed in the Department
of Energy effective October 1, 1977. NRC remained intact.
Throughout the report, DOE is used to refer to the Depart-
ment 06 Energy, Erma, and AEC.
CRAFTER 1
INTRODUCTIOE
In 1965 the Department of Energy (DOE) 1/ found during
an inspection that about 206 pounds of 'nerd-Gm-235 could not
be accounted for at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Cor-
poration (NUMEC), a nuclear facility located in Apollo, Penn-
sylvania. DOE estimated that this much uranium could make at
least four or five nuclear weapons. Although investigations
were conducted, the uranium was never accounted for.
The Federal Government has generally remained silent
about the incident. Information that has become known over
the years has been vague and inconsistent. With the current
high interest in assuring adequate safeguards over nuclear
materials, speculation about the incident has surfaced again.
Many allegations concerning the unaccounted for material and
the PUNE; facility have been made in newspaper and magazine
articles and at congressional hearings. 'These allegations
include:
--The material was illegally diverted to Israel by NUMEC
management for use in nuclear weapons.
--The material was diverted to Israel by NUMEC management
with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).
--The material was diverted to Israel with the acquies-
cence of the United States Government.
--There has been a cover-up of the NUMEC incident by
the United States Government.
1/The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was formerly responsible
for both regulating and promoting all nuclear activities in
the United States, On January 19, 1975, it was split into
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NBC) and the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration (ERDA). WIC became
responsible for nuclear regulation and ERDA became respon-
sible for nuclear development and promotion. Under Public
Law 95-91, ERDA's functions were placed in the Department
of Energy effective October 1, 1977. NRC remained intact.
Throughout the report, DOE is used to refer to the Depart-
ment of Energy, ERDA, and AEC.
IR
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Efl effictals Provided us with their views on the first
alleciattor and stated that tnev had no information to sub-
stantiate any of the other:. Eased on the totality of our
inquiry, we believe that the allecations have not Peen fully
or adeauately answered.
Overall the nuclear safeguards systems In this country
have teen greatly improved as a result of the alleged SUP=
incident. attire the alleged Incident occurred AEC and its -
succeeding agencies have placed such greater levels of con-
trol requirements on private nuclear facilities like NUMEC.
There are many new requirements which include such measures
as bimonthly inventory accounting, armed guards to protect
unauthorized access to nuclear material and alarm systems de-
signed to detect unauthorized movement of nuclear material.
Nevertheless, two reports GAO recently issued 1/ cited :snot
defictencxes in our domestic nuclear safeguard' systems.
These reports point out that there are thousands of pounds of
weapons-vide material unaccounted for in this country today.
This being the case, it is critical that Che Government be
prepared to quickly and effectively respond to allegations of
loss of ncclear material to determine whether, when, where.
and how it Occurred.
The unresolved NUMEC incident raises questions on the
U.S. capability to deal with unaccounted for nuclear mate-
rials. This report discusses, within the constraints of the
data availaole to us, the scope and effectiveness of U.S.
efforts to locate the unaccounted for uranium, and the Impli-
cations the incident has for our current nuclear safeguards
programs.
This report addresses two basic questions arising from
the NUMEC incident.-
--What information has been developed about the alleged
NUMEC ellversson7
--Were the investigations by the Federal Government into
the alleged incident adequate?
With the amount of nuclear materials in this country In-
creasing rapidly, the opportunities for diversion without
1/EMD-76-l. "ShOttcomIngs In the Systems Used to Protect and
Control Highly Dangerous Nuclear Materials,' dated July 22.
1976, and EMD-77-40, 'Commercial Nuclear Fuel Facilities
Need Better Security,' dated May 2, 1917.
KitRiz
! lasso on the totality of our
inanity. we believe that the allegations have not been fully
or adequately answered.
Overall the nuclear safeguards systems in this country
have been greatly improved as a result of the alleged NUMEC
Incident. Since the alleged incident occurred AEC and its
succeeding agencies have placed much greater levels of con-
trol requirements on private nuclear facilities like NUMEC.
There are many new requirements which include such measures
as bimonthly inventory accounting, armed guards to protect
unauthorized access to nuclear materiel and alarm systems de-
signed to detect unauthorized movement of nuclear material.
Nevertheless, two reports GAO recently issued 1/ cited major
deficiencies in our domestic nuclear safeguard' systems.
These reports point out that there are thousands of pounds Of
weapons-grade material Unaccounted for in this country today.
This being the case, it is critical that Om Government be
prepared to quickly and effectively respond to allegations of
loss of nuclear material to determine whether, when, where,
and how It occurred.
The unresolved NUMEC incident raises questions on the
U.S. capability to deal with unaccounted for nuclear mate-
rials. This report discusses, within the constraints of the
data available to us, the scope and effectiveness of U.S.
efforts to locate the unaccounted for uranium, and the impli-
cations the incident has for our current nuclear safeguards
programs.
This report addresses two basic questions arising from
the NUMFE incident..
--What information has been developed about the alleged
NUMEC diversion?
--Were the investigations by the Federal Government into
the alleged incident adequate?
With the amount of nuclear materials in this country in-
creasing rapidly, the opportunities for diversion without
1/EMD-76-7, 'Shortcomings In the Systems Used to Protect and
Control Highly Dangerous Nuclear Materials," dated July 22,
1976, and E110-77-40, 'Commercial Nuclear Fuel Facilities
Need Better Security," dated May 2, 1977.
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adequate safeguards can AiAll-VnLti se. Consecuently, answers
to these midstions nr n-ortrint n orCer to insure that Cur-
rent Federal canabilltiss extst to reshond to real or suspected
incidents of nuclear material diversion.
AGENCIES INVOLVED IL
INVESTIGATING 1/ NUMEC
Originally, there were three agencies Involved in gath-
ering information on the incident. These were DOE, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the CIA. However.
Dios and the Fs/ have begun new investigations of the incident.
In February 1978 DoE began an investigation to determine what
officials in the agency knew about the alleged diversion inci-
dent. In April of 1976, at the oral request of President Ford,
the FBI opened an investigation of the NUMEC incident aimed at
determining whether a diversion of nuclear material ever oc-
curred at the facility. Both of these later investigations
are still Agoing and we have not revieweoLthese reports.
There are also Other Federal bodies that have developed
a substantial amount of information on the incident. These
are the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), NBC
and GAO. A staff member of the former JCAE compiled a lengthy
record of the events and incidents surrounding the alleged
diversion and wrote a report which was inconclusive about
whether a diversion ever occurred at the NUMEC facility. The
report was written in about 1967 or 1968. NBC issued a report
on certain aspects of the NUMEC incident in March 1978. The
NRC report, however, did not focus on the diversion question.
It was aimed at what specific NRC officials knew about the al-
leged diversion incident. GAO issued a report to the former
JCAE in June 1967 which focused primarily on NuMEC's account-
ability controls over nuclear material. In that report GAO
said it found no evidence of diversion and after considering
information available had no reason to question AC's con-
clusion that while it could not be stated with certainty that
diversion didn't take place, the survey team found no evidence
to support the possibility.
GAO's current report focuses on the allegations and infor-
mation developed since that time in attempting to answer the
1/CIA officials informed GAO that they have no authority to
conduct "Investigations' of unaccounted for nuclear mate-
rials in the United States. As used in this report the
term "investigation(s)" is used in the context of the en-
tire Federal effort to resolve the incident.
butt.
CO1162251
adequate shtick:aids can also idiYease. Consequently, answers
to these c.isrlons art, im2oriant in crcer to insure that cur-
rent Federal capabilities exist mo rescond to real or suspected
incidents of nuclear material diversion.
AGENCIES INVOLVED II:
INVESTICATIMC 1/ NDHEC
Originally, there were three agencies involved in gath-
ering information on the incident. These were DOE, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the CIA, However,
DOE and the FBI have begun new investigations of the incident.
In February 1978 DOE began an investigation to determine what
officials in the- agency knew about the alleged diversion inci-
dent. In April of 1976, at the oral request of President Ford,
the FBI opened an investigation of the NDMEC incident aimed at
determining whether a diversion of nuclear material ever Oc-
curred at the facility. Both of these later investigations
are still cadcolng and we have not reviewed..these reports.
There are also other Federal bodies that have developed
a substantial amount of information on the incident. These
are the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), NRC
and GAO. A staff member of the former JCAE compiled a lengthy
record of the events and incidents surrounding the alleged
diversion and wrote a report which was inconclusive about
whether a diversion ever occurred at the NUMEC facility. The
report was written in about 1967 or 1968. NRC issued a report
on certain aspects of the NUMEC incident in March 1978. The
NRC report, however, did not focus on the diversion question.
It was aimed at what Specific NRC officials knew about the al-
leged diversion incident. GAO issued a report to the former
JCAE in June 1967 which focused primarily on NUMEC's account-
ability controls over nuclear material. In that report Cho
said it found no evidence of diversion and after considering
information available had no reason to question AEC 's con-
clusion that while it could not be stated with certainty that
diversion didn't take place, the survey team found no evidence
to support the possibility.
GAO's current report focuses on the allegations and infor-
mation developed since that time in attempting to answer the
1/CIA officials informed GAO that they have no authority to
conduct "investigations" of unaccounted for nuclear mate-
rials in the United States. As used in this report the
term 'investigation(s)" is used in the context of the en-
tire Federal effort to resolve the incident.
LIT 40 16 eaed sT/ET
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1 .
! "rd
guestior.s of what information nas beer developed about the
aliened diverSion. and -ere the unvestigations done by the
Federal Cover nmenr, sueoua Gs .
ACCCSS TO RECORDS DIFFICuLTIRS
During our review, we were denied documents pertinent
to the NuMEC incident by the FBI and the CIA. We repeatedly
tried to obtain documents from these groups, but with no
success. A written chronology of contacts with other Federal
agencies was provided by the CIA. however, the CIA denied GAO
access to any source documents on the case. According to
^ t Agency officials, thts was a decis_on made by the Director of
us reluctance to take action against the facility in
light of continuing material control problems is questionable.
In some Informal notes we obtained from DOE's files, a former
DOE official in charge of DOE's overall investigation of NUMEC,
admitted the agency did not know whether the material had been
stolen or diverted. Yet the facility was not ordered to cease
operations, and it continued to obtain nuclear material con-
tracts. According to this official, who was a former DOE
Assistant General Manager, there was 'no good answer' as to
why these conditions were allowed to persist over the years
of NUMEC'S operation.
DOE's handling of physical security inspection reports
on the NUMEc facility by top DOE security officials also
raises some concern. Two former DOE security inspectors
told us on March 3L and April 3. 1978, that during most of
the 1960s, including the period of the alleged NUMEC inci-
dent, DOE'S Division of Security would not issue an "unsat-
isfactory" security report on a nuclear facility. According
to these inspectors the security reports had to be written
in a certain manner in order to be approved by the top secu-
rity official at DOE, the Director of Security. For example,
one security inspection report on the NLMEC facility con-
ducted on February 10 and 11, 1966, noted two 'principal'
and several 'minor" security deficiencies at the facility.
The deficiencies were significant enough to prompt the Di-
rector of Security .to visit the MEC plant to discuss the
problems with facility management. The two former security
inspectors told us, however, that the conclusion in the in-
spection report did not represent the actual findings. The
report concluded: 'During the course of the inspection
several deficiencies were discovered though not sufficient
20
1.76;tkr
C01162251
with GaC and a former Executive Director of tne JCAE, told us
that the FBI and the JCAE recommended to DOE that NUEEC's 11-
Cense be taken away and that it be prohibited from receivino
additional nuclear materials. However, they could not recall
when or how these recommendations were communicated to the
agency. (we were unable to find any record of these communi-
cations.) Further, in a letter to DOE on July 26, 1995, a
DOE official who played a key role in the investigation of
the NUMEC facility, wrote
"A if it were within my province to do so I would,
* � � stop all further deliveries of enriched uranium
to NUMEC until such time as they had straightened out
their procedures and had satisfactorily accounted for
all enriched uranium entrusted to them to date."
We found no indications that DOE took corrective action
against NUMEC based on these recommendations.
DOA reluctance to take action against the faellity in
light of continuing material control problems is questionable.
In some informal notes we obtained from DOE's files, a former
DOE official in charge of DOE's overall investigation of NUMEC,
admitted the agency did not know whether the material had been
stolen or diverted. Yet the facility was not ordered to cease
operations, and it continued to obtain nuclear material con-
tracts. According to this official, who was a former DOE
Assistant General Manager, there was 'no good answer as to
why these conditions were allowed to persist over the years
of NUMEC's operation.
DOE's handling of physical security inspection reports
on the NUMEC facility by top DOE security officials also
raises some concern. Two former DOE security inspectors
told us an March 31 and April 3, 1978, that during most of
the 1960s, including the period of the alleged NUMEC inci-
dent, DOE's Division of Security would not issue an "unsat-
isfactory" security report on a nuclear facility. According
to these inspectors the security reports had to be written
in a certain manner in order to be approved by the top secu-
rity official at DOE, the Director of Security. for example,
one security inspection report on the NUMEC facility con-
ducted on February 10 and 11, 1966, noted two 'principal"
and several "minor" security deficiencies at the facility,
The deficiencies were significant enough to prompt the Di-
rector of Security to visit the NUMEC plant to discuss the
problems with facility management. The two former Security
inspectors told us, however, that the conclusion in the in-
spection report did not represent the actual findings. The
report concluded: "During the course Of the inspection
Several deficiencies were discovered though not Sufficient
"21khres.
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to seriously detract from the otherwise satisfactory asoects
of the security program * * "." However, three former DOE
security investigators, including the former Deputy and Assist-
ant Directors of Security, told us that the entire NUMEC secu-
rity program was inadequate.
We were unable to discuss this matter with the former
Director of Security due to his current 1_1 health.
we were told by the former DOE security inspector for the
NUMEC facility that during the February 1966 physical security
inspection at MIMEO he identified some unusual circumstances
regarding the control of nuclear material held by NOME. Al-
though this individual was not familiar with the material ac-
counting practices, the circumstances led him to believe that
an amount of highly enriched uranium about equal to the amount
unaccounted for from the NUMEC facility might have been erro-
neously shipped to Prance. This former inspector became so
concerned iibout the matter that he attempLed to report it to
the former Director of Security upon returning from the in-
spection. However, according to this individual and his former
supervisor, the Director of Security told his to "get out of
his office and not pursue the matter any further. According
to both these individuals, the entire matter was suppressed
and was never considered by top DOE security officials. Ac-
cording to Doe officials, as it later developed an authorized
Shipment of highly enriched uranium was sent to France and was
identified by DOE inspectors as being an that country.
since NUMEC was both a DOE contractor and a licensee.
the facility's nuclear activities were split between DOE's
conflicting regulatory and promotional responsibilities.
These conflicting responsibilities may have affected DoE's
conclusion about the alleged diversion incident. DOE devel-
oped a 'theory" about vaat happened to the material, even
though DOE had no conclusive information showing that a di-
version did or did not occur at the NONCE plant. Moreover.
at a top level staff meeting on February 24, 1966, a former
Assistant General Manager of AEC advised the members of the
former AEC that:
"" � � it would be theoretically possible to ship mate-
rial abroad in excess of the amounts indicated in the
company's records." And that "* � * the AEC material
accountability system night not reveal a deliberate
and systematic attempt to divert material * � *.'
Further. 3 days after AEC was advised of the possibility of
a diversion, they briefed the PHI and, according to the former
agent in charge of the investigation, Presented a convincing
C51162LS1
to seriously detract from the otherwise satisfactory aspects
of the security program � � * . " However, three former PDC
security investigators, including the former Deputy and Assist-
ant Directors of Security,
told us that the entire NUMEC secu-
rity program was inadequate.
We were unable to discuss this matter with the former
Director of Security due to his current ill health.
We were told by the former DOE security inspector for the
NUMEC facility that during the February 1966 physical security
inspection at NUMEC he identified some unusual circumstances
regarding the control of nuclear material held by NUMEC. Al-
though this individual was not familiar with the material ac-
counting practices, the circumstances led him to believe that
an amount of highly enriched uranium about equal to the amount
unaccounted for from the NUMEC facility might have been erro-
neously shipped to France. This former inspector became so
concerned About the matter that he attempted to report it to
the former Director of Security upon returning from the in-
spection. However, according to this individual and his farmer
supervisor, the Director of Security told him to "get out of
his office' and not pursue the matter any further. According
to both these individuals, the entire matter was suppressed
and was never considered by top DOE security officials. Ac-
cording to DOE officials, as it later developed an authorized
shipment of highly enriched uranium was sent to France and was
identified by DOE inspectors as being in that country.
Since NUMEC was both a DOE contractor and a licensee,
the facility's nuclear activities were split between DOE'S
conflicting regulatory and promotional responsibilities.
These conflicting responsibilities may have affected DOE's
conclusion about the alleged diversion incident. DOE devel-
oped a "theory" about what happened to the material, even
though DOE had no conclusive information showing that a di-
version did or did not occur at the NUMEC plant. Moreover,
at a top level staff meeting on February 14, 1966, a former
Assistant General manager of AEC advised the members of the
former AEC that:
a* * * it would be theoretically Possible to ship mate-
rial abroad in excess of the amounts indicated in the
company's records." And that ' � the AEC material
accountability system might not reveal a deliberate
and systematic attempt to divert material � a *."
Further, 3 days after AEC was advised of the possibility of
a diversion, they briefed the FBI and, according to the former
agent in charge of the investigation, presented A convincing
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"St. RC
case that there was no diversion or theft of material from
the NUMEC facility.
FEDSRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Our evaluation of the FBI's investigation of NEMEC was
blocked by the FBI's denial to provide us with supporting
documentation. However, based on our interviews with FBI and
Department of Justice officials, we believe that: (1) the
Flti's investigations of the incident were untimely; and (21
the scope of the investigation was limited.
From August 1965. to September 1969, the FBI developed
a substantial amount of information on the actions and asso-
ciates of NUNEc's president. According to the FBI investiga-
tors, this information was developed in response to requests
from DOE and the CIA. However, it was not until April of
1976 that the FBI began to investigate whether there was a
diversiort of material at the NUMEC plant--about 11 years
after DOE's investigation of the incident.
On Fecruary 17, 1966, DOE staff met with the FBI to dis-
cuss the incident and requested them to investigate the matter.
The FBI is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to inves-
tigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations of the act.
A diversion of nuclear material is a criminal violation of the
act; however. on February 25, 1966, the FBI informed DOE that
it would not undertake an investigation of the incident. The
question of diversion was not addressed by the Bureau again
until 1976. The former agent in charge of the investigation
stated that since such a long period of time had elapsed since
the alleged incident occurred it was very doubtful whether the
F11/ would be able to develop any evidence that would resolve
the incident.
During our review we found that the scope of the FBI's
current investigation appeared limited since they had not in-
terviewed at least eight key officials about their knowledge
of the NUMEC incident. These included a Chairman of the for-
mer AEC during the NUMEC incident; a former Deputy Director
of the CIA responsible for gathering and analyzing data on
nuclear activities in Israel during the time of the alleged
incident: the loan officer at the Mellon Bank who approved
the loan to NUMEC: a key DOE staff member responsible for mate-
rial control investigations at NUMEC; and the chief DOE field
investigator for NUMEC. These officials told us that the 727
never interviewed them about the NUMEC incident. Two individ-
uals, the former Deputy Director of the C/A and DOE's chief
field investigator, told us that they could not understand why
the FBI had never discussed the matter with them in light of
their extensive and direct involvement.
ka��t2c2ffEL.
061162251
case teat there was no diversion or theft of materia
the NUMEC facility.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Our evaluation of the FBI's investigation of NUMEC was
blocked by the FBI's denial to provide us with supporting
documentation. However, based on our interviews with FBI and
Department of Justice officials, we believe that: ill the
FBI's investigations of the incident were untimely; and (2)
the scope of the investigation was limited.
From August 1965 to September 1969, the FBI developed
a substantial amount of information on the aGtinns and Asso-
_olates_of NUMMC's president. i
1
F-Rove-tier, it was not until April'ol
1976 that the FBI began to investigate whether there was a
diversion, of material at the M.= plant--about 11 years
after DOE's investigation of the incident.
On February 17, 1966, DOE staff met with the FBI to dis-
cuss the incident and requested them to investigate the matter.
The FBI is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to inves-
tigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations of the act.
A diversion of nuclear material is a criminal violation of the
act; however, on February 25, 1966, the FBI informed DOE that
it would not undertake an investigation of the incident. The
question of diversion was not addressed by the Bureau again
until 1976. The former agent in charge of the investigation
stated that since such a long period of time had elapsed since
the alleged incident occurred it was very doubtful whether the
FBI would be able to develop any evidence that would resolve
the incident.
During our review we found that the scope of the FBI's
current investigation appeared limited since they had not in-
terviewed at least eight key officials about their knowledge
of the NUMEC incident. These included a ChailMan_of the Ler
met AEC during the NUMEC incident)
[ [the loan officer at the Mellon Bank who approved
the loan to NUMEC; a key DOE staff member responsible for mate-
rial control investigations at NUM; and the chief DOE field
investigator for NUMEC. These officials told us that the FBI
never interviewed them about the NUMEC incident.
, DOE 's chief
field investigator, told us that they could not understand why
the FBI had never discussed the matter with them
22
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C61162251 -11.61143,
In the FBI briefing we received on Octooei E, 1977. we
learrAO of another limitation in the scope of the rbi.s cur-
rent investigation. The former agent it charge 0: SSC FEI's
investigation told Us tnat the FBI did not investigate tne
source of funds for NUMEC's payment for the missino nuclear
material. Although he saw this as an important aspect of the
investigation�since Numee's financial position did not ap-
pear to support such a loan--it was not pursued because the
FBI anticipated legal difficulties in getting the appropriate
hank records. However, we obtained much of the data simply
by requesting it from the responsible bank official over the
telephone. Although the information we obtained did not re-
veal any peculiarities in NUMEC's financial dealings, it did
serve to further demonstrate the limited scope of the FBI's
investigation of the incident.
The FBI's efforts to effgctively investigate the incident
have also been impeded by its lack of technical expertise in
dealing /ith nuclear facilities such as NuMeC. This is par-
ticularly significant since the Atomic gAergy Act requires
that the FBI investigate such occurrences. According to the
former agent in charge of the investigation at the FBI, the
Fiar is not competent to do the type of investigation needed
to determine the causes of unaccounted for nuclear material
without expert assistance. Consequently, he did not think
the FBI could ever conduct effective diversion-type investi-
gations without relying heavily on DOE or NRC for technical
assistance and guidance.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
From interviews with a former CIA official and with for-
mer and current officials and staff of Me and the FBI we con-
cluded that the CIA did not fully cooperate with DOE or the
FBI in attempting to resolve the UMW matter. Although CIA
officials told us that they believe they did fully cooperate
with DOE and the FBI, it appears to us that the C/A was reluc-
tant to provide information which could have been helpful to
the domestic investigation because of Its concern about pro-
tecting its 'sources and methods' of information.
E.0.13526 I
21
11.134tEal
CM62251
In cite FBI briefing we received on OctOper 6, 1177, we
learned of another limitation in the scope of tre 5EI's cur-
rent investigation. The former agent in charge of the FBI's
investigation told us that the FBI did not investigate tne
source of funds for NUMEC's payment for the missing nuclear
material. Although he saw this as an important aspect of the
investigation�since NUMEC's financial position did not ap-
pear to support such a loan--it was not pursued because the
FBI anticipated legal difficulties in getting the appropriate
bank records. However, we obtained much of the data simply
by requesting it from the responsible bank Official Over the
telephone. Although the information we obtained did not re-
veal any peculiarities in NUMBC's financial dealings, it did
serve to further demonstrate the limited scope of the FBI's
investigation of the incident.
The FBI's efforts to effectively investigate the incident
have also been impeded by its lack of technicar expertise In
dealing isith nuclear facilities such as NEMEC. This is par-
ticularly significant since the Atomic energy Act requires
that the FBI investigate such occurrences. According to the
former agent in charge of the investigation at the FBI, the
FBI is not competent to do the type of investigation needed
to determine the causes of unaccounted for nuclear material
without expert assistance. Consequently, he did not think
the FBI could ever conduct effective diversion-type investi-
gations without relying heavily on DOE or NRC for technical
assistance and guidance.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
From interviews with a former CIA Official and with for-
mer and current Officials and staff of DOE and the FBI we con-
cluded that the CIA did not fully Cooperate with DOE Or the
FBI in attempting to resolve the NUMEC matter. Although CIA
officials told us that they believe they did fully cooperate
with DOE and the FBI, it appears to us thmt_the CLA.Was_reinc-
tent tO provide Anfordat-i
23
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cc: 16225: 25X1. F.0.13526
According to the CIA, a briefing similar to that provided
to the FBI in May 1977 was provided to certain key DOE offi-
cials on July 29. 1977. those present at the meeting are no
longer with DOE and have not been interviewed by CAO. However.
we interviewed several former officials, including a Chairman
of AEC and two other Commissioners at AEC during the time Pe-
riod 1965-1972, who told us that they were not aware that such
information ex ie tad even though several individuals agreed
that it would have been important information to have at that
[time
Further, we were told by two former CIA officials. a
former Deputy Director of Science and Technology, and an in-
dividual who did not wish to be identified, of the existence
of internal reports discussing the alleged NUKEC diversion.
The Deputy Director was one of the five highest ranking offi-
cials in the CIA at the time of the NI. NEC incident and re -
Ported directlt to the Director of the Crd on the Menet" I 1
I Officials
-c7iTiWy�E�Cir, Ire Thi-SUPIEC matter at the CIA told us that
they have been Unable to Identify or find any Such documents.
Yet the two individuals who told us about the documents said
they assisted in preparing them. DOE and FBI representatives
we questioned said they were not aware of the existence of
the documents. The appearance of the January 28, 1978, news-
paper article discussed on pages 14, 17. and IS of this report.
leads us to believe that the CIA was less than forthright in
dealing with us and the FBI. The CIA disagrees with this
opinion.
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Col 16225i
-.seant
125XLEDA3526 CHAPTER 4
01iERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
N4 ER A DIVERSION OccDARED AT NUMEC
NS TO BE_ANSRERED
Although large amounts of circumstantial information have
been developed by DOE, the Fat, and the CIA on this incident.
these agencies did not provide any information, nor did we in-
dependently identify any, that would conclusively show that a
diversion of material occurred at the NUMEC facility. Conse-
quently, whether or not such an incident occurred is still
deoatable. .
DOE has taken the position that it has no conclusive
evidence that a dtversion of nuclear material ever occurred
at the NUMEC facility, although it cannot deny such a posSi-
bility.
DOE supports the theory that the nuclear material unac-
counted for from NDMEC was caused by inadequate inventory
management. All current and former DOE officials we inter-
viewed, except one, agreed with this theory. On the other
hand, many of these same officials also agreed that the facil-
ity was sufficiently unable to control its nuclear materials
so that a diversion could have been carried out.
Fa/ agents involved in the investigation believe that
there is a substantial amount of information which tends
to support the diversion theory. However, it is circumstan-
tial in nature. The FBI is still investigating the matter.
The data which was made available to us by a former CIA
official
the understanding that NumeC was tErriXTirlarricey" source Of
I left us with some of the nuclear material that was diverted to Israel. How-
ever, during the course of our work, CIA appeared to change
its opinions on the matter and told GAO that It had no data to
specifically support such a conclusion. I
( The
newspaper article of aanuary 28, 1978, seemed to confirm this.
Current CIA officials told us that the former officials were
drawing on Memory as they recalled past events. The CIA offi-
cials who have current access to the files have advised us
that a search of the available data reveals a "semantic" prob-
lem concerning the use of the term 'evidence.' In short, CIA
states there is no 'beta evidence' of a diversion from NUMEC
to Israel_ At the same time current C/A officials admit
25X1, F..0.13526
CO1162251 ejani
CHAPTER 4
OiSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
WHETHER A DIVERSION OCCURRED AT NUMEC
RE'utINS TO BE ANSWERED
Although large amounts of circumstantial information have
been developed by DOE, the FBI, and the CIA on this incident,
these agencies did not provide any information, not did we in-
dependently identify any, that would conclusively show that a
diversion of material occurred at the NUMEC facility- Conse-
quently, whether or not such an incident Occurred is still
debatable. �
DOE has taken the position that it has no conclusive
evidence that a diversion of nuclear material ever occurred
at the NUMEC facility, although it cannot deny such a possi-
bility. $
' DOE supports the theory that the nuclear material unac-
counted for from NUmEC was caused by inadequate inventory
management. All current and former DOE officials we inter-
viewed, except one, agreed with this theory. On the other
hand, many of these same officials also agreed that the facil-
ity was sufficiently unable to control its nuclear materials
so that a diversion could have been carried out.
FBI aaents involved in the investigation believe that
there is a substantial amount of information which tends
to Support the diversion theory. However, it is circumstan-
tial in nature. The FBI is still investigating the matter.
;gar
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"rirst.z.
aenLlen6 eezn. when ccuoted vith past recollections of events,
coLld YDr-er officials to speak in terms of "linking" tht
unEczo.:nt.,f -�zerial from NUMEC to nuclear developments in
Israel.
NRC. In a Feoruaty 1978 report related to the SUMEC Inci-
dent. concluded that tOeir Previous official position of "no
evidence" to support a diversion may need to be reconSidered
in light of the many uncertainties surrounding the incident.
DOE stated that it had no evidence to indicate that a
diversion of nuclear material had occurred. We believe that
the agency could have been much more tentative in its conclu-
sions on the matter, instead of informing the public and Gov-
ernment officials that there was no need for concern about a
possible diversion of weapons-grade material from the NUMEC
facility.
Moreover, we believe that the FBI apd CIA may have al-
ready collected Information which, if added to data held by
DOE, could provide a more definitive answer to the question
of whether a diversion did occur. Until all information held
by these organizations can be consolidated and reviewed in its
entirety, a complete evaluation providing authoritative answers
to the questions Surrounding the NUMEC diversion cannot be ob-
tained.
FEDERAL MECRANISMS TO COORDINATE
INVENTIGATI00-1 MISSING NUCLEAR
It is essential that the nuclear safeguards systems em-
ployed by the United States be continually monitored and im-
proved as weaknesses in it are identified. Overall, the
safeguards systems in this country have been greatly improved
as a result of the alleged NUMEC incident. Since the alleged
incident OCCUrted AEC ar.d its succeeding agencies have placed
mucn greater levels of control requirements on private nuclear
facilities like NUMEC. There are many new requirements which
include such measures as bimonthly inventory accounting, armed
guards to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear material and
alarm systems designed to detect unauthorised movement of nu-
clear material. Nevertheless, two recent Ga0 reports pointed
out significant shortcomings in the ability of Government and
commercial nuclear facilities to adequately monitor and control
nuclear materials with current accountability systems. These
reports pointed out that due to tinitatiotta in the state-of-
the-art of measurement instrumentation, diversions Of nuclear
material from a U.S. facility can still occur and would prob-
ably not be discovered in a timely manner-.
001162251
?et7ffir
:4RC, in a February ISM report related to the NUMEC inci-
dent, concluded that their OCOVLOUS official position of "no
evidence" to support a diversion may need to be reconsidered
in light of the many uncertainties surrounding the incident.
DOE stated that it had no evidence to indicate that a
diversion of nuclear material had occurred. We believe that
the agency could have been such more tentative in its conclu-
sions on the matter, instead Of informing the public and Gov-
ernment officials that there was no need for concern about a
possible diversion of Weapons-grade material from the NUMEC
La cility.
FEDERAL MECHANISMS TO COORDINATE
INVESTIGATIONS-bp MISS/NC NUCLEAR
MATERIAL ARE LACKING
It is essential that the nuclear safeguards Systems em-
ployed by the United States be continually monitored and im-
proved as weaknesses in it are identified. Overall, the
safeguards systems in this country have been greatly improved
as a result of the alleged NUMEC incident. Since the alleged
incident occurred AEC and its succeeding agencies have placed
much greater levels of control requirements on private nuclear
facilities like NUMEC. There are many new requirements which
Include such measures as bimonthly inventory accounting, armed
guards to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear material and
alarm systems designed to detect unauthorized movement of nu-
clear material. Nevertheless, two recent GAO reports pointed
out significant shortcomings in the ability of Government and
commercial nuclear facilities to adequately monitor and control
nuclear materials with current accountability systems. These
reports pointed out that due to limitations in the state-of-
the-art of measurement instrumentation, diversions of nuclear
material from a U.S. facility can still occur and would prob-
ably not be discovered in a timely manner.
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Ina . :,aidart and its atsociated 13-year investigation
h run 1 .s nt this :pantry's current inability to effectively deal
ae(ri-ns of nuclear material. The combined
capanilitLes of 00E. FBI. and CIA were never directed at all
the factors involved in the alleged diversion. The institu-
tional barriers existing among these agencies may have Pre-
vented it. Each agency did "its own thing," to the detriment
of a unified, comprehensive investigation. A formal coordi-
nated interagency plan agreed upon plan Is needed to focus
the combined capabilities of these agencies in a more timely
and effective manner. The agreed upon plan should focus on
(1) an adequate detection and investigative system and (2) a
reporting system to the appropriate congressional committees
and to the President. As a result, if a similar incident were
to occur teday, this country may not be assured of any better
investigation. The United states needs to improve Its efforts
for effectively responding to and investigating incidents of
missing or unaccounted for weapons-grade nuclear materials.
in view of increasing terrorist activities throughout the
world, the ability to respond and investigate such incidents
should be of concern to national security and the public
health and safety. We believe a timely, concerted effort On
the part of these three agencies would have greatly aided and
possibly solved the NUHEC diversion questions, if they desired
to do so.
While incidents of unaccounted for material have been
experienced in the past, there ham not been another incident
involving public allegations such as those at NUMEC. We be-
lieve this can possibly be attributed to the increased empha-
sis tine Government has placed on protective measures against
diversions or thefts but it may also be due to a little good
luck in that people may have not tried to do it.
REcommENDATIONS To THE HEADS OF AGENCIES
GAO recommends that the heads of POE, Nee, the Depart-
ment of Justice, and the CIA, as part of their responsibil-
ities for the national security of the cotntry establish a
plan for coordinated interagency action which focuses on a
nuclear safeguards system that adequately detects, investi-
gates, and reports to tale Congress and the President on thefts
or diversions of nuclear materials. The plan which should be
submitted to the Congress within 90 days or less of the issu-
ance of this report, should include
--a formal means for a timely determination of whether
a loss has occurred;
--a clear and direct channel of communications between
the agencies;
...se276RIL
001162251
in. LEO incident and its associated 13-year investigation
hicoliont t'aie country's current inability to effectively deal
este 7osElie C aiaions of nuclear material. The combined
capabilities of ODE. FBI, and CIA were never directed at all
the factors involved in the alleged diversion. The institu-
tional barriers existing among these agencies May have pre-
vented it. Each agency did 'its own thing, to the detriment
of a unified, comprehenSiVe investigation. A formal coordi-
nated interagency plan agreed upon plan is needed to focus
the combined capabilities of these agencies in a more timely
and effective manner. The agreed upon plan should focus on
(1) an adequate detection and investigative System and (2) a
reporting system to the appropriate congressional committees
and to the President. As a result, if a similar incident were
to occur today, this country may not be assured of any better
investigation. The United States needs to improve its efforts
for effectively responding to and investigating incidents of
missing or unaccounted for weapons-grade nuclear materials.
In view of, increasing terrorist activities throughout the
world, the ability to respond and investigate such incidents
should be of concern to national security and the public
health and safety. We believe a timely, concerted effort on
the part of these three agencies would have greatly aided and
possibly solved the NUMEC diversion questions, if they desired
to do so.
While incidents of unaccounted for material have been
experienced In the past, there has not been another incident
involving public allegations such as those at NUMEC. We be-
lieve this can possibly be attributed to the increased empha-
sis the Government has placed on protective measures against
diversions or thefts but it may also be due to a little good
luck in that people may have not tried to do it.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE READS OF AGENCIES
GAO recommends that the heads of DOE, NRC, the Depart-
ment of Justice, and the CIA, as part of their responsibil-
ities for the national security of the country establish a
plan for coordinated interagency action which focuses On a
nuclear safeguards system that adequately detects, investi-
gates, and reports to the Congress and the President on thefts
or diversions of nuclear materials. The plan which should be
submitted to the Congress within 90 days or leas of the issu-
ance of this report, should include
--a formal means for a timely determination of whether
a loss has occurred;
--a clear and direct channel of communications between
the agencies;
27
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--a formal means far ranidlv focusing the abilities Of
these agencies on the resolution of a diversion insi-
dent: and
--a means for allowing any incident involving the theft
or diversion of nuclear material to be definitely re-
solved to the satisfaction of the Congress and the
President.
We also recommend that the Attorney General, working with
the FBI, take the lead In establishing the interagency plan
since the FBI, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is respon-
sible for investigating incidents involving the diversion or
theft of nuclear materials.
RECOMMENDATION TO TRE CONGRESS
The committees of Congress having jurisdiction for domes-
tic nuclea9 safeguards should
--review the nuclear safeguards plan to be submitted by
the Executive Branch to assure that an adequate system
is developed which deters and investigates thefts or
diversions of nuclear materials.
--request that the FBI and DOE's Office
General complete their investigations
cadent as soon as possible and submit
the committees.
These reports should be reviewed to determine
the investigations and their implications for
more effective future system.
The committees should note that with the passage of time
it is difficult to conclusively determine what specifically
happened at NumEC. However, the important point to remember
is that we should use this lesson and make certain that the
Nation develops an adequate detection and follow-up system to
deter future nuclear thefts or diversion.
of Inspector
of the NUMEC in-
their reports to
the adequacy of
developing a
AGENCY COMMENTS
DOE's comments on the report are contained in a letter
dated July 25, 1978. (See appendix II.) DOS agreed with the
thrust of the report. However, it disagreed with our recom-
mendation concerning the need to enter into a formal intera-
gency agreement with NRC, the FBI, and the CIA for more timely
and effective action in investigating incidents of suspected
or real diversions of nuclear materials. DOE states in its
letter that a comprehensive plan and a memorandum of
23
E.T..
nii62251
--a formal means for raoidlv focusing the abilities of
these agencies on the resolution of a diversion inci-
dent; and
--a means for allowing any incident involving the theft
or diversion of nuclear material to be definitely re-
solved to the satisfaction of the Congress and the
President.
We also recommend that the Attorney General, working With
the 551, take the lead in establishing the interagency plan
since the FBI, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is respon-
sible for investigating incidents involving the diversion or
theft of nuclear materials.
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS
The committees of Congress having jurisdiction for domes-
tic nucleajr safeguards should
--review the nuclear safeguards plan to be submitted by
the Executive Branch to assure that an adequate system
is developed which deters and investigates thefts or
diversions of nuclear materials.
--request that the FBI and DOE's Office
General complete their investigations
cident as soon as possible and submit
the committees.
These reports should be reviewed to determine
the investigations and their implications for
more effective future system.
The committees should note that with the passage of time
it is difficult to conclusively determine what specifically
happened at NOMEC. However, the important point to remember
is that we should use this lesson and make certain that the
Nation develops an adequate detection and follow-up system to
deter future nuclear thefts or diversion.
of Inspector
of the MIMEO in-
their reports to
the adequacy of
developing a
AGENCY COMMENTS
DOE's comments on the report are contained in a letter
dated July 25, 1978. (See appendix II.) DOE agreed with the
thrust of the report. However, it disagreed With our recom-
mendation concerning the need to enter into a formal intera-
gency agreement with NRC, the FBI, and the CIA for more timely
and effective action in investigating incidents of suspected
or real diversions of nuclear materials. DOE states in its
letter that a comprehensive plan and a memorandum of
sth
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understanding with the FB/ already existed for 305nt responses
to nuclear threat situations. Further, DOE stated that it has
open channels of communication to otter heencies, Inca ud in.
the CIA, for the exchange of information pertinent to nuclear
threat situations.
These factors were known to us and are commendable. The
current memorandum of understanding between DOE and the FBI
is the beginning of an effective response plan to incidents
of nuclear diversion, out it is inadequate since it does not
include CIA participation and cooperation. Without a formal
interagency agreement placing positive reporting and investi-
gative responsibilities on DOE, NRC, FBI, and the CIA along
the lines recommended by GAO, we believe the possibility
exists for a Cetetition of the 1I-year Bruise investigation.
The comments received from the CIA are contained in a
letter dated September 1, 1978. (See appendix III.) The
letter takes no issue with the facts or recommendations in-
cluded in the report. It does, however, Stint out some CIA
concerns about certain information in the report.
We believe that the CIA's concerns have been adequately
addressed in the report. However, we did not specifically
address the CIA's concerns regarding its degree of coopera-
tion with DOE and the FBI on the alleged HUNEC incident.
In its letter the CIA disagreed with the statement in
the report indicating that they failed to cooperate with DOE
and the FBI. The CIA based the disagreement on the fact that
its officials briefed a large number of officials in the exec-
utive and legislative branches of Goverrunent on the NUMEC mat-
ter in 1976 and 1977.
We were aware that such briefings wese provided. How-
ever, we believe that since the briefings were provided 4 to
6 years after some of the key information was developed their
utility in he loin� to resolve the NOW matter was greatly
diminished.
ITSXI.E.0.1392-61
This iniormation WAS not passed on to WOE Or the FBI accord-
ing to the officials we contacted in those agencies. However
we believe it must be pointed out that the current officials
we interviewed said that such documents were not known to
exist within the CIA.
The Department of Justice and the FBI did not furnish
formal written comments. We provided them more than 3 months
to do so, a time period longer than that provided DOE, CIA,
and NRC. while we did not have the benefit Of official
29
S1SRES
001162251
understanding with the FBI already existed for joint responses
to nuclear threat situations, Further, DOE stated that it ha:
open channelS of communication to other aaenc Les includinc
the CIA, for the exchange of information pertinent to nuclear
threat situations.
These factors were known to as and are commendable. The
current memorandum of understanding between DOE and the PHI
is the beginning of an effective response plan to incidents
of nuclear diversion, but it is inadequate since it does not
include CIA participation and cooperation. Without a formal
interagency agreement placing positive reporting and investi-
gative responsibilities on DOE, WAG, FBI, and the CIA along
the lines recommended by GAO, we believe the possibility
exists for a repetition of the 13-year NUMEC investigation.
The comments received from the CIA are contained in a
letter dated September 1, 1978. (See appendix Ind The
letter takes no issue with the facts or recommendations in-
cluded in the report. It does, however, Pint out some CIA
concerns about certain information in the report.
We believe that the CIA's concerns have been adequately
addressed in the report. However, we did not specifically
address the CIA's concerns regarding its degree of coopera-
tion with DOE and the FBI on the alleged NUMEC incident.
In its letter the CIA disagreed with the statement in
the report indicating that they failed to cooperate with DOE
and the FBI. The CIA based the dimagreement on the fact that
its officials briefed a large number of officials in the exec-
utive and legislative branches of Government on the NUMEC mat-
ter in 1976 and �977.
We were aware that such briefings were provided. How-
ever, we believe that since the briefings were provided 4 to
6 years after some Of the key information was developed their
Utility in helping to resolve the NUMEC matter was greatly
F
The Department of Justice and the FBI did not furnish
formal written comments. We provided them More than 3 months
to do so, a time period longer than that provided DOE, CIA,
and NRC. While we did not have the benefit of official
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written comments from the Department of justice and the FBI
in preparing the final report, we did csnsider the views and
comments of the FBI staff familiar with the alleged NUFEC
Incident.
NRC had no comment on the content of the report. How-
ever, the Commission did state that the recommendations to
the Heads of Agencies appears reasonable. (See aPPenSia
CO1162251
�ciet.71
written comments from the Department of Justice and the Frin preparing the final report, we did consider the views and
comments of the FBI Staff familiar with the alleged NUNN
incident.
NRC had no comment on the content of the report. How-
ever, the Commission did state that the recommendations to
the Heads of Agencies appears reasonable. (See appendix IV.)
�SART-I
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CHAPTER 5
SCOPE OF REVIErf
we obtained the Information contained in this report by
reviewing documents, reports, correspondence, and ether rec-
ords of the former AEC and ERDA, and DOE and NRC. We also
interviewed officials at
--DOE headquarters, Washington, D.C., and Germantown,
Maryland;
--CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia;
--FBI headquarters. Washington, D.C.;
--NRC headquarters, Bethesda, Maryland; and
--many other locations across the country.
Because we were unable to obtain source documents from
some of the organizations involved in the matter, we conducted
extensive interviews with former and current Government agency
employees about their knowledge of the incident. We also in-
terviewed people outside of the Government having an involve-
ment with the NUMEC operation. Specifically, we contacted 42
former and current employees of DOE and NRC. We contacted 12
former and current officials of the Department of Justice and
the FBI, 11 from the CIA, and 20 other individuals, including
7 people that formerly worked at NUMEC. Out interviews were
with those most knowledgeable of the incident at all levels
of these organizations, including the former Chairman of AEC,
two former Attorneys General of the United States, the presi-
dent of NUMEC, former and current presideltial aides, and
FBI/CIA/DOE investigators. (See appendix I for a summary
listing of individuals contacted during on- review.)
We believe we conducted the most thorough and complete
investigation possible under the severe limitations imposed
on us by several Federal agencies.
...sreftEL31
001162251
CHAPTER 5
SCOPE OF REVIEW
We obtained the information contained in this report by
reviewing documents, reports, correspondence, and other rec-
ords of the former AEC and ERDA, and DOE and NBC. We also
interviewed Officials at
--DOE headquarters, Washington, D.C., and Germantown,
Maryland;
--CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia;
--FBI headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
--NRC headquarters, Bethesda, Maryland; and
--many other locations across the country.
Because we were unable to obtain source documents from
some of the Organizations involved in the matter, we conducted
extensive interviews with former and current Government agency
employees about their knowledge of the incident. We also in-
terviewed people outside of the Government having an involve-
ment with the NUMEC operation. Specifically, we contacted 42
former and current employees of DOE and NRC. We contacted 12
former and current officials of the Department of Justice and
the FBI, 11 from the CIA, and 20 other individuals, including
7 people that formerly worked at NUMEC. Our interviewe were
with those most knowledgeable of the incident at all levels
of these organizations, including the former Chairman of AEC,
two former Attorneys General of the United States, the presi-
dent of NUMEC, former and current presidential aides, and
FBI/CIA/DOE investigators. ;See appendix I for a summary
listing of individuals contacted during our review.]
We believe we conducted the most thorough and complete
Investigation possible under the severe limitations imposed
On us by several Federal agencies.
31
!for,�Rer
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CG1162251
APPENDIX 1
IleKt
APPENDIY. I
C01162251 �APPEND/X I
.3ryezrr
AEC/ERDA/DOE
SUMMARY LIST Of INDIVIDUALS
AEC/ERDA/DOE
SUMMARY LIST OF INDIVIDUALS
CONTACTED IN PREPARING REPORT
CONTACTED IN PREPARING REPORT
Chairman, AEC
Commissioners, AEC
staff members. AEciERDA
staff members, ODE
Director
Deputy Directors
staff members
Chairman. AEC
Commissioners, AEC
staff members, AEC/ERDA
staff members, DOE
Director
Deputy Directors
staff members
CIA
1 former
2 former
14 farmer
13 current
Current Director
General Counsel
1 former
2 former
6 cuAent
CIA
1 former
2 former
14 former
13 current
Current Director
General Counsel
1 former
2 former
6 curVent
NRc
NRC
1
former
Chairman
5
former
staff members
1
former
Chairman
6
current
staff members
5
former
staff members
6
current
staff members
DOJ
FBI
Current Attorney General
2 former Attorneys General
3 staff attorneys
3 former agents
3 current agents
VUMEC
Former President of company
Former Vice President of company
- Former Treasurer of company
Former Secretary of company
3 former employees
JCAE
2 former executive staff directors
COO
FBI
NEMEC
JCAE
Current Attorney General
2 former Attorneys General
3 staff attorneys
3 former agents
3 current agents
Former President of company
Former Vice President of company
Former Treasurer of company
Former Secretary of company
3 former employees
2 farmer executive staff directors
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001162251 APPENDUA 1 Rani:DIX
Senate Select Inteilitence Committee
I current ataEf member
Othero
001162251 APPENDIX I ep3f r 6 APPE)DIX I ,
Senate Select Intellioence Committee
1
Others
current staff member
6
former and current Presidential aides
6
2
staff members Pennsylvania Departtent of Revenue
former and current Presidential aides
and Taxation
2
staff members Pennsylvania Department of Revenue
1
1
staff member (J.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
official of Me)lon Bank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
1
1
and Taxation
staff member U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
official of Mellon Bank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
a
....sreR33
33
SFORI`T
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Department of Energy
Washington. D.C. 20545
Mr. Monte Canfield. Jr.. Director
Energy and IMnerals Division
D. S. General ACCOUetir$ Office
dashin1ton3 D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Canfield:
July 25, 1978
APPEEDI
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment 071 the GAO draft
rep ore entitled �welder Diversion in the U.S. - 11 Years of Con-
ctsdiction and Confteithi."
In our July 21, 1.975 nearing with Mr. J. Kowa= and ocher mobtra of your
staff, we discussed our =men= and cancer= kith the draft report as
uthtten. As the result of our matting, we understand that certain changes
are to be made which vi Ii poi= out that DOE has made aignificane improve-
ments in strengthening past safeguard Policies and Practices since 1965.
We also an that the report viii be clarified in other respects
consistent with our comments furnished under separate =var. However,
we are CeReereltd that the readers of the report and ice reCOMMlUdetied
sight obtain an incorrect impression of DOE's ability to respond to
threats or incidents of =enacted Or real theft or diversion of nuclear
material (5=1.
DOE responds in � very timely and effective manner to terrorises threats
and incidents of suspected or real diversions or thefts of nuclear
materials in she U.S. we have � comprehensive plan and � amaranth= of
understardies with the III for Joint responses to =clear =rear situations.
We also have clear and open channels to other agencies such as the cra and
MSC for the exchange .f information pertinent to potential nuclear theft,
alleged black market incidents involving5565, at.c. Further. We have so
arrangement with the EDI to crawl.= formal it.04rViCe training for agents
In the technical and eciincific tOphtetleettOtUl =Invent to nuclear in-
vestigations. Net has fully participated in this program. else, = have
briefed congress in some derail on veriote aspects of our emergency pre-
paredness and [tepees, program. Informetion 055 our emergency preparedness
and response program. including our formal policies end procedures. con-
tinues to be available fox review by your raluesentitixtth
34
atta.
001162251
Department of Energy
Washington. D.C. 20545
Hr. Monte Canfield, Jr.. Director
Energy and Minerals Division
U. S. General Accounting Office
Wasnincton5 D.C. 20548
Dear per. Canfield:
July 25. �978
APPENDIX /I
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the GAO draft
report entitled "Nuclear Diversion in the U.S. - 13 Years of Con-
tradiction and Confusion."
In our July 21, 1978 meeting with Mr. J. Howard end other members of your
staff, we discussed nor commas and concerns with the draft report as
written. As the result of our meeting. V! understand that certain changes
are to be made which vi 13. point out that DOE has made significant *Decal-
manta in strengthening past safeguard policies and practices sin= 1965.
We also understand that the report will be clarified in other respects
consistent with our comments furnished wilder separate cover. However,
we are concerned that the readers of the report and its recommendation
might obtain an incorrect linpression of DOB's ability to respond Co
threats or Incidents of suspected or teal theft or diversion of nuclear
material (SNN).
DOE responds in a very timely and effective manner to terrorism threats
and incidents of suspected or real diversions or thefts of nuclear
materials in the U.S. We hme a comprehensive plan and a memorandum of
understanding with the Fir for joint response' to nuclear threat situations.
We also have clear end open channels to ocher agencies such am the CIA and
MIG for the exchange of information pertinent to potential nuclear theft,
alleged black mark= incidents involving MM. etc. Further, we have an
arrangement with the FBI to provide formal in-service training for agents
In the technical and scientific sophiatications relevant to nuclei= in-
vestigations. CRC has fully participated in this program. Also, we have
briefed Congress in anise detail on various aspects of our emergency pre-
paredness and response program. Infatuation on our emergency preparedness
And response program, including our formal policies and procedures, con-
tinues to be available for review by your represeetatives.
34
With
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APPEITW1 APPENDIX It
Mr. Monte pentacle, Jr. July 21, 1978
The thrust Of the feetwamendatIOns concerning invaatinatioa of threats via
clarified dozing our discussion to apply to after-the-fact resolution of
reasons for or causes of ChtilSC indications. /t is proposed that these
recommendations be restated to snake clear that they are directed to gentles
other than DOE and nor to DOS or its ability to Investigate and respond to
threats or diversions of Stre4 in � timely and effective manner.
Si scare ly,
Fred I,. 'sober, Director
Division of CAO Liaison
Office of the Controller
35
Irani
C01162251
;;e:71-
APP:iD 'ri, 1: APPENDIX II
Cr,
1�+
Mr. Monte Canfield, Jr. July 25, 1978
(31
(1)
The thrust of the recommendations concerning investigation of threats vas 0
clarified during our discussion to apply to after-the-fact resolution of
reasons for or causes of threat indications. It is proposed that these
ceconmendstione be restated to make clear that they are directed to agencies a.
other than Dug and not to DOE or its ability to investigate and re spend to I.
threats or diversions of SW in a timely and effective manner.
cn
35
Sincerely,
Fred L.fliider. Director
Division of GAO Liaison
Office of the Controller
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001162251
APPENEITi
The Honorable Elmer Stoats
Comptroller Seneral of the united States
kashIrigson. O.C.
APPENDIX II:
I September 1976
Dear Elmer.
Sr. the period August 1977 to August 1976 CIA was In sustained con-
tact with the leneral Accounting Office (GAO) concerning its current
investigation ofeuclear materials unaccounted for from the facilities
Of the Nuclear MdterialS and Eouiprmnt Corporation AP0110,
Pennsylvania. We believe that this dialogue has contributed to GAO's
understanding of some Of the key issues that are touched on in the 6A0
report tvtled. 'nuclear Omen on in the Umited States? Thirteen Years
of Contradiction and Confusion.' Ore needs to mote. however, that the
issues that have been of primary Interest to GAO in its present investi-
gation find their origins in a complex situation that first came to the
attention of the United States Coverntent in 1965. Al a result. while
It is agreed that the nuclear material that has been unaccounted for
Since 1965 is uranium-235, it Is less clear. despite lengthy investiga-
tions and inspections conducted at different times over the pest
thirteen years by GAO. the fill and DOE. as to what actually happened
to this uranium. In view of these CircutistanCes. CIA officers have
spent a substantial 'weber of hours during several diffe-ent meetings
In, recent weeks in reviewing vdth GAO personnel a number of factual
errors and misundarstardings in the earlier versions of :he draft
report which were eventually eliminated. We find. however. that the
tone of the GAO report suggests a Inn thanforthrightapproachto the
NUMEC issue by CIA. Insofar es this agency's Mlle in this matter is
concerned. which is all that we can address, this report creates an
unfortunate as inaccurate 'rnetessical which in our view cannot be sub.
stantiated by the facts as we have been able to reconstruct them.
This judgment leads as. therefore. to >tercet In the 1011010'19 Para-
graphs on our reactions to the CAO report before it is made final.
The circurmtences surrounding the identification of nuclear
materials unaccounted for. when combined with media speculations on
Wait may have happened to this material, have generated a number of
allegations. It is Important to note, therefore. that CIA's
knowledge of those events which could in any vvey impact on these
imsPAANinG NOTICE
rim( MiritiGINCE IMAM
KM' 40.5ns israysi
36
caw.: w Signera CO lie
001162251
'bPPENTIX
The Honorable Elmer Scants
Comptroller General of tte United States
Washington, D.C.
Dear Elmer,
APPENDIX III
1 September 1978
In the period August 1977 to August 1978 CIA was in sustained Con-
tact with the General Accounting Office (GAO) concerning Its current
Investigation or nuclear materials unaccounted for from the facilities
of the Nuclear Miterials and Equipment Corporation (ROMEO) of A00110.
Pennsylvania. We believe that this dialogue has contributed to GAO's
understanding of seine Of the key issues that are touched on in the GAO
report titled. 'Cuellar Ii version in the ()rifted States? Thirteen Years
Of Contradiction and Confusion.' One needs to note, however, that the
issues that have been of primary interest to GAO in Its present investi-
gation find their origins In a complex situation that first Came to the
attention of the united States Government In 1965. As a result, while
it is agreed that the nuclear material that lies been unaccounted for
since 1965 is uranium-235. it Is less clear, despite lengthy investiga-
tions and inspections conducted at different times over the past
thirteen years by GAO. the FBI and DOC, as be what actually happened
to this uranium. In view of these Circumstances. CIA officers have
spent a substantial number of hours during several different meetings
In recent weeks in reviewing with GAO personnel a number Of factual
errors and misunderstandings in the earlier versions of the draft
report which were eventually eliminated. We find, hOwever, that the
tone of the GAO report suggests a less than forthright approach to the
N)MEC issue by CIA. Insofar as this agency's role in this matter IS
concerned, which is all that we can address. this report creates an
unfortunate and inaccurate impression which in our view cannot be sub-
stantiated by the facts as we have been able to reconstruct them.
This Judgment leads US. therefore, to comment in the following Para-
graphs on our reactions to the GAO report before it is made final.
The circumstances surrounding the identification of nuclear
materials Unaccounted for, when combined with Media speculations on
What may have happened to this material, have generated e number Of
allegations. It is irportant to note, therefore. that CIA's
knowledge of those events which could in any way Impact On these
36
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s.
I 767:1,7;17.13526-i
APPENDIX III
APPENDIX III
allegations stems fron this agency's pursuit of foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence objectives which deal with the issues of
worldwide nuclear proliferation. In short. CIA's interest in Intelli-
gente and counterintelligence matters enables it to crown< on events
in overseas areas to include the making Of estimates about the growing
capabilities of foreign countries to the nuclear arena. This situation
has been explained to the GAO investigators on several different
occasions. The GAO !spoil implies, however, that there 'On a CIA
estimate on Use alleged MIMIC diversion Witch was never admitted to
by this agency. The GAO cites a newspaper article to buttress this
paint. /
[this
brief passage was }anytime in an overall estimate on nuclear pro-
liferation worldwide. Despite the availability of this backglounn
information, the GAO report opts to leave thin inyue factually unclear.
In a policy sense the key allegations that continue to circulate
relative to the material unaccounted for are:
a. The material was illegally diverted to Israel by
MEC's management for use in nuclear weapons.
b. The material was diserted to Israel by Milt's
management with the OSOIStanCe of the CIA.
C. The material was diverted to Israel with the
acquiescence of the United States GOVernMeat.
d. There has been a cover-up of the MUMEC incideit
by the kited States Government involving a President
of the United States.
CIA. has no "hard Intelligence" concerning the allegations outlined
in subparagraph e above. It was CIA, however. which requested an FBI
Investigation as early as 1%0.1-
I Despite this historical
record, it is Implied in the GAO report that CIA failed to cooperate
with United States officials who were concerned with the MOMEC case.
Me believe the facts of the matter argue otherwise. Of particular note
in this regard is the reality that singe the NUMEC case was reopened is
1976 by Presidential direction, a large weber of officials in vie
executive and leg's/atty. branches have been briefed on 111.1PEc -related
Oan/orznefitS by CIA. Thai/OEand FBI officialswhoreceivedteaseCIA
briefings as of 1976 Stated that while more information was now
37
irtRET
25X1, E.0.13526]
601162 2 5 1 -
APPENDIX III
APPENDIX III
allegations stems from this agency's pursuit of foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence objectives which deal with the issues of
worldwide nuclear proliferation. In short, CIA's interest in intelli-
gence and counterintelligence natters enablaS it to comment on events
in overseas areas to include tine making of estimates flout the growing
capabilities of foreign countries in the nuclear arena. This situation
- has been explained_to�theGflstioators on S4Yer11 differint
accesis.
In a policy sense the hey allegations that continue to circulate
relative to the material bnaCCOUAted for are:
a. The material was Illegally diverted to Israel by
th.IMIC's management for use in nuclear weapons.
to. The material was diverted to Israel by NUMIC's
manageimmt with the assistance of the CIA.
c. The materiel was diverted to Israel with the
acquiescence of the United States Govermoent.
d. There has been a cover-up of the RUNIC incident
by the United States Goverment involving a President
of the United States.
Wiplte this historical
" --rimPrd, implied in the GAO report that CIA failed to cooperate
with United States officials who were concerned with the !MEC case.
We believe the facts of the matter argue otherwise. Of Particular note
� in this regard is the reality that since the MIMEO Cale Was reopened in
1976 by Presidential direction, a large number of officials in the
executive and legislative branches lave been briefed tio/6111ECL-
E-MiliEwOreee-LASIAw_r
37
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ApPci:niv
available or Israeli nuclear develOPenli char hvd been "6 "" In
1960, the new irforvatIon