VASYL GOGOSHA AND THE OUN/BANDERA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06882968
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2021
• Case Number: F-2021-00927
• Publication Date: May 23, 1951

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*CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .'�
:WASHINGTON. 25,
The Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Attention: Mr. W. W. Wiggins
W. G. Wyman
-7/
Assistant Director
Vasyl GOGOSAA. and the
Th.$ubjeot,io usually spells, .h PPlii
sliteration'Wasyl:GOGOSZA';''was thrice in erroiated.by members
or this organization:. The results of these three -interrogations
.,,were in brief as follows:
It was definitely established thei'i: apposHA is a- member �
f
of CYO andora,although he at first ...denied' any, Connection with that
...Organii:eitipii'and...*eVen went so far. as to perjure himself in writing.
."
b. There is persuasive documentary ev13.ence in GO3OSHAts
own possession suggesting that he is also a',membpr _of the SecuritY,
Service (Sp) of OUN/Banderal although at no time would ho admit.
membership,in that. Service:
There is no evidence that GOGOSHL wirer belonged to � , ,
. , . .
the .I4qUi0,:t4zon.: Squad,. of the SB of OUN/Bandera. .,,:,-, .. (Careful , irtvesti.,
gatiox(thi'oUghi-,other sources would lead the�interrogatork-to believe
..
that the original allegation of membership in this outlit.1.0 ' false.), . ,. ... , ._ ..
. ;_,,,,,,,,.....,...!,.,,,,,1�.,,,:...iye444;,,,,,,,,,:-...,., i, . ., . . ' ! , .... .: �, ..:1 ; i17-,:,:' Z ..;",,,..:",.!�ti.,1111:Y4,-*.i4i4itIkr.iti-rt'":
0 ' It was impossible to prove or 'disprove :theca:I:legation
made by a Ukrainian in, Germany that GCGOSHA is anti-American.
e. GOGOSIM. willfully withheld information on the OUN/Bandera
with the explanation that he was under an oath of secrecy lihich he
could not break. �
2. There are at least twenty former or active members of the
� SB of OUN/Bandera in the United States at the present time. Although
the SB is knoWi to have used extra-legal methods while investigating
or interrogating suspedEd,Soviet agents) there have been few.cases-to
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date where it was possible to pin a specific criminal activity on
any individual belonging to the SB and take court action. Since
the SB kept elaborate files and conducted investigations on Ukrainians
and suspected Soviet agents of other nationalities, no serious attempt
has ever been made by American officials in Germany to disb'and the SB.
In the past five years the SB has been chronically unable to cooperate
wholeheartedly with American intelligence representatives in Germany,
primarily because the price set by Stefan BANDERA. for complete
cooperation involved types of political recognition and commitments
to his group which no American in Germany was in a position to make,
Operating independently, the SB has upon occasion been more of a
headache to American intelligence than a boon. Nevertheless in
war-time a highly nationalistic Ukrainian political group with its
own security service could conceivably be a great asset to the United
States. Alienating such a group could, on the other hand, have no
particular advantage to the United States either now or in war-time.
3. A brief discussion of the OUN/Bandera seems pertinent here.
The OUN/Bandera is an emigre organization of anti-communist, anti-
Russian, Ukrainian nationalists who strongly favor the creation of
an independent Ukrainian state. Most of the members of the group
are Galician Ukrainians who were Polish subjects from 1920 to 1939.
Under Poland, Ukrainian nationalism became particularly strong
primarily because the Poles treated the Ukrainians as an inferior
race: the Poles brutally denied them cultural autonomy; their
chances for professional advantages were severely curtailed,
particularly in the Polish army and civil service; all manner of
Ukrainians were arrested and beaten for opposing in any way the complete
Polonization of this ethnically Ukrainian territory. The Poles
erroneously believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a
disloyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. In actual fact, all of
the Galician Ukrainians were in violent opposition to communism and
wanted above all else to be part of a liberated, non-Russian Ukrainian
state.
After 1928, persecution of the 40 million Ukrainians within the
Soviet Union also began, much along the same lines as in Poland but
more in earnest. Since the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism in the
early part of this century, the Russians have treated the Ukrainians
as a disloyal group ready to use every opportunity to free itself
from Russian domination. Polish and Russian anti-UkrainiAn policies
only served to strengthen the national consciousness of the Ukraine.
Realizing that the aspiration for national independence was uppermost
in the minds of a majority of Ukrainians, the Third Reich promised at
the beginning of World War II that the Ukrainians would be freed from
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Soviet domination and would have their awn state. This promise
accounts for the welcome the Germans received initially when they
arrived on Ukrainian territory. The German promise also accounts
in part for the tremendous number of Ukrainian deserters from the
Red Army during the early stages of the war.
The OUN, which had resembled a secret fraternity of revolutionaries
from its birth in 1929 until June 1941, now came out in the open,
seized the radio station in Lvov and announced the creation of a
free Ukrainian state. The Germans who had promised indepandence for
tactical reasons immediately arrested the perpetrators of the Lvov
broadcast, namely Stefan BANDERA, Eugene STETSKO, Stefan LENHAVSKY,
and several other OUN leaders who spent the next three years in the
Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In simple terms, the Germans
wanted from the Ukrainians only food and supplies for their armies
and forced labor for their factories. The Germans used all means
necessary to force the cooperation which the Ukrainians were unwilling
to give. Thus by simmer 1941 a battle raged on Ukrainian soil between
two ruthless exploiters and persecutors of the Ukrainian people, the
Third Reich and Soviet Russia. The OUN and the partisan army it
created in late 1942, TWA, fought bitterly against both the German0
and the Soviet Russians. The OUN extended its activity even into
the populous areas of the far eastern Ukraine where nationalism had
been partially lulled to sleep by the First and Second World Wars.
At the end of the last war many members of the OUN cams to
Western Europe in order to avoid capture by the advancing Soviets.
The OUN reformed in Western Europe with its headquarters in Munich.
It first came to the attention of American authorities when the
Russians demanded extradiOtion of BANDERA and many other anti-Soviet
Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals. Luckily the attempt to locate
these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few far-sighted Americans
who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding. From 1945 to 1948
members of OUN and of TWA arrived from the Soviet Ukraine to Western
Germany on foot. The messages they and returning German prisoners of
war brought conclusively donfirmed that the OUN and the TWA were con-
tinuing the fight against the Soviets, with the weapons and ammunition
which the retreattng German armies had left behind. Over 35,000 members
of the Russian secret police (MVD-MGB) have been killed by MN-UM
since the end of the last war. In other words the main activities of
the OUN in the Ukraine cannot be considered detrimental to the United
States.
The relationship of the OUN/Bandera in the 'emigration to the OUN
in the homeland is debatable. The three principle leaders of OUN/Bandera
have not been in the Ukraine since 1941. A decade of evolution in the
Ukraine has rendered the ideology and principles of organization of these
emigres ten years out of date. It is therefore quite understandable that
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SitlitA
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most of the members of the OUN/Bandera in the ration have been
characterised as ultra-nationalists because they think as the Galician
ainians thought prior to 1939. Since the beginning of the Korean
war the OUN/Bandera has published articles in its press which criticize
the United States rather violently for what OUN/Bandera members deem to
be a blind or non-existent policy toward the Ukrainian resistance move-
ment. The OUN/Bandera reasons that the United States government should
show some interest in an anti-Soviet nation of 40 million people within
the Soviet Union which has carried out military opposition to the Soviet
regime for the last ten years. If members of the OUN/Bandera feel any
bitterness towards the United States it is usually only for the above
reason.
4. Both Vasyl GOGOSHA and Eugen LOZINSKI have been described as
martyrs by the Ukrainian emigre press. To the best of our knowledge
Mr. LOZINSKI is a r ing member of the OUN/Bandera. At the present
time, however, there are no accusations against Mr. LOZINSKI of which
this office is aware. Nevertheless it is suggested that Mr. LOZINSKIss
baggage be inspected for printed and eographed material in Ukrainian.
If he is carrying such material, we would appreciate being informed. It
is possible that Mr. LOZINSKI too may be carrying intelligence informa-
tion on Soviet Russia of interest to this organization. The material
found in Mr. GOGOSHAls luggage was of interest and has been returned to
him in toto with the exception of one map which will be mailed to him
at Ellis Island during the week 28 May - 1 June 1951. Attached please
find two statements in Mr. GOGOSHAls handwriting, one of which denies
membership in the OUN/Bandera while the other admits such membership.
It would be appreciated if these attachments could be returned as soon
as they are no longer of interest to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
Attachments: 2
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