U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06922911
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 128
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2022
• Case Number: F-2021-00986
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985

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R-3298
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This document consists of
127 pages. CopMo. 027
of 150 copies, Series D.
C 07770 1 -
U.S.-PRC Political Negotiations,
1967-1984
An Annotated Chronology (U)
Richard H. Solomon
December 1985
RAND CONTROL NO. 503-1168
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PREFACE
This classified annotated chronology was developed to assist U.S. government officials responsible
for managing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and government analysts of the Chinese
political scene. It was prepared as part of a larger study of PRC political negotiating behavior.' The
chronology summarizes the evolution of the "normalization" dialogue between the United States and the
PRC between 1967 and 1979 and post-normalization negotiations between Washington and Beijing on the
issue of American arms sales to Taiwan. The annotated summaries of the senior-level exchanges also
document exchanges on international political and defense issues of concern to the two governments.
NOTE ON CLASSIFICATION
This report has been given the overall classification of SECRET per review and decision by the
National Security Council Staff of September 24, 1985.
� Much of the NSC-controlled original source material for this analysis, primarily negotiating records,
was initially classified TOP SECRET. The decision to downgrade the classification of this study reflects a
number of considerations: that such negotiating records, as controlled by the Department of State, are
normally handled at the SECRET level of classification; that the sensitivity of the documents has declined
somewhat with the passage of more than a decade; and that a study of these materials at the SECRET level
would be more readily accessible�and therefore of greater value�to a broader mnge of the official
community.
1 See Richard 11. Solomon, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior. 1957-1954: An Interpretive Astessment (L), The RAND
Corporauon, R-3299, December 1985 (Secret).
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is indebted to David Grits who, in his role as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia.
conceived and supported this project, and to James McCullough, Director of East Asian Analysis, for the
support his office provided throughout the research effort.
Many officials and former officials of the US. government gave generously of their time in helping
the author assemble the documentary record of U.S.-PRC negotiations. Particular appreciation is due
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; David Laux, Brenda Reger.
and Donna Sirito of the National Security Council staff; Assistant Secretary of State Paul D. Wolfowitz; M.
Charles Hill, Executive Secretary of the Department of State; and Elijah Kelly, Jr., of the Executive
Secretariat. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and General Brent Scowcroft were helpful in enabling the author to
gain access to the records of the Nixon and Ford administrations. And Professor Michel Oksenberg assisted
in assembling the key documents from the Carter administration.
Anna Sun Wynston. my research assistant, provided timely and ever-productive assistance in
assembling materials for the project; and my secretary Mary Yanokawa is due special credit not only for
typing and producing this and the other two manuscripts of this project, but also for organizing my work
effort and providing professional support throughout that effort.
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CONTENTS
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PREFACE iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Section
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Background: A Study of Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior 1
A Chronological Reference and Running History 1
Scope: A Comprehensive Summary of Senior-Level Political Exchanges 1
Phases in the Evolution of U.S.-PRC Relations 3
Use of this Chronology 5
U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984:
AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY 7
1967 7
1968 7
1969 7
1970 10
1971 13
1972 19
1973 28
1974 40
1975 48
1976 58
1977 60
1978 64
1979 75
1980 78
1981 83
1982 93
1983 106
1984 110
Appendix
A. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON U.S.-PRC NEGOTIATIONS 113 �
B. AMERICAN AND CHINESE OFFICIALS CITED IN THE CHRONOLOGY . . . . . 117
C. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE CHRONOLOGY 125
vii
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I. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND: A STUDY OF CHINESE POLITICAL NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR
This annotated chronology of senior-level political exchanges between the United States and the
people's Republic of China (PRC) was prepared as pan of a larger study of Chinese political negotiating
behavior.' At the beginning of that study, the author constructed a brief, descriptive chronology of
negotiating encounters to assist in reconstructing the record of official exchanges between senior Chinese
and American political leaders, especially those encounters related to the normalization of U.S.-PRC
relations between 1971 and 1978, and to negotiations with Chinese authorities over the issue of U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan in 1981 and 1982.
The working chronology turned out to be of sufficient value that the author was asked to prepare an
elaborated version, including extensive summaries of the substantive issues discussed in each negotiating
encounter and a review covering the period 1967 to 1984, the years in which the United States and the PRC
gradually moved away from the hostility and confrontation of the 1950s and 1960s to establish diplomatic
ties and to conduct the full range of normal state-to-state political, economic, and�in limited form�security
relations.
A CHRONOLOGICAL REFERENCE AND RUNNING HISTORY
This classified chronology is designed to assist U.S. government analysts conccmcd with the Sino-
American relationship and "operational" officials responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. China
policy and conducting negotiations with their counterparts from the PRC. It establishes a concise historical
framework for the evolution of normal U.S.-PRC relations, highlighting the primary negotiating encounters
between senior Chinese and American officials during this 17-year period and summarizing the key issues
discussed and the major policy departures put forward by each side. This chronology is the only
comprehensive survey of this negotiating record based on official documents that are now scattered among
collections held by the White House, the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense,
the libraries of Presidents Nixon. Ford, and Carter, and the Kissinger collection in the Library of Congress.
SCOPE: A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF SENIOR-LEVEL POLITICAL
EXCHANGES
It is important to define the scope of the documentary assessment this chronology is based on:
It is comprehensive, but not complete. The documents reviewed for the chronology represent
something on the order of 95 percent of the official record of senior-level U.S.-PRC political
negotiating encounters for the years covered. Some documentation has either been lost or is
accessible only with great difficulty, but virtually all critical negotiating encounters have been
located.
I See Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior. 1967-1984: An Interpretive Assessment (D), The RAND
Cotporatiort, R-3299, December 1985 (Secret).
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U.S.-PRC POISTICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1954
Some especially sensitive exchanges, particularly those of a political name, were never recorded on
paper. For example, a discussion between PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and President Carter and a
few senior officials in Washington on January 29, 1979, which concerned China's intent to "teach a lesson'
to Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia, was never recorded. Also, Chinese and American officials would
occasionally raise particularly sensitive matters while sightseeing, in dinner-table conversations, during car
rides to or from airports, or in asides at the end of formal negotiating sessions. Most of the issues discussed
in such off-the-record encounters, however, appear in subsequently recorded discussions. �
h must also be emphasized that full control over this negotiating record is rendered almost impossible
by the documentary control procedures of the U.S. government. Each relevant agency�primarily the White
House, the National Security Council, and the Departments of State and Defense�has its own documentary
control systems. The agencies normally do not exchange negotiating records, except perhaps on an informal
or "bootleg" basis. There is no central repository of this negotiating record within the U.S. government.
Moreover, within each agency there are various levels" of documentary control. For example, the
Department of State's normal secret-level cables are given fairly wide internal circulation and extensive
distribution in the field to relevant embassies and consulates, in contrast to the highly restricted "NODIS"
(no distribution) channels at either secret or top-secret levels of classification. Similarly, the National
Security Council has a "normal" system of documentary control, while particularly sensitive materials are
handled in an "outside the system" accountability control process, or in a 'really outside the system" (i.e.,
totally unrecorded) manner. The White House, in addition, has a highly controlled "back channel" system
of telegraphic communications with U.S. embassies abroad by which ambassadors can communicate
directly with the President or his National Security Adviser in a highly restricted and secure manner.
Further complicating the problem of access to the full documentary record is the fact that over time
documentary collections are dissipated, destroyed, or removed to various governmental libraries or storage
centers. As a result of the normal turnover of government officials and the limits of documentary storage
space there is probably not much more than a three- to five-year Institutional memory' of official
documents readily available to operational officials at any given time. And it has become fairly standard
practice for an administration, in its waning hours, to remove its politically most sensitive documents to the
retiring President's library or, as in the case of the Kissinger collection, to the Library of Congress, where
the material is subject to controlled access. Finally, much documentation, including transcripts of telephone
conversations, sensitive "back channel" telegraphic messages, or uncontrolled memeranda, are virtually
beyond retrieval except through extraordinary effort and highly controlled usage.
The author of this chronology gained authorized access to the record of U.S.-PRC political exchanges
in part because of the support of senior officials of the Reagan administration, in part because of his prior
exposure to most of this material as a staff member of the National Security Council during the years 1971-
1976 and subsequent work as a consultant to the NSC and the Departments of State and Defense, and
because of the support of former senior officials who, in their formal roles in the decisionmaking and
implementing process, created much of this negotiating record.
The problems of gaining full documentary control have been partially compensated for by the growing
corpus of memoirs prepared by former government officials, which draw upon their own records as well as
their recollections of events in which they participated. This chronology draws upon a fairly extensive
collection of such memoirs (set Appendix A), which have been used to check and supplement the formal
documentary record. In addition, more than 30 detailed interviews were conducted with former senior
officials involved in the development of Sino-American relations, both to check certain aspects of the
formal record and to gain the officials' impressions of the manner in which Chinese officials manage the
negotiating process�the primary concern of this project.
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NTRODUCTION 3
The chronology focuses on senior-level. Executive Branch political negotiating encounters with
PRC counterpart officials. It docs not include internal U.S. government policy deliberations; it
is largely a record of the face-to-face negotiating exchanges between Chinese and American
officials in which the policy positions of each side were formally communicated to the other.
This record is thus based largely on the English-language memoranda of conversations, the
-memcons" which are the formal and official record of negotiating encounters.2 (It should be noted that
such records, while generally accurate, are not always precise verbatim transcripts; and on rare occasions,
they have been altered prior to distribution in governmental channels because of some special policy or
operational sensitivity.)
The chronology is largely a record of senior-level negotiations by Presidents, Secretaries of State,
National Security Advisers, and Assistant Secretaries or Ambassadors acting on behalf of their principals. It
contains few references to exchanges between senior Chinese officials and Congressional delegations,
except where such encounters contain especially important political "signals." And there are limited
inclusions of press statements by American or Chinese leaders where such public material was clearly used
by the officials concerned as part of the negotiating process.
The chronology does not include detailed assessments of negotiating encounters by Cabinet-level
officials (such as the Secretaries of the Treasury or Commerce) or other senior negotiators in which the
subjects under discussion are not relevant to the political normalization of U.S.-PRC relations, management
of the Taiwan issue, or Sino-American exchanges on international political and security issues. Similarly,
the Chronology does not include much of the increasingly voluminous "middle-lever communication
between Chinese and American officials, which is largely relevant to the process of implementing policies
set by their superiors, except in instances where such communications shed light on Chinese negotiating
practices.
PHASES IN THE EVOLUTION OF US.-PRC RELATIONS
The text below puts the period covered (1967-1984) in a broader historical context of Sino-American
relations and describes briefly the periods, or phases of the U.S.-PRC political dialogue. There are distinct
differences in the political character of these periods, as well as variations in the style of the negotiating
process and the channels of communication involved.
In broadest terms, the U.S. government's dealings with the Chinese Communist movement�which
after 1949 was institutionalized as the government of the People's Republic of China--fall into four distinct
phases. The first covers the "pre-liberation" years, especially the 1930s and 1940s, when official contact
was established through the U.S. Army's "Dixie Mission" to the Communist capital of Yanan during World
War II, the Chinese Communist Party mission in the Nationalist Chinese government's wartime capital of
Chungking (Chongqing), and after the defeat of Japan in 1945, via a range of contacts with the soon-to-be-
victorious Communist authorities during the Civil War period (particularly the mission of General George
C. Marshall to mediate the Communist-Nationalist civil war).
The second phase is the two-decade period of adversarial confrontation from the founding of the PRC
in 1949 through the Korean War years, the military confrontation over Taiwan, and the Vietnam War
The Chinese counterpart officials in this negotiating relationship keep their own verbatim records of these same exchanges�but oi
course in the Chinese language. Except in rare insunccs. no effort has been made to verify that the English-language transcript of a
negotiating encounter (which is a record of the English-language presentation by the US. official and a translation into English of the
,Chinese-language presentation by a PRC official) is the same as the Chinese-language record held by the PRC.
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U.S.-PRC POLMCAL NEGOTIATIONS.1967-1�
period. During this time. U.S.-PRC official contact was maintained primarily through ambassadorial-1m
exchanges at Geneva and Warsaw.
The third phase is the period of efforts by senior leaders in Washington and Beijing (Peking)3
initiate and conduct a process of normalizing the Sino-American relationship covering the years 1967 (whi
presidential candidate Richard Nixon published an article in Foreign Affairs calling on the United States
"come urgently to grips" with the problem of the U.S.-PRC confrontation) through 1978, when Sin
American diplomatic relations were finally established.
The fourth phase of Sino-American relations begins with formal recognition and the establishment
diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, and continues to the present day.
This chronology covers the last two of these phases in the U.S.-PRC relationship. It should also I
noted that within the years 1967 to 1984 there are several distinct periods of official COMMUiliCatiC
between Washington and Beijing. From 1967 through mid-July 1971 communication was largely indirec
either through unilateral public statements and gestures (e.g. the Nixon article noted earlier, or Chairmn
Mao's reception in 1970 of American Edgar Snow atop Tien An Men on October 1, the PRC national dc
celebration) or the exchange of messages through intermediary governments, primarily the Romanian an
Pakistani. This period also covers the last two of the "Warsaw Talk" ambassadorial-level exchanges, i
which the United States and the PRC each proposed the establishment of a direct, senior-level, secur
dialogue in either Beijing or Washington.
The next period begins with National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger's historic secret trip u
Beijing for three days of direct talks with PRC Premier Dou Enlai in early July 1971 and runs up to thi
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Communications in this period were most visibly conducted
during eight more trips to the Chinese capital by Kissinger in his roles as the President's National Security
Adviser and, after September 1973, as Secretary of State, and by trips to the PRC by Presidents Nixon (in
1972) and Ford (in 1975).
There were, in addition, several important overt and coven supporting channels of communication
during these years which carried the bulk of political communications recorded in this chronology:
publicly acknowledged channel of contact through the U.S. and Chinese embassies in Paris; a secret "Path
channel" established in July 1971, involving special Presidential envoy General Vernon A. Walters (ant.
occasionally Kissinger) and PRC Ambassador to France Huang Zhen; another secret channel established ir
New York City in October 1971, when the PRC was first admitted to the United Nations, which involvec
encounters between National Security Adviser Kissinger and China's then-Permanent Representative to the
UN.. Ambassador Huang Hua. This channel was usid until China established a liaison office in
Washington in May 1973 (the United States established an equivalent liaison office in Beijing at about the
same time).
Between the spring of 1973 and March 1979, when the two liaison offices were converted into
,embassies, the bulk of Sino-American political exchanges were conducted in Washington between Liaison
Office Chief Huang Zhen and Kissinger, or during Kissinger's periodic trips to the Chinese capital. During
the Carter administration, Huang Zhen and later his successor Ambassador Chai Zemin continued to be
primary points of contact with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski. The chief of the US. Liaison Office in Beijing, Leonard Woodcock, played a key role in
negotiating the full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in the second half of 1978.
With the conversion of liaison offices to embassies in the spring of 1979, the Sino-American political
dialogue became increasingly institutionalized ("normal"), with the Department of State playing the
3 'This text uses the pin-yin form of Romani/264m of Chinese place and given names throughout. This spelling system was adopted
by the PRC as its official form on January 1, 1979. The previously used Wok-Giles spelling of the names of the Chinese officials cited
in the chronology is given in Appendix 11.
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predominant role in communications between the two governments. While periodic leadership visits at the
Presidential or Cabinet level have continued to be an important aspect of the Sino-American political
dialogue, the negotiating process has tended to become increasingly routinized at the ambassadorial level.
This was particularly the case with the 1981-1982 negotiation on American arms sales to Taiwan.
It is important to be aware of this evolving institutional pattern of U.S.-PRC communications brellicr
of the shifting bureaucratic locus of exchanges between the two governments.
USE OF THIS CHRONOLOGY
This annotated chronology has been designed to be as simple and straightforward as possible, but a
few explanatory comments on the categories used (the date of an encounter, the senior officials involved,
and a summary of and/or comments on the subjects discussed) will be helpful.
Date. The date of a particular meeting (and the time it was recorded in the source document)
represent the actual encounter at the locale where it occurred. The recording or reporting date of a particular
exchange, upon occasion, may be somewhat later than the meeting itself, but the documentary record almost
always identifies the time and date of the meeting.
In certain negotiating situations, the time difference between Washington and Beijing4 is important to
understanding the evolution of a negotiation. This is particularly so in the negotiations of December 1978,
when the United States initiated a rapid, last-minute exchange of communications between the two
leaderships to make certain that the Chinese government understood the American position on post-
normalization arms sales to Taiwan.
The relative times of negotiating exchanges being conducted via cable between Washington and
Beijing can be accurately identified by using the "Zulu" or Greenwich Mean Time notation in the date-time
group record in a particular cable.
Senior Officials. For brevity, and to minimize repetition, only last names or surnames are used to
identify the senior spokesmen involved in an encounter. Other officials are usually in the room during a
negotiating session, but their names are not noted except where these individuals actively speak in a
particular meeting. Full names and tides are noted only the first time an individual is identified in that
particular role. Thus, Kissinger is identified on October 10, 1969, as Presidential National Security Adviser,
and subsequently is referred to simply as Kissinger, except for the entry of September 26, 1973, which is his
first negotiating encounter in the role of Secretary of State. Appendix B contains a listing of the full names
of the primary Chinese and American officials cited in this chronology.
Although Chinese names are rendered throughout the chronology in pin-yin form, the original
documentary record now held by the U.S. government uses the Wade-Giles system of Roman ization for pre-
1979 memoranda of conversation and cables. Thus, Zhou Enlai is rendered as Chou En-lai in pre-1979
source documents. The Wade-Giles equivalents of Chinese officials' names are given in parentheses in
Appendix B.
Where there could be some confusion or lack of specificity in the use of a Chinese surname, the full
name is given, e.g� Huang Hua and Huang Then are both used in full.
Locale. The locale of an exchange is usually identified implicitly as the "home office" of the first
official mentioned under the "Senior Officials" heading. Thus, for example, in an entry for October 20.
4 getjing is 13 hours "ahead" of Washington during the months of Standard Time in the United States. and 12 hours ahead when the
United States is on Daylight Saving Time.
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U.S.-PRC POLMCAL NEGOTIAMONS, 19t
1971 identified as 'Zhou-Kissinger (4:40-7:10 p.m.) the meeting was held in Beijing (Zhou Enlai's
locale�) at the given hour and date in local time. When meetings occurred in a city other than Beiji
Washington, that city is explicitly identified.
Summary and/or Comments. The documentary record summarized in this chronology co
largely of verbatim transcripts of negotiating encounters, identified only by the date and time o
encounter and the participants involved. As the process of Sino-American communication be
institutionalized and politically less sensitive, particularly during and after the Carter administrz
memoranda of conversation or instructions and reports on negotiating exchanges were communicate,
official cables, with their elaborate system of time notations identifying the hour of transmission and re
of the message and document control numbers. Such notations are not usually necessary for the retriev
a document, however; the date, participants, and subject are sufficient in most cases.5
The documentary record summarized here is voluminous; these brief summaries are ince:
primarily to provide a sense of the topics discussed in a particular negotiating session and major ix
positions (and changes in position) put forward by the Chinese side�especially as they relate to i
negotiating positions on political normalization with the United States, American arms sales to Taiwan,
international political and security issues. These summaries should not be assumed to be comprehem
however. Some sessions in which exceptional important initial presentations were made of Chinese pc
positions, or changes in established positions, are summarized in detail. Subsequent sessions that re;
established policies with little change are summarized in less detail.
Where the author has judged that a particular session is noteworthy for some reason of stylt
substance, comments are enclosed in brackets to indicate that they are interpretive judgments.
$ Cable numbers were recorded in notes taken for the preparation of this chronology; and sources other than =means or cable
similarly recorded in these notes and in the chronology where it would help the user nrtrieve a particular source document.
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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984:
AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY!
Senior Officials Summary/Comments
1967
October Publication of Richard *Any American policy toward Asia must come
Nixon's Foreign Affairs urgently to grips with the reality of China."
article, "Asia After
Vietnam"
1968
November 26 PRC Foreign Ministry Proposes [i backhanded manner] resumption of
statement Warsaw talks on 2/20/69.
1969
February 28,
March 1
President Richard M.
Nixon -French
President Charles
DeGaulle. in Paris and
Versailles, France
RN: "It is vital that we have more communication
with China." [Nixon, RN. pp. 457,460-462.]
February 18 PRC cancels Warsaw Cancellation said to be in reaction to "anti-China"
talk scheduled for atmosphere created by defection in Amsterdam of
2/20/69 PRC diplomatic official Liao Hoshu.
July 21
July 24
USG announces
relaxation of passport
restrictions on travel to
PRC, allows purchases
of Chinese goods up to
$100 in value
Captured American
yachtsmen released by
the PRC
[See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 180.)
'Abbreviations and acronyms used in the chronology am defined in Appendix C
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U.S.-PRC PouncAt. NEGOTIATIONS, 196
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
August 1
August 2
August 8
September 5
October 10
November 5
Pakistani President
YallYa Khan - Nixon. in
Labatt, Pakistan
Rumanian President
Nicholae Ceausescu -
Nixon, in Bucharest
Secretary of State
William P. Rogers'
speech in in Canberra,
Australia
Under Secretary of
State Elliot Richardson
speech at American
Political Science
Association meeting in
New York
National Sccurity
Adviser Henry A.
Kissinger- Pakistani
Minister of Information
Sher All
Yahya tells PRC
ambassador to
Rawalpindi that U.S. is
ending destroyer patrols
of the Taiwan Strait as
a gesture of its interest
in normalizing U.S.-
PRC relations
November 7 USG announces
suspension of regular
7th Fleet patrols in the
Taiwan Strait
RN expresses interest in normalizing relations wit
the PRC. asks Yahya to so inform Zhou Enlai.
(Kissinger, White House Years. pp. 180-181.)
RN expresses interest in Rumania playing a media
role between the U.S. and PRC.
"We have been seeking to open up channels of
communication" with the PRC.
"The United States could not fail to be concerned .
with an ecit2lation of the Sino-Soviet quarrel."
HAK informs Sher Ali that as a gesture of the desire
to improve U.S.-PRC relations, regular 7th Fleet
destroyer patrols of the Taiwan Strait will end.
(Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1861
Source of this information: Hilaly conversation of
� 12/19/69 (see below). \/* (VW .L)
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1969
9
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
November 19 Richardson asks U.S.
Ambassador to
Bucharest Leonard C.
Meeker to ask the
Rumanians to convey to
the PRC a letter (dated
November 17) from
author Theodore White
to Chinese Premier
Thou EnLai requesting
visa
NCNA Director Hong
Kong -U.S. Consulate
Deputy Chief Harold
Jacobson
December 3 U.S. Ambassador to
Warsaw Walter
Stoessel-PRC charge
Lei Yang, in Warsaw
December 5
December 7
December 11
December 19
Stoessel - Lei Yang, in
Warsaw.
Two American
yachtsmen, held by
PRC since February 16,
are released
Stoessel invited to PRC
Embassy, Warsaw
USG announces further
easing of trade
restrictions with PRC
December 19 Kissinger - Pakistani
Ambassador to the U.S.
Agha }Maly
White tells Zhou the ferment in the U.S. is causing a
reexamination of old positions regarding the PRC; he
says his reporting would be read In the highest
political quarters," and hints that a U.S. troop
withdrawal from Taiwan could result from a change in
PolicY-
PRC official anticipates establishment of U.S.-PRC
relations; asks for U.S. ideas on how it would resolve
the Taiwan issue. Contact continues through 4/70.
U.S. proposes renewal of Warsaw talks. [Kissinger,
White House Years, p. 188].
January 20, 1970, set for next Warsaw talk meeting.
[Kissinger, White House'Years,p. 188.]
[Kissinger, White House Years, p. 191.]
ililaly informs Kissinger that the Pakistani
ambassador in Pelcing was told by Chinese officials .
that they appreciate Pakistan's "role and efforts' in
facilitating U.S.-PRC communication, and as a result
they recently released two captured American 4,
yachtsmen as a gesture. Kissinger tells Hilaly his - y
government can now inform the Chinese that the U.S.
desires serious communication with the PRC in a
more secure channel than the Warsaw talks.
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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOITATIONS.1967-
Date
Senior Officials Summary/Comments
December 23 Kissinger-Hilalylaly informs the U.S. the Chinese are willing to
resume Warsaw talks without preconditions; they a
worried about U.S.-Japan agreement and revival of
Japanese militarism. �.6
1970
January 8 Stoessel - Lei Yang
Arrangements set for resumption of ambassadorial
talks on,1/20/70; USG will not participate in a U.S.-
Soviet condominium in. Asia. [Kissinger, White Hot.
Years, p. 193.]
January 20 Stoessel - Lei Yang U.S. proposes sending a "special envoy" to Beijing I
"direct discussions" or receiving one from China in
Washington. uykr;stA (Oil)
February 18 Nixon's foreign policy [We are] "auempting to define a new relationship to:
report to Congress, the future"; "many of our basic interests are not in
Communist China conflict"
section
February 20 Stoessel - Lei Yang Lei: "If the U.S. government wishes to send a
representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy c
the U.S. President to Beijing for further explanation c
questions of fundamental principle between China an
the United States, the government will be willing to
receive him? t (Knit
February 22 Kissinger. Hilaly Haat), conveys indirect PRC message, via Yahya
Khan, of interest in direct U.S.-PRC talks, yet concert
that the USG will see the interest as derived from
weakness or fear of the Soviets. [Kissinger, White
House Years, p. 689.] (Date of this meeting may have
been 2/26/70.)
May 3
May 18
General Vernon A.
Walters - Chinese
contact in Paris
PRC cancels 137th
Warsaw Talk meeting
scheduled for 5/20/70
VAW: The U.S. has no aggressive intentions in
Indochina [despite the recent Cambodian operation];
Kissinger is prepared to discuss issues secretly wh
Chinese counterparts. -, 4.1C-n1
The cancellation is said to be in reaction to invasion of
Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese troops.
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1970
1970
11
pate Senior Officials Summary/Comments
may
0
June 20
July 3
July 10
Statement by Mao
Zedong, "People of the
World, Unite and
Defeat the U.S.
Aggressors and All
Their Running Dogs,"
issued by PRC media
Nixon - Rumanian
Foreign Minister
Manescu
Rumanian Vice
President Emil
Bodnaras briefs U.S.
Ambassador Leonard
Meeker on contacts
with China and North
Korea, and Bucharest's
views on these
countries
American Catholic -
Bishop James Walsh,
held since 1958,
released by PRC
September 7 Walters - Chinese
contact. in Paris
October 1
October 5
October 25
Mao - Edgar Snow
review PRC National
Day parade, in Beijing
Nixon interviewed in
Time magazine
Nixon � Yahya
Mao attacks "Nixon's facist atrocities" of invading
Cambodia and instituting domestic oppression;
revolution is the main world trend, and the U.S. is in a
state of fearful panic; China supports the world's anti-
US. revolutionary struggles.
Manescu briefs on Chinese views of the U.S.
1.
cfr
Bodnaras signals PRC position on U.S. troop
withdrawal from Taiwan, Mao's interest in resuming
the U.S.-PRC dialogue despite the U.S. invasion of
Cambodia.
[Kissinger, White House Years, p. 697.)
On this date, arid once earlier in mid-June, Walters
approaches PRC defense attache and says he has a
message for the PRC frt:rtm the USG. The Chinese do
not reply to the message. [Kissinger, White House
Years, p. 696.]
[Snow's Life magazine interview published on April
30, 1971.]
"If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to
go to China. If I don't, I want my children to."
6-1/4,r
RN: It is essential we open negotiations with China;
we will send a high level emissary to Beijing; we will \
make no condominium against China." 1,7 ci ( f[111.1
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12
�
U.S.MIC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. 19674954
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
October 26
November 5
November 13
November 21
December 9
December 16
Nixon - Ceausescu
(1055 a.m.-12:55 p.m.)
Zhou- Snow, in Beijing
Mao, Zhou - Yahya
Zhou - Rumanian
Deputy Premier
Gheorghe Raduleseu
Kissinger - Hilaly (6:05
Pan.)
Kissinger- Hilaly
(11:00 a.m.)
December 18 Mao � Snow
December 23 Jean Sainteny - PRC
Ambassador to France
Huang Zhen, in Paris
Nixon signals that diplomatic relations cannot be
established at the start of U.S.-PRC dialogue.
Ceausescu expresses concern about a U.S.-Soviet
condominium. At state banquet. Nixon toasts "the eN�
People's Republic of Chine k),(0411 kf"
[Snow's Life magazine interview published on April
30, 1971.]
Yahya delivers Nixon's views, as expressed ip\their
meeting of 10/25/70. cx.r1 )
Hilaly: A Nixon envoy is welcome in Beijing "in
order to discuss the subject of the vacation of the \
Chinese territories called Taiwan."Iii 7 / (y�WIS)
HA1C: The USG is prepared to begin discussions with
the PRC with a view to bringing about a higher-level
meeting in Beijing. The meeting would not be limited
to the Taiwan question; but the USG will reduce its
military presence on Taiwan as tensions diminish" in
the East Asia and Pacific region. (HAK baits the offer
with an oral statement that withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Taiwan is not a difficult problem.] IC 7o
!vi
Interview published in Life magazine on April 30,
1971. (Interview not conveyed to the White House,
(Hersh, p. 367)1
Sainteny: The USG is looking for a channel of
communication with the PRC. LZ
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1971
13
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
1971
January 11
Kissinger - Rumanian
Ambassador Bogdan
February 4 PRC Vice Foreign
Minister Qiao Guanhua
- Norwegian
Ambassador Algard
April 10-17
April 27
April 28
May 10
May 20
May 29
"Ping-pong diplomacy"
Kissinger - Hilaly
Kissinger - Hilaly
Kissinger- Hilaly
Kissinger - Maly
Zhou reply to Nixon
messages received 4/29,
5/17, and 5/22, via
Pakistani channel.
Bogdan: If the USG has a desire and proposal for
settling the Taiwan issue, the PRC is prepared to
receive a special envoy in Beijing. 4 1,,
Qiao: Despite recent U.S. escalation of Indochina
conflict (in Laos), China sooner or later must have
talks with the U.S. Taiwan is the major problem, but
China is aware of greater U.S. flexibility on this issue.
Qiao expresses interest in meeting with Kissinger. 70 c
In a direct message from Zhou Enlai (dated 4/21/71)
replying to the USG message of 12/16/70 (delivered
on 1/5/71), Zhou reaffirms willingness to receive
Kissinger. SecState, or President Nixon publicly in
Beijing.
HAK conveys RN reply to Thou saying he will soon
send full response; asks Yahya to convey his concern
that no other U.S. politicians be brought into the
official dialogue. [This message reaches Thou via
PRC ambassador to Pakistan about 5/11
RN formally replies to Thou message of 4/21/71
(delivered on 4/27/71); accepts Zhou's suggestion that
he visit Beijing for direct negotiations in which each
side would be free to raise the issue of principal
concern to its; Kissinger Tit:gild come secretly to
China for a planning visit for a Presidential trip after
6/15/71; secrecy is essential, but the Presidential trip
can be announced shortly after a Kissinger - Zhou
meeting. [Kissinger, White House Years, p. 724.)
Message to the PRC regarding U.S.-Soviet ABM
negotiation: The USG will "conclude no agreement
[with the USSR] which would be directed against the
PRC." [Kissinger, White House Years, p. 725.]
Mao welcomes Nixon's visit. In which each side
would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to
it." First crucial issue is concrete withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Taiwan. Thou welcomes Kissinger for
preliminary, secret meeting. It may be hard to keep the
visit secret. [Kissinger. White House Years, pp. 726-
727.)
'
Pod-,
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14 U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984
Date
Senior Officials Summary/Comments
June 2 Kissinger - Hilaly Hilaly gives Zhou reply to Nixon messages receivcci_
4/29/71. S/17/71. and 5121171. 7 (1/01
June 4
Nixon reply to Zhou
message of 6/2/71 via
Hllaly
RN proposes HAK visit Beijing 7/9-lint to arrange
RN trip to PRC. Secrecy essential. 7 7 Cr_1441:)
June 4 Kissinger- Hilaly HAK replies to Zhou message received 512901:
President Nixon looks forward to personal meeting
with PRC leaders. Kissinger is authorized to discuss
all issues regarding Presidential visit and a
communique. Strict secrecy of his trip is essential.
''..,
June 11 Kissinger- Maly Zhou accepts HAK secret visit on 7/9-11/71. 71 e
[Kissinger, White House Years, p. 728.] (ie-Poti
--- )
June 28 Kissinger message to *..._..._ USG will not answer Soviet government regarding
Ambassador Farland five-power nuclear disarmament conference proposal 61 A
for transmission to PRC prior to HAK discussion with Zhou; USG will J
via Yahya maintain strict secrecy of HAK visit whatever the ,
press speculation.
July 9-11
July 9
National Security
Adviser Henry A.
Kissinger in Beijing
Zhou- Kissinger (4:35-
11:20 p.m.)
First secret.trip.
IHAK: The U.S. will not collude against China. --I
Regarding Taiwan, we will reduce our forces as U.S.- \
PRC relations improve; no U.S. support for TIM. f-At4S)
Recognition of the PRC can come in RN's second k-.� e\
term. Indochina negotiations. U.S. troops might be Cr-i'414)
withdrawn from Korea in RN's second term. How thc
U.S. bureaucracy works. Zhou: To normalize, U.S. (k5
must recognize PRC as legitimate government; u
Taiwan a Chinese province; withdraw all US. forces
and installations from Taiwan and Taiwan Strait in
limited period. History of Indochina conflict. Japanese
militarism. All U.S. troops should be withdrawn fromj
LKorea.
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1971
15
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
.July 10
Zhou - Kissinger
(12:10-6:00 p.m.)
rZhou proposes he and HAK tape-record a summary of
their discussions; systematically presses on all HAK's
presentation; bxio-Pak tensions; China might be
carved up by a USSR/U.S./Japan/India coalition; the
U.S. is dragging its feet on solutions to Taiwan,
Indochina; China opposes Moscow's five-power arms
control conference as it wants to "lasso" the PRC. The
U.S. and PRC can stay in touch through periodic U.S.
visits to Beijing. HAK: Regarding normalization,
don't press events too fast; RN will complete process
in first 2 years of second term. The U.S. will seek
PRC admission to U.N. by majority, expulsion of
Taiwan by two-thirds vote. We need time between the
military withdrawal in Indochina and the political
evolution. Zhou: Don't leave a "tail" in Vietnam; we
will not invite U.S. politicians to China at this time;
July 10
July 11
July 11
Zhou - Kissinger
(11:20-11:50 p.m.)
Ye Jianying, Vice
Chairman cc? Military
Commission/ Huang
Hua - Kissinger (12:00-
1:40 a.m., 9:50-10:35
a.m.)
Zhou/Ye Jianying -
Kissinger (10:35-11:55
p.m.)
LRN should visit Moscow before Beijing.
Zhou: No need to tape-record a statement. HAK:
U.S. will not support Taiwan military action against S -
the mainland. U.S.-Soviet summit. Berlin agreement.
Zhen Bao island incident. Sino-Indian border war of
V.,1962.
Visit communique drafting: Chinese try to make it
c
appear that RN asked to visit China: attempt to limit --
scope of the Presidential visit to discussion of /.0,- 70/S-2-
normalization.
Press announcement. Presidential visit and previsit.
AA
Zhou:akmbassador Bruce not welcome; RN can come - � 1
earlier rather than later (i.e., before the Soviet
summiSCommunications via Paris secret channel:
Ambassador Huang Zhen and General i.,-Valterstpou )
expresses thanks for gifts on behalf of himself and
Mao (but not Lin BiaoRHAK:DIN wants no political. ---
visitors before his trip; proposes mutual renunciation Li
of force agreement and accidental-war agreement;
requests release of U.S. prisoners held by PRE3
ck*
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16
U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
July 15
July 19
July 2.1
July 26
August 5
August 16
Joint U.S.-PRC
announcement of Zhou
- Kissinger secret talks
Walters - PRC
Ambassador in Paris
Walters - Huang Zhen
Kissinger/Walters -
Huang Zhen, in Paris
Zhou gives interview to
New York Times
correspondent James
Reston (published on
August 10, 1971)
Kissinger/Walters -
Huang Zhen
Thou, "knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire
to visit� the PRC, has extended an invitation to RN for
a visit "before May 1972." RN has accepted. The
meeting will be "to seek the normalization of relations
between the two countries and also to exchange views
on questions of concern to the two sides."
CK- tor-)
First of Walters' 45 meetings in secret "Paris 7
channel." Thanks from HAK for his visit hospitally;
FRN wants him to visit Beijing with Ambassador I David Bruce in another presummit planning session. Cr If
Chinese say many U.S. political figures now want to
visit PRC; refusing them is difficult in wake of HAKi
p
FWahers informs KZ of Dobrynin call on HAK �1
regarding his Beijing visit. Soviets ask if RN is
prepared to visit Moscow rusg HA1C says no. )4
Regarding U.S. politicians visiting China, there is
need to keep first U.S.-PRC exchanges free of
partisanship so as not to inhibit President's freedom of
Laction.
rChinese agree to October interim visit, but refuse �1
inclusion of David Bruce "for understandable le�asons"
[i.e., Vietnam]. HAftelpresses concern over Taiwan
and U.S. 'right wing" attacks on his China visit; Cr
requests the Chinese keep their distance from .1
LAmericantleft" groups.
Zhou: U.S. China policy is changing. Negotiations
with Nixon must lead to withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Taiwan and Taiwan Strait. Not all U.S.-PRC
problems can be solved at one stroke. Japan covets
Taiwan. China will not go into U.N. if status of
Taiwan 'undetermined.* Danger of Japanese
militarism. Settlement of Vietnam war most urgent.
Soviet buildup a threat to China. U.S. forces should
withdraw from Korea.
FHAK: A Soviet proposal for agreement on preventing
nuclear war is directed at China. US. rejects the
proposal, but is prcparcd to sign similar agTeemcnt irt
with PRC. RN will no: meet with Soviet leaders
before Chinese. Indo-Pakistani conflict. Planning for
LRN visit to China.
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17
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
September 13
PRC Defense Minister Lin Biao dies in plane crash in Mongolia
September 13 Kissinger/Walters -
Huang Then
September 23 Walters - Huang Zhen
October 3
Walters - Huang Then
October 20-26 Kissinger in Beijing
October 20
October 21
October 21
October 21
October 22
October 22
Thou - Kissinger (4:40-
7:10 p.m.)
Thou - Kissinger (10:30
a.m.-1:45 p.m.)
Zhou - Kissinger (4:42-
7:17 pin.)
Amhscsriclor Xiung
Xianghui - NSC Staff
Member John
Holdridge/State
Department China
Country Director
Alfred Jenkins
Thou - Kissinger (4:15-
8:22 p.m.)
Xiung Xianghui -
Holdridge/ Jenkins
EChinese agree to HAK interim visit beginning on
10/20171. (Note the timing of this message in relation
to the Lin Biao coup attempt.]
T�Chinese delay announcement of HAK's October tripi / I444 -A
LK)
to 10/5 because of imminent US. publication of its
"two China" position on Chirep in U.N. The RN visit pe*"774/
is to seek normalization; his talks should concentrate
on this matter and not be diverted to "side issues." C' I) C...c.
Information will be given later on technical aspects of
HAK's October visit. (Stalling because of Lin Biao i
12,ffair'n
rChinese confirm HAK's October visit; traveling party *1
is acceptable as proposed on 9/13. A later reply will (7 / A f
give special plane requirements. (The Lin Biao affair
Lcontinues to delay planningn
President's visit.
ETaiwan. Japan.] ) Ct-
LU.N. Indochina. .1
A
Ty7-7 heo
r�
USG proposes a "liaison office" or "interests section"
in addition to the secret Paris channel; expanded
cultural exchanges.
USSR; arms contro )i
International issues: Korea; Japan; South Asia;
PRC rejects liaison office" as "unrealistic" and "two
Chinas" in character. Exchanges will be limited and
on private basis only. Trade is debunked as
conditional on normalization.
oe"
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18
U.S.-PRC POL/TICAL NEGOTIATIONS. 1967-1
Date
Senior Officials Summary/Comments
October 23 Zhou - Kissinger (9:05- Presidential visit.
10:05 am.)
October 24 Zhou. Kissinger (10:23
a.m.-1:55 p.m.)
Attack on the initial U.S. communique draft; Taiwan

n
October 24 Zhou - Kissinger (9:23
PRC rust draft communique; Taiwan.
-11:00 p.m.)
(10:12-11:00 a.m.) U.S. side presents second draft communique.
October 25 Zhou - Kissinger
Zhou - Kissinger (9:50- Discussion of second PRC draft.
11:40 p.m.)
October 26 Zhou - Kissinger (5:30- Communique drafting. Presidential trip issues.
8:20 a.m.)
November 20 Walters - Chinese
contact, in Paris
November 23 Kissinger - Huang Hua.
PRC Permanent
Representative to the
UN., in New York City
(10:00-11:55 p.m.)
December 10 Kissinger - Huang Hua, -
in New York City
(6:05-7:55 p.m.)
December 12 Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs
Alexander M. Haig -
Huang Hua, in New
York City
Walters passes HAK message on date of
announcement of Presidential visit, memo on state of
U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations. (it-i4J)
First use of the secret 'New York' channelando7/�
Pakistan crisis. Taiwan Independence Movement.
U.N. Secretary-General candidate. Mid* East. PRC
U.N. Mission-White House communications.
HAK:tOffers China information on Soviet troop (1
deployments against the PRC-;Isays if China helps
Pakistan and comes under Soviiet pressure, the U.S.
"will oppose efforts of others to interfere with the 0414
PRC:
Chinese agree to immediate Indo-Pakistani ceasefire,
troop pullback, and Security Council meeting. No
recognition should be given to Bangladesh. 9 //'
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1972
19
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
1972
January 3-4
January 6
Zhou - Haig (midnight)
PRC Acting Foreign
Minister Ji Pengfei -
Haig (11 a.m.)
relatio7jSouth Asia. Indochina. Haig
offers unilateral U. . support for the PRC; tables draft tAl
communique language on Taiwan issue. Haig:tIn / 0 C I
view of opposition from the "left" and "right" in the
U.S. to Nixon's China policy, "it is crucial that there (r 64�
be no public embarrassment to the President as a
result of his visit to Beijing.'-S
South Asia. Vietnam. Taiwan. Communique.
January 7 Zhou - Haig (11:45 Sino-Soviet relations. Indochina. South Asia.
pm.) President's trip. Taiwan.
January 26 Kissinger message to Details peace plan for ending the Vietnam war.
Zhou on Vietnam. via
Paris (Walters) channel
/0 C 2_
January 30 PRC reply to Kissinger Expresses support for North Vietnam and rejects
message of 1/26, via efforts to "exert pressure on the Vietnamese side on
Paris channel behalf of the United States."
January 31 U.S. reply to PRC
message of 1/30, via
Paris channel
February 6 U.S. message to the
PRC, via Paris channel
February 9 PRC message to U.S..
via Paris channel
Febroary 11 1J.S. message to the
PRC, via Paris channel
Affirms there is no "reciprocal obligation" between
China and the U.S. on Indochina, only a unilateral
U.S. "commitment" to keep the PRC informed of its
plans for ending the Vietnam war.
rOffers a secret meeting with Le Duc Tho, rumored to-1
be visiting Beijing just before the Nixon visit, to
discuss the Indochina situation "with generosity and
justice." Statement on the President's approach to his
opening banquet toast in Beijing: the need for a new
beginning; no reference to "current disputes"; no (b)(1)
LElaim of similarity of views where they do not exist. (b)(3)
� G- a sc
11
r-Notification of USG announcement on 2/14/72 of 1
easing of trade restrictions so PRC and USSR are in (
"comparable position." President will pursue policy 1) Ct7
regarding Indian Subcontinent in parallel with the
LIRC.
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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 19674984
Date
Senior Officials
Summary/Comments
February 11
PRC reply to U.S.
message of February 6,
via Paris channel
February 14 U.S. reply to PRC
message of February 9,
via Paris channel
February 16 U.S. reply to PRC
message of February
11, via Paris channel
February 21-
28
February 21
February 21
February 21
February 21
February 22
February 22
February 23
President Nixon in the PRC
Zhou - Kissinger (2:30-
2:40 p.m.)
Mao - Nixon (2:50-3:55
p.m.)
Zhou - Nixon (4:15-
5:30 p.m.)
Zhou - Nixon (5:50-
6:55 p.m.)
Qiao Guanhua -
Kissinger (10:05-11:55
a.m.)
Zhou - Nixon (210-
6:00 p.m.)
Qiao � Kissinger (935
asn.-12:34 p.m.)
February 23 Zhou - Nixon (2:00-
6:00 p.m.)
China supports Vietnam, will definitely not meddle in
the U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations.
.1
LCoordination of responsibilities for protection of (xi c
Presidential aircraft on flight to PRC. J I
Asserts USG does not intend to "enmesh" PRC in the
....Vietnam negotiations, but is attempting to bring about
"trust and mutual confidence' through open exchanges
Land meticulous implementation of understandings.
Chairman Mao wants to meet President Nixon "soon."
Inclusion of Lord, exclusion of SecState from the/
meeting. Tone of banquet toasts. 1-11