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National paweitiFor Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO0270 OWAV-6CONTRACT- Assessment ORCON Center Africa Review Secret RP AR 78-021 22 December 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TOO912AOO27OO911OO33-4,,; If Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4 National Security Information Dissemination Control Abbreviations STATOTHR STATOTHR -Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions NOFORN (NF) NOCONTRACT (NC) PROPIN (PP) NFIBONLY (NO) ORCON (OC) FGI This publication is available on microfiche. To get a microfi he copy of this publication call=(OCR/ DSB); for future issuances in addition to or in lieu of hard copies, call= (PPG/RD). Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants Caution-Proprietary Information Involved NFIB Departments Only Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator This Information has been Authorized for Release to... _ Foreign Government Information Derivative Classification by 006266 Review 20 years from date Derived from multiple All material on this page is unclassified. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01 CQb 8ITA Rp P p9NT00912A002700010033-4 AFRICA REVIEW (U) 22 December 1978 CONTENTS Israel-Kenya: The Continuing Relationship (S NF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Since 1976 when Kenya aided the Israeli rescue raid on Entebbe, Israeli military assistance to Nairobi has grown, and Tel Aviv now plays an important role in the development of the Kenyan armed forces. (S NF NC OC) Nigeria: Reassessing Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The possibility that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty may be signed within the next few months is causing Nigerian military and civilian leaders to reassess their country's continued participation in the informal al- liance of Arab and black African states that crystallized during and after the Middle East war in 1973. (C) Nationalism Frustrates Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Horn of Africa (U) . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Somalis continue to support the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Ethiopian Somali border issue remains as alive as ever. (S NF) NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been published and disseminated in special intelligence channels. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01&A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORLON Upper Volta: Military Dissatisfaction (S) . . . . . 15 Senior military officers in Upper Volta's armed forces have become disaffected over President Sangoule Lamizana's refusal to abide by the constitution and resign his military commission. (S NF NC OC) FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Approved For Release 2002/01 /3& *i TRDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/04~36RFGIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON 25X1A Israel-Kenya: The Continuing Relationship (S NF) Kenya's commanding general and chief of staff is 25X1 C lanning a visit to Israel early next month, 25X1C The general an severa military relationship between the two countries. Since mid-1976 when Kenya aided the Israeli rescue raid on Entebbe, Israeli military assistance to Nairobi has grown and Tel Aviv now plays an important role in the development of the Kenyan armed forces. (S NF NC OC) Limited Israeli military aid to Kenya began in the early 1970s. The nature of the relationship changed markedly after Entebbe. Israel, to repay Nairobi for its help, responded to what the Kenyans saw as the growing isolation by antagonistic neighbors, such as Somalia, Uganda, and Tanzania. (S NF NC OC) Shortly after the raid, the Israelis began providing small arms and ammunition and conducted a survey of Kenyan intelligence requirements. They agreed to help the Kenyans establish three intercept sites on the Ugandan border and subsequently three additional sites on Kenya's border with Somalia. (S NF NC OC) Last fall, the two countries signed their first major arms deal--a $50 million agreement under which Israel was to provide Gabriel naval surface-to-surface missiles for four Kenyan patrol boats, antiaircraft guns, and ammunition. (S NF NC OC) Early this year, ti)e relationship expanded when Israel agreed to train more than 90 Kenyan Air Force personnel. In June, five Israelis traveled to Kenya to survey the country's logistics needs. (S NF NC OC) junior staff officers will tour Israeli military facil- ities, observe weapons demonstrations, and discuss future Israeli military assistance to Kenya. (S NF NC OC) The move underscores the growing importance of the 22 December 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01// TA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/30'~E44TRDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Israeli technicians currently are directing Kenyan workers in Mombasa in refitting patrol boats with Gabriel missiles. A course on 20 mm antiaircraft guns for Kenyans has recently been completed, and an Israeli helicopter pilot is on a one-year contract to provide instruction in Kenya. (S NF NC QC) 25X19 Future arms deals apparently will include the sale of Israeli-built 155 mm howitzers and possibly more sma arms. In addition, the two countries reportedly are discussing the possibility of establishing an Air Force technical training school in Kenya staffed by Israeli instructors and a combat engineering training program to be conducted in Israel and Kenya. Nairobi may also request a modest course on armor and mechanized tactics. (S NF NC QC) Why the Israelis? The Kenyans have been carrying out a long-term military modernization and expansion program since 1975, when the growing strength of their neighbors finally jostled them into paying more attention to their security needs. Tension with Uganda's unpredictable President Amin after Entebbe spurred additional measures, as did the Somali incursion into Ethiopia last year. (S) Nairobi turned to the West for military assistance and the West responded. Eager to anchor Kenya at a time when most of her neighbors were moving leftward, the West conducted surveys, signed agreements for equipment, and promised training programs. As a result, Kenya has begun to receive supersonic fighters, helicopters, artillery, tanks, and antimissiles. (S) Like many other Third World countries, however, the Kenyans have shown dissatisfaction with the cumbersome machinery of the West's various military assistance apparatus. To some in Nairobi, the West has been insensi- tive to the urgencies of Kenya's situation. Despite Kenyan pleas, for example, the British were unable to establish an air route to deliver a load of ammunition in the wake of the Entebbe operation that Kenya would have needed to withstand an Ugandan attack. Moreover, the Kenyans like so many other Third World buyers, can- not understand what they see as a discrepancy between Approved For Release 2002/01/3059T2DP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01$964$MA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 attestations from Washington of their importance and the failure to make promised weapons available more quickly. (S) Israel is limited in what it can offer, and the Kenyans probably have more reasonable expectations of Israel than they do of others. Nonetheless, the Israelis have generally followed through quickly convincing Kenyan leaders that Tel Aviv has a better understanding of their problems. There are similarities between the two coun- tries' situations--both have found themselves at one time or another relatively underarmed and surrounded by potentially hostile countries. (S) The Israel military also lends "more relevant" experience to Kenya's situation. Climate and geographical conditions are similar. In addition, both countries' ad- versaries are primarily armed with Soviet equipment. These factors may lead to a further strengthening of the military relationship between the two countries. (S) The Israelis apparently are not training Kenyan pilots, but the introduction this year of Kenyan main- tenance and ground crew personnel to Israeli methods could help lay the ground work in the small Kenyan Air Force for the kind of professionalism and efficiency it will need to be effective against more heavily armed opponents. The same could hold true for any Kenyan ground force units trained by the Israelis. (S NF NC OC) The Israelis are not likely to be able to offer Kenya large quantities of major end items unless the United States approves transfer. If Washington grants permission, however, Kenya could become a candidate in the 1980s for some of Israel's US-built fighters as well as some artillery and armored personnel carriers. (S) The Future The gains for Israel are primarily political, though Kenya is not likely to risk getting out in front of other African states by becoming the first to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. (S) 22 December 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01iRtTA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Tel Aviv will usually pursue any reasonable prospects for arms sales and, because of its relative state of under- development, the Kenyan military has good potential as a future customer, both for small arms and other basic needs as well as larger items that have become obsolete for the Israelis. (S) Although the relationship is of growing importance to both countries, it could easily be severed by a change in the political climate. Kenya broke relations with Israel during the 1973 Middle East war and has generally assumed a low political profile vis-a-vis Tel Aviv since, despite the growing military ties. Kenya's role in the Israeli raid on Entebbe cost it some standing in the Third World and prompted many African nations to distance themselves from Nairobi when President Amin threatened revenge. (S) Nonetheless, as long as it remains discreet, the military relationship between the two countries may well be able to weather all but the most critical developments. The Israelis have long been able to keep their relation- ships with various African countries fairly quiet. In one case--Ethiopia--they were even able to maintain military ties for several years after a radical change of government. (S) (SECRET NOFORII-NOCONTRACT-ORCON) Approved For Release 2002/01 jA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/3& $iTRDP79T00912A002700010033-4 25X1A Nigeria: Reassessing Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties (C) The possibility that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty may be signed within the next few months is causing Nigerian military and civilian leaders to re- assess their country's continued participation in the informal alliance of Arab and black African states that crystallized during and after the Middle East war in 1973. There appears to be growing sentiment within both the military government and the emergent political par- ties to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. The key obstacle to resumed ties is Israel's cooperation with South Africa, which conflicts with Nigeria's key foreign policy objective of eliminating white minority rule and apartheid. (C) The Afro-Arab relationship rests primarily on a trade-off of support on Middle East and southern Africa issues. An Egyptian-Israeli treaty would erase the need for such an arrangement in the eyes of the Nigerians. The Nigerians have for some time privately criticized the Arab states for not extending as much support to the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa as black Africa has for the Arab cause in the Middle East. They point to the paucity of material aid from the Arabs and charge that the majority of poorer African states have not received adequate economic compensation from the Arabs for severing their ties with Tel Aviv five years ago. The Nigerians are also sensitive to often heavy- handed attempts by the Arabs to expand their influence in Africa--particularly those by Libya and Algeria, which are regarded by the Lagos government as competitors for leadership in Africa. Nigeria, which itself is not dependent on Arab assistance, has always insisted that Afro-Arab cooperation must be mutually beneficial and based on mutual respect for sovereignty. (S) Should Egypt and Israel reach an agreement in the near future, it is possible that Nigeria's present mili- tary government could normalize relations with Israel before the scheduled changeover to civilian rule in Approved For Release 2002/01/36~CLU RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/3 r-8A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 October 1979. Head of State General Obasanjo recently told visiting Egyptian presidential aide Salem that Nigeria could not reestablish relations with Tel Aviv while Israel denies the Palestinians their right to self-determination and continues to occupy part of African land (the Egyptian Sinai). This formulation suggests that Nigeria would be prepared to consider re- newed relations with Tel Aviv if an Egyptian-Israeli treaty contained guarantees for Palestinians acceptable to the Egyptians and resulted in Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. (C) If the military regime does not act, Nigeria's future civilian government (assuming the transition to civilian rule occurs) might do so. The US Embassy in Lagos has reported that recent conversations with some influential members of two of the three major political parties that will contest elections next year indicate there is considerable sentiment for the reestablishment of relations with Israel. This includes the northern Muslim-oriented party, which reportedly is taking clan- destine campaign funds from Libya. The US Embassy sus- pects that pro-Israeli sentiment also exists in the third major party. (C) Any initiative by Lagos toward Israel will be heavily dependent on Nigeria's perception of Tel Aviv's relationship with South Africa, given the Obasanjo regime's preoccupation with southern Africa, which we believe a civilian government is likely to share. A rapprochement with Israel is potentially threatened by the present government's acute sensitivity to reported Israeli arms sales and alleged nuclear cooperation with Pretoria. There are signs, however, that Nigerian con- cern over Israeli ties with South Africa may be easing. Nigerian Foreign Minister Adefope recently told a US official that his government has received assurances from the Israelis that Tel Aviv will end its arms sales and curtail trade with South Africa. We cannot confirm that the Israeli Government has in fact made such a decision. (C) Should Nigeria resume relations with Israel, several other moderate African states which have benefited little from Arab aid would quickly follow suit. Indeed, they may well take the initiative if Nigeria does not. These Approved For Release 2002/01/5?c-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4 countries, including Ghana, Zaire, Zambia, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Central African Empire, and Kenya, were among the last to break with Tel Aviv in 1973. In the past, they have expressed varying degrees of interest in renewing ties with Israel, although none has so far been willing to take the lead. (S) For some other African states, particularly the poorer predominantly Muslim countries, the choice would be far more painful, and an early wholesale African desertion of the Arabs should not be expected. Despite their frustrations with the Arabs, approximately a dozen African states are in fact receiving from the Arabs im- portant development aid and credit loans that are used to offset the increased cost of oil imports that they cannot realistically expect to receive from Israel. They also must consider the unstated threat of an oil boycott. Most African countries would find it difficult to secure non-Arab oil suitable for their refineries. (S) (SECRET) SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :. CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/3( EMIRDP79T00912A002700010033-4 DAROD Tribal group Somali-in habited area South Yemen ibARio' 22 December 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/MCUA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/0EIZtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 25X1A OGCR Nationalism Frustrates Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Horn of Africa (U) The high point of the Ogaden fighting that involved some 30,000 Somali regular forces ended in March 1978, but the Somalis continue to support the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Ethiopian-Somali border issue remains as alive as ever. There may be as many as 50,000 guerrillas in southeastern Ethiopia with the majority of them in Harerge Province and an undetermined number of personnel from the Somali. regular Army serving as a leadership cadre for this force. (S NF) The Root of the Problem Hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia are rooted in intense nationalism based on each side's interpretation of history and age-old religious and ethnic rivalries that took a more tangible form during the last century when Ethiopia acquired vast new territories--including the Ogaden--from the former colonial powers in the Horn. The conflict is further complicated by each country's concept of "nation." The Ethiopians base their definition on territory, considering ethnicity to be mere tribalism that impedes nation building. The Somalis base theirs on ethnic common feelings, to which territorial considera- tions are secondary. These definitions collide in the case of the Ogaden and surrounding areas. (U) Somalia refuses to budge from its claim that "the people of the Ogaden and adjacent regions, which were annexed by Ethiopia in the late 19th century, have a right to self-determination." Actually, there were no international frontiers in the Horn of Africa prior to the 1880s. From the fourth to the seventh century, Ethiopia was a small, powerful Christian empire--the Axumite kingdom--that was centered on the provinces of Tigre, Begemder, Welo, Shoa, and Gojam in the Ethiopian highlands. It was dominated by the Amhara and Tigrai peoples whose influence by the seventh century extended from the Nile valley northeastward as far as Mecca in 22 December 1978 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/011?G' iIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/WpCA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Saudi Arabia. Until the mid-1880s, the territory east of the Ethiopian highlands was known only as the Somali coast. The region was inhabited by the nomadic Afars, Gallas, and Somalis, who migrated throughout this un- claimed desolate territory. (U) The Early Inhabitants The Afars moved into the Danakil (west of Djibouti in the Rift Valley), southern Eritrea, and the Djibouti area in the seventh century A.D. and have remained there to this day. Early in the 10th century, the Galla (or Oromo) people settled on lands east of the Afars and dominated the Ogaden region in the south, or parts of it, for the next 500 years. The Somalis who already were Islamized by the 9th century, started migrating in small irregular groups in the latter part of the 10th century; within 200 years they occupied most of present- day Somalia, and the Issas (ethnically related to the Somalis) from the northern coastal region had displaced the Gallas in the areas adjacent to the Afars. In the 11th century the Darod Somalis started their trek south- ward from the northeast coast of Somalia. It took them roughly 500 years to drive out or subjugate the Galla and gain control over most of the Ogaden region and another 300 years to reach the Giuba river (near the present Kenya border), finally stopping at the Tana river in Kenya by 1909. Thus, the Somalis have had an expanding presence in this region for nearly 1,000 years. (U) Although it is impossible to be precise about the population in Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo Provinces, ethnic Somalis make up the majority of the estimated five to six million inhabitants. Organized along kinship lines, the Somalis are divided into six clan families. The largest of these is the Darod which consists of several clans; the most important ones include the Ogaden, Migertein, and Marehan (President Siad's clan). The Ogaden clan is divided into some 17 subgroups that are located mainly in the area of the same name.* These people also constitute the core of the Western Somalia Liberation Front's insurgency against the Mengistu regime. (U) *There is uncertainty about whether the Ogaden was named after the Ogaden clan or vice versa, but it is a common practice throughout Africa to identify an area or locality by the ethnic name of the inhabitants. 22 December 1978 Approved For Release 2002/0198ORECIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/SflCRBIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 The advent of Islam provided another source of ten- sion in the Horn. During the seventh century A.D., the Muslims challenged the power of the Ethiopians and cut their empire off from the rest of the Christian world. This ushered in a long period of sporadic "Jihads" (re- ligious wars) that reached their zenith in the 1540s when Somali Muslims overran this mountain kingdom. Pe- riodic retaliatory forays against the Muslims brought the Ethiopians into limited contact with the lands east of the highlands. These actions over the centuries de- veloped into a religious power struggle for control of the Horn that still hovers around the current conflicts. (U) Ethiopia's first real involvement with the Ogaden and vicinity coincides with Emperor Menelik II's ter- ritorial expansions to create modern Ethiopia in the 1880s, at the same time that Britain, France, and Italy were dividing up the rest of the Horn of Africa. Me- nelik's objectives were to take control of the neighbor- ing lands to establish a buffer against European encroach- ment and to "redeem all territories that once were a part of the empire," according to Ethiopian tradition.* He conquered the Harer and Jijiga areas in 1889, imposed his rule over the Afars to the north, and in 1891 moved southward into the Ogaden, Bale, and Sidamo regions. Effective Ethiopian control over the Ogaden was really never established, nor has there ever been a substantial presence of the Ethiopian people among the inhabitants- even today. (U) The Boundary Question France and Britain established the boundary between French Somaliland and the British Somaliland protectorate in 1888, and in 1894 the British and Italians fixed the frontiers between their respective Somaliland protector- ates. Establishment of these borders around the areas un- der European administrative control was an alien proce- dure to Menelik and his predecessors who traditionally *Menelik's concepts of Ethiopia's former frontiers extended to Khartoum, Sudan; Nyanza Province in Kenya; and included all Galla country (southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya). 22 December 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/31SEEca1WRDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/0SI EtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 annexed territory in name only, without benefit of bound- aries, treaties, or even a presence. Thus Ethiopia was forced to define its borders, especially in the east, for the first time in its long history. The boundaries between Ethiopia and the French and British Somalilands were settled in 1897, but only after the Europeans gave up much of their territorial claims and Britain obtained guarantees for Somali herdsmen on both sides of the border the right to move freely across the line for grazing and water. The first (1897) treaty between Italy and Ethiopia on the boundary with Italian Somalia did not agree with the map, so it was never signed by either party. The second agreement in 1908 was just as vague as the first, but it was signed after Italy compensated Ethiopia for a 49,210-square kilometer (19,000-square mile) tract of land and ceded all of the Ogaden and its people to Menelik. This treaty was still disputed in 1960 when Somalia became independent and voided all prior boundary agreements. The existing frontier between Ethi- opia and the former Italian colony is still just a UN- imposed provisional administrative line of uncertain legality. (U) The often repeated accusation about Somalia's obses- sion with territorial expansion obscures some basic issues concerning the treaties that created Ethiopia's eastern frontiers. The Somalis claim that the British and Italian agreements with Menelik violated prior treaties with the various Somali clan families. The 1884 and 1886 treaties with five Somali clan families provided for British protection of the Somalis and their territory from increasing Ethiopian encroachment and administra- tion of the British Somaliland protectorate in return for Somali logistical support for Aden. These treaties also denied both parties the right to unilaterally cede Somali territory. To get Ethiopian recognition of the border with its protectorate, however, the British aban- doned their claim to most of the Baud region and allowed Menelik to annex it. This, in effect, was an abrogation of British obligations to the Somalis. (U) A similar treaty between the Italians and Somalis in 1889 placed southern Somalia under Italy's adminis- tration and protection from Ethiopian encroachment in return for a substantial annuity. Following their de- feat at Adowa by the Ethiopians in 1895, the Italians Approved For Release 2002/0$ 42ECIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/0$=EtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 withdrew their claim to most of the Ogaden in return for control of Eritrea; the 1908 treaty not only ceded the rest of the Ogaden to Ethiopia, but identified the Somali "tribes" that went with it. (U) The government of Ethiopia claims that the British agreement of 1897 is valid and that the Somalis must recognize this border; but the 1908 treaty. with the Ital- ians still requires an interpretation before any settle- ment on the frontier with this former colony can be made. Ethiopia also argues that the 1950 provisional administra- tive line deprives Ethiopia of a large portion of its territory, but Addis Ababa would consider renouncing this claim if Somalia recognizes the line as the de jure boundary. Although Ethiopia's claim to Somalia was re- jected by the UN, it still maintains that much of the Somaliinhabited area of the Horn was formerly part of the Ethiopian empire. (U) Outlook The prospects for a peaceful settlement of Ethio- pian-Somali differences over the Ogaden are not promis- ing. Indeed, the Ethiopians-emboldened by the recent success of their hardline military policy toward seces- sionist guerrillas in Eritrea-will probably be more de- termined than ever to crush the Somali-supported guer- rilla movement in the Ogaden by force. Tactical suc- cess in Eritrea-if it can be sustained--will, addition- ally, enable the Ethiopians eventually to redeploy some of their veteran combat units back to their original base of operations in the Ogaden, thus increasing pres- sure on the Ogadeni insurgents. The Somalis, for their part, appear equally determined to upgrade dramatically guerrilla force levels in the Ogaden and to encourage increasingly aggressive insurgent operations there. (S) Moreover, before any negotiations-even of an ex- ploratory nature--to resolve the Ogaden dispute can begin, Ethiopia demands that Somalia cease its support for guer- rilla activities, publicly and formally renounce all Irredentist ambitions in the Horn, and pay reparations for war damages in the Ogaden. The Somalis, on the other hand, continue to demand autonomy for all inhabitants Approved For Release 2002/019961 'IA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01$ aS 1A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 of the Ogaden and show no willingness to abandon their official or covert support for the guerrillas. Indeed, to do otherwise would be politically risky, if not fatal, for Siad or any other Somali leader-given the continuing strong national commitment to the "Greater Somalia" concept. (S) (SECRET NOFORN) Approved For Release 2002/01/3DC1tA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/3: aCIML-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 25X1A Upper Volta: Military Dissatisfaction (S) Senior military officers in Upper Volta's armed forces, have become dis- affected over President Sangoule Lamizana's refusal to abide by the constitution and resign his military com- mission. Lamizana, a four-star general who assumed leadership of Upper Volta's civilian government last May, relies on the Voltan military for his principal source of political power and is reluctant to sever this rela- tionship, at least until he is certain that he has established a secure civilian power base. (S NF NC OC) The senior officers have also grown dissatisfied with Chief of Staff Baba Sy, who has constitutional authority to force the President's resignation but refuses to do so. Baba Sy cannot ask for the Presi- dent's resignation, however, without jeopardizing his own position--he is past the mandatory retirement age and in an effort to cushion military pressure for his resignation, the President has requested Baba Sy to stay. (S NF NC OC) Although Lamizana may be aware of the growing dis- sension among his military officers, it is highly un- likely that the President will resign his military commission in the immediate future. Lamizana has also had to face a series of minor incidents of civilian unrest--a student demonstration during Upper Volta's national day celebration and a threatened air controllers' strike last October. His continued failure to comply with the constitution will, however, exacerbate the disaffection his senior military officers already harbor against him. (S NF NC OC) The military is intent on ensuring that the civil- ian government runs legally and could feel obligated to act if Lamizana does not resign h4s commission in a rea- sonable amount of time. The military could also force Bab a Sy into retirement--the officers are concerned with advancement possibilities and probably feel a Approved For Release 2002/01/36~?FkTRDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/~gCl -RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 peaceful purging of these senior officers is desirable- and replace him with a military leader who would be more forceful in demanding Lamizana's resignation. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON) Approved For Release 2002/01/3k7c-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/0 i lA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 FOR THE RECORD 25X1A South Africa: The frequency of urban terrorist acts and sabotage has increased noticeably in the Johannesburg area during the past three weeks. While there is no in- dication that widespread urban violence is imminent in South Africa, this flurry of low-level incidents indi- cates a pattern of urban violence that is slowly increas- ing, despite extensive government security precautions. (C) Last year there was a spate of urban bombings during the Christmas season: a large shopping center in Johan- nesburg and several police stations were damaged. This year's incidents appear to be targeted more toward delib- erate sabotage rather than acts of wanton terrorism that produce backlashes from both the white and black commun- ities. Thus far, the Soweto Community Council building, a symbol to many urban blacks of government authority, has been bombed. Also, a depot supplying government- owned black beer halls was set afire and a large dynamite factory near Johannesburg was extensively damaged. (C) In October, the Minister of Justice, warned the white population to expect increased terrorism, partic- ularly from the African National Congress, the largest of the exiled liberation organizations. During November, the government publicly acknowledged on two occasions that trained guerrillas were infiltrating South Africa from neighboring black states. The police have begun a series of arrests of urban blacks that may be related to underground terrorist activities and they can be ex- pected to mount larger security crackdowns if the sabo- ta a e continues. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL) ORPA, 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/O E~IA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4