"'Face' Among the Arabs" by Peter A. Naffsinger
Stud. Intel. V8:3-43-54 (Summer 1964) PDF [170KB*]
Detailed and well illustrated description of why the outward appearance of personal dignity (or “face”) is so important to Arabs, how it affects their behavior, and why the concept is of operational importance.
"'Rolling Thunder' and Bomb Damage to Bridges" by Kenneth C. Fuller, Bruce Smith, and Merle Atkins
Stud. Intel. V13:4-1-9 (Fall 1969) PDF [407KB*]
How CIA economic analysts developed criteria and procedures for assessing the success (and ultimate failure) of the US program to interdict North Vietnamese transport facilities (after Air Force assessments showed ten times as many bridges destroyed as had originally existed). The techniques used would be useful for bomb damage assessments in other underdeveloped countries.
"'Truth' Drugs in Interrogation", George Bimmerle
Stud. Intel. V5:2-A1-A19 (Spring 1961) PDF [277KB*]
A review of published literature on the efficacy of drugs and hypnosis to extract truth from uncooperative persons. Concludes results are generally unreliable.
"'Foretesting' ABM Systems: Some Hazards" by Sayre Stevens
Stud. Intel. V12:3-1-9 (Summer 1968) PDF [158KB*]
Description of analytic processes of CIA S&T weapons analysts (1968), with emphasis on managing uncertainty by setting forth technical limitations on what the USSR can do rather than reaching specific judgments on Soviet plans before sufficient evidence is available.
"A Cable from Napoleon" by Edwin C. Fishel
Stud. Intel. V2:3-81-101 (Summer 1958) PDF [383KB*]
Tells the story of how the US government, in 1867, intercepted a critically important cable from Napoleon III to his commanding general in Mexico confirming Napoleon’s order to withdraw all French troops from Mexico. This was probably the first instance of US peacetime communications intelligence.
"A Case Officer's First Tour" by Richard Stolz
Stud. Intel. V37:1-53-58 (1994) PDF [KB*]
Describes a case officer’s first tour in Trieste (1951-54), the lessons learned, the operations run, the Base organization, the family life.
"A Classic Case of Deception" by Antonio J. Mendez
Stud. Intel. Winter 1999/2000:1-16, PDF [989KB*]
A blow by blow description of the planning, preparation, and execution of the mission to exfiltrate six State Department personnel hiding in the Canadian Embassy in Tehran after the seizure of the embassy by student radicals in 1980.
"A Close Call in Africa" by Richard L. Holm
Stud. Intel. Winter 1999/2000:17-28, PDF [2MB*]
Recounts a Case Officer’s 1964 assignment to the Belgian Congo, describes the severe burns received in a plane crash in the jungle, his survival, rescue and rehabilitation.
"A Comment on 'A Note on KGB Style'" by John W. Monkiewicz. Letter to the Editor
Stud. Intel. V16:1-81-82 (Special Edition 1972) PDF [89KB*]
Underscores the differences in operational styles between the KGB First (foreign) and Second (internal) Chief Directorates.
"A Crucial Estimate Relived" by Sherman Kent
Stud. Intel. V36:5-111-119 (Spring 1964) PDF [216KB*]
A classic evaluation of a classic intelligence estimating failure: “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” 1962, by the manager of the estimate.
"A Definition of Intelligence" by Martin A. Bimfort
Stud. Intel. V2:4-75-78 (Fall 1958) PDF [85KB*]
A refinement of previous proposals for a pithy definition of the intelligence process.
"A Dim View of Women", by Chef de Renseignements
Stud. Intel. V6:2-A1-A5 (Spring 1962) PDF [73KB*]
A European Intelligence Chief’s low assessment of women as agent material