1997

Unpopular Pessimism: Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam

By Harold P. Ford

Introduction

In traveling through Tonkin, every village flew the Viet Minh flag, and had armed soldiers, many with Japanese weapons taken in raids. The women and children were also organized, and all were enthusiastic in their support. The important thing is that all were cognizant of the fact that independence was not to be gained in a day and were prepared to continue their struggle for years. In the rural areas, I found not one instance of opposition to the Viet Minh, even among former government officials. 

—OSS report, October 1945

It is well documented and well known that for decades CIA analysts were skeptical of official pronouncements about the Vietnam war and consistently fairly pessimistic about the outlook for “light at the end of the tunnel.” Less well known is why the Agency’s analysts were so doubtful, especially because CIA was all the while a central player in US operational efforts to create and strengthen South Vietnam. Thus, it is important to examine the sources of CIA analyses’ doubts about successive administrations’ repeated assurances and claims.

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