INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A002200010004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 24, 1974
• Content Type: BRIEF

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24 January 1974
DCI BACKUP BRIEFING FOR
25 JANUARY WSAG MEETING
INSURGENCY IN THAILAND
I. Twenty years ago the Thai Communist Party chose
revolutionary warfare as a means of gaining power
in Thailand. In 1965, armed insurgency broke out
in the northeast. Despite continued growth, the
insurgency is still small, vulnerable and for the
most part limited to the periphery of the Thai
nation and society. There are now three separate
areas where there is active insurgency.
A. The most serious problem is in the northeast.
There, some 2,500 insurgents have begun to
erode Bangkok's political control at the vil-
lage level in the remote areas of Nakhon
Phanom, Sakon Nakhon and Udorn Provinces.
1. This force represents only about one per-
cent of the population in the northeast,
but affects some 200,000 people in 400
villages.
2. This political base is held together by
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terror rather than by strong anti-govern-
ment feeling, and is vulnerable to govern-
ment security and civic action programs.
B. The greatest Communist military threat is in
the north.
1. There the insurgent leadership is ethnic
Thai, but the rank and file come the hill
tribe population.
2. These forces are the best armed in the
country, primarily because of the short
supply lines to north Laos. Nevertheless,
they have not been able to influence the
politically important lowland Thai.
3. In fact, during the past year serious
disaffection with Communist political
control has arisen among the hill tribes.
As a result, the Communists have had to
divert resources to shoring up their po-
litical hold in the mountains, further
reducing their capabilities in the low-
lands.
C. In the south, the Communists have never man-
aged to make more than a nuisance out of them-
selves.
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1. The insurgency is confined to an area in
the southern peninsula near the Malaysian
border.
2. The movement is on the defensive due to
imaginative government counterinsurgency
programs and dissension within the leader-
ship.
II. The Communist movement continues to grow largely
due to government neglect. Both the present and
past governments have been preoccupied with Bangkok
political affairs. Thai officials, with few ex-
ceptions, do not consider the insurgency serious
enough to warrant the economic sacrifice necessary
for an all-out push. This attitude would appear
to rule out a more aggressive counterinsurgency
program in the near future.
A. We do not believe the insurgency will grow
very rapidly. In fact, there may be some
fundamental limits to its expansion.
B. The Communist Party has never been able to
attract a significant following among the
ethnic Thai, who tend to look upon it as a
Chinese creation. This image is strengthened
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by the party's largely Sino-Thai leadership,
which is more Chinese than Thai.
C. China and North Vietnam still provide mainly
training and logistical support. There is
some recent, but unconfirmed, evidence that
Hanoi has increased its support to the insur-
gents in the northeast.
1. This support, however, appears to be lim-
ited to amounts the insurgents can absorb.
External assistance has not lien the criti-
cal factor in determining the insurgency's
progress, and we doubt that it will be in
the future.
D. In effect then, an armed stalemate has evolved
over the past year.
1. The government has largely been able to
check insurgent political and military
advances but has made no serious effort
to eliminate Communist base areas.
2. The Communists, for their part, have not
been able to break out of their established
strongholds, and until they do will not
threaten the government.
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III. At the same time, the overthrow of the Thanom
Praphat regime could have a significant impact
on the insurgency and future Thai Communist
strategy.
A. Communist propaganda had been centered against
the ruling military clique. The Communists
will likely find it even more difficult to
nuture a popular movement against a govern-
ment that came into power as a result of
spontaneous mass action.
the Communists may now begin to shift part
of their effort to a "united front" strategy.
Such an approach--at least in the short term--
could potentially bring greater gains for the
Communists than the present insurgency.
-5-
CID
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