SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 4, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
Iq
PLiuR NFORMATION PE Ph
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material ?anteing information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the ilipionage Laws. Title
1$, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or relation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law
COUNTRY USSR/China
SUBJECT Soviet-Chinese Relations
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE ACQUIRED
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
4 **vat 1955
4
RD
25X1
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
1.
after .the ,
Geneva conference. The Chinese were apparently dissatisfied with the results
of this conference because of their failure to secure meMbership in the United
Nations and diplomatic recognition by major western powers. The 3ovi1tit-110--
lieved that they were partly blamed for this failure by the Chinese.
the Soviets were not particularly interested in giving China, for
tne time being at least, the international standing that was undoubtedly due
her. The Soviets realized that China Still depended on their good offices in
the international field) a situation which gave Soviet di lomat? a certain
influence on the conduct of China's foreign policy.
the Soviets feared that China, if fully recognized internationally, might not
always follow the Soviet line and might not set primarily as the protagonist
of Asian interests.
2. The Soviets believed that China was bent upon becoming the leading country
in Asia. It had been notedwith apprehension by the Kremlin that China, which
was vehemently fighting any western interference in Asia, was also very
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
STATE I x
ARMY I x NAVY I AIR
FBI AEC OCI Ei X I
(Not*: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "*".)
25X1
VI
L k
Approved For Release 2007/10/26 : CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
S-E-C4-E-T
- 2 -
distruntful of all. Soviet attempts to have direct influence in Asian countries.
The Soviets viewed-the latter,develoyaint with some *lama bedews. they feared
that the room getiAgoloa of COMMEAW China bad not yet been comeolidated
s? Withresardsto the Chime* demand for hegemony in Asia
influence in North :Koren was very limited and. practically non-
Worth nebula. Soviet inflsence had also been completely eliminated
initiachuria.
other points reflecting the cooling of!' of friendship between
it000nw anal Peiping, as fellows:
a, Since the Dal of 190 Peiping hes srntemstically removed Soviet military
and economic adwisers. Way of the advisers who were not desired- by the
Chinese ware Nowolimented out of the country." Soviet citizens, including
staff members of the Soviet diplomatic miss ion in Paining, were practically
prohibited from visiting specific areas, particular': the coastal area.
Masao Wong, portions albino-Uri*, and North Yietnameee and Tibetan
border aroma.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
h. Peiping was reluctant to give the Soviets military, Political, and
economic data.. Chinese goversmat officials who were 25X1
*impacted of /Awing stafr geghen of the Soviet Embassy direct intonation
and party funotionsoles who enjoyed the confidence of the Soviets have
been removal frog drfiee. auserowS cases, data on =Awls indmetrial
produetion offisisay given to the Soviets had. provedtole, incorrect. The
exchange of esomomit informationias favored by the Chinese only OS long as
it served their-ant interests. Eve* in the field of military Affairs, there
vas *growing Chinese tesdenny to got rid of direct Soviet influence at
least in those sectors where the Chinese believe& themselves to be self-
Sufficient.
*. She gravest crisis in Soviet-Chinese relations occurred in November 193k
when Peiping, which at the time was preparing operations soinst Taiwan,
domande& the delivery of sigh immense quantities of vermstialel that
compliance with the requests would. have endangered the eat-readiness
of the Soviet armed forces. The Chinese even requestathe delivery of
*tonic bombe sad rocket wesnons.2 The Soviets refused to nosply with
these relnests; conseliently the Chinese ambassador was reoalled from
'Osseo', end China was repryent.d in the Soviet capital by s, charge
d. 'affaires for two months. This development contrihnted to lbaenkovas
dovetail.
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
8-344-E-T
-3 -
4. While Communist China was asking efforts to establish closer ties with non-
Commuist countries in Asti in the second half of 1954, Soviet diplomats
discovered that their *Um** to increase Roscoe 's influence in these countries
was meetimg with distrust ant reserve beolowee of China's ''1 tions. The
Sovieti therefore modifiei their Otani. toPart China *Sproul:Natoli tom.
weeks "Kee to the osertheoe efalentov. After mid.January 1953, the USSR
delivers& most of the war materiel desire& by China, including** fighters,
bomber., motsmaaStomic bombs, bit no roetet weepons. Mt order to be able
to mate these deliveries, the Soiiete revised their industrial planniag and
shifted their Asia efforts to heavy indmstrial production. At the same time
those fuestionariea who Imre reSponsible for the deterioration of Soviet
relations with China were removed.frma their positions. As a result, Soviet-
Chinese relations have *lowly but steadily *Proved.
5.
25X1
25X1
Soviet di:Amato appear to be convinced that China is going tart:Um Tito '$
course. Semenov stated that *AO TseetiniS 1111* a trustworthy Mend of the
USSR but that he pas la sick maswhon04 no longer very active in polities.
I000CRa-lai41 primary politica gamma not so much the 25X1
spreading of Commuatia UAW,* as the establishment of a bloc of Asian countries
designed to work for the elimination of all remnants of colonialism and im-
perialism' in Asia. I the countries to be included in this 25X1
blocs had an antiwestern attitude, but he not sere they wonld continue to
have this attitude after all. vestiges of western colontalism had been overcome
in Asia. In this connection the exuge or Yugoslavia. 25X1
Socialism in Chine may tate on a national cheracter. In LOA]
view of this possibility the USSR mast lure froa the mistakes it MAR in
Yugoslavia and try to exert as such influence as possible on the development
of Chinese Communion. This attempt most be paralleled bylarge.solle economic,
military, and political sort. In order to rellime such an ambitiose progres4
the Soviets muet-bave the situsibien4ta Beres* cousolidated so that they will be
free fres worried there. it was the aim of the USSR to 25X1
bring about a growing of covntries in Europe that will never :participate in
any aggression spinet the eastern bloc. At a later timi4 the Soviets way be
able to ruder commie support to this group of European states. wklich met
be made as strong as possible. In thAS connection the 25X1
possibility that the neutralised European States slight export their surplus
production to Asia and thus lessen the dependence of Asian countries on the
United States.
S.E0CAR.E-T
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
25X1
25X1
Cant" 25X1
L. Smienov, Soviet Ashassadorto Bait Civiriany until JuLY 1934) is now
DoelityKiaister or Foreign Affair* of the USSR.
2. Since the Chinese Covinuastaalreedy had rocket launclers at this tine,
valuably guided sisailes are meant.
3. The sppointeant of =fall", (040556) as Chinese Asbassador to the
USSR, replacing CRXMaibmwtlien (17118/5113/1131), vas &mosso& OR 13
January 1955. Aecoriing tastes* reports, LW arrived ialSaSeor on
k NargarY 1935 saA.Prolectial his credentials on 7 FebrnarY 1955.
UNCODED
4,40C-11.E-T
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A007600210008-0
25X1
25X1