ETHIOPIA: THE NORTHERN INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Directorate of
Intelligence
Ethiopia:
The Northern Insurgencies
ALA 84-10105
October 1984
346
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ethiopia:
The Northern Insurgencies
Office of African and Latin American
of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 84-10105
October 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
Ethiopia:
The Northern Insurgencies I 25X1
Key Judgments Ethiopia's military position in its two northern provinces of Eritrea and
Information available Tigray has steadily deteriorated over the past two years. Eritrean insur-
as of 21 October 1984 gents, who are fighting for independence, have increased the area under
was used in this report.
their control and put the Ethiopian Army on the defensive. In Tigray
Province, insurgents dominate most of the rural area and have expanded
their operations into Tigrean-inhabited areas of neighboring Gonder and
Welo Provinces.
Ethiopian efforts to crush both insurgencies through large-scale military
operations have failed, with heavy losses of men and equipment. Morale
within the military has plummeted and serious deficiencies in training,
tactics, and leadership have been highlighted. At the strong urging of his
senior commanders and Soviet advisers-including the Commander of
Soviet Ground Forces General Petrov-Chairman Mengistu has called a
temporary halt to major offensive operations while launching programs to
try to correct these problems.
Despite their recent gains, we believe that neither the Eritreans nor the Ti-
greans have the capability to defeat decisively the Ethiopians. The Eritrean
People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the only effective insurgent force in the
province, is a formidable organization, but lacks the quantities of heavy
weapons and air defense equipment necessary to engage the Ethiopians in
sustained conventional combat. Forces of the Tigrean Peoples Liberation
Front (TPLF) are lightly armed, lack mobility, and receive little outside
assistance, although they do have a close working relationship with the
EPLF.
Ethiopia's northern war continues to attract outside intervention. Sudan,
Saudi Arabia, and several other Arab states provide varying amounts of as-
sistance to several Eritrean factions, although the level of aid has declined
over the past four years. The Soviet Union, which is committed to
defending the Mengistu regime and protecting its access to air and naval
facilities in Eritrea, provides weapons and advisory assistance to the
Ethiopians. Soviet advisers help plan operations and are attached to
Ethiopian military units in the field. Cuba, which has consistently refused
to provide troops in the north, performs only limited advisory and logistic
functions.
The government has paid a high political and economic price to pursue its
military objectives in the north. Popular support for the regime has eroded
because of the declining economy, the growing Soviet presence, and the
iii Secret
ALA 84-10105
October 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
continuing heavy demand for military inductees. Economic costs directly
attributable to the fighting, which we estimate are at least $3 billion since
1974, include government defense and refugee expenses, physical damage,
and lost industrial and agricultural production and exports. Indirect
costs-which we are unable to quantify-include reduced business confi-
dence, capital flight, and the need to cut development expenditures to pay
for defense. In addition, dissatisfaction among some senior military and
security officers over the conduct of the war was probably behind coup
plotting late last year. Mengistu successfully preempted this threat by
postponing his plans for an offensive.
The Mengistu regime, however, is willing to pay the costs involved to
maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity. The threat to the government's
stability remains low because the officer corps-the key pillar of the
regime-despite some concern over Mengistu's overall tactics in the north
has little sympathy for civilian grievances.
We believe that the Ethiopians will launch another major offensive in
Eritrea within the next six months. Addis Ababa probably will be able to
reverse at least some of its recent losses but, in our view, has no prospect of
crushing the Eritreans militarily. In Tigray Province, we see little or no
prospect for a major breakthrough by either side, although the intensity of
the fighting will periodically escalate. At the same time, efforts to find a
political solution to the insurgencies will continue to prove futile with none
of the actors willing to make significant concessions.
Moscow appears in a position to perpetuate its influence with Addis Ababa
in either a continuing military stalemate or a negotiated peace. Moscow
can continue to try to broker a political settlement while supplying military
hardware to the Mengistu regime, thereby assuring continued access to
Ethiopian naval and air facilities. If successful as a mediator, Moscow
would enhance its political credentials in the region.
In the unlikely event that the Mengistu government falls, a successor
government would probably continue efforts to retain Ethiopian territorial
integrity. Thus, even a pro-Western junta would find it difficult to break
with the Soviets because of its need for arms to combat the insurgents. In
addition, Moscow stands to gain from Ethiopia's directing its mounting
frustration at Sudan and Somalia, both of which are friendly to the United
States, or at the United States itself.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
Contents
Key Judgments
The Military Situation
The Eritrean Struggle Resumes 1
The Tigrean Insurgency 4
Prospects and Implications
The Northern Insurgent Groups 13
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Eritrean and Tigrean Insurgencies
.el Kowa, Mersa Teklay
Sudan 'Ar
-rfS
't'
LI ~rrt>n ( c
Nak'faj
Gonder
Tana \A i
Hayk'
Sri te,;.
Keren. y/,
' Mits'iwa,
Ak'ordat; . ', "JM ssawa),
Tom, ;
0 / -~ -~ 100>
Insurgent Forces
EPLF 20,000-24,000
TPLF 15,000
Note: All figures are approximate.
703502 10-84
Yemen
Arab
Republic
(N. Yemen)
Aseb
(Assab)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Asmera
Dehalak' Deset
(Dhalak Island)
edesaibera n \
nt activity , Ti a r a v
AR.
(N.Yemen)
--%.D.R.Y
(S. Yemen)
Area of Map
*ADDIS ABABA
OGiO /f
- / Somalia
eoundy rep,eoentetbn le
not noneaeeaiy eetno,i,auvo. ) ~.~
Eritrea 75,000
Tigray 12,000
Gonder 8,000
.tiopia
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
Ethiopia:
The Northern Insurgencies
The political, economic, and human cost for Ethiopia
of more than two decades of conflict in its northern
region has been high. Even so, the military govern-
ment appears firmly committed to either crushing the
insurgencies militarily or forcing a political settlement
on its terms. The Eritreans, in rebellion since 1962,1
have been equally obstinate in insisting on independ-
ence, while the leadership of the nine-year-old Ti-
grean rebellion is intent on overthrowing the regime.
Although none of the parties involved in the fighting
seem capable of achieving their goals through a
definitive military victory, animosities are so deep
that the prospects for a political solution are almost
nonexistent
Ethiopia's military position in its northern provinces
of Eritrea and Tigray has eroded steadily since the
collapse of the much-heralded 1982 "Red Star" cam-
paign-an offensive designed to crush the Eritrean
rebellion and, by extension, the Tigrean insurgency.
According to diplomatic reporting, its failure, at the
cost of heavy casualties, left the northern Army
demoralized with many units under strength and
unable to break the stalemate that persisted in Eritrea
throughout 1983.
During the lull in Eritrea, Addis Ababa's military
strategy indicated increasing concern over the spread-
ing insurgency in Tigray Province. After a year of
steady rebel gains in the countryside against limited
' Until Eritrea became an Italian colony in 1889, the region
consisted of several fragmented entities under the domination of
various neighboring countries. Italian rule was ended by British
forces in 1941. London administered the region until 1952 when,
under UN auspices, it was federated with Ethiopia despite Eritrean
opposition to the union. During the 10-year existence of the
federation, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie used quasi-legal
government resistance, the Ethiopian Army and Ti-
grean insurgents engaged in almost continuous com-
bat from late 1982 until November of last year.
Although the Army scored several successes, it suf-
fered heavy casualties and failed to inflict a crushing
defeat on the rebels; the Tigreans, on the other hand,
succeeded in expanding their operations into Tigrean-
inhabited portions of northern Gonder and Welo
Provinces.
In our judgment, Addis Ababa continues to view the
Eritrean rebellion, to which it has committed approxi-
mately 75,000 2 troops, as its principal threat despite
the Tigrean upsurge. According to the US Embassy,
the government believes-correctly, in our view-that
the integrity of the Ethiopian state would be threat- 25X1
ened by military defeat or significant concessions to
the insurgents, including the probable loss of the
critical ports of Assab and Massawa.
The Eritrean Struggle Resumes
Since the beginning of this year, the Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF)'-numbering 20,000 to
24,000 combatants-has seized the initiative in the
fighting and scored several major victories over the
government forces, corroborated independently by
press, US defense attache, and Embassy reporting:
? In January they overran the border town of Te-
seney, routed the Ethiopian garrison, and forced 25X1
hundreds of troops to flee into neighboring Sudan.
' Military strength figures for government and insurgent forces are
estimates based on order-of-battle data collected from a wide
variety of classified and unclassified sources.
' Although the Eritrean Movement is split into several factions,
only the EPLF has sizable combat forces in Ethiopia and actually
controls territory. Unless otherwise specified, references to the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Major Military Operations in the
North Since the Revolution
Date Developments
January-October 1975 Both the government and the Eritreans launched a series of campaigns for control
of the province's urban areas and lines of communication. Addis Ababa had some
success in reasserting control over the cities and towns, but the insurgents clearly
dominated the countryside.
Addis Ababa organized a `peasants' march, " designed to crush the Eritreans and
to populate the countryside with loyal Tigreans and Amharas. The poorly armed,
led, and trained peasants-who numbered up to 50,000-were routed by Eritrean
attacks in northern Tigray Province, causing the campaign to collapse.
The ELF and EPLF launched major attacks in Eritrea. This period marked the
high water mark of Eritrean control of the province as all government garrisons
were overrun except for Asmara, Massawa, Assab, Barentu, and Adi K'eyih (all
except Assab came under siege).
June-December 1978 Addis Ababa launched massive attacks, mainly from Tigray Province, which
succeeded in rolling back Eritrean forces. The ELF suffered heavy casualties (as
did their Tigrean allies), and the EPLF was pushed back to their mountain
stronghold around the town of Nak fa.
April-July 1979 The government launched two major assaults on the EPLF stronghold of Nak fa.
Both efforts were defeated and Addis Ababa suffered approximately 15,000
casualties.
December 1979-January The EPLF launched a preemptive attack on Ethiopian forces south of Nak fa.
1980 The insurgents overran forward positions, inflicting up to 4,000 casualties,
capturing much equipment, and demoralizing government troops.
September-October 1980 The Ethiopian Army launched a limited offensive against TPLF guerrillas who
were attacking major highways and government garrisons in Tigray Province. The
operation had only limited success because the TPLF avoided major
engagements.
February-June Ethiopia launched, with much fanfare, the "Red Star" campaign designed to
1982 capture Nakfa and break the back of the EPLF. Although Addis Ababa moved to
within a few kilometers of the town, the offensive collapsed because of stiff
insurgent opposition. The Ethiopian Army suffered up to 20,000 casualties.
September-November Addis Ababa launched another inconclusive campaign against TPLFforces in
1982 Ti gray Province.
February-April 1983 The Ethiopian Army again went on the offensive in Tigray Province. Addis
Ababa, after heavy fighting, occupied a number of towns long held by the
insurgents. The TPLF, however, blunted the drive by inflicting heavy casualties
on several government units.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
February-November 1983 The EPLF and TPLF launched a series of attacks against government forces. The
Tigrean insurgency spread to Gonder and Welo Provinces. Addis Ababa suffered
at least 15,000 casualties in the fighting and was clearly put on the defensive in
Ti gray and Gonder Provinces.
January-March 1984 The EPLF resumed offensive operations, capturing the towns of Teseney, Kerora,
and Mersa Tek'lay, all of which had been under government control since 1978.
Addis Ababa was unable to initiate effective counterattacks and has been content
to maintain control of major population centers.
? In March insurgent forces overwhelmed Ethiopian
units at Mersa Tek'lay and Kerora, captured an
important supply base, and drove Ethiopian forces
southward from their garrisons along the Sudanese
border.
? In late May EPLF commandos raided the major
Ethiopian airbase near the provincial capital of
Asmara, destroying or damaging two Soviet IL-38
naval reconnaissance aircraft and several Ethiopian
helicopters and jet fighters.
In addition, EPLF forces located south of their moun-
tain stronghold of Nak'fa have inflicted moderate-to-
high casualties on government troops during a series
of skirmishes in recent months. Most of the fighting
has been at a relatively low intensity, however, with
both sides jockeying to improve their tactical positions
along ridge lines.
Eritrean Goals and Tactics. We believe the EPLF, for
its part, is content to pursue a war of attrition.
Offensive operations appear aimed principally at
gaining publicity, maximizing Ethiopian casualties,
and eroding the capabilities of the Ethiopian military.
For example, the attack on the airbase at Asmara was
designed, in our opinion, to weaken Ethiopian morale
by highlighting the vulnerability of such a major
military facility. The insurgents also attempt to ex-
ploit weaknesses in the Ethiopian defenses to increase
the area under their control, such as the capture of
Teseney, but generally have avoided major combat in
areas where Addis Ababa can bring its superiority in
heavy weapons to bear.
The Eritreans, although inferior in numbers and
equipment to their opponents, have exploited effec-
tively the difficult terrain to neutralize Ethiopian
advantages. According to several journalists who have
been to the Nak'fa front, rebel positions are well
camouflaged and deeply dug into the hillsides. These
positions reduce the effectiveness of Ethiopian armor
and mechanized units, artillery, and airstrikes. As a
result, Ethiopian forces are often involved in fighting
that requires continued infantry assaults against forti-
fied, high-ground positions without effective support
from their heavy weapons.
Nevertheless, we believe the Eritrean insurgents will
not be able to achieve a decisive military victory,
primarily because they lack the quantities of heavy
weapons and air defense artillery necessary to engage
the Ethiopian Army in sustained conventional opera-
tions. As a result, the lightly armed guerrillas are 25X1
unable to capture large urban areas or garrisons that
are heavily defended by government troops. More-
over, the EPLF receives significantly less economic
and military assistance than other Eritrean factions
from the Arab states because of its Marxist-Christian
composition.
The Army's Problems. Several US Embassy sources
report that the government was planning a major
offensive of its own earlier this year. This operation
was suspended, however, because of opposition from
Mengistu's senior military commanders and his Soviet
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
advisers. They argued that the northern Army needed
time to rebuild its understrength units, to conduct
tactical training, and to improve the morale of the
frontline troops who have suffered heavy casualties
planners. Consequently, maintenance problems, insur-
gent ambushes, and shortages of fuel often delay or
limit the shipment of supplies to the front.
The Tigrean Insurgency
While the Eritreans have settled on a war of attrition,
forces of the Marxist-dominated Tigrean Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF) have significantly expanded
their area of operations over the past two years.' The
insurgents now control large parts of rural Tigray
Province, and several small towns and have solidified
their control over Tigrean-inhabited areas of adjoin-
ing Gonder and Welo Provinces. The insurgents also
have occasionally raided larger urban areas. Fighting
has been limited during the past six months, however,
25X1
25X1
over the past two years.
Ethiopia is attempting to address these problems.
Since the beginning of this year, according to the US
Embassy, Addis Ababa has stepped up its recruitment
campaign throughout the country and initiated com-
pulsory military service for all Ethiopians reaching
18. According to US military analysts, there are over
3 million physically fit draft age Ethiopians. Several
new training facilities have been constructed to ac-
commodate the influx
According
to military attache reporting, several thousand re-
cruits already have been sent to the northern front,
although the majority of the initial inductees under
the program will not be ready until their training is
completed later this year.
The effort to flesh out the Army, however, has
encountered several problems. Morale among the
inductees is low, according to various Embassy and
attache sources, resulting in a small but continuous
stream of deserters fleeing into Sudan or returning to
their villages. In addition, the training most receive is
rudimentary and probably does little to prepare new
recruits for combat against veteran Eritrean insur-
gents.
In our view, the most serious problem facing the
Ethiopian Army in Eritrea is the shortage of experi-
enced junior officers and senior NCOs. The casualty
rate among these two groups, according to various US
defense attache sources, has been especially high
because most of the fighting in Eritrea has involved
small-unit clashes and close-in fighting.
US Embassy I (reports confirm that the
Ethiopians also suffer from a weak logistic network in
Eritrea, which has made shortages of food, spare
parts, fuel, and ammunition commonplace even
among the best and most well-supplied units. The
military has made serious efforts to address these
weaknesses, according to Embassy sources, but the
scale of assistance needed and the strains on the
transportation system often overwhelm the military
both because the Ethiopians have scaled back their 25X1
military operations and because the insurgents proba-
bly are suffering supply shortages after the heavy
fighting late last year.
The TPLF, which we estimate to number 15,000
regulars and militia, has avoided setpiece battles in
favor of small-unit, classic guerrilla operations against
isolated garrisons and lines of communication a
major factor in its success.
the TPLF also has established an effective intelli-
gence network among a largely sympathetic populace.
We believe, on the basis of our meetings with TPLF
officials, that the group suffers from several key
weaknesses that severely limit its overall military
effectiveness:
? Its forces are lightly armed, possessing only a few
heavy weapons either captured in battle or provided
by the EPLF, and are unable to challenge the
Ethiopians in conventional combat.
? The insurgents' mobility is limited by a shortage of
motor vehicles.
' According to a Tigrean spokesman, the TPLF would like to see
the Government of Ethiopia transformed into a civilian-led federa-
tion, providing for the full and equal participation of the various
ethnic groups in the country. Failing this, he stated that the TPLF
would like to acquire either a strong measure of autonomy or full
independence for the province. We believe, however, that the
Tigrean leadership's principal long-term objective is supplanting
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
? Aside from its military alliance with the EPLF,
which provides primarily small arms and training,
the TPLF receives little outside assistance from
neighboring Arab countries because of its Marxist-
Christian makeup.
? The movement has limited appeal at best outside its
region and, in fact, has been unable to win the
support of the Amhara and other ethnic groups that
border the Tigrean area.
The US Embassy reports that the government has
become increasingly concerned about the TPLF's
challenge to Addis Ababa's control of Tigray Province
and its overland supply routes to Eritrea. Moreover,
the Tigreans are tying down approximately 20,000
government troops that Ethiopia would probably pre-
fer to commit to the struggle in Eritrea. Although
Addis Ababa has launched several offensive opera-
tions designed to crush the Tigrean forces, they have
had only limited success primarily because the TPLF
has avoided conventional battles in which Addis Aba-
ba could bring to bear its superior numbers, firepow-
er, and mobility. In addition, because of its extensive
commitment in Eritrea, the government has been
forced to supplement its Army with lightly armed,
poorly trained local militia who have generally proved
unreliable in combat, according to US
Embassy sources. F_ F
We believe the Ethiopian campaign against the Ti-
greans is hindered by Mengistu's inability to see the
insurgency as having roots separate from the Eritrean
conflict.' We conclude, on the basis of US Embassy
reporting, that Mengistu and most of his commanders
view the Tigrean insurgency as a front created by the
Eritreans primarily because of the ties between the
TPLF and EPLF. In this context, they believe that
the Tigrean problem will wither away once the Eritre-
an conflict is ended. Thus, despite occasional offensive
operations, troops stationed in Tigray have as their
primary mission the defense of urban areas and
highway links to Eritrea.
External Involvement
The Arabs. The Eritrean rebellion in particular has
long drawn the attention of neighboring countries and
outside powers. Historically, the Arab states have
provided political, economic, and military support to
the Eritreans for a variety of reasons-including Pan-
Arabism, influence projection, inter-Arab rivalries,
and concern over Soviet gains in the region represent-
ed by the regime in Addis Ababa. Indeed, some states
such as Iraq and Syria are, or have been, associated
with several of the Eritrean groups, including the
EPLF. In recent years, however, overall Arab assist-
ance appears to have declined substantially, primarily
because the Muslim-based Eritrean factions tradition-
ally supported by the Arabs have been supplanted by
the Marxist and largely Christian EPLF.
Sudan increasingly has sought to bolster the northern
insurgents during the past year, according to the US
Embassy. It has come to believe the only way to force
Addis Ababa to end its assistance to southern Suda-
nese rebels is to back Ethiopia's own separatists, the
Eritreans and Tigreans. Sudanese President Nimeiri
and other senior officials frequently have expressed
their belief to US officials that Ethiopia and its ally,
Libya, are surrogates for a Soviet attempt to install a
Marxist regime in Khartoum.'
Although Sudan is unable to provide significant direct
military or economic assistance to the insurgents, it
permits all of the insurgent groups to use Sudanese 25X1
territory as a base of operations and a logistic corridor 25X1
for material supplied by other Arab states. Sudan also
lobbies other Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, to increase their aid to the insurgents, accord- 25X1
ing to US Embassy officials. In addition, according to
US defense attache reporting, Khartoum has returned
some arms previously confiscated from the Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF).
We believe Saudi Arabia continues as the major Arab
supporter of the Eritreans.
the Saudi Government provides funds,
medicine, food, and other support-but rarely arms-
to the Muslim-dominated Eritrean groups. It also
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
encourages other Arabs, such as the Persian Gulf
states, to provide assistance. Riyadh's assistance to
the weaker Eritrean factions, such as the ELF and
Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces
(ELF/PLF), is designed to strengthen them politically
and militarily vis-a-vis the EPLF. The EPLF and its
ally, the TPLF, do not receive Saudi assistance
because of their Marxist-Christian makeup, although
occasionally the Saudis promise to consider such aid
as an inducement to create a unified Eritrean move-
ment. Saudi efforts to build such unity-centered
upon the more conservative groups as an alternative to
the EPLF-have not met with success, however,
primarily because of the intense personal rivalries
among the leaders of the various factions. According
to spokesmen from one of the larger Eritrean groups,
Riyadh has indicated that it will accept the EPLF in a
united front, but only if all the factions are given
equal representation. This proposal has been rebuffed
by the EPLF, which sees the attempt as a poorly
masked effort by Riyadh to weaken the movement's
position.
Syria and Iraq, according to several academic sources
and press accounts, provided military assistance to the
EPLF in the past, primarily in recognition of its
progressive credentials and to counter Saudi assist-
ance to the more conservative Eritrean fronts. We
believe their support has declined significantly, how-
ever, because of their increasing preoccupation with
their own conflicts. Even so, according to press ac-
counts and Eritrean officials, both states, as well as
Egypt, have kept up sporadic shipments in an effort to
maintain some influence with the EPLF leadership.
The paucity of Arab support has forced the EPLF to
augment the procurement of weapons and supplies.
all heavy weapons-tanks, artillery,
APCs-used by the EPLF were captured from the
Ethiopians and maintained by EPLF technicians or
Ethiopian defectors. Small arms, ammunition, and
support equipment are either captured from the Ethi-
opians, self-produced, obtained from Arab benefac-
tors, or purchased on the international arms market.
Journalistic and academic sources state that almost
all of the funds for these purchases come from
contributions obtained from expatriate Eritreans or
the organization's smuggling operations.
The Soviet and Cuban Role. Moscow's support of
Addis Ababa against the insurgents stems from its
broad political-military commitment to the Mengistu
regime. In addition, the Soviets' establishment of a
naval support facility at Dahlak Island off the Eritre-
an coast and their use of Asmara Air Base by IL-38
naval reconnaissance aircraft give Moscow a direct
stake in preventing Eritrean secession, in our opinion.
As a result, Soviet arms and advisers are deeply
involved in supporting the government campaigns in
the north. In Eritrea, Soviet advisers are attached at
least down to brigade-size units, and several have
been killed or wounded in combat, according to
attache reporting. Moscow's advisers also are involved
in planning military operations against the insurgents
in both Tigray and Eritrea, according to several
Embassy sources. The Soviet Commander of Ground
Forces, General Petrov, has traveled repeatedly to
Ethiopia to oversee major ground operations in the
north in recent years. According to the US Embassy,
he played a key role in convincing Mengistu to cancel
a major offensive planned for Eritrea earlier this year
and to concentrate instead on retraining and equip-
ping the northern Army.
Moscow also has attempted, unsuccessfully, to broker
a political settlement to the conflict, but Eritrean
officials report that they rejected the Soviet proposals.
According to US Embassy reporting, the Soviets
continue to advise Mengistu to find a political formu-
la to end the fighting, a recommendation causing
some tension in Moscow's relationship with the Men-
gistu regime. The Ethiopian leadership is sensitive to
outside criticism of its internal policies, and, we
believe, they are also suspicious of Soviet policy
toward the Eritrean conflict. The Ethiopians most
certainly recall that Moscow was a firm backer of
Eritrea's right to independence during the Haile
Selassie regime and of the numerous reports of Soviet
aid to the insurgents during that time.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85S00317R000300050001-2
Secret
Over the years, several efforts have been made toffnd
a solution to the Eritrean problem. Sudanese Presi-
dent Nimeiri, who has stated to US Embassy officials
that Soviet influence in Ethiopia will end only with a
political settlement, has been the most consistent
advocate of negotiations. According to Eritrean and
Sudanese officials, Nimeiri has often cooperated with
Saudi Arabia to try to establish an Eritrean negotiat-
ing team consisting of all the groups to facilitate
talks with the Ethiopians. Eritrean factionalism,
however, has prevented the formation of such a
negotiating team and talks have not begun. Sudanese
and Saudi efforts to pressure the Eritreans by threats
to reduce support have been weakened by its limited
scope. They have been further offset by the Muslim-
dominated insurgent groups' ability to get limited
support from other Arab supporters and their lack of
influence with the EPLF. In recent years, Nimeiri's
efforts have been further frustrated by the refusal of
the dominant EPLF, whose participation is vital to
the success of any negotiations, to cooperate with the
other factions.
Two of the Eritrean groups have held unilateral talks
with the Ethiopians in recent years. In the early
1980s, the Eritrean Liberation Front, according to a
spokesman held a series of
secret meetings with the Ethiopians in Rome. The
talks reportedly were arranged by the Italian Com-
munist Party. The ELF leadership had hoped to
arrange a separate peace that would guarantee it a
dominant role in a postwar Eritrea, according to
Sudanese officials. The Eritreans stated, however,
that Addis Ababa was not willing to make any
meaningful concession. In our opinion, the Mengistu
government viewed these talks as a device to further
divide the Eritrean movement-which was already
suffering from strains between the ELF and EPLF-
and to split the ELF from its Arab benefactors. F
The talks collapsed, according to Sudanese officials,
when Khartoum became aware of them and pressured
the ELF to withdraw. Nimeiri was concerned that
any agreement that excluded the other Eritrean
factions, especially the EPLF, would lead to a civil
war among the Eritreans, compounding Sudanese
security problems along the frontier.
The Soviet Union, acting both directly and through
the East Germans, has attempted on several occa-
sions to strike an agreement between the EPLF and
Addis Ababa. According to EPLF leaders, Moscow
has stressed that the common Marxist ideology
shared by the EPLF and the Mengistu regime guar-
antees the protection of Eritrean rights in a unified
Ethiopian state. The EPLF leadership, however, re-
buffed the Soviets by denying the relevancy of ideolo-
gy to the conflict. Indeed, EPLF spokesmen stated
that, according to the writings of Lenin, Eritrea has a
right as a nation to determine for itself the nature of
its relationship with Ethiopia. According to the Eri-
treans, denial of this right by Addis Ababa cast
doubts on the regime's Marxist credentials.
During 1983 and early this year, representatives of
the EPLF have stated that they secretly met directly
with Ethiopian delegations in Rome and Athens on
several occasions. According to an EPLF spokesman,
however, Addis Ababa refused to expand on its offer
of limited autonomy for the province within the
framework of a centralized state. For its part, the
EPLF refused to budge from its demand that Ethio-
pia recognize Eritrea's right to independence or, at a
minimum, to an impartially supervised plebiscite
within Eritrea on the issue.
The US Embassy reports-and we concur-that the
government has not opened negotiations with the
Tigrean rebels because the Mengistu government
views the Tigrean insurgency as merely an extension
of the Eritrean conflict.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85S00317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Cuba also supported the Eritrean independence strug-
gle before to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.
We believe, however, that Castro views the Marxist
regime in Addis Ababa as capable of addressing the
grievances of the Eritreans within a centralized state.
Cuba, at the same time, has refused several Ethiopian
requests to provide troops for the northern campaigns,
although it provides limited advisory and logistic
support, according to the US Embassy. We believe
Havana realizes the war is unwinnable, and Castro is
concerned over the high Cuban casualties a protracted
counterinsurgency campaign could entail. Castro's
unwillingness to become involved in the fighting
probably contributed to Ethiopia's decision last year
to request a drawdown in the Cuban military pres-
ence, according to the US Embassy. Senior Ethiopian
officers resented having to support several thousand
Cuban troops whose role was limited to garrison duty
in the Ogaden region as a deterrent against a much-
diminished Somali threat.
We believe that Ethiopia's pursuit of a military option
in the north has proved extremely costly socially,
militarily, politically, and economically. There is,
according to the US Embassy, a war weariness in the
capital and other urban areas that exacerbates discon-
tent with regime policies. Although this unhappiness
has not translated into support for the insurgents-
indeed most Ethiopians, especially the dominant Am-
haras, oppose Eritrean succession-it has fueled a
desire that the government find some type of political
settlement to the conflict. According to the US Em-
bassy, the middle class and other educated segments
of society hold the regime's commitment to the war at
least partly to blame for their declining economic
fortunes and the increasing Soviet role in Ethiopia.
According to the US Embassy-whose access is ad-
mittedly restricted-there is also growing opposition
to Mengistu in the rural areas, the source of the vast
majority of military inductees. The Embassy reports
that rural families are resisting the recruitment ef-
forts and at times the government has coerced local-
ities into meeting their quotas, further alienating the
populace from the military government.
Overall, the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies have
contributed to the regime's steadily eroding popular
support. We agree with the US Embassy's assessment
that the rule of Mengistu, whose position rests upon
the backing of military officials who have little sym-
pathy for civilian complaints about conscription or
economic difficulties, is not directly threatened. In the
view of the US Embassy, the regime's pervasive
security apparatus, which has reacted swiftly to any
signs of open dissent, appears to have thoroughly
intimidated the population.
Impact on the Military
Mengistu-with some effort-appears to have main-
tained the support of his senior commanders even
though some of his military tactics in the north have
caused some divisions within the Army and clearly
have resulted in a decline in the military's effective-
ness. According to the US Embassy and defense
attache reporting, the prolonged conflict has inflicted
heavy losses on the Army especially among junior
officers and senior NCOs, and, as a result, leadership,
maintenance, and training have suffered. The US
defense attache in Khartoum also believes that morale
within Ethiopia's northern Army has declined, al-
though not to the level of the mid-1970s when muti-
nies were a common occurrence in Eritrea. He further
states that there have been some localized mutinies
and several petitions from the north demanding an
end to the fighting and better conditions for the
troops.
Mengistu and his senior commanders are sensitive to
the threat posed to the regime by military unrest and
make extensive use of a network of political commis-
sars throughout the armed forces to detect signs of
dissent, according to the US Embassy. At times the
regime has reacted quickly to restore order by execut-
ing ringleaders; on other occasions, they have met
some of the demands put to them, such as providing
increased pay, and deferring action on others. Thus
far, these methods have enabled the regime to keep
the Army in line.
Late last year, dissatisfaction over the course of the
northern campaigns led to coup plotting by some
senior military and security officials, including mem-
bers of Mengistu's inner circle, according to several
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
US Embassy sources. The nascent plot, the first
serious threat to Mengistu since he took power in
1977, stemmed from the military's concern over de-
clining military morale and the heavy casualties
suffered in continuous combat, and was triggered by
Mengistu's plans for another offensive, according to
the Embassy. These issues also fueled the plotters'
disillusionment over the pervasive Soviet influence
within the military and resentment over Cuba's un-
willingness to commit forces to the counterinsurgency
Mengistu successfully preempted the threat, in our
view, by postponing his plans for an offensive and
instituting a number of training and personnel meas-
ures-such as small unit operations and increased
recruitment-long sought by his military chiefs. We
also believe that he supported a Cuban troop reduc-
tion in Ethiopia in an effort to defuse further the
situation.
In our opinion, the inability of the plotters to formu-
late an alternative policy for dealing with the rebel-
lions also contributed to their decision not to move.
all of
the plotters were committed to a unified Ethiopian
state. Some of the conspirators, however, had been
involved in government-sponsored negotiations with
the insurgents, according to
Eritrean spokesmen, and they probably realized tat a
political settlement was unlikely as long as the EPLF
demanded independence or elections supervised by
third parties
Economic Losses
The economic cost of the insurgencies, in our opinion,
has been limited by the confinement of the fighting to
areas relatively unimportant to the national economy.'
Nonetheless, we estimate that costs directly attribut-
able to the fighting probably have totaled roughly $3
billion since 1974-almost twice the amount of offi-
cial development assistance received during the same
period from OECD countries. This sum includes
The major growing regions for foodgrains and for coffee-which
traditionally has accounted for about three-fifths of all export
earnings-are in the central and southwestern areas of Ethiopia. In
addition, although some of the small manufacturing sector is
located in Asmara, most industrial activity occurs around Addis
government defense and refugee expenses, and pro-
duction losses in commerce, agriculture, and industry.
We believe agricultural and industrial output has
been particularly hard hit by transportation disrup-
tions of needed inputs and final products. In addition,
the indirect economic costs of fighting include re-
duced business confidence, capital flight, the need to
cut planned development expenditures to help pay for
defense, and the government's inability to concentrate
its energies on economic problems. Some of these
indirect costs, particularly capital flight and changes 25X1
in business confidence, may have declined over time
as the region has adjusted to a war footing.F__1 25X1
We estimate that government spending accounts for
almost three-fourths of the total direct cost of the
insurgencies. Our calculations, based on official bud-
get statistics, indicate that military spending attribut-
able to the northern insurgencies has totaled at least
$1.7 billion since 1974, with extrabudgetary expendi- 25X1
tures-particularly during the heavy fighting of the
mid-to-late 1970s-possibly adding several hundreds
of millions of dollars more to the price tag.' In
addition, the government has attempted to increase
development spending in the northern area; two years
ago, for example, the regime budgeted approximately
$90 million as part of the Red Star campaign,
according to US Embassy reporting. We believe,
however, that most of the funds were never disbursed
because of the failure of the Army to crush the
insurgency. Addis Ababa also has provided limited 25X1
funding to help cover the food and housing require-
ments of the hundreds of thousands of people in this 25X1
region displaced by drought and combat; almost all of
the costs involved, however, have been covered by aid
Production losses, defined as the shortfall between
potential output and actual reported output, have
added to the bill. Commerce and agriculture have
8 Budgeted defense expenditures have remained high since the late
1970s as the regime has concentrated more of its troops and
' Last year alone, according to preliminary figures released by the
United Nations, aid donors contributed some $90 million in food
aid and cash grants to help refugees located all over the country.
We are unable, however, to break out either aid directed solely to
Eritrean and Tigrean refugees, or assistance aimed only at victims
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
suffered the most damage. On the basis of national
trends during 1961-75 and our estimate of the north-
ern region's share of domestic commerce, we estimate
that domestic trade and transportation in Eritrea and
Tigray have fallen as much as $450 million below
potential levels since 1975, and we believe much of
the loss can be attributed to the insurgencies. More-
over, this total does not include ripple effects that
have hit other economic sectors in Eritrea and Tigray.
The insurgency has hit the agricultural sector. We
think commercial and export crops grown in the
northern region-mostly oilseeds, but also cotton,
pulses, fruits, and vegetables-have been particularly
affected. According to our estimates, derived from
comparing Ethiopia's average exports in 1971-74 with
sales during the following years, national exports of
these crops have dropped almost three-fifths by vol-
ume since the early 1970s, costing the government
some $700 million in lost foreign exchange earnings.
We believe most of this loss is attributable to produc-
tion shortfalls in the northern region caused, in part,
by insurgent operations that have intimidated and
dislocated workers, damaged agricultural equipment
and crops, and reduced access to inputs and markets
because of transport bottlenecks. Other factors unre-
lated to the insurgencies-especially the recurrent
drought and soil erosion-also have significantly re-
duced regional productivity. In addition, grain pro-
duction has lagged although we believe the drought
was primarily responsible.
Our calculations, based on changes in the northern
region's share of national industrial output over the
past decade, indicate that insurgency-related produc-
tion losses in Eritrea's small industrial sector-manu-
facturing, handicrafts, and small industry-probably
total less than $100 million since 1974, an amount
probably far less than the impact of disruption caused
by the economic policies followed during this time.
The insurgents have reduced local production directly
by disrupting transportation and sabotaging electric
plants, and indirectly by driving the government to
military conscription that results in labor shortages,
particularly in rural areas. There has been little
impact on Ethiopia's export earnings, however, since
almost all industrial production in Eritrea and Tigray
Although the northern insurgencies have contributed
to the regime's increasingly tight financial bind, we
believe the economic burdens in themselves are un-
likely to turn Mengistu away from his resolve to
pursue military victory. Faced with a heavy defense
load and insufficient revenues-in part because of
reduced tax collection and increased smuggling in the
northern provinces-the government has pared
planned nonmilitary spending and stepped up domes-
tic and foreign borrowing. This strategy already is
weakening the base for future economic growth and
has led, since 1980 alone, to a doubling of Addis
Ababa's external debt servicing costs to the West.
Moreover, even though Western donors have helped
ease the government's financial plight by extending
roughly $250 million annually in official aid in recent
years, foreign exchange reserves have fallen so low
that Addis Ababa may be reappraising its stand
against approaching the IMF for balance-of-pay-
ments support.
We believe there is little likelihood of a military or
political solution to either of the northern insurgencies
for the next two years. In Eritrea, the EPLF almost
certainly will maintain its capability to achieve tacti-
cal victories by carefully choosing its targets, but the
government's military superiority-and Moscow's
support-will keep the Eritreans from achieving their
goal of independence. We agree with the US Embassy
that Addis Ababa will launch another major offensive
within the next six months and probably will recap-
ture some of the area lost earlier this year. According
to EPLF spokesmen, for example, Teseney is not
defendable and they plan to withdraw from the town
if the Ethiopians attack it. At the same time, however,
the tenacity of the insurgents, their support from the
population, and the large areas of difficult terrain
favoring the guerrillas will prevent Addis Ababa from
crushing the insurgency, even if it should capture the
rebel stronghold at the town of Nak'fa.
On the basis of Soviet support to date, Moscow
appears to be determined to stay the course. The
Soviets probably are concerned that the loss of Eritrea
is for the domestic market.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
might cause the Mengistu regime to collapse, threaten
Moscow's position in Ethiopia, and damage Soviet
credibility among other clients.
The Soviets probably will continue to search for a
political formula that appeals to both sides, but Addis
Ababa's uncompromising stance and the complete
domination of the Eritrean rebellion by the hardline
EPLF argues against any political accommodation.
An EPLF spokesman reports the leadership of the
guerrilla group firmly believes victory is possible and
has rejected repeatedly Soviet-designed settlement
terms that might appeal to the central government.
We do not believe the EPLF or any other Eritrean
faction would accept an offer that does not at a
minimum include a referendum supervised by third
parties, which almost certainly would favor Eritrean
independence.
In Tigray, we envision a continuing military stalemate
with little or no prospect for a major breakthrough by
either side. Moreover, Mengistu's failure to under-
stand that there are differences between the Eritrean
and the Tigrean rebellions and his commitment to a
strong centralized regime in Addis Ababa appear to
rule out any political solution
The northern insurgencies probably will continue to
frustrate US interest in reducing or eliminating the
Soviet presence in Ethiopia, since they ensure that
Ethiopia will continue to seek weapons and advisers
from Moscow. Even in the unlikely event that the
Mengistu government falls as a result of serious
defeats or war weariness in some quarters of the
military, a successor government would be likely to
continue efforts to retain Ethiopia's territorial integri-
ty. Thus, even a pro-Western junta would find it
difficult to break with the Soviets because of its need
for arms to combat the insurgents.
In addition, the United States might become the
target of a more hostile Ethiopian policy. According
to the US Embassy, Mengistu and other senior Ethio-
pian leaders believe the United States is involved in
supporting the northern insurgents. Continued suc-
cessful operations by the rebels would cause the
Mengistu government to look for ways to retaliate for
this perceived US activity, either directly by breaking
relations or striking at US targets, or indirectly by
increasing military pressure on Sudan and Somalia,
countries friendly to the United States. In either case,
US interests in the region would be jeopardized as
Addis Ababa searches for scapegoats in frustration
over its inability to suppress its northern insurgencies.
25X1
25X1
We believe, however, that Mengistu's continuing fail-
ure to suppress the northern insurgencies poses little
direct threat to Ethiopia's political stability. Although
the military and the government differ on tactics for
fighting the conflict, as long as Mengistu continues to
accede to their desires by improving training and
tactics before launching another major offensive, we
see little likelihood they will move against him over
this issue.
A continuing stalemate has impact beyond Ethiopia's
borders. At a minimum Addis Ababa probably will
continue to blame Sudan for its problems in the north
and may even choose to escalate its assistance to anti-
Nimeiri rebels that operate in southern Sudan. If so,
Khartoum would look to the United States for in-
creased military aid to combat this threat. The situa-
tion could become further inflamed-as it has in the
past-by inadvertent clashes between Ethiopian and
Sudanese forces along the border or Ethiopian air
attacks against Eritrean base camps located in Sudan.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
Appendix
The Northern Insurgent Groups
The Eritrean liberation movement is split into three
main factions by ideological, religious, and personal
rivalries. These divisions are deep rooted and have
frustrated several efforts by Saudi Arabia and Sudan
over the past 10 years to unify the Eritreans. Faction-
al resentment over the political and military domina-
tion of the movement since 1981 by the hardline
Eritrean People's Liberation Front makes unifica-
tion-or even cooperation by the factions-unlikely
even in the long term.
The Eritrean People's Liberation Front
The Marxist and largely Christian EPLF split from
the Eritrean Liberation Front in the early 1970s. At
that time, the organizers of the EPLF openly criti-
cized the ELF's espousal of Pan-Arab and Muslim
goals rather than Marxist ideals. For several years
thereafter, the EPLF was engaged in combat with the
other Eritrean factions, especially the ELF, which it
finally defeated in the summer of 1981
Academic studies and press reports indicate that,
although the EPLF is pragmatic in its application of
Marxism in areas under its control, ideological con-
cerns are important to its leaders and cadre-a group
coming primarily from the politicized urban areas of
the province. Many were students in Western Europe,
especially Italy, and the movement has close ties with
several European Socialist and Communist parties,
according to their own propaganda and academic
studies. In addition, some senior officers have stated
that they received military and ideological training in
the People's Republic of China in the late 1960s.F_
The EPLF is the most hardline Eritrean group in
negotiating with the Ethiopian Government. Its lead-
ers consistently have rejected Addis Ababa's offers of
autonomy for the province, insisting that uncondition-
al Ethiopian acceptance of Eritrean independence is
the only basis for a political settlement, according to
press releases and public policy statements
The Eritrean Liberation Front
The ELF originally was almost exclusively Muslim,
reflecting its formation in 1962 in opposition to the
absorption of Eritrea by Christian-dominated Ethio-
pia. Eventually, it attracted a sizable number of
Christians who were alienated by former Emperor
Haile Selassie's repressive policies in the province.
Although the ELF attempted to be a loosely struc-
tured, umbrella organization, encompassing different
religious and ideological beliefs, factional infighting
between Muslims and Christians, and Marxists and
conservatives, soon emerged.
Our analysis of contemporary accounts suggests the
rapid decline of the ELF between 1978 and 1981
stemmed from several factors:
? Its armed units suffered heavy casualties in fighting
with the Ethiopian Army during Addis Ababa's
major offensive in 1978.
? A power struggle in 1980 between the conservative- 25X1
moderate faction and leftist opponents paralyzed
the leadership and prompted many ELF members to
switch to other Eritrean factions.
? The ELF's forces were evicted from the province
and most of its weapons seized by Sudan after the
group's defeat by the EPLF in 1981.
? Support from its traditional Arab backers, such as
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, declined as a result
of the movement's unilateral meetings with Soviet 25X1
and Ethiopian representatives to discuss peace op-
tions. 25X1
25X1
The ELF has splintered into several factions and
probably retains fewer than 5,000 troops-very few of
whom are located in Eritrea Province. Although
Sudan recently returned to the ELF some of the arms
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85S00317R000300050001-2
Secret
it confiscated from the group three years ago and
Saudi Arabia provides financial aid, the organization
appears demoralized and engages in little military
activity, according to Embassy and defense attache
reporting.
The Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular
Liberation Forces
This faction was formed by longtime Eritrean spokes-
man Osman Saleh Sabbe after his expulsion in 1976
from the EPLF. Its published propaganda indicates
an appeal to conservative Muslims, but it has only a
few hundred troops. We believe the faction is little
more than an extension of its colorful leader. Despite
this, Sabbe has been able to acquire large amounts of
money and equipment as a result of his personal
contacts with Arab leaders and his reputation outside
Ethiopia as a spokesman for the Eritrean cause.
We believe the ELF/PLF, however, has not developed
a strong following among Eritreans because Sabbe
has focused his efforts on generating support abroad
rather than developing an internal organizational
structure. Most of Sabbe's followers are recruited
from Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan. It has con-
ducted few operations inside Ethiopia since its forces
were driven out in 1979 after extensive fighting with
the ELF-generated by Sabbe's attempts to recruit
ELF members. Neither the EPLF nor the ELF accept
Sabbe's group as an equal, and their leadership
considers him an opportunist.
Tigray Province
The Tigreans, largely Christian peasants, share a
common cultural and religious heritage with Ethio-
pia's dominant Amhara ethnic group. For centuries
the Tigrean and Amhara royal houses vied for control
of the country and recognition as the legitimate
defender of Ethiopian culture and Coptic Christian
orthodoxy.
The collapse of Emperor Haile Selassie's regime in
1974 weakened central government control of the
countryside, and prompted a renewal of Tigrean
nationalism that had been dormant since the 1940s,
when a short-lived rebellion was suppressed by the
central government with British military assistance.
This postrevolution rebirth culminated in the forma-
tion of the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)
in March 1975. Our analysis of US defense attache
and Embassy reporting leads us to believe that the
Tigrean movement grew slowly at first, primarily
because of competition within the province from other
groups on the left and right. According to academic
works and journalist reports, the TPLF gradually
absorbed the smaller Tigrean resistance forces and
defeated rival non-Tigrean guerrillas.
The TPLF increased significantly in size and strength
following its alliance in 1978 with the EPLF. The
relationship between the leadership of the TPLF and
the EPLF is based on ideological compatibility and, to
some extent, a common Coptic Christian heritage.
The relationship gives the TPLF access to EPLF arms
and training, supplementing the weapons it captures
from the Ethiopian Army. In addition, the TPLF
gains valuable experience in more conventional fight-
ing by occasionally participating in joint operations
with EPLF units.
The TPLF leadership originally was dominated by
Marxist nationalists from the urban areas, although
more conservative, less doctrinaire figures may have
assumed some leadership positions in recent years as
the organization has expanded to include more con-
servative elements. This shift probably reflects the
increasing numbers of conservative Christians who
have joined the TPLF. In an effort to broaden the
appeal to these elements, we believe the TPLF leader-
ship has downplayed ideology, stressing instead the
historical appeal of Tigrean nationalism and the
threat posed to the traditional Tigrean social structure
by Addis Ababa's internal socialist policies.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85S00317R000300050001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/27: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300050001-2