CIA Headlines Schieffer Panel on “China’s Rise” at CSIS
On Wednesday, March 20th, Deputy Assistant Director of CIA for the East Asia and Pacific Mission Center, Michael Collins, participated in a panel discussion on the rise of China, moderated by former CBS’ Face the Nation anchor Bob Schieffer at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.
Schieffer Series: China's Rise
good evening and welcome to the Center
for Strategic international studies I’m
Andrew Schwartz here at CSIS so happy to
have all of you here especially Dean
Kristy button from TCU TCU and the
Schieffer College of Communication are
our partners and we’re very sad that the
horn frogs didn’t make the NCAA
tournament March Madness but we love
them anyway and it’s baseball season so
who cares right we also have to thank
our partner long time for the schieffer
series that’s the New York host
foundation who has been amazing and
helping us put the series on thank you
to them and without further ado the
strongest name in news Bob Schieffer
well this is a big one and I think we
have one of the strongest groups of
experts that anybody has put together on
this the title as you saw in your
program is the rise of China in the West
as it is in every country we have our
creation story we have some people call
it a myth when I was back when I was in
the Air Force during the Vietnam era I
discovered that the creation myth in
Laos is that they believe they came out
of a giant pumpkin everybody has their
own myth but the the creation story of
China as Henry Kissinger has pointed out
is different than any other in that
unlike any other creation story
basically China was already here when
the world was created how China got here
is still unknown so we should not be
surprised when we talk about the rise of
China that the Chinese do not see it
exactly the way we do to them what is
happening today is China’s return to the
center stage however we see it most of
the foreign Paul
a community I think would tell you how
we manage this relationship and how they
manage this relationship is perhaps the
greatest challenge facing the leadership
of both countries we also know that in
the long history of the world when a
country rises to challenge the existing
sole superpower in most cases it has
resulted in war the so called the
clippies trap ram allison of harvard
says there have been 16 sons junctures
in the history of the world starting
with the rise of athens which rose up to
challenge sparta and in 12 of those 16
jump junctures the result was war so
that is where we’re heading today we
find ourselves in a great competition
with China but is it leading us closer
to war or is it leading us toward a more
stable world that’s what we want to talk
about and may I say as I already said
this panel is one of the best we’ve ever
assembled I really encourage you to read
their full biographies in your programs
but let me introduce each of them
briefly Michael L Collins is the deputy
assistant director the CIA’s East Asia
and Pacific mission Center he has served
in the CIA since 1996 as an analyst at
various times on the East Asia the
Middle East as well as North Africa and
the Caribbean Peninsula he is joined by
our own quince Johnson whose senior
advisor at CSIS holder of the Freeman
chair of China studies he’s a longtime
CIA analyst and China watcher Victor
chow down on the end holds the Korea
chair at CSIS he came here after leaving
the National Security Council in 2007 I
think he is acknowledged by most people
as one of the most knowledgeable Korea
scholars in America today and finally
Margaret Brennan who I must say has the
best job in Germany
she’s moderator to face the nation and
is CBS News chief foreign affairs
correspondent she was a full byte
scholar and graduated with distinction
from the University of Virginia where
she majored in Middle East Studies and
minored in Arabic and she’s a new mom so
congratulations project well let’s just
set the stage here by getting a brief
thought from each of you where are we
right now at this juncture how would
each of you describe the relationship
between China and the United States what
is the threat being posed by China or is
it a threat so michael wondering you’re
the active you’re not a former you’re
you’re you’re the active here today part
of the government how would you compare
this juncture right now well okay well
thanks Bob thanks for the question thank
thanks for your interest in the topic
more generally but let me also say
thanks to CSIS for the opportunity as
you know we don’t do these things very
often when we do I hope that affirms
just how important the issue is being
discussed so the rise of China let me
say two things about it one thing about
what concerns us and one thing that does
not concern us as to what the threat is
and what is it so the challenge we see
stemming from China’s rise is I would
say no longer of a traditional military
security or intelligence nature it is
increasingly so and more seriously so
but even more broadly it represents I
would argue the most serious challenge
to the liberal international order our
government and our like-minded partners
have stood behind for the last several
decades why do I say this I see this in
the open aspirations that the Communist
Party of China under Xi Jingping
actually enunciates in terms of defining
their aspirations as essentially a
zero-sum struggle for influence on
leadership around the world at the
expense of the norms and institutions
the liberal international order as we
currently know it
holds dear the increasing understanding
of how the Communist Party of China is
defining how they want their country
certainly governed and the norms and
institutions around the world that best
enable that are in direct conflict with
what our government and like-minded
countries actually stand behind I say
this as well because China’s clearly
increasingly proactively using its power
and more coercive and assertive ways to
establish greater influence around the
world with governments and within
countries with academia with media in
ways that are intended to advance that
objective I say this as well because
when you look at the standards that the
Communist Party of China requires in its
international engagement with countries
around the world and its assistance in
the terms it requires for trade
agreements or great arrangements they
are in direct conflict with many of the
standards we have required in the
international financial institutions
that have advocated transparency and
corruption free assistance requiring but
the last point I want to say as well is
what this threat is not so broadly it is
an honest and I’m saying this as
dispassionately as possible we we see a
a difference of view on how governments
should be governed our country should be
governed but what the threat is not the
threat is not the challenge is not
necessarily coming from China’s rise
alone China’s economy alone our
relationship with China at Chinese
people and certainly the Chinese
diaspora around the world to the
contrary those are all very positive
forces for moderation cooperation and
change the challenge is increasingly
coming from a state the Communist Party
of China and Russia Jinping that
increasingly defines its aspirations by
how it desires to define and govern its
own society at home and there and I
think is the greatest challenge for what
the United States and our partners
around the world have to wrestle with as
it pertains to a victor you’re the Korea
expert you know a lot about Japan and
also how is this situation where we find
ourselves
how is it being viewed in Asia thanks
for the question Bob I think so first I
would say with a it’s it’s viewed as the
most important question out there when
we think about the future across any
metric by which we define great power
status there’s only one actor out there
besides the United States that equates
with that great power status and that is
China and I think countries in the
region Korea Japan Vietnam Australia all
of them understand that that this is the
the next big challenge for the post-war
liberal international order that Michael
was describing and so I think this this
is the big unanswered question in
international relations today going
forward is how is China either going to
accommodate this post-war liberal order
or to what extent they’re going to try
to revise it and if they seek neither to
accommodate it nor to revise it but
actually seek simply to destroy it with
no other model to follow many would
argue that’s even worse and so I think
many allies in Asia you know they they
are transitioning now because in the
past many of them said I don’t want to
choose don’t make me choose between the
United States and China I would like to
have my cake and eat it too I would like
the security benefits from the United
States and the economic benefits from
China but increasingly because of the
things that Michael described many
countries in the region are realizing
that it’s going to be harder and harder
in the future to have your cake and eat
it too because you know whether it’s
China or the United States they are
compelling choices that countries did
not want to make before whether it’s
things like joining the AIB or not
joining it or whether it’s joining the
US missile defense system in Asia or not
joining it there are now choices that
are being that they’re being compelled
to make that they’re having a very
difficult time Chris what’s your take I
agree with most of what’s been said I
tried it maybe just sharpen the point a
little bit by saying that in my mind
really trying
resurgence on the world stage the
emerging blueprint that might kind of
referred to as to how they want to
execute the ambitions they have and
therefore the challenge that that then
presents to the rules-based global
international order is the dominant
strategic narrative for the 21st century
I mean I guess that’s about as tight a
bumper sticker as I can put on it and I
also would just emphasize as well that
the change the challenge is one like
we’ve never seen before and this is why
I don’t like the Thucydides trap model
because hey I think it’s bad history but
well bore people with that but the
technology has fundamentally changed the
game it has turned out for example to
Mike’s point technology has been a
tremendous enabler for authoritarian
regimes much to the dismay of the
Fukuyama’s of the world and you know
people like that it’s not the end of
history and it turns out if you have a
market that’s big enough and enough
determination you can use the internet
you know in a very sort of course of
coercive way I also would just highlight
that I think it’s important that we
understand and we’ll get into this I’m
sure these policies did not start with
Xi Jinping’s arrival you know on on to
the scene my sense has only spent if you
understand the Communist Party of China
as an organization and its history much
of what they’re doing now should not
surprise I think what we’re seeing is
that the underlying strategic tension
certainly between the US and China have
been building for a while and I believe
we’re in a situation now where Xi
Jinping is an accelerant for those
challenges and so is Donald Trump so
that’s making things a lot you know sort
of more robust and I think the main
thing to underscore here is that what
worked for us in the Cold War with the
Soviet Union it was so Fiat I Soviet
isolation China is not isolated and –
the ability to engage in unrestricted
competition across all domains that is
either non-existent with China or is
seriously challenged in a lot of domains
especially given the close intertwining
between our
economist Margaret well I would say two
things and these are great sort of big
picture items sketched out here I know
for everyday sort of viewers consumers
it’s always like well how does this all
affect me and two things I’d point out
one President Trump was just at a rally
in Ohio and talking again about China in
terms of this trade deal that he expects
to strike he keeps talking about it as
if it’s about to happen going to happen
we’ve seen the date for potential
meeting with Xi Jinping pushed from the
end of March possibly out till April
nothing’s on the calendar the White
House says in part because they don’t
want to be pinned down to something
because the Chinese assume that if a
meeting happens that means there’s
actually a deal and they don’t want to
walk in and have happened to them what
happened to Kim jong-un a few weeks ago
in Hanoi but the president’s language
around this is to workers in Ohio about
the money China is stealing from the US
the five hundred billion they take from
this country was how he was phrasing it
I believe he’s referring to about a five
hundred billion dollars in goods
purchased from China you know as somehow
as someone who covered Wall Street for a
long time people just kind of
short-handed referred to China as the
world’s Walmart
for a reason China had cheap labor it
made things cheaper Americans like cheap
deals right these are the things that as
consumers we like about how China has
changed markets but there are a lot of
things workers in states like Ohio don’t
like about some of these levels of
competition and things and so I think
you are gonna hear about China on the
campaign trail in 2020 in ways that
people haven’t quite figured out how
they want to articulate policy changes
yet but they most likely will have some
kind of trade agreement with China to
either complain about or praise in a few
months time because the president seems
committed to a deal what that deal looks
like is really hard to describe at this
point you know you often hear the
president talk about Goods agricultural
products that is something that
politically really will resonate for him
you don’t necessarily hear the
particulars of what the trade dispute is
supposed to be about which is about
technology transfer and all of these
kind of esoteric things that may not
read
on the campaign trail but mean a heck of
a lot to people who are investing there
in terms of trying to set up businesses
so that’s something that I’m constantly
tracking the other thing I’d point out
that I haven’t quite figured out how to
digest yet is I thought it was very
notable that Secretary of State Pompeyo
in the past week and a half or so has
used much stronger language to talk
about China’s human rights abuses in a
way that a frankly as the United States
you would expect the u.s. to talk about
meaning pointing out that close to a
million people are believed to be
rounded up in parts of China Muslim
minorities the language used by the
State Department twice was saying we
haven’t seen something like this since
the 1930s
that’s pretty stark language to compare
it to didn’t really get a lot of
attention because you haven’t heard it
from the White House yet but secondly
I’d say one thing that stood out to me
about that a that he’s talking about it
at all
because this administration is often
accused of pulling its punches on human
rights so it’s a little bit of pressure
I think interestingly starting to happen
on that front that maybe if this trade
deal gets done we hear more about or
maybe we’ll hear from higher levels than
the Secretary of State about and perhaps
carrying some consequence with it
largely it has had zero consequences us
far so I guess our people are going back
to China next week aren’t they Venetian
gardens like Kaiser to start
negotiations what doe does anybody have
any thoughts on do you think they’re
going to get a trade deal I’ll take a
stab at it I think we will get one
eventually I think as Margaret was
saying the the devil is in the details
right now and I think one of the
challenges we face as we’ve kind of gone
through this process and for those who
have to watch it every day that’s very
painful is that there’s a cycle that
happens in these negotiations which is
you know the the sort of hawkish
elements which are really defined
largely by light hyzer in the
administration say we have to have a
deal that is not just transactional it
has to be meaningful it has to address
all of the u.s. very valid US and US
business community concerns about
industrial policy in China subsidies to
state-owned enterprise
the regime’s use of a coercive
regulatory toolkit to block our
companies from markets you know these
sort of issues structural issues let’s
call them versus simply buying more
stuff soybeans airplanes you know
they’re the other things that are that
are on on the table and so what we tend
to see is a cycle where the Hawks are
ascendant for a while
markets begin to become skittish that
nothing’s actually gonna get done
Trump starts to panic because he sees
the markets going down and he gets on
his people to let’s get this across the
finish line and I’ve seen it these ten
cycles of this since we take this off
you know last year and I think we’re in
another one of those cycles so for
example I think this most recent trip
that we’re seeing emerge it’s very
interesting my understanding is is the
Treasury Department that we leaked the
upcoming trip to the press because
yesterday markets were going down based
on stories over the weekend and this
might take tell me or Jim and they
wanted to you know arrest that the trip
was already planned but they wanted to
dive in so we keep seeing this over and
over again so my sense is let’s see what
comes out of this next round
I don’t think expectations are high on
either side I think it’s mainly let’s
keep up appearances and as marty was
saying we’re just gonna see this date
keep getting push because it turns out
this is really hard to do you know this
negotiation if it’s serious is far more
complex than China’s accession to the
WTO and that took a decade to negotiate
we have seen the Chinese government
evolve as I was reading to get ready for
this today as somebody I read where
someone remarked that don’t shall being
opened up China’s economy as power was
passed from mouth but the political
system was not open and this observer
said perhaps because they saw what had
happened to Gorbachev and the collapse
of the Soviet Union but how does that
affect our dealing with China Michel
well I think what’s your thought
stepping back from the day to day
on the on the bilateral negotiations
what what’s happening is a is a great
reflection of fundamental differences
into how we see economies being governed
and how they want economies being
governed I think more recently on
cheating things ascendance in particular
there’s consolidation all the more of
authoritarian control in that society
and the elimination and move moving past
the collective leadership structure they
used to have to be sure following Deng
Xiaoping the political political opening
was not necessarily the thing to have
but at the same time it still had my
brought a collective leadership
structure the most fascinating thing to
me that’s happened in China most recent
years is the consolidation of Greater
Communist Party control over all things
China all things within China and all
things Chinese outside of China as they
themselves enunciate the the idea that
political reform will follow as
international relations theory might
suggest economic engagement and open
economic openness assumes in that that
economic openness and open economic
perform is an end to be achieved itself
I would submit that the fundamental end
of the Communist Party of China under
Seiji ping is all the more to control
that society politically and
economically so the economy is being
viewed and affected and controlled to
achieve a political end vice thinking
about open up opening up the politics to
help enable what we would think are the
reforms needed to achieve an economic
end and there and I think is the
greatest challenge right here in this
particular issue we’re discussing how
this plays out I like the way Victor
framed this more broadly stepping back
how this actually plays out and in
particular not just what happens in our
relationship our bilateral relationship
but how others actually react to this
how do the other partners who are also
wrestling with China on these same
issues how do the international trading
and financial institutions respond to
that I think this is going to be a you
know a key moment in to how this plays
and then and what and what Michael is
describing is a de mess
issue for China but but it’s a domestic
issue that has all sorts of
international ramifications because
precisely because China is a great power
it is or will be the next great power I
mean the sort of domestic makeup and
choices that great powers make
historically has all sorts of ripple
effects for other countries in the
system there is a reason why the United
States in its leadership role after
World War two also saw the third wave of
democratization in the world right and
we are seeing Democratic backsliding in
the world in no small part because you
have countries like Russia and China
well China Ascended Russia back in the
game and the United States sort of
receding from the scene so what what
mike describes as a domestic experiment
in China I would argue has international
repercussions for the way we think about
regime type democracy and domestic
choices around the world and it
definitely does because I think the the
two dilemmas the Chinese Communist Party
basically faces are they have a
requirement to break through the middle
income trap to keep themselves in power
they are in a performance-based
legitimacy system so they have no choice
but to succeed on that secondly as they
rise in power and prestige they have a
desire to gain international legitimacy
they need to do both of these things but
they don’t want to open the political
system yet they know that most of the
successful cases especially in Asia who
have conquered those various things have
done throw done so at least in part
through democratization so this is their
challenge they are determined not to
follow the democratization path so then
it leaves them in certain tracks
industrial policy on the economy and
making this the world safe for China’s
unique governance system and state
capitalist economy in the international
space you know market one of the things
we haven’t talked about in connection
with the economy and trade is security
national security there’s no question
that the administration clearly wants to
rein in China’s economical and
technological ambition
and to stop China from playing a role in
the next iteration of the technological
revolution the so-called 5 G’s that we
talked about which I had to go look that
I think a lot of people though even in
the government will be like yes the 5
G’s is important then you ask them what
they mean really guy you gotta talk to
somebody else it turns out what areas
5th generation right exactly this
technology which just proves what John
Connally once said when he said all jobs
in government are the same once you
learn the jargon you’re set if you have
common sense but there was a very
interesting story in the New York Times
I guess was it day before yesterday the
headline was allies are spurning
campaigned by the United States to block
Huawei the Chinese telecom giant and
clearly there is a concern about
security there what’s that all about
Margaret there there is and I think a
lot of that was based around some verbal
sparring with the the German government
in particular well why way there’s so
many levels to this story but in this
country you have heard you know it’s one
of the interesting things that’s a few
bipartisan issues done for griemann is
that China is the threat right but it’s
exactly what you do about that and how
you counter it goes you can run the
gamut Marco Rubio of Florida has been
championing for some time this effort in
the United States to specifically block
Huawei and ZTE do companies from being
able to sell products here there’s been
pressure politically to to ban certain
products with the idea that they can be
used to be a national security threat to
the United States in other words if
there’s something physiology and they
have a backdoor entry essentially yes
and which is why I think the Pentagon
has already implemented some of these
bans but in terms of everyday consumers
that’s what people like Marco Rubio are
talking about trying to block them out
of the market and it led to the
and remember if you remember the Twitter
messages that the president had posted
about a personal call from she’s in pain
a year ago about CTE that company and
how important it was all of this is is
is a long complicated story but it gets
to this bigger question of our Chinese
companies actually you know capitalist
entities within a communist system or
are they arms of the Chinese government
I mean that’s the kind of fundamental
question this comes down to and how they
view it and most certainly Republican
senators particularly Marco Rubio would
argue the PLA and these companies are
the same thing and therefore they
shouldn’t be having access to our market
we’re trying to tell our allies this is
also a risk as well but I don’t find and
I’m I’m sure Michael probably can’t
comment on this so I’d love to know what
he thinks about it but you find a
difference of opinion cuz I had asked a
light hyzer the the trade represented
when he was on my program a while ago
what he thought about bands like that
and he said when I pressed him on it
that he wasn’t in favor but it doesn’t
seem like that’s necessarily where the
administration is right I can’t
articulate for you what the
administration’s policy is on this I
don’t know what it is so Michael is
there something we ought to be worried
about so I would say there’s three
aspects to the challenge behind the
stepping back one is let me just say one
thing upfront to I think the irony and
what we’re talking about terms of
economic engagement I do find it ironic
that when you step back and you think in
this international free and liberal
economic worth that we’ve stood behind
no countries actually benefited more in
their economic ascendance than China
from that international economic order
we have maintained in the free and
liberal principles that have allowed
China to actually engage in our country
to acquire the technology they are
acquiring to achieve what they’re trying
to do in things like 5g and at the same
time no country has historically more
threatened that order than trying to
chrome he does I find that irony
noteworthy but the threat that comes
from this one is it’s on the national
security standpoint not just to us but
the countries around the world that
vital technology that innovative
expertise and capability that gives our
country and other
country’s strengths is that risk by all
the means by which the Chinese go about
to acquire that so there is one aspect
of a threat
you know the second is how they use that
capability saying nothing specifically
about five G per se but from a you know
a military security dimension one of our
greatest concerns about Chinese military
capabilities are increasingly in those
areas that require high-end technology
areas and cyber and space an electronic
warfare where let’s say the norms of the
road have not actually been established
and in our national security process we
adhere to certain norms and rules when
we utilize such technology
the Chinese don’t second point third
point is look at how trying to use that
technology domestically look at what
happens what is happening in Shin John
look at what is happening to repress
free and open expression look at what is
happening to repress freedom of Liberty
and all those other things how they use
that technology domestically and the
laws that are on the books requiring
Chinese entities to have that technology
to have called upon to provide support
to the security services of China not
just in China but overseas that’s why
this is a risk that’s why this is a
challenge and I think before we leave
this one Bob it’s really important to
underscore the issue because it’s such a
microcosm for the China challenge that
we started off with in terms of trying
to get allies and partners to work with
us on the challenge that it faces the
reason we’re seeing I think some of the
pushback you highlighted is because the
allies are saying to our government
you’re asking us to rip all this stuff
out of our systems and our governments
are with you but our business
communities may not necessarily be with
you so how about some evidence that’s
one issue and it’s very difficult
because there’s no one questions that
Huawei rips off technology there’s that
even admitted you know there’s a long a
long-standing issue there but it’s this
issue of how do you prove a negative in
terms of backdoors and those sort of
things and then I think the allies are
also sort of saying so we’re doing this
at your request where’s the skin in the
game for you your semiconductor
companies are making huge profits
selling to Huawei you say you’re going
to do an executive order banning
while way from sales so probably but you
don’t do it you know these are things so
it creates strains I think within the
Alliance in an era where our credibility
is arguably a little less than maybe
that’s what Victor I’m going to ask you
this next question to me the most
interesting thing that I learned reading
that article it was deep in the article
about our allies are rebelling against
us telling them not to do business with
lovely deep in this story I found an
interesting paragraph saying the
president has repeatedly undercut his
own Justice Department which laid out a
sweeping criminal indictment against
Huawei and its chief financial officer
and previously he had East penalties on
another Chinese telecom firm ZTE it also
said in that article that some in the
government and Michael Collins I won’t
ask you to comment on this but some of
the government are concerned that he
might try to put some of this into a
trade deal yeah yeah yeah well I mean
it’s a it’s a it’s a great point the you
know I think what this comes down to is
as my colleagues were describing it’s
questions like wow a & ZT that raises
this issue of sort of three choices that
we have with China with regard to this
you know one of them is and perhaps some
of our allies would prefer we do this
which is just to muddle through right
and basically say as Chris said you know
let’s just get them to buy more stuff
right reduce the trip merchandise trade
that just buy more stuff and just let’s
just muddle through right
you know what light hyzer what Michael
was talking about the second way is to
say is to really try to negotiate
meaningful agreements with China their
protect technology that prevent theft
that essentially regulate the behavior
so that the United States and China can
work together in the future which is
probably the hardest path
and then the third path is the one that
allies are rebelling against which is
this idea we just disconnect let’s just
disconnect from Jack
let’s rip out all the hardware let’s
just disconnect and in many ways that is
the most dramatic path that is the
choice we’re pushing on to allies
according to that article and in many
ways that’s the hardest one for the
Allies to do for all the reasons that
Chris Chris just mentioned and the other
challenge is we don’t make this stuff in
the USA we allowed a strategic industry
to disappear here we wouldn’t let that
happen in the aerospace industry for
example or in defense or these other
areas so there’s there are a few
alternatives its Ericsson and Huawei
primarily so without some sort of
coalition and there are thoughts about
how to do that and so on a lot of people
just don’t have any choices and then
Holi is cheap there’s that too which is
attractive especially to the developing
world I’d like to ask you all we just
had the summit in hanoi with kim jungeun
Margaret was there Victor knows a lot
about it what did China want to happen
there what what does China want this how
do they want this situation to be
resolved so so Margaret can comment on
if she was there I was covering it for
NBC not CB so I would say a couple of
things the first thing is the absence of
an agreement out of Hanoi was not
something that China wanted no China I
think wanted to see some sort of
agreement I think as we all know their
bottom line is stability on the Korean
Peninsula they do not want to see crises
like we saw in 2017 so they would have
liked to see some sort of agreement
emerge out of Hanoi I think all of us
were surprised that there wasn’t one I’m
sure Margaret I mean I I was quite
surprised that there wasn’t an agreement
and I’m kind of worried about the path
forward but I think the bottom line for
China is they would like to see some
sort of agreement that ensures there no
there’s not more testing by North Korea
that compels political crises for the
United States of course they would like
to see
some practical things done with regard
to the the North Korean nuclear test
site which sits on the Chinese border I
don’t feel that they are deeply vested
in denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula like like the United States
and its allies are but I think that
there are there probably as concerned as
the South Koreans are about the absence
of an agreement hanoi and where we go
from here South Korea it’s had a
tremendous impact on the government
there am I not correct by far the
biggest the the biggest losers at of my
where the South Koreans because they had
so much invested in this engagement with
North Korea they’re the ones that are
going to have to try to pick up the
diplomatic pieces there’s clearly a gap
between the United States and North
Korea on what is a potential deal of
sanctions for denuclearization and you
know it’s going to be the ball is
effectively in North Korea’s court but
anybody who’s negotiated with North
Korea knows that when we say the ball is
in North Korea’s court that means it’s
not going anywhere and it’ll basically
and so it’ll the South Koreans I think
are now going to try to work very hard
to try to find some sort of diplomatic
halfway point and I don’t think the
Chinese would mind if those troops left
any time soon which was something that
the president said when we sat for an
interview with him that you know was
something he’d never even thought about
but in the future he would like to bring
those troops home and it is quite costly
but we’re not talking about it right now
leaning into the idea of maybe it’s not
so crazy to float the concept so I’m
sure China was hoping for a different
conclusion on that particular issue of a
peace arrangement as well you know I
thought it was interesting we had it in
Vietnam in the first place as a summon I
know there was a lot of talk about that
as the setting as look at you know
country America was at war with now a
friend and when I go to Vietnam and have
with past secretaries of state the
emphasis is always like this is a
country so stuck between the US and
China all the time and pressure on both
sides that’s what I was thinking that
that almost was more of a fitting
parallel for the summit but I mean I
think China muddling through is always
what they kind of want they don’t want
conflict what’s interesting to me when I
talk to the administration officials now
about how this played out and I think
it’s very
clear that john bolton was happy with
his position sort of winning out in
terms of taking a harder line that they
as i believe he said publicly now and in
a few interviews floating this idea that
further sanctions are possible i think
that presumes that china is going to be
on board for those sanctions i don’t
know that they are but there’s this idea
that you could see china and the rest of
the international community tighten
things up around these like ship-to-ship
transfers like cheating around the edges
on some of the sanctions and more
pressure pressure on North Korea so
that’s really where I’m not clear where
China’s going to end up and on that
question if they’re going to continue to
help us play hardball they probably
won’t I mean I think that’s the
interesting piece in all this China
itself has been on a huge roller coaster
ride in their policy toward North Korea
during this process I think the scariest
thing that happened to them was the US
president who was willing to engage
directly with the North Koreans and I
think the their game was a stabilizing
long game initially I think probably to
their detriment that’s how they describe
it now they believed that when President
Trump said to them work hard on North
Korea with me and I’ll get this trade
stuff off your back you know and which I
said explicitly yeah on to John
Dickerson if they help us right here ok
they’ve tried pretty hard actually and
gummed up the border pretty well and
actually did more than I think most
people acknowledged but they now believe
that they over they overdid it in other
words they worked hard they didn’t get
anything on the trade front of fact they
got another two hundred billion dollars
in in tariffs and so now I think their
strategy is to micromanage the North
Koreans you know for summits with Kim
Dolan in months whereas in the previous
five years of Xi Jinping’s rule they had
not so I think the Chinese feel pretty
comfortable they’ve got him reasonably
under control and the rest of it just
kind of let it play Michael do you want
to hit three points on I think it’s in
the context of what broadly we see China
trying to achieve in Northeast Asia as
well as what they’re trying to avoid in
that process so clearly trying to
achieve weakening of the US security
influence and presence in East Asia and
all of our alliances in particularly
with South Korea clearly trying to be
more influential
hunt issues that matter in the region
for issues not necessarily specific to
the United States but to the region
itself and clearly trying to avoid
instability on their borders and in
particular a conflagration right on the
border in form of North Korea I think
it’s noteworthy comments have been made
there just to sharpen it a bit in terms
of what they didn’t want to see happen I
think in this process being certainly
returned to a major increase in the
temperature that could get into a
situation where things could unfold
markedly and and they would have the
crisis on the border second is a an
accelerated resolution of the issue
whereby the importance of that issue as
Chris is referring to that issue is
important to them strategically because
it is important to the United States so
therefore it gives them leverage with us
on various issues a rapid resolution of
that issue especially one with it within
which the United States certainly
remains you know a solid provider of
security on the peninsula thereby
undermining broadly with the Chinese
strategic they’re trying to achieve is
also something that is certainly not
there China is not eager to see and the
last but not on the on the on the troop
presence the yes I think it’s noteworthy
how the narrative in China on talking
about the removal of of troops from the
peninsula is certainly on their radar
it’s on their radar screen in terms of
things they want to avoid but I don’t
know if that’s necessarily the case and
the rest of the region are certainly on
the peninsula we haven’t talked about
the artificial islands that China’s been
building out there in the Pacific what
about that are they going to are they no
longer artificial are they and why I
think you’re still pretty hard official
they’re getting more artificial by the
day I mean I think that’s that’s the the
challenge you know the u.s. in my sense
missed the boat on this one you know we
had an opportunity in a Scarborough
Shoal incident in 2012 this was a
territory that was controlled by the
Philippines
the Chinese were making an effort there
there was an agreement that was brokered
diplomatically that they would use an
approaching typhoon as the excuse for
everybody just go home the Filipinos did
the Chinese didn’t and the important
part is there were no consequences for
that decision by the Chinese and that
set the stage then for that ambitious
building program that we saw afterward
China would have done most of what it’s
done down there I think anyway but they
would have done so over a much longer
time horizon than one to two years and
so I think we face a situation where
certainly we can do and the
administration is doing this and they
deserves credit for it you know more
aggressive operations and within the 12
nautical mile zone and so on but the
only way to undo it is something we
might term rollback with a nuclear power
so that’s a very challenging situation
and in effect do those islands mean
enough to us even in the context of the
commitments to our allies and so on and
so far we’re not seeming to suggest that
it does I want to get some questions
from the audience but while you’re
thinking of a question Alan is Margaret
what’s the latest news on Mike Pompeo is
he going to run for the Senate well
asking that question will get you a heck
of an answer a sharp one the Secretary
of State does not like being asked about
that but as we know he did talk to Mitch
McConnell about it he’s saying for the
moment he’s staying in the admit
administration I would not rule it out
in the future to see him run for office
there but do you want to go from being
fourth in line to the presidency to
junior senator from Kansas I don’t know
perhaps within the next few years but he
keeps saying on the record that he’s
staying for the moment I asked the
president about this during our
interview first he told me his fake news
then when I said that no the secretaries
actually said he talked to Mitch
McConnell about it he said well I asked
him and he said no he’s not leaving well
one reporter who asked him this question
said that he told them he was going to
let the Lord decide over the weekend so
I don’t have any sources there
I don’t know how to check that out what
are any of the rest of you hearing
anything along that line yeah Michael
you’re excused
he has spent a heck of a lot of time in
the American heartland for a Secretary
of State I will say that very recently
doing a lot of speeches in a way that
typically secretaries of state speak to
local media overseas the secretary and
the State Department explain that to say
this is part of the China policy talking
to farmers in Iowa this is part of
recruiting he has said to bring in more
people from the heartland instead of all
the elites who are running our
government he has said so those are the
official explanations for why he spent
so much time in Iowa recently well he’s
waiting for the weekend I mean who has a
question here how about right here yeah
it’s coming yes here it comes
and please identify yourself as well hi
my name is Angelita my question is so
Russia and China are actually after
global supremacy and they have learned
their economic lessons from the past
administrations but I think the silent
problem is the partnership actually
between Russia and China which which the
you the United States still has to
accept to learn how to make a long term
strategy how to deal with both and then
Mike my other question is which I want
your opinion please I mean it’s really
the domestic bickering in the United
States which takes time from shaping up
global foreign policies economically
politically militarily I mean it seems
to be the leverage of ship and Jing and
and Putin is that they have they have
centralized decisions and their
administration is quite long-term unlike
the United States where we are quite
dependent on host the political party in
line and then the lawmakers are
bickering about the political situation
and investigation all that so what do
you think is the best global
curity or how to deal long-term with
both Russia and China given your
expertise thank you I think that’s a
great thanks for the question
you know there’s I have to say this is
um as I said I don’t do a lot of these
venues a lot but the ones I have done
the majority of the time is spent on
Russia
mr. Commerce say you haven’t mentioned
Russia yet but thank you for bringing up
you know for all the rightful concerns
we have about Russia’s attempt to
undermine us standing around the world
continuing for all that they’re trying
to achieve for all the reasons we just
talked about China as a source of
concern we also have to think about
China’s a source of concern Russia is
more able to get away with being
assertive and coercive and meddling
because it can sort of count on if not
legally officially formally it can count
on sort of the backing of China who has
shared sort of mutual interests in
undermining the US
standing around the world vice versa
right China also doesn’t have to get its
hands dirty as much and the Russians get
their hands dirty by doing things around
the world meddling in the affairs of
other countries and not being as
concerned about getting caught doing so
right and and that also undermines you
know to the extent undermined us
standing a credibility that also
supports at the end were you know as I
say the influence the Chinese are trying
to acquire that’s that ’s that’s
noteworthy solidarity stepping back stop
solidarity with all of our partners and
friends and like-minded countries around
the globe
is the answer to a lot of these issues
the extent to which our partners Steve
stand behind us on the issues we stand
for and the extent our adversaries
actually see that as well
Chris’s point about the South China Sea
you know when we talk about an
adversaries threat to us three things
matter right intentions capability and
this third thing I call resolve that is
the ability to calculate over time what
did I learn to get away with right and
it’s in that in that reading of that
international arena if we’re successful
in moderating the behavior of not just
China but Russia what we do to achieve a
perception of resolve and pushback as
chris says was not there in the case
perhaps of the South China Sea
more effective the last point is Russia
and China they’re not allies
I think it’s noteworthy in all of this
when we talk about alliances around the
world what the United States stands for
and the principles we stand before how
that underpins mutual interests the
Russia China relationship is more of one
of sort of strategic solidarity and
convenience over mutual interests but I
wouldn’t go so far that to say that the
values that underpin what we know to
underpin the Alliance as we stand for
are necessarily there I think there’s an
important distinction to be made between
Russia and China’s efforts to achieve
hegemony versus Russia and China’s
efforts to undermine the u.s. order I
think a lot of their activities focused
on undermining the u.s. order but in
terms of achieving hegemony you know
usually the hegemony after they achieved
their power and influence actually
provide goods to the international
system because they want to maintain
their new order the concern is that
Russia and China whether their allies
are not are seeking to undermine us
hegemony and then really still take from
the system without giving anything back
the United States at the end of World
War two are going forward we took from
the international system but we also
gave back to the international system
you know there’s always this comparison
of China’s one belt one Road with the
Marshall Plan I mean one belt one road
and all these other activities by the
Chinese are it’s basically these are
loans are giving out right debt trap
diplomacy the Marshall Plan one grants
that the I that was that was money we
gave to Europe to help reconstruct
Europe so it’s a very different thing
that we’re talking about when we talk
about efforts to undermine American
hegemony in Russia and Chinese efforts
to achieve their own hegemony they’re
interested in undermining the US
influence but they’re actually not
interested in replacing the United
States which leaves us overall with a
much worse order than we could possibly
have today okay another question
how about toward the back
Warren Cowan Wilson Center
what about Taiwan yeah I have a didn’t
hear what about Taiwan oh yeah it’s a
good question that’s kind of a big topic
can you be a little more specific sure I
heard state boy the other day arguing
that we should be very careful to
protect the one China policy it’s not
screwing around with Taiwan
then I heard Cory Gardner and others on
the hill who have been arguing for
stronger ties with Taiwan to push
further for Taiwan’s independence where
do you see the pressure that Xi Jinping
and others are putting on Taiwan now and
the American response
sure okay thank you that’s much clearer
I’ll give it a shot you know I think a
lot has been made Xi Jinping made a
major speech and on Taiwan recently and
a lot has been made and of it especially
its content which seemed to suggest you
know let’s have her unification sooner
rather than later which was a sub-theme
of it there was definitely a sense of
urgency in that in that speech but a lot
of the language and content was actually
sort of old wine in new bottles you know
very similar to previous sub speeches
that had been done
two things I would just point out one
it’s very striking that the US
government through the Defense
Intelligence Agency this year decided
that they wanted to publish something in
an unclassified State that said
basically the Chinese military now
believes it can do that mission and win
so that is something that should give a
lot of us pause the second I think in
perhaps more fundamental is we see China
using a lot of the tactics of Russia to
influence Taiwan’s democracy and I think
that really is the bigger threat as
opposed to say a DJ style invasion
because it’s cheap it’s relatively
successful Taiwan’s domestic politics
can be quite polarized and we now see
even the ruling party is now about to
have a factional split between the
premier and the president over running
for president and so on and China will
be deeply involved in all
happened to be in Taiwan you know during
the run-up to their recent municipal
elections in November and a lot of this
what’s going on it’s a deep concern and
so I actually think in a lot of ways
that’s really that the larger threat has
to the role of the u.s. I think Taiwan
is learning a lot of lessons in this
process I you know certainly the phone
call with then president-elect Trump was
a huge win for Taiwan but they also then
got a lot of backlash from the mainland
which I suppose they should have seen
coming but it’s not not necessarily
clear they did and there is a risk I
think for Taiwan in some cases on this
of being in a position of sort of don’t
love us too much to the Americans right
because they are always the ones that
are sort of sort of caught in the middle
what I do think just to come back to
several comments mike has made in a way
is Xi Jinping style of governance is
making it easier shall we say for voices
to emerge to say we ought to be
supporting the democracy that’s Taiwan
not the CCP ideology driven you know
sort of socialist state so you can argue
that new forces are being unleashed in
that relationship which would then test
those who say no the one-child policy
was decided at the time of the forming
of relations and it cannot be violated
and the Spirit has to be managed very
strictly so it’s it’s very messy I think
for all three parties okay anybody over
on this side right here right here
deciding right here
a good evening I’m Jen Runyon currently
a graduate student at Georgetown given
the fact that China has recently issued
a polar strategy I was wondering your
thoughts on China’s aspirations as a
polar power you’d like to talk about ok
I’ll give a quick answer anyone else can
jump in they clearly have one and and
want to be involved in the issue and I
think there’s a sense this is another
area actually where the points that have
been made by all of us today about
alliances and the importance of
alliances you know the Nordic countries
are very worried about this they’re
seeking US assistance we are a polar
power I always have been and I think it
will be important for us to show some
leadership I think there’s certainly a
question as to whether some of the fear
of China’s ambition let’s say in this
area is slightly over rot so far they’re
talking a lot and not doing much but you
know we have situations where for
example they now have the largest fleet
I believe of icebreakers in the world
they have serious trade and economic
reasons for wanting to be involved up
there and I think in that aspect they do
seem to share the Russian philosophy of
look at all these minerals and economic
opportunity you know that’s it’s in
their say as opposed to environmental
protection in the in the Nordic area you
know things like that so again this is
an area where it’s kind of on low boil
but it’s getting getting stronger and
it’s an opportunity for the u.s. perhaps
to show leadership in managing the
process okay one more question let’s see
if we got anybody from over this area
how about right there
hi Julian Barnes from the New York Times
I was wondering if mr. Collins would
engage on the question of whether as the
panel brought up a possible ban on US
exports to not just Huawei but other
Chinese companies would that have any
effect on China’s ability to surveil
control their own society some of the
things that you pointed out in your
original comments that are concerning
about China’s rise is there any way for
the United States to hamper that sort of
ability to exercise social control over
their own people and furthermore could
that slow the rise of law way until a
Western competitor can catch up I think
it’s a great question the one of the
realities out there that is not openly
widely enough discussed it’s just how
dependent Chinese technology still is on
its access to the international arena
not just the United States but elsewhere
despite the idea that Huawei has owns
the you know the 5g system from start to
finish you know there’s there’s parts
and you know there’s dependencies they
still have on capabilities and access
they need from componentry from others
around the globe and that doesn’t apply
just 5g technologies the the priority
seating thing is putting on this 2025
this vision were China to be the leading
provider of these you know major
technologies around the world as much as
they aspire to achieve that that depends
heavily on access they still have to the
technology the expertise the data the
intellectual property they know they can
get elsewhere so I would just say
objectively there is a vulnerability in
terms of China’s ability to be dominant
in those technology spaces by the fact
that they still have to have access to
innovative capability not just
States but around the globe and I think
I would add to that because of that
dependency look at things like the
budding relationship between China and
Israel rather closely all right well on
that I know how to get off on time thank
you all for coming
[Music]
Collins, and fellow panelists, held a robust conversation on a broad range of issues impacting US-China relations and the international community, including how China’s domestic governance model has changed under President Xi Jinping’s leadership and how China leverages its economic growth and military strength to influence the international order. Collins was very clear about what the challenge is not. “The challenge is not necessarily coming from China’s rise alone, China’s economy alone, our relationship with China, Chinese people, and certainly [not] the Chinese diaspora around the world. To the contrary, those are all very positive forces for moderation, cooperation, and change, “he said.
Collins was joined on stage by Margaret Brennan, Moderator of “Face the Nation” and CBS News senior foreign correspondent; Victor Cha, CSIS Senior Adviser and Korea Chair; and Christopher K. Johnson, CSIS Senior Adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies.